Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shrish Agrawal vs State Of M.P. And Anr. on 10 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(2)MPHT97
ORDER S.P. Khare, J.
1. The question which arises for determination by the Full Bench in the present case is: "Whether Sections 47-A to 47-D of the M.P. Excise Act, 1915 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') are Constitutionally valid ?
2. The M.P. Excise Act, 1915 has been amended by the M.P. Excise (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act No. 22 of 2000) which has come into force from 1-12-2000. The penal provision in Section 34 has been made more condign and deterrent if a person is convicted for an offence for manufacture, transport, import, export, collection, possession and sale of intoxicant if the quantity of the intoxicant being liquor found at the time or in the course of detection of the offence exceeds fifty bulk litres. In such a case as provided in Sub-section (2) he will be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty five thousand rupees but may extend to one lac rupees. Sub-section (3) provides that when an offence covered by Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) is committed and the quantity of liquor found at the time or in the course of detection of such offence exceeds fifty bulk litres, all intoxicants, articles implements, utensils, materials, conveyance etc., in respect of or by means of which the offence is committed, shall be liable to be seized and confiscated. Section 46 (1) of the Act has been recast to provide for confiscation of certain articles and conveyance etc. Section 47 (1) further provides that where in any case tried by him the Magistrate, decides that anything is liable to confiscation under Section 46, he shall order confiscation of the same: Provided that where any intimation under Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 47-A has been received by the Magistrate, he shall not pass any order in regard to confiscation as aforesaid until the proceedings pending before the Collector under Section 47-A in respect of thing as aforesaid have been disposed of, and if the Collector has ordered confiscation of the same under Sub-section (2) of Section 47-A, the Magistrate shall not pass any order in this regard.
3. Sections 47-A to 47-D have been inserted by the Amendment Act of 2000. Section 47-A provides for confiscation of seized intoxicants and articles etc. in the case of quantity of liquor exceeding fifty bulk litres by the Collector. It is also provided in this Section that he may during the pendency of the proceedings for such confiscation also pass an order of interim nature for the custody, disposal etc. of the confiscated intoxicants and articles etc., as may appear to him to be necessary in the circumstances of the case. Sub-section (3) of Section 47-A envisages (a) an intimation about initiation of proceedings for confiscation of seized intoxicants and articles etc. to the Court having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure has been made, (b) a notice in writing to the person concerned, (c) affording an opportunity to such person of making a representation against proposed confiscation, and (d) giving of hearing to him.
4. Sections 47-B, 47-C and 47-D are more relevant for the present purpose and are being reproduced as below:--
"47-B, Appeal against the order of confiscation.--(1) Any person, aggrieved by an order of confiscation passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 47-A, may within thirty days of such order, prefer an appeal to the Divisional Commissioner of the concerned division or to any other officer authorised for the purpose by a notification of the State Government (hereinafter referred to as 'the appellate authority'). Such appeal memorandum shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed against.
(2) The appellate authority on presentation of such memorandum of appeal (shall), issue a notice to the appellant and to any other person who is likely to be adversely affected by the order that may be passed in appeal.
(3) The appellate authority after hearing the parties to the appeal, shall pass an order confirming, reversing or modifying the order of confiscation appealed against:
Provided that he may pass such order of interim nature for custody, disposal etc. of the confiscated articles during the pendency of appeal, as may appear to him just or proper in the circumstances of the case but he shall have no power to stay the order of confiscation appealed against during the pendency of appeal.
47-C. Revisions before the Court of Session against the order of the appellate authority.--(1) Any party to appeal aggrieved by the final order by the appellate authority under Sub-section (3) of Section 47-B, may, within 30 days of such order submit a petition or revision solely on the ground of illegality of such order to the Court of Session within the sessions division.
(2) The Court of Session may, if it finds any illegality in the order of appellate authority, confirm, reverse or modify the order passed by the appellate authority:
Provided that the Court of Session shall have no power to stay the order of confiscation of the order passed by the appellate authority during pendency of the petition for revision before it.
47-D. Bar of jurisdiction of the Court under certain circumstances.--Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act, or any other law for the time in force, the Court having jurisdiction to try offences covered by Clause (a) or (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 34 on account which such seizure has been made, shall not make any order about the disposal, custody etc. of the intoxicants, articles, implements, utensils, materials, conveyance etc. seized after it has received from the Collector an intimation under Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 47-A about the initiation of the proceedings for confiscation of seized property."
5. The petitioner claims that he is owner of Jeep No. MP 20 HA 0073; he is said to have given this jeep to M/s. Sanjeev Brothers who are dealing in foreign liquor; this jeep was seized on 16-5-2001 by the police on the allegation that it was illegally transporting Indian Made Foreign Liquor exceeding fifty bulk litres; the petitioner submitted an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur under Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Code') for release of this vehicle on supurdnama but it was rejected by him by order dated 28-6-2001 in view of the jurisdictional bar created by Section 47-D of the Act; his application submitted before the Collector under Section 47-A of the Act for the same relief has been rejected by his order dated 21-11-2001 and now an appeal under Section 47-B of the Act is said to be pending.
6. The petitioner challenged the Constitutional validity of the provisions contained in the Amendment Act of 2000 regarding the confiscation of the articles including the vehicle by filing the present writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking the relief that the respondents be directed to release the vehicle on his supurdnama. This petition was heard by a Division Bench of this Court. Our learned brother Ajit Singh, J,, in the judgment proposed to be delivered on behalf of the Division Bench repelled the contention of the petitioner with regard to the validity of Sections 47-A and 47-D of the Act and held that these provisions which in effect take away the jurisdiction of the Court trying the offence to consider the question of confiscation of the articles and the vehicle etc. and confer the same on an executive authority are valid and do not violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It has been observed that the power conferred on the Collector is of quasi-judicial character and he would be exercising his power in dealing with the question of confiscation in a reasonable manner consistent with the principles of natural justice. It has also been stated that the Collector in a suitable case can release the vehicle on supurdnama as he has been specifically empowered to pass an order of interim nature for the custody of the articles and the vehicle etc. "as may appear to him to be necessary in the circumstances of the case". It has been emphasised that the Collector would pass the order on the question of confiscation or interim release within "a reasonable time". However, the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C of the Act which deprives the Court of Session the power "to stay the order of confiscation" during the pendency of the revision has been sought to be held as "wholly arbitrary and unreasonable" and therefore offending Article 14 of the Constitution and is bad in law and it has been proposed to be struck down.
7. Dipak Mishra, J., in his separate order concurred with the view that the provisions in Sections 47-A and 47-D are intra vires and do not offend Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. But he disagreed with the conclusion that the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C of the Act is ultra vires being arbitrary and unreasonable thereby inviting the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. It has been observed in Para 31 of his opinion: "the Court of Session can pass any interim order which the appellate authority can pass. It is only deprived of the power to pass an order of stay". It has been further stated that certain observations of the Division Bench in Basant Kumari v. State of M.P. 1990 MPU 4, are "too broadly stated" particularly when it states that the power of Court to grant stay can never be curtailed. The learned Judge observed: "It cannot be stated, that if there is divesting of power relating to grant of stay qua the Court of Session that would amount to entrenchment of legislature to the judicial process may not be correct". It has been expressed that the observations of the Division Bench "requires reconsideration by the Larger Bench". In view of this opinion this Full Bench has been constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice by order dated 20-2-2003.
8. The learned Counsel for both the sides have been heard at length. As stated above Sections 47-A and 47-D have been held to be valid by both the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench. As a matter of fact this is sequal to the pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court in Kailash Chand v. State of M.P., AIR 1995 MP 1. In that case the parallel provisions in the Indian Forest Act, 1927, as amended by the Indian Forest (M.P. Amendment) Act, 1983 were challenged. The scheme of the amended provisions partially separated the process of confiscation from the process of prosecution. The power of the Court regarding disposal of property was made subject to the jurisdiction of the authorised officer with regard to that aspect. After scanning the amended provisions the Division Bench held that criminal prosecution is not an alternative to confiscation proceedings. The two proceedings are parallel proceedings, each having a distinct purpose and object. The object of confiscation proceeding is to enable speedy and effective adjudication with regard to confiscation of the produce and the means used for committing the offence. The object of the prosecution is to punish the offender. Thus, the plea that two procedures are prescribed for the same purpose and to cover the same area would not be tenable. The plea that the procedure for confiscation is more drastic than the procedure for prosecution is equally untenable. In one case, confiscation may result if the authorised officer is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed. In the other, the Magistrate must be satisfied that the charge has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot be said that there is no safeguard for the persons subjected to confiscation procedure. The Magistrate is informed about the confiscation proceeding. Show-cause notice is given inviting representation. Hearing is given. The expression "hearing" is one of broad import. It includes opportunity to adduce evidence also. Appeal lies to a Superior Officer, namely, Conservator of Forests. Revision lies to the Sessions Court whose decision is final. The existence of these substantial safeguards negatives any possibility of denial of justice. The provision in Section 52 (3) cannot therefore be said to be arbitrary. It has been further observed that the authorised officer while discharging his statutory function in regard to confiscation cannot be regarded as a Judge in his own cause. The doctrine of bias can have no application in relation to the procedure. There cannot be any apprehension or real likelihood of bias or whittling down of purity of administration of justice. The decision of the Authorised Officer is subject to appeal before the Conservator of Forests and to revision before the Court of Session. The appellate and revisional authorities have ample power to correct order of confiscation. Therefore it cannot be said that the provision of confiscation violates principles of a natural justice. There is nothing in the said provision which even remotely can be regarded as violative of Articles 19(1)(g) or Article 21. It is also stated : Confiscation proceeding is quasi judicial proceeding and not a criminal proceeding. Proof beyond reasonable doubt and proof of mens rea are foreign to the scope of the confiscation proceeding. Confiscation proceedings are on the basis of the 'satisfaction' of the Authorised Officer in regard to the commission of forest offence. The authorised officer has incidental or ancillary power of passing an order of temporary custody or possession of the property. Similarly, the appellate authority and revisional authority also must be taken to have such "incidental and ancillary" power. The alternative scheme of confiscation proceedings has been provided partly to overcome the adverse consequences resulting from delay in disposal of criminal prosecutions involving confiscation. Though the provisions do not prescribe time limit for termination of confiscation proceedings, yet it would be reasonable to expect that the Authorised Officers who have to deal with confiscation proceedings whose number is small compared to the number of criminal prosecutions pending in the State would be in a position to dispose of the proceedings within a reasonable time.
9. The Division Bench has relied upon in the above case the decision of Supreme Court in Divisional Forest Officer v. G.V. Sudhaker Rao and Ors., AIR 1986 SC 328. In that case similar provisions introduced in the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967, were under challenge. The Supreme Court observed as under:--
"The change in the law was brought about with a view to prevent the growing menace of ruthless exploitation of Govt. Forest by illicit felling of teak and other valuable forest produce by unscrupulous traders, particularly from Reserved Forests by providing for a machinery for confiscation of illegally felled trees or forest produce by forest authorities..... There was no provision in the Act enabling the Forest Officers to confiscate such timber or forest produce and implements etc. used for committing forest offences even in a case where he was satisfied that a forest offence had been committed. In view of this, the Forest Deptt. was finding it difficult to curb the forest offences effectively and quickly in spite of the fact that large scale smuggling of forest produce was on the increase. Hence; it was thought necessary to empower officials of the Forest Deptt. seizing any property under Sub-section (1) of Section 44, instead of merely making a report of seizure to the Magistrate also to order confiscation of timber of forest produce seized with all the tools, boats, vehicles, etc. used in committing such offences. The intendment of the Legislature in enacting Act 17 of 1976 was, therefore, to provide for two separate proceedings before two independent forums in the Act, one for confiscation by a departmental authority exercising quasi-judicial powers conferred under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the goods forming the subject-matter of the offence and the other for the trial of the person accused of the offence so committed.... It would, therefore, appear that there can be no conflict of jurisdiction between the authorised officer acting under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act to direct confiscation of the property seized under Sub-section (1) on his being satisfied that a forest offence has been committed and the Magistrate making an order for confiscation of the property so seized on conviction of an accused for a forest offence under Section 45. The power of confiscation conferred on the authorised officer under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act is separate and distinct from the power of the Magistrate to direct confiscation on conviction of an accused under Section 45......"
The Supreme Court further proceeded to observe that the general provisions of Sections 452 and 457 of the Code must "necessarily yield where a statute makes a special provision with regard to forfeiture of the property and its disposal".
10. It is to be noticed that in the present case the Collector has the discretion to order the confiscation or not. That is clear from the use of the word 'may' in Sub-section (2) of Section 47-A. He has to record in writing the grounds for ordering the confiscation. He has also been empowered to pass an order of interim nature for the custody and disposal etc. of the confiscated intoxicant, articles and conveyance etc. "as may appear to him to be necessary in the circumstances of the case". Thus, in a suitable case the conveyance or other material can be placed on supurdnama of any person till the disposal of confiscation proceedings. The Collector has to give an opportunity of hearing to the affected person before passing any order on the question of confiscation. In this connection it would be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Company, AIR 1967 SC 276. In that case it was found that Section 11(d) of the Opium Act, 1878 as applicable to Madhya Bharat provided that "the property detailed herein-below shall be confiscated". Interpreting these words the Supreme Court held that the confiscation is "permissible and not obligatory". It was observed that the use of the word "shall" does not always mean that enactment is obligatory or mandatory; it depends upon the context in which the word 'shall' occurs and the other circumstances. It has been held that Section 11 of the Madhya Bharat Act is not obligatory and it is for the Court to consider in each case where the vehicle in which the contraband opium is found or is being transported should be confiscated or not, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. In Section 47-A of the Act, as already discussed the word "may" has been used instead of "shall". Therefore, the Collector also while considering the question of confiscation under Section 47-A (2) of the Act would keep in mind that the confiscation is not obligatory in all cases but the judicial discretion conferred on him is to be exercised keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case. This legal position is being made clear as the learned Counsel for the petitioner expressed an apprehension that the Collector may pass order of confiscation in all the cases brought to him under Section 47-A of the Act.
11. Sections 47-A to 47-D have been held by both the learned Judges of the Division Bench to be infra vires not offending any provision of the Constitution. In our view also these provisions do not suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality.
12. Now coming to the question whether the proviso to Section 47-C infringes Article 14 of the Constitution, it is noticed that there is a proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 47-B of the Act which also lays down that the appellate authority "shall have no power to stay the order of confiscation appealed against during the pendency of the appeal". The petitioner has not specifically challenged this curb on the power of the appellate authority in the writ petition. Our learned brother Ajit Singh, J., has also not expressed any view that the curtailment of power of the appellate authority is in any way "arbitrary and unreasonable" as he has held while dealing with the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C of the Act which imposes a ban on the power of Court of Session to "stay the order of confiscation". This is presumably for the reason that the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 47-B specifically provides that the appellate authority "may pass such order of interim nature for custody, disposal etc. of the "confiscated articles" during the pendency of appeal, as may appear to him just or proper in the circumstances of the case". By exercising this power, the Appellate Court can preserve and keep intact the confiscated articles during the pendency of appeal and those would be available for being dealt with in conformity with the final order of the appellate authority. Thus, the anxiety to protect the property in its original form is taken care of by the provision to pass an order of interim nature during the pendency of the appeal as may be considered just and proper in the circumstances. It follows that if the property whish has been confiscated by the order of the Collector can be kept preserved till the disposal of appeal, then the restriction on the power '"to stay the order of confiscation" appealed against during the pendency of the appeal cannot be held to be arbitrary or irrational.
13. Section 47-C of the Act, as reproduced above, provides in Sub-section (2) that the Court of Session may if it finds any illegality in the order of the appellate authority confirm, reverse or modify the order passed by the appellate authority. This revisional power has been conferred on the Court of Session qua the Court and, therefore, this Court would have all the powers conferred upon it under the Code to deal with the revision petition. Section 397 of the Code empowers the Sessions Judge to call for the record of the case and to direct that the execution of any "order" be suspended. This power of suspending the execution of the order of appellate authority under Section 47-B of the Act would not be available to the Court of Session "to stay the order of confiscation" of the appellate authority as the statutory provision in the proviso to Section 47-C of the Act would supersede the general provision in Section 397 of the Code. But the Court of Session being in seisin of the matter can pass any other "incidental or ancillary order" including the order for custody, disposal etc. of the confiscated articles during the pendency of the revision as has been conferred on the appellate authority. It is true that the proviso to Sub-section (2) of the Section 47-C does not specifically confer on the Court of Session the power to pass the order of interim nature for custody and disposal of the confiscated articles during the pendency of revision as has been conferred specifically on the appellate authority, but, as already stated the Court of Session can pass an interim order for the purpose of preservation and custody of the property till the disposal of the revision in exercise of its general power except that it cannot stay the order of confiscation. Section 399 of the Code provides that the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 401. Section 401 of the Code provides that in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called, the Court may exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by Section 386 of the Code. Now adverting to Section 386 of the Code it is found that Clause (e) of the Section empowers the Court to make any "incidental order that may be just or proper". It is under this provision and also in exercise of its general power stated above, the Revisional Court can pass an interim order of the nature specified in the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 47-B of the Act. As the revisional power was being conferred on a Court of Session qua the Court it was unnecessary to provide in the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C that the Court of Session would have the power to pass an order of interim nature of the kind specified in the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 47-B of the Act. There is no prohibition in the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C to pass an order of interim custody or disposal of the confiscated property and the Court of Session can legitimately direct interim custody or disposal in exercise of its incidental and ancillary power. In case of Kailash Chand v. State of M.P., AIR 1995 MP 1, referred above it has been clarified that the revisional authority can pass orders regarding temporary custody or disposal of the property. That is an incidental and ancillary power of the Court of Session while exercising the revisional power.
14. In Basant Kumari v. State of M.P., 1990 MPLJ 4, a Division Bench of this Court was called upon, inter alia to decide Constitutional validity of Section 42-A of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (as amended by M.P. Act 8 of 1989) which provided: "No stay shall be granted by appellate authority under Section 41 or by the revisional authority under Section 42". The Division Bench held that if an appellate or revisional authority is prohibited from passing an order of stay in cases where a strong prima facie case is made out, then even if ultimately the impugned order passed by the competent authority declaring any land as surplus is set aside, restitution would be practically impossible if the land in question has already been distributed to other persons, as provided by the Act. For the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction, an appellate authority grants stay. That is why it has been observed by the Supreme Court in Income-tax Officer, Cannore v. M.K. Mohammad Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430, that the Appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. In order that an appellate authority may not exercise this power in a routine way, the statute may provide that no order for stay shall be passed unless certain conditions are satisfied so that the appellate authority acts rightly and fairly towards all the parties concerned. But by prohibiting an appellate or revisional authority from passing an order staying the order of the competent authority, whose order is the subject-matter of appeal or revision, the decision of the appellate or revisional authority setting aside the order of the competent authority is likely to be rendered ineffective in so far as restoration of land distributed by the competent authority is concerned. This would therefore, virtually amount to modification of the order passed by the appellate or revisional authority and would, in a sense, constitute encroachment by the Legislature on the judicial power exercised by the appellate or revisional authority. The provisions of Section 42-A are, therefore, violative of the Rule of law and deserve to be struck down.
15. It is clear from the above that the anxiety of the Court was that the property in dispute should be preserved or kept intact, as far as possible, so that it may be dealt with in conformity with the final order of the Appellate or Revisional Court. It is for this purpose that interim order of stay is generally granted to see that the property in dispute is not frittered away or disposed of before the final decision of the dispute by the Appellate or the Revisional Court. It is the deprivation of this power of granting stay by the Appellate or Revisional Court which has been struck down keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the text of the statute. If the appellate or the revisional authority can keep the property in dispute intact by passing a suitable order, it cannot be said that the restriction on the power to stay the impugned order would always be unreasonable or against the rule of law. The observations of the Division Bench referred above were made in the light of the facts of that case and the words of the statute which were under consideration. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has recently observed in P.S. Rao v. State of T.N., AIR 2002 SC 1334, that there is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Similarly in State Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills, AIR 2002 SC 834, by a three Judge Bench, it has been stated that observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes.
16. Now coming to the case in hand, as stated above, the Court of Session in exercise of its revisional power can pass the orders of incidental and ancillary nature for preserving and keeping intact the articles or other property which have been confiscated by the Collector and such a confiscation has been upheld by the appellate authority. In such a situation statutory provision restricting the power of the Revisional Court to "stay the order of confiscation" cannot be said to be arbitrary, unreasonable or against the rule of law violating Article 14 of the Constitution. It is well settled that in considering the validity of a Statute, the presumption is in favour of its constitutionality and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of constitutional principles. For sustaining the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may take into consideration mat-
ters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived. It must be always be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination, if any, is based on adequate grounds. It is well settled that Courts will be justified in giving a liberal interpretation to the section in order to avoid constitutional invalidity. These principles have given rise to rule of reading down the section if it becomes necessary to uphold the validity of the sections. (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Radhakrishan, AIR 1979 SC 1588). This principle of law has been reiterated in several subsequent decisions.
17. In view of above legal position the provision depriving the Court of Session of the power "to stay the order of confiscation" during the pendency of the revision cannot be held to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or contrary to the rule of law if it is recognised that the Court of Session has the power to pass order of interim nature for custody and disposal of confiscated articles during pendency of the revision as have been conferred on the appellate authority by a specific provision. By invoking such power the Court of Session would be in a position to preserve and protect the property even if the order of confiscation is not stayed. The proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C of the Act can be read down to uphold the validity of this provision.
18. The proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 47-B of the Act enables the appellate authority to pass order of interim nature for custody and disposal etc. of the confiscated articles even after the order of confiscation passed by the Collector. If the appellate authority can pass an appropriate order in respect of the confiscated property for its preservation, the Revisional Court also, for the same reason can preserve and protect the confiscated property so as to be dealt with in conformity with the final order of the Revisional Court.
19. Consequently, the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C of the Act restricting the power of the Court of Session "to stay the order of confiscation" during the pendency of the revision is held to be Constitutionally valid by reading it down to the extent that the Court of Session would have the power to pass such order of interim nature for the custody and disposal etc. of the confiscated property during pendency of the revision, as may appear to it just and proper in the circumstances of the case as have been conferred on the appellate authority by the proviso to Section 47-B (3) of the Act so that if necessary the property may be kept intact till the decision of the revision petition. Accordingly, the petitioner may pursue the remedy of appeal and revision as provided in the Act. Such appeal or revision should be disposed of as early as possible. The writ petition is dismissed.