Bombay High Court
Mont Blanc Properties And Industries ... vs Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal And Ors. on 22 June, 1998
Equivalent citations: [1999]240ITR154(BOM)
Author: A.Y. Sakhare
Bench: A.Y. Sakhare
JUDGMENT
1. By this writ petition, the petitioners seek to challenge the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench "E", Bombay ("the Tribunal"), dated March 16, 1996, by which, the Tribunal rejected the miscellaneous application of the petitioners praying for recalling the order passed in one miscellaneous application filed by the petitioner earlier for rectification of the order of the Tribunal dated April 28, 1994.
2. We have heard Mr. Dastur, learned counsel for the petitioners. The uncontroverted factual position in this case is that the appeal of the petitioners was decided by the Tribunal by order dated April 28, 1994. Against the said order, the petitioners filed application for reference under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the "Act"), before the Tribunal. That was also rejected by the Tribunal by order dated January 29, 1996. Further application of the petitioners under Section 256(2) of the Act was also rejected by this court on October 10, 1996. The petitioners filed special leave petition before the Supreme Court against the order of this court rejecting the application under Section 256(2) of the Act. That too was rejected by the Supreme Court on July 23, 1997. The order of the Tribunal dated April 28, 1994, thus, attained finality.
3. It appears that the petitioners also took out some miscellaneous application for rectification of the very same order of the Tribunal dated April 28, 1994. Those applications were rejected by the Tribunal by its order dated August 11, 1994. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioners filed an application for reference under Section 256(1) of the Act seeking reference of a question "whether the Tribunal was justified in not making the order setting aside the ex parte order dated August 11, 1995 ?". This reference application was also rejected by the Tribunal. No further application was filed under Section 256(2) of the Act to this court. Thus, the order dated August 11, 1994, refusing to recall the order also attained finality. The petitioners now seek to challenge the very same order by this writ petition.
4. It is clear from the facts above that this writ petition is misconceived. The challenge to the order of the Tribunal having been turned down by the Supreme Court by the rejection of the special leave petition, that order has become final. Despite that, the petitioners tried to get that very order set aside by the Tribunal by taking out another round of litigation before the Tribunal by filing miscellaneous petitions. That attempt also was foiled by the Tribunal by rejecting the applications and also the reference application taken out by the petitioners against the same. The petitioners did not proceed further in the matter and, in our opinion, rightly so. By this writ petition, the petitioners now seek to have a third round to get the order of the Tribunal set aside which has attained finality by rejection of special leave petition by the Supreme Court and that too, after two and half years of the order of the Tribunal on the miscellaneous application and rejection of the reference application against the same by the Tribunal. This application, in our opinion, is totally misconceived and gross misuse of the process of the court.
5. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed at the admission stage itself.