Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra vs Bhatu Keshavrao Marathe on 6 February, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1993(3)BOMCR458
JUDGMENT D.J. Moharir, J.
1. This is an appeal by the State challenging the acquittal of the respondent accused upon a charge under section 7(1)(d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.
2. The prosecution case is that one Sambhaji Indave is a Forest Guard whose beat includes amongst others two villages Aslod and Doodkheda. The Forest Guard was provided with a government residential quarter at Aslod at a short distance from the public road and quite opposite is a flour mill.
3. According to the prosecution, the complainant Forest Guard in the usual discharge of his duties to prevent illegal collection and appropriation, transport, etc., of forest produce, saw the respondent-accused at about 6.00 p.m. on 30th December 1981 on his tractor to which a trolley was attached. The trolley was full of manure. On the premise that the forest manure was a forest produce, the complainant stopped the accused on the road and made an enquiry as to whether he had a permit to collect and transport the manure. The accused replied that no such permit was necessary. The accused also retorted to him that the complainant was free to take such action against him as he might consider necessary, if manure was forest produce. With that remark the accused is alleged to have driven away his tractor to his village Doodhkheda.
4. The matter did not however stop at that. As per the prosecution case at about 8.00 p.m. the accused again returned to Aslod. He drove right upto to the residential quarters of the Forest Guard, got down and started abusing him very filthily particularly with reference to his past as a member of the scheduled caste. The accused called him by the words `Mahardya' `Dhedgya'. The accused was also alleged to have attempted to rush at and assault the complainant, but timely intervention of the persons in the vicinity including one Bhamtya who was at the flour mill at that time avoided anything more untoward. The accused was pacified and persuaded to go away. The persons who in fact witnessed this abusing on the part of the accused were the complainant's own wife Hansabai, one Chandra Singh, Bhamtya and others.
5. On the next day in the morning, the complainant went and lodged his complaint against the accused at the Police Station Sarangkheda. On this complaint, an offence under section 7(1)(d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act was registered and upon completion of investigation a charge-sheet was presented against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and the trial proceeded.
6. Upon consideration of the evidence of the complainant, his wife Hansabai and the second witness Bhamtya and also considering the statement of the accused during his examination under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate was satisfied that the evidence was neither sufficient nor satisfactory much less convincing for holding that the accused had indulged in abusing the complainant in the name of his low caste, using the words `Mahardya' and `Dhedgya' as alleged. The accused was accordingly acquitted.
7. In challenging this order of acquittal, learned Additional Public Prosecutor urges that the learned Magistrate failed into a grave error in disbelieving the evidence of three prosecution witnesses, namely, the complainant Sambhaji, his wife Hansabai and Bhamtya. The other witness examined at the trial was one Rajaram whose evidence is not of any particular importance except that he proves the situation of the house of the complainant and the flour mill at which the prosecution witness Bhamtya was alleged to have been waiting that evening.
8. The learned Magistrate has observed that it would be difficult to place reliance upon the testimony of Hansabai, she being admittedly the wife of the complainant and hence an interested witness, interested in the successful prosecution launched at the instance of her husband. Even if Hansabai were not to be rejected out-right solely on that ground, there can be no doubt that it would have to be appreciated that great caution in needs to be exercised by her keeping oneself alive to the possibility of her giving an interested account. Starting therefore with the testimony of the complainant himself, it is no doubt true that to a considerable extent his complaint Exhibit 11 would appear to corroborate him but then it is also not clear from the prosecution case as to whether this complaint to be so corroborative, had came to be lodged promptly at the police station Sarangkheda. It is only stated to have been filed `on the next day' of the incident. According to the complainant, he in a way intercepted the tractor which the respondent-accused had been driving towards Doodhkheda at about 6.00 p.m. on that day. He found the trailer attached to it and full of manure. He admits that the tractor was stopped at his signal, by the accused. There is also no doubt about the conversation that took place between the two of them. The complainant inquired from the accused whether he had a proper permit in respect of the forest produce. Now, whether any such occasion to question the accused in respect of the manure arose must depend upon the fact whether in the first instance, that manure does constitute a forest produce, the illegal collection and transporting of which - without a proper permit - constitutes breach of some rules, regulations or the Forest Act. There is nothing on record to show that manure is such a forest produce and that the complainant had therefore a right to stop and question the respondent accused. Whatever that be, the complainant did stop the accused, did make enquiries from him and also received replies, the last remark of the accused being that if the complainant considered the manure to be a forest produce which required a permit for its transport, then, he was free to take such action as he might deem fit. That was the end of the meeting between the two. At this meeting, it is to be appreciated that, the accused is not at all alleged to have indulged in any kind of abusing, much less with any insulting reference to the caste of the complainant, a lower one which could be referred to contemptuously. Nothing of that sort happened in this meeting between the two.
9. The learned Magistrate has, therefore, seriously questioned the possibility of the respondent accused then again going to the house of the complainant to pick up a quarrel with him and during the same, to indulge in abusing him by the words `Mahardya' and `Dhedgya'. I think the learned Magistrate is right when he observes that just for the sake of using these abuses and inviting the commission of an offence under this Act, the respondent-accused would not after going back to him village Doodkheda, again take it into his head to return to Aslod, a distance of two kilometers through the jungles in night, just to use those abusive words referring contemptuously to the complainant's caste. That is the state of evidence and the circumstances which indeed will have to be taken very seriously into consideration while appreciating the testimony of the complainant. One more factor to be added is that, according to the complainant, he had on a few previous occasions also seen the respondent-accused carrying manure in the tractor but had never chosen to question him about the same and no friction between the two had occurred at any time earlier.
10. Necessarily, therefore, the complainant's version corroborated though by the complaint Exhibit 11 needed further corroboration, according to the trial Court. This is the conclusion drawn by the Court but such corroboration was not available from the record. The learned Magistrate declined to place any reliance upon the testimony of Bhamtya. The reasons given by him for so doing are also, according to me, quite valid. For at the time of this incident, the witness Bhamtya claimed to have been present at the flour mill because he wanted to have some quantity of his grain grinded at the flour mill. Bhamtya admits that as the supply of electricity went out, the flour mill could not be run. Inspite of this, he claims to have continued to wait there. This, the learned Magistrate has considered as being a rather remote a possibility. This, for the second reason that Bhamtya admitted that he belongs to village Doodkheda and was required to return to the said village after the corn was grinded at the flour mill. He admitted that the forest road between Doodkheda and Aslod is considered as a dangerous one, danger being from thieves and robbers also and, therefore, village people prefer to cross through the jungle before it becomes dark. Therefore, the possibility of Bhamtya having waited at the flour mill after it became dark just to be able to witness the incident of the altercation between the complainant and the accused in front of the former's house, does not carry conviction. A third and equally important reason put forward by the trial Court is this : Both according to the complainant Sambhaji and his wife Hansabai there were other persons who had gathered there when the accused had indulged in abusing the complainant. Some three persons have been mentioned in the complaint and amongst them one is Chandrasing and the other being his wife Hansabai, the third being this witness Bhamtya. In his deposition the complainant has referred to some more persons, Bhiram Megha Bhil. None of these persons who are residents of the village Aslod itself was examined at the trial. The only witness examined is, therefore, Bhamtya who does not belong to that village and, therefore, according to the learned Magistrate, apart from Bhamtya not belonging to the said village the very remote possibility of his being present at village Aslod at that time renders his testimony also doubtful.
11. It was argued by learned Additional Public Prosecutor that both Bhamtya and the respondent accused are from the village Doodkheda and ordinarily Bhamtya would not support a charge against the accused. However, it would then be an equally pertinent an observation to be made that if the accused is also from a place Doodkheda and the incident occurred at Aslod then the accused being a stranger to the people of Aslod, the villagers of Aslod would also find no difficulty in giving evidence against him and yet none of these villagers have been examined. Considering the careful scrutiny of the evidence as made by the learned Magistrate, the circumspection exercised by him in appreciating the evidence of all these three witnesses, it is difficult to accept the contention that the judgment suffers from any illegality much less perversity. Even if a different view of the evidence led were possible, on appraisal of appeal, that in itself, as is a settled principle of appreciations of evidence does not become a ground for reversing the judgment i.e. unless it is found to be illegal perverse. The present judgment does not fall in that category. The appeal is thus without any merit and therefore dismissed.