Madhya Pradesh High Court
Babu Lal Jain And Anr. vs State Of M.P. And Ors. on 4 April, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(5)MPHT338
Author: Dipak Misra
Bench: Dipak Misra
ORDER Dipak Misra, J.
1. Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have prayed for issue of appropriate writ for quashment of the proceeding in question and the decision taken by the respondents which has led to passing of the impugned order of confiscation of the wooden slabs belonging to them and further to grant any other relief as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
2. The facts as have been unfolded are that the petitioner No. 1 is a resident of village Garhi Tah. Gairatganj, Distt. Raisen and is the father of petitioner No. 2 who is a resident of Bhopal. The said petitioner with a view to construct a house, purchased a plot in Bhopal from J.P. Grah Nirman Samiti. One Dheeraj Kumar resident of village Garhi Tah. Gairatganj, Distt. Raisen, intended to sell that superstructure. The petitioner No. 1 purchased that superstructure because it had lot of wooden structure. The same was purchased for Rs. 6500/-. After dismantling the old structure the petitioner collected the wooden slabs therefrom. The petitioner No. 2 applied for grant of transit Pass for transportation of those wooden slabs from Village Garhi to Bhopal to the Sub Divisional Forest Officer. Alongwith the said application a list of wooden slabs for construction of the house was also enclosed. The Sub Divisional Forest Officer directed the Range Officer to issue the transit Pass for transportation of wooden slabs in question. Despite personal request and approach, the Range Officer did not issue the transit pass. Instead of issuance of transit Pass the Range Officer seized the wooden slabs belonging to the petitioner No. 2 to harrass them. Being aggrieved by the order of seizure the petitioner filed an application for release of the seized material before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raisen who directed the respondents to release the material immediately in favour of the petitioners. The aforesaid order was passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was called in question before the Sessions Judge, Raisen. It is pleaded that the authority with malafide intention on one hand preferred a revision before the learned Sessions Judge and on the other initiated a proceeding for confiscation which was not illegal but unwarranted in view of the challenge in the criminal revision. It has been urged that powers under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act cannot be taken recourse to after the release of property by the Magistrate. It has been pleaded that after intiating the proceeding for confiscation the authority withdrew the revision and completed the confiscation proceedings. It has been putforth that when the criminal revision was withdrawn the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate attained finality but the proceeding for confiscation was completed. Feeling aggrieved by the order of confiscation the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Conservator of Forest but it was dismissed. Eventually the matter travelled to this Court forming the subject matter of WP. No. 140 of 1996 which was dismissed in limine by order dated 11-4-97. It has been setforth in the petition that this Court was not apprised of the fact that during pendency of the criminal revision a proceeding for confiscation could not have been initiated and hence the order of this Court came into existence. It is also pleaded that the whole action of the respondents is reeked with malafide and the petitioner, therefore, is entitled to the relief as prayed for.
3. I have heard Mr. V.K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners for the purpose of admission.
4. It was submitted by Mr. Jain that certain facts and points inadvertantly missed the attention of this Court while deciding the earlier writ petition and, therefore, this writ petition is maintainable. Though in the petition the order passed on earlier occasion has been reproduced, I thought it apposite to call for the record of W.P. No. 140/1996. On a perusal of the same I find the prayer was for quashing of the order dated 12-5-93 passed by the appellate authority and order dated 9-8-95 by which the Revisional Authority affirmed the order passed by the lower authority. There was also a further prayer to command the respondents to release the materials seized from the petitioner. On a perusal of the averments in the present writ petition it transpires that the challenge relates to the same grievance but has been couched in a different manner. At this Juncture, I think it apposite to reproduce the order passed by this Court in W.P. 140/96. It reads as under:
"The matter stands concluded by finding of fact by three Courts below. I am not inclined to interfere with the order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition stands dismissed in limine."
5. Though this order was passed in 1997 the petitioners have visited this Court again in this millennium essentially seeking the similar reliefs. As it appears the two petitioners, namely, Babulal Jain and Nirmal Kumar Jain have indefatigable spirit in knocking at the doors of Courts for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. They are determined not to allow a controversy to put to rest and have no sense of responsibility as citizens of this country not to waste the valuable time of the Courts. Mr. V.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised a novel contention that certain points could not be urged in the earlier writ petition and, therefore, the petitioners have been compelled and constrained to approach this Court again. While so submitting the learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to Paragraph 5.9 of the writ petition to highlight that the petitioners have not suppressed about the earlier order but have taken the stand that the particular point/fact inadvertantly missed the attention of this Court while deciding the earlier writ petition. True it is, no fault can be found with the petitioner for suppression of facts but indubitably they are at fault for not allowing a litigation to be put to rest inasmuch as they have visited this Court in an independent writ petition which is ex facie not maintainable. A litigant at sometime or other has to be satisfied with regard to the verdict of a Court of law though the same may not be in his favour. He cannot be allowed to approach the Court of law at his whim and fancy. A litigant is expected to have due respect for the majesty of law and cannot magnify his individual dissatisfaction by making a colossus complaint which is nothing but a Sisyphian endeavour. The petitioners very well knew that their writ petition was not accepted by this Court and same was dismissed. They could have challenged the order before the higher forum but they chose not to do so. They remained in slumber for a period of four years and to woke up in the beginning of this millennium to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Such an action at the instance of the petitioners is absolutely impermissible and cannot be countenanced by this Court.
6. At this juncture, I may quote a line from Justice Frank Furter from the case of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat Bank, 314 U.S. 63. It reads as under:
"Litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of Chess."
7. At this juncture, I may also profitably quote an observation of Stanley Reed, Stall v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172. It reads as under:
"It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should be a place to begin litigation."
8. In this context I may hasten to add that a litigant cannot be permitted to approach a Court in piecemeal manner. Once the matter was dismissed by this Court it is not open to a litigant to canvass some other point and file an independent writ petition. This is not allowable either in the connotative concept of substantive law or technical realm of procedural law. It can never be conceived that the procedure at all steps is a noxious moss. A litigant cannot be given the liberty to conceive the idea that he has come to Court to play a game of chess.
Such an approach by a litigant is not only ambitious but irrefragbly unscrupulous. An unscrupulous litigant is not to be permitted not only to have any relief but the Courts have a duty to see that their proclivity to knock at the doors of the justice at their pleasure is curbed and scuttled. They cannot be given the freedom to snatch the time which could have been utilized for other needy and waiting litigants.
9. In view of my preceding analysis, I am of the considered view that the writ petition is not maintainable and does not deserve to be entertained. Resultantly, it is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/-.