Legal Document View

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

- Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc - ...
Upgrade to Premium
[Cites 18, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Sri Janardhan V vs Smt Uma Abhilash Iyer on 1 February, 2025

Author: H.P.Sandesh

Bench: H.P.Sandesh

                               1



       IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025

                          BEFORE

           THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH

          CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.58/2016
                           C/W.
          CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.438/2020

IN CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.58/2016:

BETWEEN:

1.     UMA ABHILASHA IYER
       D/O LATE N.S.ANANTHA IYER
       AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
       RESIDING AT NO.A-101,
       PURVA HEIGHTS, BILEKAHALLI,
       BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
       BANGALORE-560 076.                 ... PETITIONER

            (BY SRI. KASHYAP N. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:

1.     V. JANARDHAN
       SON OF VENKATESH
       MAJOR,
       RESIDING AT NO.10,
       GOVINDASHETTY PALYA,
       ELECTRONIC CITY POST,
       BANGALORE-560100.                  ... RESPONDENT

            (BY SRI. M.D.BASAVANNA, ADVOCATE)
                               2




     THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 397 R/W 401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE AND
MODIFY THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE DATED
12.03.2014 PASSED BY THE XXII ADDITIONAL CHIEF
METROPOLITON      MAGISTRATE,   BANGALORE     CITY  IN
C.C.NO.12697/2009, TO THE EXTENCE OF QUANTUM OF
COMPENSATION     GRANTED    TO   THE  PETITIONER   AND
ACCORDINGLY SENTENCE THE ACCUSED TO PAY A SUN OF
RS.30,00,000/- (RUPEES THIRTY LAKS ONLY), BEING DOUBLE
THE CHEQUE AMOUNT, APART FROM THE FINE AMOUNT OF
RS.5,000/- (RUPEES FIVE THOUSAND ONLY) TO BE PAID TO
THE STATE EXCHEQUER.

IN CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.438/2020:

BETWEEN:

1.     SRI. JANARDHAN V,
       S/O VENKATESH,
       AGED ABOUT 49Y EARS,
       NO.10, G.S.PALYA,
       ELECTRONIC CITY,
       BANGALORE-560100.                  ... PETITIONER

            (BY SRI. M.D.BASAVANNA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     SMT. UMA ABHILASH IYER
       D/O LATE N.C.ANANTHA IYER,
       RESIDING AT NO.A-101,
       PURVA HEIGHTS, BILEKAHALLI,
       BANNERGATTA ROAD,
       BANGALORE-560076.                  ... RESPONDENT

            (BY SRI. KASHYAP N. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
                                      3



     THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 397 R/W 401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE DATED 12.03.2014 IN
C.C.NO.12697/2009 PASSED BY THE HONBLE XXII ADDITIONAL
CHIEF METROPOLITON MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU CITY AND
IMPUGNED    ORDER    DATED    01.10.2015   PASSED     IN
CRL.A.NO.359/2014 PASSED BY LXVIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH-69).

     THESE CRIMINAL REVISION PETITIONS HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 20.01.2025 THIS DAY,
THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM:        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH

                               CAV ORDER

        Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned

counsel for the respondent.


        2.     The   parties   are   referred         to    in   the   name   of

complainant and accused for the sake of brevity and convenience

of the Court.


        3.     Crl.R.P.No.58/2016        is   filed    by    the   complainant

praying to set aside and modify the order of conviction and

sentence dated 12.03.2014 on the file of the XIII Additional

Chief        Metropolitan      Magistrate,        Bengaluru            City   in

C.C.No.12697/2009. Crl.R.P.No.438/2020 is filed by the accused
                                   4



against     the   judgment   of   the   First   Appellate   Court   in

Crl.A.No.359/2014 dated 01.10.2015 on the file of LXVIII

Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH-

69) contending that criminal appeal is not maintainable and that

only revision petition is maintainable.


       4.     The complainant filed the complaint under Section

200 of Cr.P.C. alleging that the accused person has committed

an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act stating that

the accused being a vendor of immovable property bearing Site

No.134, new Khatha No.2/1, old Khatha No.14/4 situated at

Doddanagamangala Village, Begur Hobli, Bengalore South Taluk,

coming under the jurisdiction of Konnappana Agrahara Village

Panchayath and measuring East to West 44 feet and North to

South 90.09 inches, in all measuring a total extent of 3,993

sq.ft., the complainant and accused had entered into a sale

agreement in respect of the said immovable property for a total

sale   consideration   of Rs.40    lakhs   dated 07.01.2008. The

complainant had paid a sum of Rs.10 lakhs, the accused had

acknowledged the same. In view of the above said transaction,
                                     5



the complainant further paid a sum of Rs.5 lakhs on 14.02.2008

for   which   the   accused   had       acknowledged   the    same   on

16.06.2008. The accused received a sum of Rs.5 lakhs towards

part sale consideration, then complainant had paid totally a sum

of Rs.20 lakhs. It is the further case of the complainant that

accused had issued a legal notice to the complainant on

08.06.2008. After receipt of the said notice, the complainant

suitably replied through her advocate on 14.06.2008 for the

above said reasons and transaction, the complainant and

accused came into mutual understanding, the accused agreed to

return the above said part sale consideration for a sum of Rs.15

lakhs received from the complainant. For the above said liability

on the demand, the accused had issued Cheque in favour of

complainant for a sum of Rs.15 lakhs dated 10.02.2009 and

when the same was presented, it was dishonoured.              Again the

accused requested to represent the same, accordingly, the same

was represented, once again it was dishonoured.              Hence, got

issued the legal notice on 24.03.2009 through her advocate by

RPAD and UCP and the postal receipt produced, the postal

acknowledgement has not been received through legal notice,
                                 6



the complainant had demanded to pay the said Cheque amount.

The accused on receipt of the said legal notice, gave reply notice

through his advocate on 07.04.2009 simply denying the liability.

Hence, complaint was filed and the Trial Court taken cognizance

and registered criminal case against the accused for the offence

punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act.


      5.    In support of the case of the complainant, she

examined herself as P.W.1 and got marked the documents as

Exs.P1 to P12. On the other hand, the statement of the accused

was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and he also led

evidence and examined himself as D.W.1 and got marked the

documents as Exs.D1 to D4.


      6.    The Trial Court having considered the material on

record, convicted the accused for the offence punishable under

Section 138 of N.I. Act and directed to pay a fine of

Rs.15,05,000/-. Out of the same, Rs.5,000/- is payable to the

State. In default of payment of fine, the accused to undergo

simple imprisonment for a period of six months. Being aggrieved

by the order of the Trial Court, both the complainant and the
                                 7



accused have filed Criminal appeals before the City Civil Court

and Sessions Judge. The appeal filed by the accused is

numbered as Crl.A.No.359/2014, wherein prayed the First

Appellate Court to set aside the conviction and sentence and the

appeal     filed   by   the   complainant     is   numbered     as

Crl.A.No.687/2014, wherein prayed the Court to modify the

judgment and enhance the compensation. The First Appellate

Court having reassessed the material on record, dismissed the

appeal filed by the accused and also dismissed the appeal filed

by the complainant stating that the same is not maintainable,

but given liberty to prefer an appeal before the competent Court.

Hence, the complainant has filed Crl.R.P.No.58/2016.


      7.     The main contention of the learned counsel for the

complainant in Crl.R.P.No.58/2016 is that no dispute with regard

to issuance and dishonour of Cheque and also there is no dispute

with regard to issuance of Cheque Ex.P1 for repayment of Rs.15

lakhs. The counsel would contend that more than 5 years have

been elapsed by the time when the Trial Court passed an order

and failed to take note of the fact that inspite of this gap, not a
                                  8



single   paisa   more   is   awarded   as   compensation   to   the

complainant on the principal Cheque amount of Rs.15 lakhs. The

transaction being a commercial transaction between the parties,

the Trial Court ought to have awarded the compensation amount

by calculating the interest minimum at 18% per annum on Rs.15

lakhs besides awarding damages.         It is contended that the

leaned trial Judge failed to notice the unrighteous conduct of the

accused throughout the proceedings in the Trial Court and

therefore, he ought to have imposed a maximum imprisonment

of 2 years, in the event of default of payment of compensation

amount within 30 days. It is further contended that the object of

introducing Section 138 to the Act is only to encourage

commercial transactions and not to discourage and punish such

fraudulent persons, who issue Cheques with a dishonest motive.

It is contended that the order passed by the Trial Court is

erroneous and when the appeal was filed under Section 372

Cr.P.C. against the impugned judgment and sentence, the

appeal was dismissed with liberty to prefer an appeal before the

competent Court.     Hence, the present revision petition is filed

before this Court.
                                    9



      8.    In Crl.R.P.No.438/2020 filed by the accused, it is

contended that the Trial Court committed an error in convicting

the accused and both the Courts failed to consider the material

available on record and the Cheque is not issued towards legally

enforceable debt.     It is contended that Cheque was issued on

threat and coercion and one Mico Manju @ Payasa came to him

along with other 10 persons and taken him to Lakkasandra to

the house of one Corporator.        The said Mico Manju and other

persons assaulted him and taken him forcibly to the house of the

Corporator and obtained the Cheque.        It is contended that he

has repaid the earnest money to the respondent and even then,

the respondent has not returned the Cheque to him and clearly

set out the defence throughout in the cross-examination and

also in the evidence, when he was examined as D.W.1 and both

the Courts failed to take note of said fact into consideration and

committed an error in convicting and sentencing the accused.

Hence, it requires interference.


      9.    Learned    counsel     appearing   for   the   accused   in

Crl.R.P.No.438/2020 in his argument would vehemently contend
                                    10



that the Trial Court failed to consider Ex.D4, cancellation of sale

agreement.     It is also not in dispute that earlier there was an

agreement between both of them.               Learned counsel would

vehemently contend that signature and contents of Ex.P1-

Cheque not belongs to the accused. Learned counsel would

further contend that matter is civil in nature and through the

rowdy elements, Cheque was obtained and the same was

misused. The answered elicited during the course of cross-

examination of P.W.1 shows that there was no any transaction.

Learned counsel would vehemently contend that Sessions Court

rightly dismissed the appeal filed by the complainant and

revision filed by the complainant is not maintainable for

enhancement.       Hence, allow the revision petition filed by the

accused     and    dismiss   the   revision   petition   filed   by   the

complainant.


      10.    Per      contra,      learned     counsel       for      the

respondent/complainant would contend that issuance of Cheque

is not disputed and execution of agreement and cancellation of

the same is also not in dispute. When the agreement was
                                 11



cancelled, Cheque was given and when the said Cheque was

presented, it was dishonoured. The counsel would vehemently

contend that the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court

rightly considered the evidence available on record and convicted

the accused. However, learned counsel would contend that the

First Appellate Court committed an error in coming to the

conclusion that the appeal is not maintainable. Though the

counsel would contend that Cheque was obtained under coercion

and force, no complaint was given and the same is not admitted

and the defence is not proved. Learned counsel would contend

that payment was made in the year 2009 and double the amount

was not awarded.       Hence, the appeal was filed and now the

revision petition is filed.


      11.    Learned counsel for the respondent/complainant in

support of his argument, relied upon the judgment in R.

VIJAYAN VS. BABY AND ANOTHER reported in (2012) 1 SCC

260 and brought to notice of this Court paragraph Nos.17 and

18, wherein discussion was made with regard to invoking Section

357(1)(b) of the Code and the provision for compounding the
                                 12



offences under Section 38 of the Act. Even where the offence is

not   compounded,    the   Courts    tend   to   direct   payment   of

compensation equal to the Cheque amount (or even something

more towards interest) by levying a fine commensurate with the

Cheque amount. A stage has reached when most of the

complainants, in particular the financing institutions (particularly

private financiers) view the proceedings under Section 138 of

the Act, as a proceeding for the recovery of the Cheque amount,

the punishment of the drawer of the Cheque for the offence of

dishonour, becoming secondary. Learned counsel also brought to

notice of this Court discussion made in paragraph No.18,

wherein it is observed that in those cases where the discretion to

direct payment of compensation is not exercised, it causes

considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably, by the

time the criminal case is decided, the limitation for filing civil

cases would have expired. As the provisions of Chapter XVII of

the Act strongly lean towards grant of reimbursement of the loss

by way of compensation, the Courts should, unless there are

special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly

exercise the power to levy fine up to twice the Cheque amount
                                 13



(keeping in view the Cheque amount and the simple interest

thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss)

and direct payment of such amount as compensation.


      12.   The counsel also relied upon the judgment in P.

SURESH KUMAR VS. R. SHANKAR reported in (2007) 4 SCC

752 and brought to notice of this Court paragraph Nos.13 to 18,

wherein discussion was made with regard to Section 138 and

also Section 29(2) Cr.P.C. and so also Section 357 Cr.P.C. that

consideration   for   payment   of   compensation   is   somewhat

different from payment of fine. The counsel also brought to

notice of this Court paragraph No.18, wherein it is discussed that

purpose of imposition of fine and/or compensation, however,

must be considered having regard to the relevant factors in mind

as envisaged under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. Learned counsel referring these two judgments would

contend that this Court has to allow the revision petition and

enhance the fine amount and sentence, in case of default.


      13.   In reply to this argument, learned counsel appearing

for the accused would contend that Cheque is disputed and no
                                     14



such special circumstances to enhance the compensation.             In

reply to this argument of the learned counsel for the accused,

learned counsel for the complainant would contend that in the

reply notice itself the accused admitted the cheque and now

cannot dispute the same.


      14.     Having heard learned counsel for the complainant

and learned counsel for the accused and also having considered

the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, the

points that would arise for consideration of this Court are:

      (i)     Whether the complainant has made out a
              ground   to   allow    Crl.R.P.No.58/2016     for
              enhancement of compensation?

      (ii)    Whether the accused has made out a ground
              to set aside the order of conviction and
              sentence as prayed in Crl.R.P.No.438/2020?

      (iii)   What order?


Point Nos.(i) and (ii)

      15.     Having   heard   respective   counsel   and   also   the

material available on record i.e., both oral and documentary, it is

the specific case of the complainant that there was an
                                15



agreement and the same was subsequently cancelled. It is the

contention of the complainant that earnest money which was

paid under the agreement was repaid by way of issuance of

Cheque at Ex.P1 and the same was dishonoured. It is also not in

dispute that after dishonour of the Cheque, notice was issued

and reply was given in terms of Ex.P9. Having perused the reply

also, the accused admitted the issuance of subject matter of

Cheque and also admitted receipt of Rs.20 lakhs as earnest

money which was given towards sale consideration. It has to be

noted that, in the reply notice at paragraph No.1, the accused

admitted and acknowledged receipt of an amount of Rs.20 lakhs.

In paragraph No.2, admitted that he paid back the entire

amount and there is no due from his end. However, admits that

Cheque was issued at the time of executing the cancellation of

sale deed on 20th day of November, 2008 and the same was

incorporated therein in the cancellation of sale agreement.

Having taken note of this admission in the reply notice as well as

evidence available on record, there is a clear admission with

regard to issuance of Cheque and the same is towards earnest

money which has been received under the sale agreement.
                                16



Though it is contended that signature and contents of Ex.P1-

Cheque not belongs to him, but admission takes away the case

of the accused.


     16.   The other contention of the complainant is that by

bringing the rowdy elements, Cheque was collected by one Mico

Manju and he threatened, assaulted and taken him to Corporator

and the Cheque which was obtained forcibly was misused. But,

admittedly, answer is elicited from D.W.1 that he has not given

any complaint for taking the Cheque by force and misusing the

same.   The defence was not proved though it was contended

that it was taken forcibly by rowdy elements. It is admitted that

Cheque was given towards cancellation of sale agreement for

return of the earnest money. Hence, the very contention of the

learned counsel for the accused that the material has not been

appreciated by both the Courts in a proper perspective cannot be

accepted. Having read the entire evidence of P.W.1 and also

D.W.1, there is a clear admission on the part of the accused that

subject matter of Cheque was issued towards cancellation of

agreement and return of earnest money and the contention that
                                  17



matter is civil in nature cannot be accepted, once the issuance of

Cheque has been admitted. Hence, I do not find any ground to

interfere with the order of conviction and sentence.


      17.     Now the question before this Court is with regard to

enhancement of sentence is concerned. Admittedly, an appeal is

filed before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate

Court taking note of the material available on record, discussed

in detailed whether the appeal is maintainable and the First

Appellate      Court,    while    answering      point   No.1    in

Crl.A.No.687/2014 filed by the complainant, taken note of the

grounds urged in the appeal and discussed with regard to

Section 372 Cr.P.C. in view of amendment.          The amendment

also says "the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal

against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or

convicting     for   lesser   offence    or   imposing   inadequate

compensation, as such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an

appeal ordinary lies against the order of conviction of such

Court".     Referring this Section, learned counsel would contend

that the appeal is maintainable.        The same is objected by the
                                 18



learned counsel for the respondent placing the order passed by

this Court in Crl.P.No.6072/2014 dated 24.02.2015, wherein the

short point had arisen for consideration before this Court

whether appeal can be maintained against the judgment of

acquittal for offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act,

before the jurisdictional Sessions Court under proviso to Section

372 Cr.P.C. The First Appellate Court also taken note of

reasoning given by this Court that a person under the complaint

U/s. 138 of N.I. Act cannot be termed as 'Victim' defined U/s.

2(wa) Cr.P.C. This Court also taken note of proviso to Section

142 N.I. Act.   The First Appellate Court having considered the

same, in paragraph No.36, comes to the conclusion that the

word 'Complaint' under proviso to Section 142 of N.I. Act and

the 'victim' U/s. 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. are not one and the same.

Hence, comes to the conclusion that appeal filed under proviso

to Section 372 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. In the case on hand

also, the complainant has preferred the appeal for inadequate

compensation awarded as per the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C.

Hence, the appeal is not maintainable. However, while passing

the order, the First Appellate Court has given liberty to prefer an
                                  19



appeal before the competent Court.       Learned counsel referring

the same would contend that in view of the said observation, the

present revision petition is filed before this Court, since the First

Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the appeal is not

maintainable.


      18.     Having considered the grounds urged in the petition,

it is not in dispute that an amendment was brought into Section

372 Cr.P.C. and the word used in Section 372 Cr.P.C. is that the

victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order

passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for

lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, as such

appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinary lies

against the order of conviction of such Court.            It is also

important to note that under Section 374 Cr.P.C., 'Appeals from

convictions', an appeal lies to the First Appellate Court as against

the conviction and proviso of Section 377 Cr.P.C. is 'Appeal by

the State Government against sentence'. The appeal provision is

also made under Section 378 Cr.P.C. i.e., 'Appeal in case of

acquittal'.
                                20



      19.    Now the question before this Court is what is the

remedy to the complainant, if the complaint is filed under

Section 200 invoking Section 138 of N.I. Act and provision is

only made to the State to file an appeal against the sentence.

No doubt, Section 372 Cr.P.C. is also very clear that victim shall

have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the

Court acquitting the accused or convicting for lesser offence or

imposing inadequate compensation, the Court has to take note

of the revisional provision to file the revision before the High

Court under Section 401 Cr.P.C. and also revisional powers of

District and Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C.


      20.    Having read the powers enshrined under Section 401

Cr.P.C., this Court would like to extract the same, which reads as

hereunder:

      "401. High Court's powers of revision.--(1) In
      the case of any proceeding the record of which has
      been called for by itself or which otherwise comes
      to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its
      discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on
      a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390 and
      391 or on a Court of Session by section 307, and,
                           21



when the Judges composing the Court of Revision
are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be
disposed of in the manner provided by section 392.


      (2) No order under this section shall be made
to the prejudice of the accused or other person
unless he has had an opportunity of being heard
either personally or by pleader in his own defence.


      (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed
to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of
acquittal into one conviction.


      (4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and
no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of
revision shall be entertained at the instance of the
party who could have appealed.


      (5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but
an application for revision has been made to the
High Court by any person and the High Court is
satisfied that such application was made under the
erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and
that it is necessary in the interests of Justice so to
do, the High Court may treat the application for
revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the
same accordingly".
                                      22



     21.     This Court would like to rely upon Section 397 of

Cr.P.C which reads as follows:

       "Section 397 - Calling for records to exercise
     powers of revision
           1. The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for
              and examine the record of any proceeding before
              any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his
              local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself
              or himself as to the correctness, legality or
              propriety   of   any   finding,   sentence   or order,
              recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
              proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when
              calling for such record, direct that the execution of
              any sentence or order be suspended, and if the
              accused is in confinement, that he be released on
              bail or on his own bond pending the examination
              of the record.

     Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive or
     Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate
     jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions
     Judge for the purposes of this Sub-Section and of section
     398.

           2. The powers of revision conferred by Sub-Section
              (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
              interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry,
              trial or other proceeding.
                                     23


            3. If an application under this section has been made
                by any person either to the High Court or to the
                Sessions Judge, no further application by the same
                person shall be entertained by the other of them."




      22.       Having read the proviso of Section 401 of Cr.P.C, it

is clear that the High Court has got power to exercise revisional

jurisdiction.     The proviso of sub-section (4) of Section 401 of

Cr.P.C is very clear that where under this Code, an appeal lies

and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall

be entertained at the instance of the party who could have

appealed and the proviso of sub-section (5) of Section 401 of

Cr.P.C is clear that where under this Code an appeal lies but an

application for revision has been made to the High Court by any

person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was

made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and

that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High

Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of

appeal and deal with the same accordingly.
                                  24



      23.   The other provision of sub-section (1) of Section 397

of Cr.P.C is very clear that the High Court or any Sessions Judge

may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before

any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local

jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or

order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any

proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for

such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order

be suspended and sub-section (3) of Section 397 of Cr.P.C is

very clear that if any application under this section has been

made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions

Judge, no further application by the same person shall be

entertained by the other of them. Having read Section 397 of

Cr.P.C, it is clear that both the High Court or any Sessions Judge

can exercise the power under Section 397 of Cr.P.C and powers

are vest with both the High Court and Sessions Court.


      24.   In the case on hand it has to be noted that an appeal

was field before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate
                                 25



Court comes to the conclusion that appeal not lies but again

instead of giving liberty to file revision, it is mentioned that

appeal can be filed hence, it appears that the same is a mistake.

In the present revision petition, the counsel for the petitioner

invoked both Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C.

Having taken note of the revisional jurisdiction, this Court has to

examine the material available on record.


      25.    Now, the question before this Court is that whether

this Court can enhance the sentence. Admittedly, the Trial Court

while convicting the accused, ordered to pay an amount of

Rs.15,05,000/- and out of that amount, Rs.5,000/- is ordered to

be paid to the State and remaining amount of Rs.15,00,000/- is

ordered to be paid to the complainant as compensation. It is

important to note that the case of the complainant is that

accused is liable to pay an amount of Rs.15,00,000/- and hence,

he issued the Cheque and the same was dishonoured with an

endorsement 'funds insufficient' but the Trial Court only the

Cheque amount is ordered to pay to the complainant and hence,

filed this revision petition.
                                26



      26.   This Court in the judgment reported in ILR 2000

KAR 2588 in the case of B HARIKRISHNA vs MACRO LINKS

PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER held that inadequacy of sentence of

fine, the Courts must take in to consideration all aspects of the

case including financial loss caused and in this judgment detail

discussion was made and referred the two provisions of the N.I.

Act i.e., Sections 30 and 117 of N.I. Act. Under Section 30, the

drawer of a cheque is bound, in case of dishonour by the drawee

or acceptor thereof, to compensate the holder, provided due

notice of dishonour has been given to, or received by, the

drawer as provided under the NI Act.     Section 117 prescribes

rules as to compensation payable in case of dishonour of

promissory note, bill of exchange or Cheque, by any party liable

to the holder or any indorsee. To determine the compensation

the rules are:

      (a)   The holder is entitled to the amount due under
            the instrument together with the expenses
            properly incurred in presenting, noting an
            protesting it;
                           27



(b)   When the person charged resides at a place
      different from that at which the instrument
      was payable, the holder is entitled to receive
      such sum at the current rate of exchange
      between the two places;


(c)   An indorser who, being liable, has paid the
      amount due on the same is entitled to the
      amount so paid with interest at (eighteen per
      centum)   per   annum     form   the   date   of
      payment until tender or realization thereof,
      together with all expenses caused by the
      dishonour and payment;


(d)   When the person charged and such indorser
      resides at different places, the indorser is
      entitled to receive such sum at the current
      rate of exchange between the two places;


(e)   The party entitled to compensation may draw
      a bill upon the party liable to compensate him,
      payable at sight or on demand, for the
      amount due to him, together with all expenses
      properly incurred by him.    Such bill must be
      accompanied by the instrument dishonoured
      and he protest thereof (if any). If such bill is
      dishonoured, the party dishonouring the same
                                28



           is liable to make compensation thereof in the
           same manner as in the case of the original
           bill.


     27.   This Court having considered Section 117 of N.I. Act

referred above, comes to the conclusion that said provision is

clear that the drawer of a Cheque, is bound in case of dishonour

of the Cheque, to compensate the holder in accordance with the

rule under Section 117 at least to the tune of Cheque amount

and expenses or costs.      Taking note of the said fact into

consideration and also the aim and objects of N.I. Act especially

Chapter XVII thereof, held that sentence of fine, if imposed,

ought to be the minimum equivalent to the amount of the

Cheque and proportionate costs incurred by the payee or holder

in due course with outer limit of twice the Cheque amount.


     28.   The Court also taken note of the judgment of the

Apex Court in the case of BHASKARAN vs SHANKARAN

VAIDHYAN BALAN AND ANOTHER reported in VIII (1999)

SLT 147 and in terms of the dictum it is held that Magistrate

cannot impose a fine exceeding Rs.5,000/- and the Apex Court
                                 29



held that impugned fine imposed in that case was by the

Magistrate First Class and also discussed with regard to Section

29 of Cr.P.C and clarified that though the power and jurisdiction

of imposing fine is limited to Rs.5,000/-, it is open for the

Magistrate   to   resort to   Section 357   Cr.P.C   for   awarding

compensation even exceeding Rs.5,000/- if the trial is before the

Court of the Magistrate First Class and hence, it is held that

necessity of awarding compensation in the cases coming under

Chapter XVII of the NI Act. Taking into note of the discussions

made by the Court, it is held that revision petition succeeds and

the fine imposed is modified and enhanced from Rs.10,000/- to

Rs.31,500/- with default clause to undergo simple imprisonment

for four months in case of non-payment of fine.


     29.     This Court also would like to rely upon the judgment

of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar

pronounced on 22.11.2021 in CRN(M) No.21&22/2020 in a

similar set of facts and circumstances, a detail discussion was

made to the scope of revision as well as Section 357 of Cr.P.C

and also discussed in detail the judgment of the Apex Court in
                                     30



the case of BIR SINGH vs MUKESH KUMAR reported in

(2019) 4 SCC 197 and the case of R VIJAYAN vs BABY AND

ANOTHER reported in (2012) 1 SCC 260 which is referred by

the petitioner's counsel and allowed the revision petition and

remanded the matter to the Trial Court for considering the

imposition   of    sentence   upon       the   respondent     making     an

observation that the Trial Court has miserably failed to take all

these aspects into consideration and has awarded Rs.2.00 lac, to

be paid as compensation to the complainant, when admittedly

the Cheque amount was to the tune of Rs.10.00 lacks.


      30.    This Court also in the judgment reported in 2004

SCC   ONLINE       KAR    219      in    the   case   of   NAGARAJ       vs

GOWRAMMA discussed regarding maintainability of the revision

petition before Sessions judge for enhancement of sentence and

held maintainable.


      31.    I    have   already    pointed     out    that   revision   is

maintainable under Section 397 of Cr.P.C and either the High

Court or Sessions Court can exercise the jurisdiction.             In the

case on hand also though appeal was dismissed, under the
                                31



provisions of Section 397 of Cr.P.C, the High Court can exercise

its revisional jurisdiction.


      32.    The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied

upon the case of R. VIJAYAN referred supra wherein in

paragraph 17, the scope of Section 357 of Cr.P.C is discussed in

detail and in paragraph 18 it is held that where the discretion to

direct payment of compensation is not exercised, it causes

considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably, by the

time the criminal case is decided, the limitation for filing civil

cases would have expired. The Courts should, unless there are

special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly

exercise the power to levy fine up to twice the Cheque amount

(keeping in view the Cheque amount and the simple interest

thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss)

and direct payment of such amount as compensation.


      33.    The factual aspects of the case is that when the

amount of Rs.20 lakh was taken and admitted and Cheque was

issued for refund of amount of Rs.15 lakh and the same was

bounced, the Trial Court has not exercised its discretion instead
                                  32



of that only ordered to pay the Cheque amount and fails to take

note of Section 117 of N.I. Act. Even, the Apex Court in the case

of R VIJAYAN referred supra held that at least simple interest

thereon at 9%      per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss

would have been considered. In the case on hand also it has to

be noted that transaction was taken place in the year 2008 for

sale consideration of Rs.40 lakh and sale did not come through,

the fact that the accused received a sum of Rs.5 lakh towards

part sale consideration and also complainant had paid totally a

sum   of   Rs.20   lakh   agreeing    to   pay   the   remaining   sale

consideration after getting the original documents. The fact that

notice was issued and when, transaction did not come through,

agreed to refund the amount of Rs.15 lakh on demand. The fact

that the Cheque was dishonoured is also not in dispute.            Such

being the case, when the amount was paid long back i.e., in the

year 2008, the Trial Court ought to have been taken note of the

said fact into consideration. Hence, it is a fit case to exercise the

revisional jurisdiction to compensate the complainant for the

amount he has paid since no dispute with regard to the payment

of said amount is concerned. If any order is passed, though it is
                                 33



a case for awarding the double the amount of Cheque taking into

note of the factual aspects of the case, it is appropriate to allow

the revision petition in part filed by the complainant and enhance

the compensation.    Hence, I answer point No.1 as affirmative

and point No.2 as negative.


Point No.3:

      34.    In view of the discussions made above, I pass the

following:

                              ORDER

The criminal revision petition filed by the complainant in Crl.R.P.No.58/2016 is allowed and ordered to pay the compensation of Rs.22,10,000/- and out of the said amount, ordered to pay an amount of Rs.22,00,000/- to the complainant and an amount of Rs.10,000/- shall vest with the State.

The criminal revision petition filed by the accused in Crl.R.P.No.438/2020 is dismissed.

Sd/-

(H.P. SANDESH) JUDGE ST/SN