Kerala High Court
Lakshmikutty vs Mohandas And Anr. on 28 July, 1989
Equivalent citations: AIR1990KER78, AIR 1990 KERALA 78, 1989 (2) KER LJ 512 (1989) 2 KER LT 539, (1989) 2 KER LT 539
ORDER
1. This revision arises under the Indian Lunacy Act. Indira Devi-- the daughter of the revision petitioner is said to be a lunatic. Respondents herein filed an application invoking the power of the court under Section 62 of the Indian Lunacy Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', for directing an inquisition for the purpose of ascertaining whether Indira Devi is of unsound mind and incapable of managing herself and her affairs.
2. Respondents-petitioners before the lower court claimed that they are consanguine brothers of the alleged lunatic. They further claimed that the mother of the lunatic is not taking proper care of the lunatic and her properties and that her interest is adverse to the alleged lunatic. Besides they say that certain properties belonging to the lunatic are being sold away to the second respondent in the petition before the lower court. In these circumstances, the respondents wanted the court to appoint the respondents, or one of the respondents or a proper person, for the custody of the said lunatic for her better maintenance and protection of her properties.
3. Admittedly, Indira Devi is the daughter of deceased Murukan. Petitioners (here the respondents) claim that they are also children of Murukan in his second wife. They claim that they are relatives of Indira Devi and as such they are entitled to maintain the petition.
4. Section 63 of the Act enjoins that certain persons alone can maintain a petition for action invoking Section62 of the Act. The persons who have got the right to file an application under Section62 are enumerated in Section 63. In the class of persons enumerated under Section 63, a relative is also included. The revision petitioner in her objection filed before the court below disputed the status of the petitioners as relatives of Indira Devi. Despite such a vital controversy was raised in the objection, which goes to the very case of entertainability of the petition by the court, the court below directed the production of Indira Devi before the court as the first step for the inquisition proceedings, strangely the court did not consider this vital dispute before directing the production of the alleged lunatic before the court. That order was challenged in review, but that review was also dismissed by the court below. The present revision petitioner filed a revision before this Court. This Court observed that Section 63 of the Act has permitted only a relative of the lunatic to initiate proceedings for inquisition of the alleged lunatic. This Court further said that the mother of Indira Devi is alive and there are materials to indicate about the hotly contested legal proceedings between the alleged relatives and the mother of Indira Devi. This Court observed that no relative is so intimate in the world and have such concern as would be a mother in relation to her child. It was noticed that the mother is resisting the application filed before the court. After observing that lunacy proceedings is a serious proceedings, this court observed that the lower court should be meticulously care-fill about the steps to be taken at each stage of the proceedings because it may cause great prejudice to the alleged lunatic if ultimately the court taken some steps in the proceedings for inquisition, even though those steps may be to collect evidence. The court trying a lunacy matter should be well informed of the serious impact of entertaining such proceedings on the peaceful life of the alleged lunatic. The publicity that would naturally be evoked by such a petition being entertained by a court itself would create mental agony and traumatic experience to the alleged lunatic and if there is any possibility of the unsustainability of the petition, the court should be over vigilant before issuing notice on such petitions to the alleged lunatic. These matters weighed very much in allowing the revision petition filed by the mother. This Court directed the lower court to consider the question whether any enquiry is at all warranted, after hearing both parties and affording opportunities if sought for to substantiate the respective contentions in that behalf. This court also directed that no enquiry would be warranted before decision on the preliminary question about the maintainability of the petition itself is decided by the court.
5. Thus the order of this Court in C. R. P. No. 1814 of 1986 mandated the lower court to make an enquiry as to the locus standi of the respondents to maintain the petition before the lower court. Certainly, the locus standi depends upon the fact whether the respondents are relatives within the meaning of Section 3(11) read with Section 63 of the Act.
6. The court below directed its enquiry on two questions. The court below first made an enquiry as to the fact whether the petitioners (respondents herein) are the children of Murukan. After an elaborate consideration of the evidence placed before the court, the court below found that Murukan did not marry the mother of the respondents. But the court found that the respondents herein are the children of Murukan, to say plainly, that the finding is that the respondents are the illegitimate children of Murukan.
7. Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted before me that the evidence for the finding that the respondents are the illegitimate children of Murukan is inadequate and inconclusive, I have examined the evidence when the counsel with utmost dexterity using the art of pleasing persuasion led me to the entire evidence on the point though I am not expected to re-appreciate the evidence when exercising the power under Section 115, C. P. C. I cannot accept the submission made by the counsel for the revision petitioner that the evidence is insufficient and I do not see any justifiable reason to disagree on the finding by the court below on this point.
8. The court below considered the second aspect of the matter that whether even if the respondents are the illegitimate children of the father of the lunatic, they are relatives of the lunatic. This question was answered without much discussion. The court below relied on the meaning given in Mitra's Legal and Commercial Dictionary and found that even though the respondents are the illegitimate children of the father of the alleged lunatic, they can claim the status of a relative to maintain a petition under Section 63 of the Act. The court below solely relied on the meaning given in Mitra's Legal and Commercial Dictionary. Mitra's Legal and Commercial Dictionary only quoted Section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956. The first part of the section reads thus :--
"RELATIVES. Two persons shall be deemed to be relatives if, and only if, they are husband and wife, or the one or the spouse of the one is related to the other or the spouse of the other, whether legitimate or illegitimate descent or by adoption and whether by full blood or by half blood, in any of the following ways, namely -- ........"
It has to be remembered that it is not very correct and proper to import the meaning of the word "relative" given in the Companies Act for the purpose of determining whether a person is a relative who can file a petition under Section 63 of the Act.
9. It is not always safe to rely on the definition of a word given in a different statute to understand the meaning of the same word in another statute. There is no point in accepting the definition of the word relative in the Companies Act for the purpose of understanding the purport of the word relative used in the Act. Of course, the learned Judge has taken the meaning of the word relative from a dictionary, but it has to be noted that the meaning given in the dictionary for the word relative is the definition in the Companies Act, 1956. Reliance on dictionary meanings for the word used in a statute also should be with care and caution. Lord Coleridge said :
"1 am quite aware, "that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books" he then cited Johnson's and Webster's definitions of credit". -- R. v. Peters, (1886) 16 Q. B. D. 636.
The meaning of words has to be understood in the context in which they are used. Of course, the doctrine of stare decisis applies in a limited and controlled form to cases which determines the interpretation of particular statutory provisions with the help of the interpretation placed on similar words used in acts of similar scope. James L. J. observed :--
"If an Act of Parliament uses the same language which was used in a former Act of Parliament referring to the same subject, and passed with the same purpose, and for the same object, the safe and well-known rule of construction is to assume that the legislature when using well-known words upon which there have been well-known decisions use those words in the sense which the decisions have attached to them". -- Greaves v. Tofield (1880) 14 Ch. D. 563.
10. The object and purpose of the Act have always got significance and importance in giving definition to a particular word used in the Act. The meaning of a particular word used in the statute always takes its scope and content, colour and hue from the purpose for which the word is used in the particular provision of the particular Act. Significantly further it has to be noted that a total change has been effected in the definition of the word relative in the new Companies Act and the present section does not take in an illegitimate child. Anyhow, I am of the view that the court below was not justified in blindly accepting the definition given in the Companies Act to understand the meaning of the word 'relative'.
11. Section 3 of the Act deals with definitions. Sub-clause (11) of Section 3 defines the word 'relative' thus -- "relative" includes any person related by blood, marriage or adoption". Counsel on both sides did not place before me any decision under the Lunacy Act dealing with the question whether an illegitimate son of the father of a lunatic can claim to be a relative of the lunatic to file an application under Section 63 of the Lunacy Act. Prof. Leon Green has said that the word relation as the best term available to express the value of one human being to another. Certainly the word 'relative' used in Section 3 of the Act has to be understood in a legal sense and it has to be understood in the setting where that word is used in the provisions of the statute, particularly, the provision enabling a relative to entertain a petition under Section 63 of the Act.
12. The prime devoir of the provision in Section 63 of the Act is the concern of the State to protect a mentally disabled subject. It has to be noted that naturally the Legislature is aware of the possible misuse of the provision and the danger of persons uninterested and perhaps enimical to the alleged lunatic filing applications under the Act to cause difficulties, prejudice and traumatic feeling to the person concerned to defend such an action. In this background I feel that the power given to a relative to file a petition for initiating an inquisition proceedings should be silhouetted on the fact whether a closer or a nearer relative like the mother or father is in a position to initiate proceedings under Section 63 before the court entertains a petition through a distant relative of the alleged lunatic. Anyhow, there is no such restrictions expressly made in the statutory provision, but I feel the court can take note of that fact also before entertaining a petition under Section 63, since the whole object of the inquisition proceedings is in the interest of the alleged lunatic. In the section, the definition of relative said generally that relatives include any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. When it is said that any person is a relative by blood, the question is whether the court can accept an illegitimate" son as a relative by blood. As I said earlier, no authority was brought to my notice by counsel on both sides.
13. The House of Lords in Seale-Hayne v. Jodrell, (1891) A.C. 304 was interpreting a will where a residuary clause of the will of the testator required an interpretation to be put on the word 'relatives' Lord Herschell said :
"It is of course not open to dispute that the word "relatives" according to its natural interpretation, if there were nothing to show that another meaning was to be attributed to it would not include those who were what may be termed natural blood relations, but whose parents or grandparents were not born in wedlock, and who therefore were not in the eye of the law related to the testator".
So, when the court is asked to interpret the meaning of the word relative either in a statute or in a document like a will, it can take only the natural meaning and whether a person claiming to be a relative is a relative in the eye of law even if he may be related by blood.
14. It is axiomatic that the law makers who represent the people of the country and who want to put life to the wishes, hopes, aspirations and needs of the people would enact only laws which the society considers as honest, fair and equitable. Every legislation is purposed to advance public advantage and welfare. Crowford has outlined this principle in his book statutory construction, saying that the entire legislative process is induced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the bulwark and palladium of the general legislative intent in every piece of legislation. This leads me to think that I should avoid a construction which would operate harshly or against the objective and good intentions behind the provision or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason. There are cases where apparent or suggested meaning of the statute was not the one intended by the law makers. In the absence of clear and plain indication, a word in the statute has not to be interpreted to produce harsh and unmerited effect.
15. It is interesting to note that precedents are many supporting the two rival schools of thought on the basic question of interpretation of statute. One school looked at what the Act was intended to do while the other looked at what it said. In short, it is a battle between the purposive approach and literal approach to statutory interpretation. In Seaford Court Estate Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 KB 481, Lord Denning suggested that in interpreting statutory provisions, a Judge should "look to the purpose of the legislation and remedy the defect". Lord Denning said : "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity........ A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases". This view of Lord Denning was not approved by Lord Mac Dermott in (1950) AC 508 and he expressed his strong dissent against the view taken by Lord Denning, though the House of Lords upheld the decision of Lord Denning. Lord Denning's view is which is called the new approach -- the purposive approach -- of the statutory interpretation has been strongly supported by Lord Diplock in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torguay) Ltd., (1971) AC 850 and also in R v. National Insurance Commissioners, 1972 AC 944. In Carter v. Bradbeer (1975) 3 All ER 158, Lord Diplock re-enforced his earlier view and said 'over the last thirty years, the House of Lords has increasingly moved away from the purely literal approach to statutory interpretation towards the purposive approach'. The Supreme Court also is now more prone to accept the new approach, viz. the purposive approach in preference to the literal approach --vide Authorised Officer v. S. Naganatha Ayyar, (1979) 3 SCC 466 : (AIR 1979 SC 1487) and Union of India v. Rajdhani Grains and Jaggery Exchange Ltd., (1975) I SCC676 :(A1R 1975 SC 1218).
16. In Eramma v. Veerupana, AIR 1966 SC 1879, considering the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, the Supreme Court considered as to whether the expression possession of property used in that section can attract possession without any legal right to it. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the court said :
"In other words, the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property".
In taking the above view, the Supreme Court considered that it is obligatory to interpret the word 'in possession of the property' on the format of the avowed object of the provision in the Act. In Budhan Singh v. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880, the Supreme Court has c6nsi-dered whether the expression "held" used in Section 9 of U.P. Zemindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 would only mean lawfully held or not. The Supreme Court said that though according to the dictionary meaning the word 'held' can mean either a lawful holding or even a holding without any semblance of a right such as holding by a trespasser, the meaning of the word 'held' can be to possess a legal title. Further it is said by interpreting the word 'held' as 'lawfully held', the court would not be adding any word to a section. I also feel that by interpreting the word "relative", if I say a legitimate or lawful relative, 1 am also not adding any word in the definition relative.
17. In an old Indian decision reported in (1906) 8 Bom LR 322 (Smith v. Massev), the House of Lords' decision quoted by me has been referred to. This case related to the will of one Mary Anne Houghland. One Captain Ballas had two daughters from a native woman, Georgiana and Mary Anne. The will was made only a day before the testatrix's death, so that, under Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), if Thomas, the son of Georgiana is the nephew of Mary Anne, would bar bequests to religious and Charitable uses. But the difficulty in his way was that the mother Georgiana and Mary Anne were illegitimate daughters of Captain Dallas by a native woman. The court observed that Georgiana and Mary Anne being in the eye of law filiae nullius, they were not sisters, and Thomes's claim to be regarded as Mary Anne's nephew must consequently be rejected. Batchelor, J. observed thus:--
"1 cannot conceive that such an Act as this, which defines certain relations simpliciter, intended any other relations than those flowing from lawful wedlock. If the arguments were conceded, a bastard would share equally with a son - - i.e. a legitimate son, he being the only son known to our law -- and this result appears to me wholly repugnant and impossible".
18. This interpretation is the general interpretation that can be given considering the question of right to inherit the properties of a father under the Indian Succession Act. The words in Indian Succession Act expressing relationship denote only legitimate relationship; such relationships as originate from lawful wedlock. 1 feel the same interpretation is the fair and justifiable interpretation that can be given in this case also.
19. I am aware of the provision in Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act that notwithstanding that a marriage is null and void under Section 11, any child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid shall be legitimate, whether such child is born before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, and whether or not a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that marriage under the Act and whether or not the marriage is held to be void otherwise than on a petition under the Act. It has to be noted that by this provision what has been done is to give legitimacy to the children born to the parents whose marriage is null and void under the section by the use of a deeming provision. This only indicates that if a general term is used as children, son or daughters, the law can take into account only children born in lawful wedlock. Similarly, the word used relative by blood must be understood as a relative by blood through lawful wedlock. In this view, I have to hold that the respondents are not relatives who can maintain a petition under Section 63 of the Act.
20. I feel in law, the respondents herein cannot maintain a petition before the lower court and so the petition before the lower court has to be dismissed. Though I had serious doubt about the question of law involved in this case, which I have now resolved, I frankly and candidly confess that I had no doubt that the circumstances revealed in the case would not justify allowing the respondents herein to take inquisition proceedings under Section 63 of the Act, for a declaration by the court that Indira Devi is a lunatic, when her own mother is seriously resisting that petition and there are serious disputes between the mother and daughter on one side and the respondents herein on the other side regarding the properties left by Murukan, the father of the alleged lunatic.
In the result, 1 allow the Civil Revision Petition and dismiss O. P. No. 61 of 1985 before the District Court, Palghat.