Allahabad High Court
Gajendra Singh vs High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad ... on 16 January, 2004
Equivalent citations: (2004)3UPLBEC2934
Author: Jagdish Bhalla
Bench: Jagdish Bhalla, Kamal Kishore
JUDGMENT Jagdish Bhalla, J.
1. At the out set we would like to mention that the aforesaid writ petition and the Review Petition has been assigned to this Bench by the Hon'blc the Chief Justice vide order dated 16.8.2002. In pursuance of the said order dated 16.8.2002 the aforesaid matters were listed before this Bench. Both the writ petition and the Review Petition were heard together by us and the same arc being decided by a common judgment.
2. Petitioner who was posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi has filed the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001 challenging the order of suspension dated 18.5.2001, contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition on the ground that the order of suspension has not only been passed in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice, but while passing the impugned order of suspension, the opposite party has relied on the orders passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5238 (MB) of 2000; M/s. Credit Agricoal Indosuez and Ors. v. M/s. S.A.F. Yiest Ltd. and Ors., which in fact are the exparte orders. In addition to the quashing of suspension order, the petitioner has also sought the quashing of the report submitted by the District Judge dated 15.1.2001, contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition.
3. Shorn of details, in brief the facts of the case are that the relevant time petitioner was posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi. On 24.7.2000, S.A.F. Yiest Company Ltd, Sandila, district Hardoi through its General Manager moved an application Under Section 156(3) CrPC on which the petitioner passed an order directing the S.H.O. P.S. Sandila, to register the report and investigate. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner being a Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi was fully competent to pass order for registering the case and for investigation and the petitioner has not committed any illegality in passing such order as it is the petitioner, who has made rules and had allotted police stations to the various other Judicial Magistrates of the First Class. Further by allocating the work to the Magistrates, it cannot be said that he is legally incompetent to pass order on the application made Under Section 156(3), CrPC. It has also been pointed out that after passing the aforesaid order, the case was transferred to the Court of 1st Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi, who was conferred with the jurisdiction for trial in respect of the cases pertaining to P.S.Sandila, district Hardoi.
4. The order dated 24.7.2000, passed by the petitioner was challenged by the Credit Agrocoal Indosuez and others before Division Bench of this Court with the prayer to quash the first information report lodged in pursuance of the order dated 24.7.2000. A Division Bench of this Court while passing the order dated 14.12.2000, observed that the manner in which proceedings of the case Under Section 156, CrPC took place raises some doubts and as such directed the District Judge, Hardoi to conduct a detailed enquiry in the matter and submit his report.
5. In pursuance of the above order, the District Judge conducted a thorough enquiry into the matter and submitted his report dated 15.1.2001. In this report, the District Judge has mentioned that from the comments submitted by the 1st Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate and the distribution order it is clear that jurisdiction of P.S.Sandila was with the 1st Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate. In the report he has mentioned that the date who which the petitioner passed the order on the application made by S.A.F. Yiest Company Ltd., Sandila, the First Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate was present in the office and the petitioner was also not the link officer of the 1st Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate. The District Judge, in his report has stated in unequivocal terms that he docs not agree with the contention of petitioner that he was competent to pass the order in view of Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While concluding, the District Judge has mentioned that the petitioner was devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the application, Under Section 156(3), CrPC, made by S.A.F, Yiest Compete Ltd, and thus the order dated 24.7.2000, passed by the petitioner was without jurisdiction.
6. Dr.L.P. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent petitioner relying on 1985 Crl. LJ 301, Mahesh Chandra etc. v. State of Rajasthan; (1998)8 SCC 686, Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and Ors., contended that the respondent-petitioner was fully competent to pass the order dated 24.7.2000 irrespective of the fact that the offence relating to PS Sandila fall within the jurisdiction of 1st Add. Chief Judicial Magistrate. In other words the respondent-petitioner was having jurisdiction to pass such an order in view of Section 190, CrPC. Placing reliance on (2001) 2 SCC 628, Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. and Anr., learned Counsel stated that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation Under Section 156(3), CrPC and there is nothing illegal in doing so. Thus, the order dated 24.7.2000 passed by respondent-petitioner directing Station House Officer, PS Sandila to register and investigate the case is perfectly legal. As regard to the allegation of misconduct levelled against the respondent-petitioner, Dr. L.P. Shukla, learned Counsel contended that in view of the Apex Court decision in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 491, the order dated 24.7.2000 passed by the petitioner-respondent can be said to be an erroneous exercise of judicial powers but it cannot be treated as misconduct by any stretch of imagination.
7. The contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Writ Petition No. 5238 (MB) of 2000, Credit Agrocoal Indosuez and Ors. v. S.A.F. Yiest Company Ltd, and Ors., was dismissed by this Court on 17.4.2001 wherein quashing of order dated 24.7,2000 passed by the petitioner was sought, thus the petitioner has not committed any misconduct and it cannot be said that the order dated 24.7.2000, passed by him was the out come of nay malice. Therefore, it is contended that no disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner with regard to his exercise and performance of judicial powers. Further, the petitioner has been discriminated as the officers, whose name also find place in the report of District Judge and are actually responsible for issue of non-bailable warrant, no action has been taken against them and as such the impugned order of suspension, passed against him is not only arbitrary and in violation of the principles of natural justice, but is also hit by the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution.
8. Sri Sudhir Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that placing a person under suspension is not a punishment and as such it is not necessary to give opportunity of hearing before placing a Government servant under suspension. The Administrative Committee in its meeting dated 8th May, 2001, before passing the resolution to suspend the petitioner has considered the orders dated 16.3.2001, 14.12.2000 and 22.11.2000 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5238 (MB) of 2000 as also the enquiry report dated 15th January, 2001, Thereafter by the order dated 18th May, 2001 was issued placing the petitioner under suspension in contemplation of enquiry. Learned Counsel has pointed out that the enquiry against the petitioner is not conducted to verify whether the order passed by him as Chief Judicial Magistrate was correct or incorrect but the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against the conduct of the petitioner and to find out as to whether the petitioner is guilty of misconduct or not.
9. Elaborating further, learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that interference in matter like suspension can be shown by the Court only, if the order has been passed by an authority not competent to pass such and order or the order of suspension is contrary to the rules. Reliance in this connection has also been placed on a decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, AIR 1993 SC 1478. Since the Administrative Committee is fully competent to place Judicial Officer under suspension as such it cannot be said that the Administrative Committee has no such power. Further, the petitioner has not a very good reputation in past as Judicial Officer. During his posting at Banda in the year 1988 he involved himself in an altercation and fight with Advocates and the situation at Banda became very explosive. The Administrative Committee after considering the reports resolved for immediate transfer of the petitioner from Banda. The petitioner was awarded adverse remarks in the years 1992-93, 1995- 96. He was awarded censure entry in the year 1999.
10. We have given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and to the submissions made by the rival parties. We are of the view that the order passed by the petitioner may or may not be absolutely correct or justified in law but the contention of the petitioner that this could be no ground to initiate disciplinary proceedings or to draw an inference of misconduct is not correct. Further, it is not mandatory to give opportunity before placing a person under suspension. It is not the case of the petitioner that the authority who has placed him under suspension was not competent to do so or the order of suspension is contrary to statutory rules. No such foundation has been laid by the petitioner in the writ petition. Learned Counsel, for the petitioner has also not been able to show any reasonable good ground for quashing the report of the District Judge, which was submitted by him after obtaining comments of the petitioners and other concerned.
11. In Union of India v. A.N. Saxena, 1992 (64) FLR 1059 (SC), the Court ruled as under:-
"... The initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence. Hence the need for extreme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions. But it is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely, a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive, there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken." [e.s]
12. In another case, namely, Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, AIR (1993) 2 SC 1484, it has been held as under :
"Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct. of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer,"
13. In K.K. Dhawan (supra) and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shrish Kumar R. Patil, AIR 1997 SC 2631, the Apex Court has expressed the view that it is incorrect to say that no disciplinary proceedings could be held against a delinquent in regard to his conduct of passing judicial orders while performing his duty as a Judicial Officer. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Uday Singh, AIR 1997 SC 2286, emphasis has been laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the fact that in judicial service maintenance of discipline is a paramount matter. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently been of the view that in suspension matters the interference should be shown only when the order is contrary to service rules or it has been passed by an authority not competent to pass such an order. The petitioner has not been able to show any reasonable good ground for interference.
14. It appears that certain remarks were made by a learned Division Bench of this Court against which petitioner has made an application and the same is pending as per averments made in the writ petition . It may be mentioned at this juncture that the learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on (2001)3 SCC 54,7 In the matter of: and K.A. Judicial Officer K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540, which relate to expunction of remarkds of remarks and have no applicability in respect of the controversy involved in the present matter. Further no such relief has been sought in Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001.
15. The decisions, referred to above, were followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Chandra Shukla v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2002(46) ALR 138. The controversy involved in this case was that the petitioner was a member of Higher Judicial Service and at the relevant time was posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge at Etah. One application for bail made by accused was rejected by the Incharge Sessions Judge. He filed application for bail before the High Court, which was also rejected. Shortly, thereafter petitioner entertained a second bail application directly in his Court and granted bail. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. After enquiry he was dismissed from service. Against the order of dismissal, Ram Chandra Shukla, filed a writ petition before this Court. Hon'ble G.P. Mathur, J. (at present a Judge of the Hon'ble Supreme Court) while speaking for the Bench observed that it is hot possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner that no disciplinary proceedings could be held against the petitioner in regard to his conduct of passing judicial orders while performing his duty as a Sessions Judge.
16. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent-petitioner to the effect that the order passed by respondent-petitioner does not suffer from any infirmity and even if, it is an erroneous exercise of power, it cannot be treated as misconduct against the petitioner, are of no help to the petitioner. In these circumstances, no interference is warranted in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
17. Now, we deal with the arguments advanced by the Counsel for the parties with regard to the Review Petition No. 12 of 2002, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Gajendra Singh, arising out of Writ Petition No. 1630 (SB) of 2001.
18. This review petition has been file by the applicant seeking review of the judgment and order dated 22.11.2001 passed in Writ Petition No. 1630 (SB) of 2001, Gajendra Singh v. High Court of judicature at Allahabad and Ors.; by a Division Bench of this Court whereby the writ petition preferred by the respondent No. 1-petitioner was allowed and the charge-sheet dated 11.10.2001 was quashed.
19. The main grounds on which learned Counsel for the applicant has sought review/recall of the order dated 22.11.2001 are that it has been wrongly observed that there is no allegation of extraneous consideration and the only allegation against the respondent No. 1 is that he could not have directed the police to register and investigate as the Police Station Sandita, District Hardoi was within the jurisdiction of the 1st Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi, According to him, in fact the allegations of extraneous consideration were against the respondent No. 1-petitioner in the charge-sheet dated 1 lv10,2001 land only after enquiry it can come out that the allegation so levelled against the respondent No. 1 is true or not.
20. Learned Counsel for the applicant has next submitted that the Writ Petition No. 1630 of 2001 filed by the respondent-petitioner was not maintainable being the second writ petition on the same subject matter. The respondent- petitioner has earlier filed Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001 against the suspension order dated 18th May, 2001 and the preliminary enquiry report dated 15.1.2001. This Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001 was pending at the time of filing second writ petition, and the proper course for the respondent-petitioner was to move an application for amendment in Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001 for challenging the charge-sheet issued to him instead of filing a fresh petition. Perhaps, this point was not brought to the knowledge of this Court as such there is an error apparent on the face of record in the impugned judgment dated 22.11.2001. Moreover, the respondent-petitioner while challenging the charge- sheet has not been able to point out any malafides against any individual nor was he able to establish that the charge-sheet has been issued by an authority which has no jurisdiction or competent to issue the same.
21. Lastly, it has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the High Court that it can be easily inferred from the conduct and deeds of the respondent petitioner that the respondent-petitioner passed the order on extraneous considerations overlooking the fact that he was having no jurisdiction to pass order in respect of the police , station which falls within the jurisdiction of another Magistrate and; that the said Magistrate, who was having jurisdiction of that area was available on the said date. According to him to Division Bench while allowing the writ petition of the respondent-petitioner has not considered this aspect of the matter and the fact that judicial proprietary and discipline demans that he should have not exercised the power as such committed an act of misconduct. For this reason also the order deserves to be recalled.
22. Dr. L. P. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- petitioner relying on 1985 Crl. L.J.301, Mahesh Chandra and etc. v. State of Rajasthan; (1998) 8 SCC 686, Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and Ors., contended that the respondent-petitioner was fully competent to pass the order dated 24.7.2000 irrespective of the fact that the offence relating to PS Sandila fall within the jurisdiction of 1st Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate. In other words the respondent-petitioner was having jurisdiction to pass such an order in view of Section 190, CrPC. Placing reliance on (2001) 2 SCC 628, Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. and Anr., learned Counsel stated that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation Under Section 156(3), CrPC and there is nothing illegal in doing so. Thus, the order dated 24.7.2000 passed by respondent-petitioner directing Station House Officer, PS Sandila to register and investigate the case is perfectly legal.
23. Dr. L. P. Mishra, Learned Counsel for the contesting respondent-petitioner submitted that under Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error, which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record. He has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Meera Bhanja (Smt) v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt.), (1995) 1 SCC 170, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the review petition has to be entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of record and not on any other ground, According to learned Counsel the limitation of power of Court under Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC is similar to the jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226. In this connection reliance has also placed on 2002 (20) LCD 69, (U.P. Jal Nigam v. Satyendra Kumar and Ors.; (1997)8 SCC 715, Parison Devi and Ors. v. Sumitri Devi and Ors..
24. It has been also pointed out by Dr. L.P. Mishra learned Counsel for the respondent-petitioner that time and again it has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if complaints arc entertained on trifling matters relating to Judicial Officers which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side, and if the Judicial Officers arc under constant threat of complaints and enquiry on trifling matters, no Judicial Officer would feel secure and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner.
25. Sri Sudhir Agrawal, appearing for the applicant-respondent, while rebutting the contention made by learned Counsel for the petitioner-respondent argued that it is wholly incorrect to say that it is immaterial whether the order passed by the petitioner-respondent in his capacity as a Chief Judicial Magistrate was legal or illegal but it will not preclude the respondent from taking the disciplinary action for his acts which can easily be termed as misconduct and in violation of conduct rules. Placing reliance on a Supreme Court decision rendered in IIP. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan, 1993 Suppl(3) SCC 483, he submitted that even if charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive, no conclusion should be derived without examining the entire record in question and in such cases the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to continue unhindered. He also invited our attention to a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. A. N. Saxena, AIR 1992 SC 1223, and argued with vehemence that the writ petition was allowed on the very first day and the charge- sheet was quashed without giving opportunity to the review-applicant to contest the writ partition by filing counter affidavit as such there is error apparent in the judgment and order dated 22.11.2001 passed in Writ Petition No. 1630 (SB) of 2001.
26. At this juncture, we also deem it proper to refer some of the other cases in which scope and powers of review have been dealt with. In Union of India and Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, AIR (1992) 2 SC 1233, on which Counsel for the review- applicant has placed reliance, it has been held as under:
"The imputations made against the respondent were extremely serious and the facts alleged, if proved, would have established misconduct and misbehavior. It is surprising that without even a counter being filed, at an interim stage, the Tribunal without giving any reasons and without apparently considering whether the memorandum of charges deserved to be enquired into or not, granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings as it has done. If the disciplinary proceedings in such serious matters are stayed so lightly as the Tribunal appears to have done, it would be extremely difficult to bring any wrong-doer to book."
27. In Chandrika Prasad and Ors. v. D.D.C., Faizabad and Ors., 1983 RD 147, this Court while dealing with the maintainability of review petition observed as under :-
"In the present case, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has accepted the reference by passing only one word order "accepted". He has not given a speaking order. He has not mentioned what were the points involved in the case and what has been accepted by him by the said impugned order. In the present case, it also appears that no notice was served upon the petitioners by the Consolidation Officer nor the Deputy Director of Consolidation had issued notice to the petitioners before accepting the reference and passing the aforesaid final order."
28. In Shivdeo Singh and Ors., v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1909, a five Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the power of review of the High Court, it held as under :
"There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. In entertaining B's petition the High Court thereby did what the principles of natural justice required it to do."
29. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. State of UP., (1999) 1 UPLBEC 396 (FB), while considering the powers of review of the High Court arising out of proceedings, under Article 226 of the Constitution held as under :
"We consider appropriate to remind ourselves as to what is the scope of review jurisdiction of this Court rising out of a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This has already been answered by the Supreme Court through its two 5 Judges, decisions and accordingly no longer res-integra. In Shivdeo Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1999, it was held that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in very Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. In State of Gujarat v. Sardar Begum and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1695, it was held that if a patent error has crept in due to inadvertence the same could and should have been suo motu corrected by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction even after the expiry of the ordinary period of limitation, if any, prescribed for a review application."
30. As stated above, petitioner has filed Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001, Gajendra Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, for quashing of the order of suspension dated 18.5.2002 and has also sought quashing of report dated 15.1.2001 submitted by the District Judge. While this writ petition was pending, the charge-sheet dated 11.10.2001 was issued against the petitioner. The petitioner filed another Writ Petition No, 1630 (SB) of 2001 praying for quashing of the charge-sheet dated 1.10.2001. In our view, the contention of Sri Sudhir Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the High Court is correct that the second writ petition was not maintainable when the Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001 filed by the petitioner-respondent was pending in view of catena of decisions of the Apex Court on the subject. The proper course available to the petitioner was to file an application for amendment in the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001 instead of filing second writ petition. Moreover, a perusal of the order dated 22.11.2001, passed in Writ Petition No. 1630 (SB) of 2001, clearly indicates that it was not brought to the knowledge of the Bench which passed the order dated 22.11.2001 that the Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001, filed by the petitioner is already pending. Had this fact been brought to the notice of the Bench, the Bench would not have travelled to pass the order dated 22.11.2001, resulting in quashing of the charge-sheet. In M.M.Thomas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 1 SCC 666, the Hon'ble Supreme Court said that it is the duty of the Court to correct a mistake, if it is brought to its notice. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under ::-
"In M.M.Thomas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 1 SCC 666, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "the High Court as a Court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A Court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A Court of record is undoubtedly a superior Court, which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court as a Court of record has a duty to itself keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in aspect of any orders passed by it, the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it."
31. In paragraph 17 of the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court further held as under :-
"If such power of correcting its own record is denied to the High Court, when it notices the apparent errors its consequence is that the superior status of the High Court will dwindle down. Therefore, it is any proper to think that the plenary power of the High Court would include the power of review relating to errors apparent on the face of record."
32. Naresh Sridhar Mirajkarv. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has identified the superior status of the High Court as a Court of plenary jurisdiction being a Court of record.
33. We may recall at this juncture that the respondent-petitioner has not challenge the charge-sheet on the ground that the authority which has issued the charge-sheet was not having the jurisdiction or that the charge-sheet has been issued against him with malafide intention. Infact, the charge-sheet issued against a delinquent is nothing but commencement of investigation regarding correctness of the allegation contained in the charge-sheet and it docs not in any way cause any stigma on a delinquent employee.
34. We are conscious of the limited scope of review as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Meera Bhanja (supra) but at the same time we have to keep in mind the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.M.Thomas v. State of Kerala (supra), five Judges Bench decision in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 and by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. (supra). In the latter three decisions, referred to above, emphasis has been laid that the power of review can be exercised to correct errors committed by it. In the instant case, as stated above, it was not brought to the notice of the Court that the Writ Petition No. 1000 (SB) of 2001 filed by the petitioner was pending, secondly, opportunity was necessary to the respondent to put their version of defence in view of settled position of law. Lastly, in some mistaken belief, it was incorrectly observed in the order dated 22.11.2001 that there is no allegation of extraneous consideration. As a matter of fact, in the charge-sheet it has been mentioned in clear words that "...which leads to reasonable inference of having been influenced by extraneous consideration. And you thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty and as such committed misconduct..." We may mention here that in departmental proceeding, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and the Court generally avoid with the factual controversy. Further, while challenging the charge-sheet, the petitioner has not alleged any bias much less any malafides cither against the High Court or against any other officer.
35. For the reasons aforesaid, there are genuine and reasonable grounds justifying invocation of powers of the review. Accordingly, the review application is hereby allowed. The order dated 22.11,2001, passed in Writ Petition No. 1630(SB) of 2001 is hereby recalled. The writ petition shall be treated to have been disposed of finally with the direction to conclude the disciplinary proceedings expeditiously on the basis of the charge-sheet dated 11.10.2001.
36. In the preceding paragraphs, we have also indicated the reasons for not interfering with the order of suspension and such, the Writ Petition. No. 1000(SB) of 2001 is dismissed. However, before parting we would like to mention here that in catena of decisions it has been held that suspension is not a punishment but at the same time, we need not forget that when a Government Officer is placed under suspension, he is looked with suspicious eyes not only by his colleagues and friends but by public at large too. In the present case the petitioner was placed under suspension way back in the year 2001 as such we deem it proper to direct that the disciplinary proceedings shall be completed with utmost zeal and the earnest efforts shall be made to conclude the same within a period of three months.