Kerala High Court
P.Vinod vs Industrial Tribunal on 24 June, 2025
2025:KER:45806
W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU
TUESDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 / 3RD ASHADHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 20525 OF 2006
PETITIONER:
KDHP COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED
(PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS TATA TEA LIMITED),
MUNNAR WORKSHOP & ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT,
REPRESETNED BY ITS MANAGER (IR), MR.G.SOMANATHAN.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.BENNY P.THOMAS (SR.)
SRI.E.K.NANDAKUMAR (SR.)
RESPONDENTS:
1 P.VINOD
HOUSE No.IX/852, HIGH RANGE CLUB ROAD,
MUNNAR P.O., IDUKKI.
2 INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
IDUKKI.
BY ADVs.
SRI.A.JAYASANKAR
SRI.MANU GOVIND
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
24.06.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).22663/2006, THE COURT ON THE SAME
DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:45806
W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006
2
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU
TUESDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 / 3RD ASHADHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 22663 OF 2006
PETITIONER:
P.VINOD
NIRAVATH KRISHNA BHAVAN,
VALAYANCHIRANGARA, PERUMBAVOOR-683556.
BY ADVS.
SRI.A.JAYASANKAR
SRI.MANU GOVIND
RESPONDENTS:
1 INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
IDUKKI,
ELAPPARA P.O.
2 KANNAN DEVAN HILLS PLANTATIONS (PRIVATE) LIMITED,
(FORMERLY TATA TEA LIMITED), REPRESENTED BY ITS
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS MANAGER, MUNNAR, IDUKKI
DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
SRI.E.K.NANDAKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
24.06.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).20525/2006, THE COURT ON THE SAME
DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:45806
W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006
3
S.MANU, J.
-------------------------------------------
W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006
-------------------------------------------
Dated this the 24th day of June, 2025
JUDGMENT
These two writ petitions were filed by the management and the workman aggrieved by award dated 25.1.2006 in I.D.No.92/2000 of the Industrial Tribunal, Idukki. W.P. (C)No.20525/2006 was filed by the management aggrieved by the finding that the workman is entitled for reinstatement with 50% of backwages. W.P.(C)No.22663/2006 was filed by the workman discontented with limiting of back wages to 50%.
2. The workman was an Assistant Technical Officer in the unit of the management at Munnar workshop. He was charge-sheeted by the management. Relevant portions of the charge sheet dated 19.8.1999 are extracted hereunder for clarity :-
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 4 "CHARGE SHEET It is alleged against you as under:
You have been responsible for the following omissions/commissions as per a recent investigation carried out by the Internal Auditors.
1. BUNGALOW PAINTING Against a budget sanction of Rs. 12,500/- each for 3 bungalows, the amount spent for painting the bungalows of Messrs. Jagdish Kumar, K.N. Krishnan and Jamal Rasheed was Rs.20,664.28. But, in addition to the above, the Nadiar bungalow and the bungalow occupied by Mr. Koshy Chacko were painted at a cost of Rs.18,613.85 and Rs.6,590.52 respectively for which there was no sanction and thus incurred an over expenditure of Rs.8,368.65.
2. MONSOON DAMAGE The actual length of the revetment constructed near Mr. Edwin Selvaraj's old quarters was found to be 53.6 metres against 59.1 metres shown in the measurement sheet, ie., an excess of 5.5 metres.
3. SRISHTI COMPLEX PAINTING Wide variations in consumption of paints have been observed in the Srishti Complex painting works carried out under your supervision as detailed below:
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 5 Area Quantity Quantity Excess painted Required Used Consum-
Sq.m. Kg/lit. Kg/lit ption
Kg/lit.
Water proof painting 5695.7 569.57 725 155.43
Diste-mpering and
Snowcerm
Painting of Wood 779.63 77.96 103 25.04
work
4. Mr. SAMINATHAN'S BUNGALOW REPAIRS The number of tiles debited to the above job is not commensurate with the area of tiling work done as shown below:
Tiles Tiles
required Debited
Kitchen slab work - black tiles 42 Nos 60 Nos.
Kitchen and bathroom walls 195 Nos. 250 Nos.
- grey tiles
Bathroom floor - grey tiles 42 Nos. 60 Nos.
Also the following materials were found lying in the bungalow premises:
One bag of cement, solidified Five PVC pipes of 10" length.
Though an amount of Rs.15,905/- was debited to the bungalow repairs account in March 1999 being the cost of 43 Nos., GCI 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 6 sheets, the sheets have not been used in the bungalow, nor was there any documentary evidence such as materials transfer notes/despatch notes etc., for verification.
5. Dr.MATHEW VARKEY'S BUNGALOW The number of tiles debited is not commensurate with the area tiling work done as shown below:
Tiles Tiles
required debited
Wall tiling - 12" x 8" mint 205 Nos. 675 Nos.
grey tiles
Floor tiling - 12" x 12" tiles 53 Nos. 110 Nos.
6. HIGH RANGE SCHOOL BUILDING PAINTING Wide variations in the quantity of paints required and quantity debited to the job are noticed, as shown below:
Quty. Quty.
required debited
Kg/Lit Kg/Lit.
Oil bound distemper 183.19 203
Plastic Emulsion 15.72 44
Snowcerm 228.8 350
Cement (for cement washing) 222 bags 500 bags
7. KUTTIAR BUNGALOW SURROUNDING/BUILDINGS ROOF
PAINTING:
Against the sanctioned amount of Rs.75,000/-, an amount 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 7 Rs.84,763.73 has been spent for the above work; also it is seen although the quantity of the enamel paint required was only 37.74 litres a quantity of 110 litres has been debited to the job.
8. RO STAFF REST ROOM AND TEA TASTING ROOM On verification the total area covered with tiles was found to be 140.68 sq.m. against 165.95 sq.m. shown in the measurement sheet. The number of tiles debited to the job is found to be far in excess compared to the actual requirement as shown below:
Requirement Quty.Debited
Wall tiling 896 1000
Floor tiling 967 1180
9 Dr. RAJESH EAPEN'S BUNGALOW
Credit given to the contractor for fixing glazed tiles was for 147.54 sq.m against 82.21 sq.m actually done. Also difference is noticed in the use of Gl pipes debited for construction of a lean-
to at the rear of the bungalow as follows:
50 mm pipes 40 mm pipes Debited to the job 18.90 meters 19.20 meters Found on 17.55 meters 15.90 meters physical verification 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 8 If the above allegations are found to be true, you will be guilty of misconducts amounting to:
"Willful insubordination or disobedience whether alone or in combination with another or others of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior", "Theft, fraud, or dishonesty in connection with the employer's business or property", "Riotous or disorderly behaviour on the premises of the estate or any act subversive of discipline", and "Habitual absence from duty, habitual late attendance and/or habitual neglect of work", as per clauses (a) (c) (g) and (i) of the Certified Standing Order No. 14 applicable to you."
3. Domestic inquiry was thereafter conducted against the workman. The workman submitted a representation expressing no confidence on the inquiry officer appointed by the management. However, he later attended the inquiry and participated in the proceedings. Apart from the presenting officer, an internal auditor of the management was examined. The workman did not examine any witnesses on his side.
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 9 Exts.M1 to M8 were produced by the presenting officer. The inquiry officer analysed each of the charges and found charges 1, 4(part), 5, 7 and 8 proved against the workman. Copy of the findings was provided to the workman and he submitted his representation in response to the same. The management later decided to dismiss the workman from the service with effect from 7.1.2000.
4. The workman raised industrial dispute. Conciliation was conducted, however it failed. On receiving the failure report, Government referred the issue for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. The issue referred was - 'Whether the dismissal of Sri.P.Vinod with effect from 7.1.2000 is justifiable? If not, what relief he is entitled to?'
5. The case was registered as I.D.No.92/2000 by the Tribunal. Management and the workman entered appearance and filed their pleadings.
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 10
6. In the claim statement filed by the workman, several contentions were raised which were refuted by the management in its written statement. Workman thereafter filed a rejoinder. Claim statement filed by the workman has been produced as Ext.P3, written statement of the management as Ext.P4 and rejoinder of the workman as Ext.P5 in this writ petition. Two witnesses were examined by the management before the Tribunal. Wage slip of the 1st respondent, leave applications submitted by two workers and recommended by the workman and the inquiry file were produced by the management. No evidence was adduced by the workman.
7. Admittedly, no preliminary order was passed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal passed the impugned award on 25.1.2006. The Tribunal after examining the matter disagreed with the findings of the inquiry authority on all five charges, found to be proved by the inquiry authority. Tribunal held that the first respondent was not guilty of any of the charges. The 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 11 Tribunal directed the petitioner to reinstate the first respondent in service with 50% back wages and all other benefits.
8. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri.E.K.Nandakumar appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel Sri.A.Jayasankar appearing for the first respondent. Also, I have perused the pleadings and the documents produced.
9. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned award is vitiated by procedural irregularities causing serious prejudice to the petitioner management as also erroneous exercise of the jurisdiction by the Tribunal. He contended that the Tribunal committed a grave error by not passing a preliminary order. The learned Senior Counsel invited my attention to the counter statement filed before the Tribunal by the petitioner management. In paragraph 3 of the counter statement the management had specifically pleaded that whether the first 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 12 respondent was a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act may be decided as a preliminary issue. In paragraph 8 of the written statement the petitioner management had made another specific statement that, in case the inquiry was found vitiated in any manner by the Tribunal, the management may be permitted to adduce fresh/additional evidence to prove the misconduct before the Tribunal. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that in spite of such specific pleadings, the Tribunal did not pass a preliminary order and failed to provide opportunity to the management to adduce additional evidence. Relying on various reported judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that, it was indispensable to provide opportunity to the management to adduce additional evidence, if the Tribunal was of the view that the inquiry was vitiated. He hence contended that the failure to pass a preliminary order has to be considered as a fatal error committed by the Tribunal and on that ground alone the award 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 13 is liable to be set aside.
10. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Tribunal has committed serious errors in rendering the impugned award. He argued that the Tribunal has acted like an appellate authority over the findings of the inquiry officer. He submitted that the Tribunal differed with the findings of the inquiry officer, not on the basis of any evidences but merely on surmises. He contended that the Tribunal has in fact substituted the findings of the domestic inquiry with its own findings which were all based on conjectures and surmises. After referring to various judgments on the scope of interference by Industrial Tribunals and specifically with regard to the band width of the jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Tribunal has approached the matter and rendered the impugned award ignoring the settled principles regarding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. The learned Senior Counsel further 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 14 submitted that the Industrial Tribunal did not enter into any finding that the conclusions of the inquiry officer against the first respondent were perverse or unsustainable for lack of evidence. He hence submitted that the interference by the Tribunal and substitution of the findings were therefore wholly unjustified. The learned Senior Counsel also made reference to the evidence adduced in domestic inquiry in support of the charges proved against the first respondent and submitted that the evidence unerringly pointed out the huge losses caused to the petitioner management. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that such acts or omissions causing serious loss to the management could not have been lightly dealt with and hence the management was perfectly justified in imposing the punishment of termination of service on the first respondent. He hence submitted that the interference by the Tribunal was totally improper and illegal. He pointed out that the workman had submitted an application under Section 17B of the I.D.Act 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 15 and last drawn wages were being paid to the workman during the pendency of the writ petition. He concluded his submissions by asserting that the impugned award was not sustainable in any view of the matter.
11. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the proceedings initiated by the petitioner management against the first respondent was in fact without sufficient reasons. He referred to the charges leveled against the first respondent and pointed out that all of them were with respect to maintenance and construction activities held during the relevant period. Referring to various items of charges the learned counsel pointed out that the allegations were trivial in nature and the proceedings were therefore not justified. He also submitted that the workman had met with an accident on 14.4.1999 and was on medical leave for a long period. He was later suspended on 8.10.1999. The submission of the learned counsel is that the first respondent was proceeded against for 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 16 various things happened during his absence from duty also. He submitted that the charges were therefore not sustainable. The learned counsel further pointed out that there was no allegation of dishonesty on the part of the first respondent and no evidence was adduced to the effect that the first respondent was dishonest and obtained any gain. The learned counsel further submitted that the management had appointed a former employee as the inquiry officer and the inquiry officer was biased. Though this was pointed out during the inquiry, the said contention was not accepted by the inquiry authority. Ignoring the said contention of the first respondent, the inquiry authority proceeded against him. He hence submitted that serious prejudice was caused to the first respondent.
12. With respect to the contention of the petitioner management that the Industrial Tribunal erred in not passing a preliminary order, the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that there was no occasion and requirement to pass 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 17 such a preliminary order in the case at hand, as no such specific request was raised during the trial and no effort was properly made by the management in that regard. He contended that the statement in paragraph 8 of the written statement of the management was not sufficient. The Industrial Tribunal has not hence committed any error by not passing the preliminary order. The learned counsel, in response to the contentions raised by the petitioner management submitted that perversity of the findings of the inquiry officer was also substantiated before the Tribunal and hence the interference by the Tribunal was just and proper.
13. Learned counsel for the first respondent further contended that it is not totally beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to re-appreciate the evidence. He submitted that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not so restricted as canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel and in appropriate cases re- appreciation of evidence and entering into different findings is 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 18 well within the competence of the Tribunal. He therefore contended that the Tribunal has correctly held with respect to the five charges found by the inquiry officer against the first respondent, that they were not properly proved. He also submitted that the conclusion of the Tribunal that the first respondent was entitled for reinstatement needs no interference by this Court. He further contended that the only fault committed by the Tribunal was in limiting the back wages to 50%. The contention of the learned counsel is that, the Tribunal having found that none of the charges were proved against the first respondent, should have granted full back wages to the first respondent as termination of service by the petitioner management was wholly unjustified.
14. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the following judgments in support of his contentions:-
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 19
1. Kurukshetra University v. Prithvi Singh [2018 II LLJ 257 (SC)].
2. Standard Chartered Bank v. R.C. Srivastava [JT 2021 (9) SC 471].
3. West Bokaro Colliery(Tisco,Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh [2009 (4) L.L.N.599].
4. Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v.
Management of Usha Breco Ltd. and
Another [2008 II LLJ 945(SC)].
5. General Manager, Electrical Rengali
Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others v. Sri Giridhari Sahu and others [2020 III LLJ 257 (SC)].
6. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Gajadhar Nath [2022 I LLJ 254(SC)].
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 20
15. In Kurukshetra University v. Prithvi Singh [2018 II LLJ 257 (SC)] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"20. So the question, which the Labour Court was expected to decide in the first instance as a "preliminary issue", was whether the domestic enquiry held by the appellant (employer) was legal and proper. In other words, the question to be decided by the Labour Court was whether the domestic enquiry held by the appellant was conducted following the principles of natural justice or not.
21. If the domestic enquiry was held legal and proper then the next question which arose for consideration was whether the punishment imposed on the respondent (delinquent employee) was proportionate to the gravity of the charge leveled against him or it called for any interference to award any lesser punishment by exercising the powers under Section 11-A of the ID Act.
22. If the domestic inquiry was held illegal and improper then the next question, which arose for consideration, was whether to allow the appellant (employer) to prove the misconduct/charge before the Labour Court on merits by adducing independent 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 21 evidence against the respondent (employee). The appellant was entitled to do so after praying for an opportunity to allow them to lead evidence and pleading the misconduct in the written statement. (see- also Para 33 at page 1665/66 of Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Another (supra)).
23. Once the appellant (employer) was able to prove the misconduct/charge before the Labour Court, then it was for the Labour Court to decide as to whether the termination should be upheld or interfered by exercising the powers under Section 11-A of the ID Act by awarding lesser punishment provided a case to that effect on facts is made out by the respondent (employee).
24. We are constrained to observe that first, the Labour Court committed an error in not framing a "preliminary issue" for deciding the legality of domestic enquiry and second, having found fault in the domestic inquiry committed another error when it did not allow the appellant to lead independent evidence to prove the misconduct/charge on merits and straight away proceeded to hold that it was a case of illegal 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 22 retrenchment and hence the respondents' termination is bad in law."
16. In Standard Chartered Bank v. R.C. Srivastava [JT 2021 (9) SC 471] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"18. In the instant case, after we have gone through the record, we find that the Tribunal has converted itself into a Court of Appeal as an appellate authority and has exceeded its jurisdiction while appreciating the finding recorded in the course of domestic enquiry and tested on the broad principles of charge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt which is a test in the criminal justice system and has completely forgotten the fact that the domestic enquiry is to be tested on the principles of preponderance of probabilities and if a piece of evidence is on record which could support the charge which has been levelled against the delinquent unless it is per se unsustainable or perverse, ordinarily is not to be interfered by the Tribunal, more so when the domestic enquiry has been held to be fair and proper and, in our view, 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 23 the Tribunal has completely overlooked and exceeded its jurisdiction while interfering with the finding recorded during the course of enquiry in furtherance of which, the respondent was dismissed from service and the High Court has also committed a manifest error while passing the judgment impugned.
19. The decision of the Labour Court should not be based on mere hypothesis. It cannot overturn the decision of the management on ipse dixit. Its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Act 1947 although is a wide one but it must be judiciously exercised. Judicial discretion, it is trite, cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously. It may scrutinize or analyse the evidence but what is important is how it does so."
17. In West Bokaro Colliery (Tisco, Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh [2009 (4) L.L.N.599] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"17. After going through the order of the Industrial Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 24 has interfered with the findings recorded by the domestic tribunal as if it was the Appellate Tribunal. There was evidence present on record regarding indecent, riotous and disorderly behaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. The management witnesses who were present at the scene of occurrence have unequivocally deposed about the misbehaviour of the respondent towards his superiors. Their evidence has been discarded by the Tribunal by observing that in the absence of independent evidence, the statements of the workmen who were present at the scene of occurrence could not be believed. The Industrial Tribunal fell in error in discarding the evidence produced by the Management only because the independent witnesses were not produced."
18. In Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v. Management of Usha Breco Ltd. and Another [2008 II LLJ 945 (SC)] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"26. Indisputably, in the event, fresh evidence is adduced before the Labour Court by the Management, the Labour Court will have the 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 25 jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence. But, in a case where the materials brought on record by the Enquiry Officer fall for re-appreciation by the Labour Court, it should be slow to interfere therewith. It must come to a conclusion that the case was a "proper" one therefore. The Labour Court shall not interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer only because it is lawful to do so. It would not take recourse thereto only because another view is possible. Even assuming that, for all intent and purport, the Labour Court acts as an appellate authority over the judgment of the Enquiry Officer, it would exercise appropriate restraint. It must bear in mind that the Enquiry Officer also acts as a quasi-judicial body. Before it, parties are not only entitled to examine their respective witnesses, they can cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the other side. They are free to adduce documentary evidence. The parties as also the Enquiry Officer can also summon witnesses to determine the truth. The Enquiry Officer can call for even other records. It must indisputably comply with the basic principles of natural justice.
.......................................................................
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 26
34. The upshot of our discussion is that the decision of the Labour Court should not be based on mere hypothesis. It cannot overturn a decision of the Management on ipse dixit. Its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Act although is a wide one, must be judiciously exercised. Judicial discretion, it is trite, cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously. It may scrutinize and analyse the evidence but what is important is how it does so."
19. In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others v. Sri Giridhari Sahu and others [2020 III LLJ 257 (SC)] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"27. In Durga Das Basu "COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA" 9th Edition, in regard to the concept of no evidence, we find the following discussion:
"No evidence' does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding, or where, in other words, no tribunal could 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 27 reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. This "no evidence" principle clearly has something in common with the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is aunauthorised and ultra vires. An order made without "any evidence" to support it is in truth, made without order made without "any evidence is worthless, it is equal to having "no evidence" jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied)
28.In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants, viz., Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. S.Viswanathan (supra), it is, inter alia, held as follows:
"12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon...."
20. In Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Gajadhar Nath [2022 I LLJ 254 (SC)] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 28 "5. The scope of an adjudicator under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may be noticed. The domestic inquiry conducted can be permitted to be disputed before the Tribunal in terms of Section 11A of the Act. This Court in a judgment reported as Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. v. Management & Ors. held that in terms of Section 11A of the Act, if a domestic inquiry has been held and finding of misconduct is recorded, the authorities under the Act have full power and jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and to satisfy themselves whether the evidence justifies the finding of misconduct. But where the inquiry is found to be defective, the employer can lead evidence to prove misconduct before the authority. This Court held as under:
"32. From those decisions, the following principles broadly emerge :-
(1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of the employer is justified.
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 29 (2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality.
(3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide. (4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 30 justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra.
(5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry.
(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective.
(7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straight way, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee once it is found that no 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 31 domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective.
(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct.
(9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation. (10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid compensation is, as held by this Court in Management of Panitole Tea Estate v.
2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 32 Workmen, (1971) 1 SCC 742 within the judicial decision of a Labour Court or Tribunal."
21. The Tribunal held with respect to the first charge alleged against the 1st respondent that it was not proved stating that the 1st respondent was not responsible for painting five bungalows instead of three bungalows or for incurring any expenditure more than allotted in the budget. This conclusion was adopted for the reason that MW1 was a qualified Civil Engineer and he was not expected to blindly accept assurance by the 1st respondent that the fund allotted was sufficient to paint 5 bungalows. Regarding Charge No.4(a), the Tribunal held that MW1 Assistant Manager, a qualified Civil Engineer had visited the site and it was difficult to assume that he would have signed on the bill of materials on 24.3.1999 if the number of tiles as per requisition was excessive. As far as charge No.4(b) is concerned, the Tribunal took note of the fact that the 1 st respondent had met with an accident and was on leave from 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 33 14.4.1999 and hence he cannot be blamed for leaving some materials in the work site. With respect to charge No.5 Tribunal held that for want of original estimate for the work in Dr.Mathew Varkey's bungalow, it was not possible to determine whether tiles debited to the job was commensurate with the area of work estimated. Regarding charge No.7 pertaining to Kuttiar Bungalow surrounding/building roof painting, the Tribunal concluded that the charge was not proved. The Tribunal held that it was difficult to assume that the management would have issued requisition to materials department without ascertaining the actual requirement. Similarly, regarding charge No.8 Tribunal accepted the version of the 1st respondent that wastage of tiles will be up to 24.72%.
22. Perusal of Ext.P6 award shows that the Tribunal undertook extensive analysis of the evidence recorded in the course of inquiry and arrived at conclusions partly relying on materials on record and rest by employing guesswork. The 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 34 Tribunal discarded every conclusions of the inquiry officer against the 1st respondent and substituted them with fresh findings. The Tribunal therefore acted in this case absolutely as an appellate authority and arrived at contrary conclusions on each charge proved in the domestic inquiry . The parameters adopted for analysing the evidence was not of preponderance of probability but much higher as if the misconduct should have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts. In view of settled principles of law regarding the scope of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 11A, in my considered view the Tribunal has seriously erred in rejecting every conclusion of the inquiry authority by substituting the findings arrived at by it. Tribunal failed to keep in mind the restricted scope of interference.
23. Failure of the Tribunal to pass a preliminary order was also improper. The learned Senior Counsel for the Management had pointed out that the case was adjourned by 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 35 the Tribunal after hearing the parties on the propriety of inquiry and without passing preliminary order and without hearing the parties further, the award was passed after some time. The said course adopted by the Tribunal was definitely improper. I find considerable merit in the contention that the said omission has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. The proper recourse is therefore to remit the matter for fresh consideration by the Tribunal. I am conscious of the fact that the dispute was registered in the year 2000 and the award was passed in 2006 and consequently there will be some difficulties for the parties when the matter is remanded. However, in my considered view the proper course open to this Court in the facts and circumstances of this case is to remit the matter for fresh consideration.
24. In view of the above discussion, the impugned award is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. As the case was of the year 2000, the Tribunal 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 36 may make endeavour to conclude the proceedings at the earliest. As the award has been set aside and the matter is being remitted, no separate order is required in W.P.(C)No.22663/2006.
Writ Petitions are disposed of as above.
Sd/-
S.MANU JUDGE skj 2025:KER:45806 W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006 37 APPENDIX OF WP(C) 20525/2006 PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF CHARGE SHEET DATED 19.8.1999 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 1ST RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE ENQUIRY OFFICER DATED 15.12.1999.
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE CLAIM STATEMENT FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN I.D. NO.
92/2000 BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT DATED 5.1.2001.
Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF THE WRITTEN STATEMENT FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN I.D. NO.92/00 BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT DTD. 2.8.2001.
Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN I.D. 92/00 BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT DTD 5.10.2001.
Exhibit P6 TRUE COPY OF AWARD PASSED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT IN I.D. 92/00 DTD.
25.1.2006.
2025:KER:45806
W.P.(C).Nos.20525 & 22663 of 2006
38
APPENDIX OF W.P.(C)No.22663/2006
EXT.P1 : TRUE COPY OF THE AWARD DTD.25.1.2006
PASSED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT IN
I.D.No.92/2000.