Uttarakhand High Court
Dr. Samrat Sharma vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 12 October, 2017
Author: Lok Pal Singh
Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia, Lok Pal Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition (S/B) No. 353 of 2014
Dr. Samrat Sharma .........Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & others
........Respondents
Present:- Dr. Samrat Sharma, petitioner in person.
Mr. Yogesh Pandey, Additional C.S.C. for the
State/respondent no. 1.
Mr. Paresh Tripathi, Advocate for respondent no. 2.
Mr. A.V. Pundir, Advocate for respondent nos. 3 and 4.
Mr. Mukesh Rawat, Advocate for respondent no. 5.
Coram: Hon'ble Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
Hon'ble Lok Pal Singh, J.
The petitioner before this Court is an Assistant Professor of Hindi Literature in the Department of Hindi, at B.S.M. P.G. College, Roorkee, District Haridwar which is a private college, though under Government aid, and is affiliated to Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal Central University, Srinagar, Pauri Garhwal, which is a Central University.
2. In the present writ petition, the petitioner had initially challenged the order dated 30.01.2014, by which he was put under suspension by the Management Committee during the pendency of a departmental proceeding, and later during the pendency of the petition by way of an amendment he has also challenged the resolution of the Committee of Management and the order of the Vice-Chancellor of HNB Garhwal University dated 16.09.2014 by which his services have been terminated.
3. The petitioner states that he has to his credit various published works, in literary Journals. He has 2 also won a National award in the year 2012, for research works in Hindi literature. He has been an Associate Professor of Hindi Literature in B.S.M.P.G. College, Roorkee, District Haridwar, since November 2007.
4. On 01.09.2012 in the office of the Principal of the College, during a meeting which was called to discuss the time table of the Hindi Department, some altercations took place between the petitioner and one Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma who is the Associate Professor and In- charge of the Hindi Department. There are allegations and counter allegations as to the said incident, but the fact remains that later on 04.09.2012, the said professor i.e. Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma moved a complaint before the Principal of the College in whose presence and in whose office the said incident on 01.09.2012 is said to have occurred. The complaint is annexed as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition, and is a part of the record.
5. As per the complaint, on 01.09.2012 at 10.00 A.M. in the office of the Principal of the College while the meeting was going on, Dr. Samrat Sharma, Professor Hindi Department (the petitioner before this Court) levelled strong charges against the complainant regarding the framing of the time table. He addressed the complainant in an aggressive manner and used indecent language, which caused mental agony to the complainant. The complainant further states in her complaint to the Principal that her husband Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma has recently undergone a by-pass surgery, which is a matter of concern to the complainant, and when incidents like the one which occurred on 01.09.2012 happen, it affects her mental condition and she is also not able to take proper care of her husband, 3 under these circumstances. As a result of the treatment she was given by the petitioner since she is not able to take proper care of her husband, it has affected the health of her husband as well. She further states that apart from the incident which happened in the office of the Principal, the petitioner has misbehaved with her earlier in the staff room as well. Not only this, this has become a habit with Dr. Samrat Sharma, the complainant alleges, a habit to behave in an unruly and indecent manner with the lady teachers of the institute. The reason assigned by the complainant regarding this behaviour of Dr. Samrat Sharma is that Dr. Sharma has in fact lost his mental balance, because his wife Smt. Jayanti Adjania has left her matrimonial home. Dr. Samrat Sharma is fighting cases against her in various courts. The complainant lastly alleged that due to the behaviour of Dr. Sharma towards her, she feels insulted and rather let down. She is the senior teacher who has got 38 years of teaching experience, and when the Principal is on leave, she becomes the officiating Principal, and therefore, the Principal should take appropriate action against the petitioner.
6. The petitioner then received a letter from the Secretary of the Management Committee dated 20.09.2012, referring to the complaint of Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma (who is respondent no. 5 before this Court), and sought petitioner's reply. Petitioner gave his reply dated 12.10.2012 denying the incident dated 01.09.2012 as alleged to have happened in the complaint. In his reply, the petitioner said that since undue charges were being levelled by Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma against him on that fateful day, he thought it better to leave the meeting which he eventually did along 4 with another Professor, Dr. Ram Bharose. He denies the allegations levelled by Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma.
7. Meanwhile, the matter was referred to the Management Committee and the Management Committee decided to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the matter and appointed Dr. I.D. Consul and Dr. Kamal Singh Sharma (both members of the Management Committee). This Enquiry Committee gave its report on 25.11.2013 with findings that the complaint of Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma is true and the petitioner did misbehave, in an indecent manner, with Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma. A reference of Dr. Anita Gupta, Dr. Reena Sinha, Dr. Sunita Kumari, Dr. Surjeet Singh and Dr. V.P. Gautam has been given, all of them who were present in the meeting supported the allegations made by Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma.
8. At this stage what is relevant for our consideration is that the main charge against the petitioner which relates to the incident of 01.09.2012. The charge as elaborated by the complainant in the preliminary inquiry say that the petitioner misbehaved with her. What exactly was this "misbehavour" was never explained by the complainant in her complaint, nor has this been stated in any of the statements of the professors named above. There is no evidence on this before this Court as well. All the same, we are constrained to note that after the conclusion of the departmental enquiry and termination of the services of the petitioner, in the writ petition before this Court, that too highly belatedly a new twist is being given to this incident to which we shall now revert.
9. Learned counsel for the Committee of Management - Mr. Ajay Veer Pundir though has categorically stated that the statements given before the 5 enquiry committee are part of the record. All the same, none of these records have been placed before this Court, although the learned counsel for the Committee of Management has filed a supplementary counter affidavit placing the report of the fact finding Committee for the first time as late as on 10.10.2017, but the exact statement of the complainant as well as the statements of other Professors referred above have not been placed before this Court. The learned counsel made a request at the fag end, while the order was dictated for calling the records, a request which was declined by this Court. Therefore on record what exactly constitutes an "indecent behaviour" at the hands of the petitioner has not been established! According to the learned counsel for the Committee of Management the petitioner had actually tried to pull the hand of the complainant, on that fateful day, and that was an indecent behaviour. All the same, there is no reference of this kind of behaviour on part of the petitioner either in the complaint of Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma dated 04.09.2012, nor does it find any reference in the show cause notice, or any of the charges. It is also not a finding of the preliminary enquiry committee. Moreover, apart from making a complaint to the Principal, Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma also made a complaint before the State Women Commission which in turn conducted an enquiry. In the enquiry of the Tehsildar which is on 24.05.2013, there is no mention of such an allegation. In fact the report, which is a part of record, suggests that the dispute is over trivial matters, such as, "time table" of the College and which class and how many, are to be taken by which teacher. It is also an admitted fact that the State Women Commission did not proceed with the matter and in fact had dropped the matter.
610. As far as the pulling of the hand of the complainant on the fateful day of 01.09.2012 is concerned, the same is an afterthought and has come out for the first time before this Court in the counter affidavit filed by respondent no. 5 on 10.10.2017. The sequence of events is as follows:
The ordersheet reveals that after the petitioner had approached this Court, on the first date i.e. 10.10.2014 there were certain defects pointed out by the Registry in this writ petition. On 14.10.2014, there is an order of the Registrar (Judicial), where one day's time was given to the counsel for the petitioner Mr. Manish Arora to remove the defects and since the defects were not removed, the matter came up before the Division Bench, for the first time, on 16.10.2014. On 16.10.2014, counsels for the University and the Degree College were present before the Division Bench and had taken notices.
Notices were also sent to respondent no. 4 i.e. the Principal, B.S.M. P.G. College, Roorkee and respondent no. 5 Dr. (Smt.) Kamlesh Sharma, who is the complainant and on whose complaint entire disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. The office report shows that on 27.10.2014, notices were sent to respondent no. 5 by the Registered Post. Mr. V.S. Rawat, counsel for respondent no. 5 has filed his "Vakalatnama" in the Registry on behalf of respondent no. 5 on 27.11.2014. All the same, though the matter continued to be listed before the Division Bench of this Court on various dates, learned counsel for respondent no. 5, who had already put in his appearance, did not file counter affidavit on behalf of respondent no. 5. From 16.10.2014 till the matter was finally decided on 12.10.2017, there are as many as 69 dates when the matter was listed. Most of these dates are non-effective hearing. Initially, since 7 one of the learned Judges sitting with the Hon'ble Chief Justice has recused himself from the case on 19.07.2017, the Hon'ble Chief Justice then nominated another Division Bench to hear the matter. This Division Bench too recused from the case on 28.08.2017 and that is how, on administrative side, by order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice dated 13.09.2017, the matter came up before this Court, for the first time, on 05.10.2017 when after hearing the parties at some length the matter was adjourned to 11.10.2017. It was then, for the first time, that respondent no. 5 filed her counter affidavit, the contents of which we shall refer to in a while. The matter was again adjourned for the next day on 12.10.2017 when it has been heard at length. It is for the first time, in the counter affidavit which has been filed by respondent no. 5 after two years which is sworn on 10.10.2017, and filed before this Court on 11.10.2017, that respondent no. 5 states in para 4 which is quoted as under:
"4. That on 1-9-2012, when meeting was being held in the Principal Room with regard to the fixation of time table of B.A. (Hindi Subject), petitioner herein started misbehaviour with answering respondent and started abusing her and hold pulled the hands of answering respondent towards him and molested her and aforesaid incident was seen by Principal including other Assistant Professors, who were present in the meeting."
(Emphasis provided) It is for the first time before this Court that respondent no. 5 in her belated counter affidavit, which has been filed before this Court without leave of this Court that she gives an entirely different colour to the incident dated 01.09.2012. This was never a charge 8 earlier. Petitioner was never given any opportunity to rebut this charge earlier. We therefore cannot take notice of this fact, at the hands of respondent no. 5 at this stage. Not only is it highly belated, but it has come as a result of an afterthought, apparently done with the intention to improve upon the case of the management committee, and to the prejudice of the petitioner. Earlier than this, there is no such allegation by respondent no. 5 or by the Disciplinary Authority, at any stage as already referred above.
11. Another fact which does not give any credence to this assertion is that though admittedly the entire incident of 01.09.2012 is said to have taken place inside the office of the Principal which is under cover of CCTV cameras, CCTV footage is not part of record. The petitioner under the Right to Information Act had sought the CCTV footage, but the reply given to the petitioner by the College states that CCTV cameras were not working since morning of 01.09.2012 for 10.00 A.M. to 12.00 P.M., the precise period, when the said incident took place in the office of the Principal!
12. Ultimately three charges were levelled against the petitioner. The first is relating to the incident dated 01.09.2012, for which a show cause notice was given to the petitioner. Later the charge-sheet adds two other charges apart from the one above. The second charge against the petitioner was that he has been attending court proceedings and taking classes on the same dates, and this itself constitutes "misconduct", on part of the petitioner under First Statute of the University of Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna, Garhwal under Chapter XVII Part I of 17.04 i.e. wilful neglect of duty and misconduct, including disobedience to the orders of the Principal.
913. The reply of the petitioner on this charge is that during absence from the College, he has always taken a "casual leave", which is on record, which are with the administration and the Management Committee. While establishing these charges, the Inquiry report nowhere elaborates on this aspect. In the charge, there is a mention of various dates from August 2010 to April 2013, on which allegedly the petitioner attended his Court cases. The petitioner was not on leave on these dates, yet his presence has been shown in the College on these dates. The charge is obviously to the effect that on at least 19 occasions, petitioner showed his presence in the College, though on the same dates he was also attending his Court cases. Petitioner in his reply to these charges categorically states that all such days when he was not present in the College he has taken either a casual leave or a station leave, as the case might be. Thereafter he states that for the year 2010-11, the official working hours were 7:40 A.M. to 11.20 A.M., for the year 2011-12 and 2012-13, the official timings were 8.00 A.M. to 11.40 A.M. and he was always present during that time. What he does outside that time should not be a concern of the College. In other words, the stand of the petitioner is that on such dates, when he was attending courts i.e. Family Court or any other Court, and was not in a position to attend his duties, he had actually taken casual leave and it is wrong on the part of the Management Committee to charge him of showing his presence on the said date in the Institute is wrong. Logically what was meant by the petitioner was that it is perfectly possible for him to take classes and attend his court cases on the same date as the classes are over by 11:40 a.m. At this stage, it must be stated that the bulk 10 of the court proceedings primarily refer to the proceedings in the Family Court at Roorkee town itself, where the College of the petitioner is situated. We do not find any conclusive proof that the petitioner either falsely showed his presence in the college on the dates he had court cases or that he was negligent towards his duties.
14. The third charge against the petitioner was that he has recorded certain conversations on his mobile phone, conversation he had with his colleagues Dr. Kamlesh Sharma, Dr. Shikha Jain and Dr. Surjeet Singh. The petitioner admits the fact that he has recorded the conversations, which he had placed before the Inquiry Committee in order to meet the charges levelled against him, in the departmental proceedings. In all these conversations, according to the petitioner, all the three professors have admitted that they have nothing against the petitioner but have all been forced by the Management Committee to take a stand against the petitioner. Dr. Surjeet Singh in fact admits that nothing untoward happened in the meeting on September 1, 2012. Dr. Surjeet Singh is an eye-witness to the said meeting. In other words, the recorded conversations are a proof of the fact, according to the petitioner, that nothing of the sort happened in the meeting as is being made out by the complainant, and his colleagues who have deposed against him in the enquiry have done so under compulsion from the management. The petitioner gave these recorded conversations to the enquiry committee to establish his innocence. The petitioner categorically said that the CDs be examined and their veracity be established. The management instead of examining the veracity of these recorded conversations, slapped another charge on the petitioner which is "recording of 11 conversations without consent of the other party". Now the petitioner is one of the parties to the conversations which have been recorded. He is not doing any extortion, or blackmailing his colleagues nor using these conversations for any unlawful purpose. Where is the illegality or wrong? Even if there is one, it may give rise to the "affected party" to lodge a police report or complaint. They may take a suitable action against the petitioner. Instead, the management has levelled a fresh charge against the petitioner, this time for recording conversations of his colleagues in the ongoing departmental proceedings!
15. On a pointed query of this Court as to how the recording of these conversations become a crime or a "misconduct", nothing has been said before this Court. How far such conservations are valid in the eyes of law since they have been recorded without the consent of other party, and whether it can be read as an evidence, is an entirely different matter, but whether it constitutes a crime or even "misconduct", this Court has serious doubts. In any case short of saying that it is a "misconduct" nothing further has been said by the respondent College. The charges and even the departmental proceedings are silent as to whether the petitioner brought these recorded conversations to some illegal use.
16. Thereafter the services of the petitioner were suspended vide order dated 30.01.2014 pursuant to the resolution of the Management Committed dated 08.12.2013.
1217. We have already seen the nature of charges initially levelled against the petitioner. None of these charges were sustainable in the eyes of law in the light of available evidence. Consequently towards the fag end i.e. on 02.07.2014, another set of three charges which have been described as "supplementary charges", were levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner was asked to give reply to these charges by 12.07.2014, failing which an ex parte proceedings will take place against him. At this stage, it is also relevant to mention that the petitioner did not personally appear before the Committee though he has given his explanation in a form of long reply to the earlier three charges levelled against him. The reason is evident. The petitioner right from the very beginning has been stating that he does not trust the impartiality of the Committee, and the Committee has a bias against him, which according to the petitioner, is evident from the fact that the enquiry committee was asking details of personal matters from the petitioner, such as, what personal cases have been filed by his wife against him and in which court they are presently going on and what is the exact nature of such cases, etc. To this, the petitioner has already replied that the enquiry committee has absolutely no jurisdiction to enquire into his personal matters, unless and until, these matters constitute misconduct.
18. Be that as it may, the fourth charge (i.e. 1st of the three supplementary charges) against the petitioner is that the petitioner though is subordinate to the Principal is writing to his superior officers against the Principal and the Management Committee without proper channel i.e. not through the Principal straightaway but to 13 the higher authorities, and has therefore committed an act of misconduct.
19. The fifth charge against the petitioner is that pursuant to the presentation of fabricated public documents by the petitioner before the State Information Commissioner, an FIR has been lodged against him and therefore he is guilty of misconduct.
20. The sixth charge is also that on the report of the State Information Commissioner Sri Vinod Nautiyal an FIR has been lodged against the petitioner at Thana Kotwali Gangnahar Roorkee, District Haridwar, which also constitutes misconduct. In fact, these are not even the charges considering that while giving the supplementary charges, a finding has already been disclosed that these charges have been proved against the petitioner. Moreover, an unreasonably short time was given to the petitioner to reply on these charges, all of which shows that the enquiry committee was less than fair towards the petitioner. What reply the petitioner has given to the charges is not clear but as per the resolution of the management committee, these charges too stood proved against the petitioner. It is in fact evident that handing over of the supplementary charges to the petitioner at the fag end of the enquiry itself shows that the department was not proceeding in a fair and just manner against the petitioner. The very language of the charges and the manner in which it has been done leaves absolutely no doubt in the mind of this Court that the departmental enquiry has not been fair to the petitioner.
21. The resolution of the management committee dated 13.07.2014 shows that the enquiry committee has 14 given its finding that all the six charges stood proved against the petitioner and has recommended a strong punishment.
22. After taking the full view of the entire situation, this Court is of a considered view that the charges against the petitioner are clearly not established. The finding on these charges by the enquiry committee is totally perverse. Not only this, the petitioner has been charged on absolutely flimsy charges as well, such as, that he moved a complaint to the higher authorities, without proper channel!
23. It is indeed true that what the petitioner faced was a departmental proceeding and not a criminal trial. The standard of appreciation of evidence in a departmental proceeding definitely differs from that of a criminal trial. Whereas in a criminal trial the prosecution has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding charges can be established on a preponderance of probabilities. Though a charge need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a departmental proceeding, yet a charge has to be reasonably established, on a preponderance of the probability! This has not been established against the petitioner.
24. Another question which falls for our consideration would be whether the petitioner was liable to be punished to the maximum, by way of termination of his services, assuming all the charges stood proved against the petitioner. There are two serious charges against the petitioner, one attending Court proceedings and taking classes during the same day. But this charge 15 has not been established. The reply given by the petitioner to this charge has not been found to be false, by any worthwhile evidence. The second serious charge against the petitioner is of tampering with official records, showing false records to be genuine and presenting them before the State Information Commission. However, this matter is again sub judice and not been established.
25. The remaining charges of misbehaving with the senior lady colleague in the College, recording of conversations and corresponding with superior authorities without proper channel, are not of a nature that could have invited termination of service, even if proved. All this shows that the Department was biased against the petitioner and was proceeding against the petitioner with a pre-determined mind. Petitioner at no stage was given a fair hearing. The filing of supplementary charges at the fag end of the departmental proceedings giving ten days time to reply and thereafter immediately proceeding to terminate the services of the petitioner on the face of it shows a bias attitude, to say the least. During the course of arguments before this Court, when the petitioner appeared in person, this Court was told that the main reason for the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was that earlier the petitioner had raised allegations against the management for misutilization of funds received from the University Grants Commission. There is a reference to this on record, but since nothing has been elaborated on this by the petitioner who appears in person before us, we can say nothing further.
26. It must also be stated that B.S.M. P.G. College, Roorkee, District Haridwar is affiliated to H.N.B. Garhwal 16 University. The University in question was initially a State University and was governed by the U.P. Universities Act. Since 2009, however, the University has become a central University. All the same, those colleges which are affiliated to this University, such as, B.S.M. P.G. College, Roorkee, District Haridwar, and the teachers of such affiliated colleges are still governed under the U.P. Universities Act. Therefore, the provisions of U.P. Universities Act would be relevant for our purposes.
27. We state this as the most disturbing aspect of the entire process which culminated in the termination of the services of the petitioner is at the hands of the University. Finally it is the rank casual manner in which the Vice Chancellor of the University has given his seal of approval to the resolution of the Management Committee, which had resolved by its decision dated 13.07.2014 to terminate the services of the petitioner, must be looked into by this Court. One must not forget that at stake were the very services of the petitioner, who is a Professor in a Degree College. He has not been given a fair hearing even during the departmental proceeding. It is for these contingencies and in order to check arbitrariness, illegality and violation of due process that the U.P. Universities Act under its Section 35 of the Universities Act, acts as a check. Sub-section (2) of Section 35 reads as under:
"35. Conditions of service of teachers of affiliated or associated colleges other than those maintained by Government or local authority.-
(1)..........
(2) Every decision of the Management of such college to dismiss or remove a teacher or to reduce him in rank or to punish him in any other manner shall, before it is communicated to him, be reported to the Vice-Chancellor and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor.17
Provided that in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (1), of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the management dismissing, removing or reducing in rank or punishing in any other manner any teacher shall not require the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, but, shall be reported to him unless he is satisfied that the procedure prescribed in this behalf has been followed, the decision shall not to given effect to."
28. A bare perusal of the above provision shows that ultimately it is not the order of the Management Committee but it is the order of the Vice Chancellor, which can terminate the services of a teacher of an affiliated or associated college, inasmuch as the order dismissing or removing a teacher even before it is communicated to the concerned teacher has to be reported to the Vice Chancellor and it cannot take its effect unless the order has been approved by the Vice Chancellor. Therefore, it is the order of the Vice Chancellor which has the ultimate significance. The order is quasi judicial in nature and being an order of this nature, it must be governed by the principles of natural justice and fair play.
29. It need hardly be emphasized that recording of reasons by a quasi judicial authority is mandatory. Assigning reasons in support of an order is one of the three principles of natural justice and fair play. The other two being the Rule of Bias and Audi Alteram Partem.
30. The Management Committee in its resolution dated 13.07.2014 resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner. This resolution was sent for approval of the Vice Chancellor of the University. It is an admitted case that the Vice Chancellor did not give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before giving its order of approval on 16.09.2014. Even if opportunity of personal hearing 18 was not necessary, it would have been only fair to call for a written explanation. The least, however, which was required for the Vice Chancellor was to assign reasons while affirming the resolution of the Committee of Management! Even this has not been done. The translated copy of the order of the Vice Chancellor dated 16.09.2014 (which is on record), which is addressed to the Secretary/Chairman of the Management Committee reads as under:
"Letter- Recognition/1609 dated:16.9.14 To Secretary/Chairman Managing Committee B.S.M. (PG) College Roorkee District Haridwar Subject: Approval of Proposal No. 7 dated 13.7.2014 of the Management Committee of B.S.M. (PG) College Roorkee passed on the Report dated 12.7.2014 of the Inquiry Committee constituted for inquiry of the allegations leveled on Dr. Samrat Sharma, Assistant Professor (Suspended) Department of Hindi.
Sir, With regard to above noted subject, vide letter no. 132/2014-15 dated 14.7.2014, a proposal no. 7 passed in meeting dated 13.7.2014 of the committee of management on the inquiry repot of inquiry committee constituted by committee of management for inquiry of the allegations leveled by senior most Professor (Dr.) Kamlesh Sharma, Department of Hindi regarding misbehave and defamation against Dr. Samrat Sharma, Associate Professor Department of Hindi, has been received for approval.
A Professor can be terminated for one or more reasons stipulated in Chapter 17 Part-1 Sub Rule 10.04 of Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University (State) 1st Regulation.
The proposal no. 7 passed in meeting dated 13.7.2014 of the committee of management on recommendation dated 12.7.04 of inquiry committee for initiating inquiry against Dr. Samrat Sharma, Associate Professor Department of Hindi BSM (PG) College Roorkee, is hereby approved.19
Sd/-
Vice Chancellor"
31. The so called approval only repeats what has been resolved by the Management Committee and thereafter simply accords its approval. No reasons assigned!
32. The material portion of the approval granted by the Vice Chancellor dated 16.09.2014 is that the resolution "is hereby approved". Was this the only requirement at the level of the Vice Chancellor of the University? Was he not required to assign reasons as to why he has agreed with the decision taken by the Committee of Management of the Degree College?
33. It is absolutely necessary for a quasi judicial body to assign reasons. The powers vested with the Vice Chancellor under Section 35 of the Act read with the aforesaid provision of the First Statute makes this power of the Vice Chancellor quasi judicial in nature. He was therefore required to assign reasons while approving the resolution of the Committee of Management.
34. It is true that earlier the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1966 SCC 671 was that recording of reasons by an appellate body was not necessary particularly when it is affirming the order, which is appealed. However, the later decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court emphasize the necessity of recording reasons. The reference is being made of the Constitution Bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhagat Raja v. Union of India reported in AIR 20 1967 SC 1606, which has actually disagreed with the distinction made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in M.P. Industries between an order of confirmation and an order of reversal. Later, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1969) 3 SCC 868 has held that "the majority judgment of this Court in M.P. Industries Ltd. has been overruled by this Court in Bhagat Raja". Recently the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India and others reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 has again emphasized the recording of reasons by a quasi judicial authority, and has held that to be mandatory. The view of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, wherein certain principles were formulated, was reiterated. Para 40 of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. (supra) reads as under:
"40. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. V. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 this Court after considering various judgments formulated certain principles in SCC Para 47 of the judgment which are set out below: (SCC pp. 510-12) "(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restrain on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker 21 on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or 'rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restrain on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731-37).
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine 22 of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553, EHRR at p. 562, para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 ICR 847 (CA, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, 'adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions'.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of 'due process'."
35. Ultimately the services of the petitioner have been terminated not by the resolution of the Committee but by its approval by the Vice-Chancellor. The approval by a quasi judicial body has to be a reasoned order. It has to be so primarily as it then gives the ground to the affected person to seek remedy in appeal or in writ as the case might be but here where the non-speaking order is an order by which an approval has been granted which results in the termination of the services of the petitioner, the order is in fact a nullity.
36. In view of the above observations, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 30.01.2014, 22.09.2014, Resolution dated 13.07.2014 so far as it relates to the termination of services of the petitioner as well as the order dated 16.09.2014 by which approval was granted to the resolution dated 13.07.2014 are hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner is hereby reinstated in service with immediate effect. His entire arrears of salary shall be given to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of production 23 of a certified copy of this order, subject to the deduction of subsistence allowance.
37. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are also of the view that since the entire exercise is coloured with a malice towards the petitioner, we therefore allow this writ petition with a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only), which shall be given to the petitioner by the Management Committee, from its own funds. We also are of a considered opinion that the University Grants Commission may consider making an inquiry as to the proper utilization of funds to the B.S.M. P.G. College for the past five years.
38. Let a copy of this order be sent to the University Grants Commission by the Registrar General of this Court.
(Lok Pal Singh, J.) (Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.) 12.10.2017 Avneet/