Madras High Court
***** vs Regional Provident Fund Commissioner on 11 December, 2019
Author: J.Nisha Banu
Bench: J.Nisha Banu
1
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 06.11.2019
PRONOUNCED ON : 11.12.2019
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE J.NISHA BANU
S.A(MD)No.2120 of 2003
and
M.P.(MD).No.1 of 2008
The Palliadi Handloom Weavers'
Co-op Production and Sale Society,
Limited No.2489 rep.by its
Special Officer,
Valvachakoshtam Village,
Kanyakumari District.
***** Appellant/Appellant/Plaintiff
1.Regional Provident Fund Commissioner,
Sub-Divisional Office,
43-B1 Trivandrum Road,
Tirunelveli-627 002.
2.The Recovery Officer,
Employees Provident Fund Organisation,
Sub-Regional Office, Tirunelveli.
3.Srikantan
4.Sornakaran
5.Ganapathy
6.Saroja
7.Hemalatha
Respondents 3 to 7 were set exparte
in the trial Court and the appellate Court
since no relief is asked for against them.
Hence, they are given up in the second appeal
... Respondents/Respondents/Defendants
http://www.judis.nic.in
2
PRAYER:- Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of
Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree
in A.S.No.32 of 2000 on the file of the Sub-Court,
Padmanabapuram, dated 13.08.2003 confirming the
judgment and decree in O.S.No.183 of 1998 on the file
of the Principal District Munsif Court,
Padmanabapuram dated 13.01.2000.
For Appellant :Mr.A.R.Nixon
For Respondent :Mr.K.Gurunathan
*******
JUDGMENT
The Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.32 of 2000 on the file of the Sub-Court, Padmanabapuram, dated 13.08.2003 confirming the judgment and decree in O.S.No.183 of 1998 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Padmanabapuram dated 13.01.2000.
2. The background facts in which the present Civil Appeal has been filed are briefly stated as under:
2.1. The appellant before this Court is the unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.183 of 1998 and http://www.judis.nic.in 3 unsuccessful appellant in A.S.No.32 of 2000. Against the concurrent findings, the present second appeal has been filed by the appellant.
2.2. The appellant Society is registered under the Co-operative Societies Act 30/1993 whose members main business is to get the yarn from the Society and convert the same into textile goods.
According to the respondents, the Society had 479 members when the enquiry was conducted on 29.09.1997. The Society started functioning from 13.06.1945 and continued to pay wages to its members and therefore, the first respondent herein conducted inquiry and issued with coverage notice on 30.09.1997 and allotted separate EPF Code bearing No.33252 covering the establishment with effect from 01.09.1978 and communicated to the appellant herein followed with Section 7(A) summon notice under the EPF Act was issued on 13.10.1997 for the period to till the date of notice. The appellant through his then Secretary, namely, Arumugam and Assistant Manager C.Vijayakumari participated in the inquiry and after perusal of the http://www.judis.nic.in 4 consolidate statement of salary given to the weaving members and staff determined the contribution by way of speaking order to a sum of Rs.12,05,453.75 vide order dated 17.11.1997.
2.3. The appellant challenged the said order before the Civil Court in O.S.No.183 of 1998 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Padmanabapuram who dismissed the suit on 13.01.2000 and later the first appellate Court also dismissed A.S.No.32 of 2000 on 20.03.2000. Aggrieved over the same, the appellant is before this Court for the relief stated supra.
3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that first of all, there was no employer-employee relationship between the appellant Company and the workers engaged by them. The workers were not employees under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act as alleged by the respondents herein. He further submitted that the weaving machines used by the workers were owned by them and not provided by http://www.judis.nic.in 5 the appellant Society. The workers worked from their homes and not at the production centers of the appellant Society. Hence, the work performed by them, could be done by their relatives, or any other person on their behalf. Furthermore, the workers were not bound to report to the production centers regularly, nor were they required to work at the production centers. No department action can be taken against the workers, if they did not turn up to the Society. The appellant Society exercised no supervisory control over the workers. He also submitted that they had no direct or indirect control over the workers. The conversion of cloth into garment could be done by any person on behalf of the workers. Hence, the appellant Society did not exercise any supervisory control over the workers. The appellant further submitted that on an erroneous appreciation of facts, the respondents had wrongly come to the conclusion that the appellant is covered under the Employees' Provident Funds Act and it is also liable to pay contributions. In these circumstances, the appellant is before this Court.
http://www.judis.nic.in 6
4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the workers employed by the appellant Society fall within the definition of “employee” under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act. He further submitted that even before the trial Court, they filed written statement that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try this case. Therefore, issue was framed in regard to the jurisdiction as well as the other issues. The learned trial Court taking note of the contribution paid by the appellant insofar as the other Schemes namely, Tamil Nadu Savings and Security Scheme wherein the weaver has to contribute 8% of its wages and the Tamil Nadu Government will contribute 4% and the Government of India will contribute 4% came to the conclusion that the appellant is liable to make contribution towards the workers. Further, it took note of the fact that there was no objection made by the appellant in regard to the allotment of the EPF Code, coverage notice and enquiry. Therefore, according to the http://www.judis.nic.in 7 respondents, the appellant is liable to pay Provident Fund contribution in respect of those workers.
5. At the time of admitting the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration:-
(i) Whether both the Courts below failed to note that the share holders are the employers since the appellant society consist of share holders?
(ii) Whether both the Courts below
failed to note that the members of the
appellant society are given various
benefits under various Tamil Nadu
Government Orders like pension etc., which have been stated in paragraphs 8 to 10 of the plaint?
(iii) Whether both the Courts below failed to note that the appellant was not given any information regarding the code No.TN/II by the respondents 1 and 2?
http://www.judis.nic.in 8 5.1. Subsequently, the appellant herein has raised additional substantial question of law, which is as follows:-
“ Whether the judgment of the Courts below based on order in W.P.No.4392 of 1997 is correct since the Writ Order has been set aside in W.A.No.1947 of 1997?”
6. This Court heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and perused the pleadings and written submissions and citations relied on by the parties.
6.1. It is not in dispute that the appellant is a handloom weaving cooperative society registered under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act and Rules. They are governed by their own bye-laws and special bye- laws. From the facts, it could be seen that the main objective of the appellant Society was to encourage, promote, develop, setup or cause to be setup a unit with a view to provide gainful employment to people possessing skills in garments, and its allied activities, especially to the people http://www.judis.nic.in 9 who are from the economically weaker sections of the Society. To sum up, the appellant engaged workers who were provided with fabric to be made into garments at their own homes. The main object of the appellant is to uplift the weaving community in and around their area by providing employment. The Central and the State Governments have made contributions for operating the society. The weavers are the members of the society. The appellant-society does not have any looms. The yarn is directly supplied to its members and in turn the members weave the yarn in their home and supply the finished cloth to the society.
6.2. It is also not in dispute that a coverage notice was issued by the respondents followed by EPF code and the representative of the appellant Society also appeared before the respondents and a detailed speaking order was passed by the respondents. At that time, no objection was raised by the appellant society. Furthermore, it is not under dispute that wages were paid to those workers for the work done by them. Therefore, the http://www.judis.nic.in 10 Provident Fund Officer vide Order dated 30.09.1997 held that the workers engaged for making garments were covered by the definition of “employee” under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act. It was assessed towards Provident Fund dues of the appellant Company. The appellant challenged the aforesaid Order by filing O.S.No.183 of 1998 before the Principal District Munsif Court, Padmanabapuram and the Court below dismissed the same vide its order dated 13.01.2000. The appeal preferred by the appellant met the same fate. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the present Civil Appeal has been filed by the Provident Fund Office.
7. After culling out the facts, the short issue which arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether the workers employed by the appellant Society are covered by the definition of “employee” under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act or not. Section 2(f) of the EPF Act is setout hereinbelow for ready reference:
http://www.judis.nic.in 11 “2(f) “employee” means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets, his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person:-
(i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment;
(ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of 1961), or under the standing orders of the establishment;” (emphasis supplied) 6.1.
The definition of “employee” under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act is an inclusive definition, and is widely worded to include any person engaged either directly or indirectly in connection with the work of an establishment.
http://www.judis.nic.in 12 7.1. In the present case, the workers employed by the appellant Society were provided all the raw materials from the appellant Society. With that material, the workers were required to make textile goods as per the specifications given by the appellant Society. The workers could make the garments at their homes, and provide them to the appellant Society. The appellant Society had the absolute right to reject the finished product i.e. the garments, in case of any defects. When that is the factual position, the mere fact that the workers made garments at home would make no difference at all. It is the admitted position that the workers were paid wages directly by the appellant Society as per the work done by them for every garment.
7.2. In addition to, the issue involved in the present case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House and Ors. v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments and Ors reported in (1974) 3 SCC 498. The appellants http://www.judis.nic.in 13 therein were engaged in the business of producing garments. They employed workers who were provided with the cloth, and were instructed by the appellants how to stitch it. The workers were paid on piece rate basis. If a worker failed to stitch a garment as per the instructions, the appellants rejected the work, and asked the worker to restitch the garment. This Court held that such workers fell within the definition of “person employed” under Section 2(14) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Shops and Establishments Act, 1956. It was held that:
“35. Quite apart from all these circumstances, as the employer has the right to reject the end product if it does not conform to the instruction of the employer and direct the worker to restitch it, the element of control and supervision as formulated in the decisions of this Court is also present.” (emphasis supplied) 7.3. On the issue where payment is made by piecerate to the workers, would they be covered by the definition of “employee”, this Court in Shining http://www.judis.nic.in 14 Tailors v. Industrial Tribunal II, U.P., Lucknow and Ors.,3 held that:
“5. We have gone through the record and especially the evidence recorded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has committed a glaring error apparent on record that whenever payment is made by piece rate, there is no relationship of master and the servant and that such relationship can only be as between principal and principal and therefore, the respondents were independent contractors. Frankly, we must say that the Tribunal has not clearly grasped the meaning of what is the piece rate, If every piece rated workmen is an independent contractor, lakhs and lakhs of workmen in various industries where payment is correlated to production would be carved out of the expression ‘workmen’ as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. In the past the test to determine the relationship of employer and the workmen was the test of control and not the method of payment. Piece rate payment meaning thereby payment correlated to production is a well recognised mode of payment to industrial workmen. In fact, wherever possible that method of payment has to be encouraged so that there is http://www.judis.nic.in 15 utmost sincerity, efficiency and single minded devotion to increase production which would be beneficial both to the employer, the workmen and the nation at large. But the test employed in the past was one of determining the degree of control that the employer wielded over the workmen. However, in the identical situation in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House and Ors. v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments and Anr. (1973) IILLJ 495 SC Methew, J. speaking for the Court observed that the control idea was more suited to the agricultural society prior to Industrial Revolution and during the last two decades the emphasis in the field is shifted from and no longer rests exclusively or strongly upon the question of control. It was further observed that a search for a formula in the nature of a single test will not serve the useful purpose, and all factors that have been referred to in the cases on topics, should be considered to tell a contract of service. Approaching the matter from this angle, the Court observed that the employer's right to reject the end product if it does not conform to the instructions of the employer speaks for the element of control and supervision. So also the right of removal of the workman or not to give the work has http://www.judis.nic.in 16 the element of control and supervision. If these aspects are considered decisive, they are amply satisfied in the facts of this case. The Tribunal ignored the well laid test in law and completely misdirected itself by showing that piece rate itself indicates a relationship of independent contractor and error apparent on the record disclosing a total lack of knowledge of the method of payment in various occupations in different industries. The right of rejection coupled with the right to refuse work would certainly establish master servant relationship and both these tests are amply satisfied in the facts of this case. Viewed from this angle, the respondents were the workmen of the employer and the preliminary objection therefore, raised on behalf of the appellant employer was untenable and ought to have been overruled and we hereby overrule it.” (emphasis supplied).
7.4. Similarly, in the case of M/s P.M. Patel & Sons and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors reported in (1986) 1 SCC 32, the appellants therein were engaged in the manufacture and sale of bidis.
http://www.judis.nic.in 17 The appellants engaged contractors, and the contractors engaged workers who rolled the bidis at their own homes after obtaining the raw materials either directly from the appellants, or through the contractors. The appellants contended that those workers were not covered by the definition of “employee” under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act. This Court rejected the contentions raised by the appellants therein, and held that:
“8. … Clause (f) of Section 2 of that Act defines an “employee” to mean “any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment.” It will be noticed that the terms of the definition are wide. They include not only persons employed directly by the employer but also persons employed through a contractor. Moreover, they include not only persons employed in the factory but also persons employed in connection with the work of the factory. It seems to us that a home worker, by http://www.judis.nic.in 18 virtue of the fact that he rolls beedis, is involved in an activity connected with the work of the factory. We are unable to accept the narrow construction sought by the petitioners that the words “in connection with” in the definition of “employee” must be confined to work performed in the factory itself as a part of the total process of the manufacture.
...…
8. In the context of the conditions and the circumstances set out earlier in which the home workers of a single manufacturer go about their work, including the receiving of raw material, rolling the beedis at home and delivering them to the manufacturer subject to the right of rejection there is sufficient evidence of the requisite degree of control and supervision for establishing the relationship of master and servant between the manufacturer and the home worker. It must be remembered that the work of rolling beedis is not of a sophisticated nature, requiring control and supervision at the time when the work is done. It is a simple operation which, as practice has shown, has been performed satisfactorily by thousands of illiterate workers. It is a task which can be performed http://www.judis.nic.in 19 by young and old, men and women, with equal facility and it does not require a high order of skill. In the circumstances, the right of rejection can constitute in itself an effective degree of supervision and control. We may point out that there is evidence to show that the rejection takes place in the presence of the home worker. That factor, however, plays a merely supportive role in determining the existence of the relationship of the master and servant. The petitioners point out that there is no element of personal service in beedi rolling and that it is open to a home worker to get the work done by one or the other member of his family at home. The element of personal service, it seems to us, is of little significance when the test of control and supervision lies in the right of rejection.” (emphasis supplied)
8. The aforesaid judgments make it abundantly clear that the workers employed by the appellant Society are covered by the definition of “employee” under Section 2(f) of the EPF Act. http://www.judis.nic.in 20
9. In the present case, the workers were certainly employed for wages in connection with the work of the appellant Society. The definition of “employee” under Section 2(f) is an inclusive definition, and includes workers who are engaged either directly or indirectly in connection with the work of the establishment, and are paid wages.
10. The another contention of the appellant the judgment relied by the Courts below was set aside and therefore, this Court has to allow this Second Appeal is liable to be rejected on the ground that though the additional substantial question of law is admitted at the request of the appellant, this Court is of the view that the lower Court has not only decreed the suit in the light of the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge/writ Court rendered in W.P.No.4392 of 1997 in the case of Q.793, Madathupatti Weavers Co-operative Production and Sales Society Limited, but also it took it note of the other factors. More particularly, in paragraph 8 http://www.judis.nic.in 21 of the judgment made in O.S.No.183 of 1998, it has discussed the applicability of the Act under Section 2(f) of the Provident Fund Act and thereafter, it came to the conclusion, that this appellant should be brought under the EPF Act. Inasmuch as weaver the appellant-society paid wages to the workers, they are the appellant's employees as per the definition in the statute.
11. This Court has further noted that the weavers in question do the work in connection with the work of the appellant Society. They are also paid wages on the basis of their work. The cloth woven by the weavers is sold by the appellant Society. The yarn is supplied to the weavers by the appellant Society. Thus, it would be seen that the weavers are engaged for the work in connection with the work of the appellant Society. Therefore, it is crystal clear that there is an employer and employee relationship between the appellant Society and their weaver workers. Hence, the decisions arrived at by respondents is correct and in order. The weaver http://www.judis.nic.in 22 workers are entitled for provident fund benefits and the appellant Society has to enrol them and remit the provident fund contributions in respect of them. The Act covers all types of employees employed directly and indirectly, permanent or casual and the petitioner establishment cannot absolve itself of its liability under the Act in respect of their weaver workers. Even though the appellant-Society has pleaded that a notification has been issued exempting weavers cooperative society by the Central Government and the same was recorded by this Court in the docket order dated 17.04.2009, there is no order of the Government of Tamil Nadu exempting the appellant Society from payment of provident fund dues in respect of their employees. The Act is a piece of social legislation conferring certain benefits on the working class of people. It is a beneficial enactment pursuant to constitutional mandate keeping in view of the basic human rights of individuals in a democratic country. Further, the respondents gave opportunity to the appellant Society regarding the liability and quantum and it has been specifically determined. http://www.judis.nic.in 23
12.The another contention of the respondent that the civil court has no jurisdiction also holds good. In the case at hand, it is crystal clear that any order passed under Section 7-A of the EPF Act is appealable to the statutory authority created under the Act which is usefully extracted hereunder:-
''7-I(1) any person aggrieved by a
Notification issued by the Central
Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any authority under the proviso to Sub Section (3) or Sub Section (4) of Section 1 or Section 3 or Sub Section (1) of Section 7-A or Sec. 7-B except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in Sub Section (5) thereof or Sec. 7-C or Sec. 14-B may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such Notification or order.'' Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred and on erroneous facts, the courts below have tried the suit and the appellant managed to drag on the proceedings in the forum of civil court depriving the rights guaranteed under our Constitution of India. This court once again reiterates that the http://www.judis.nic.in 24 civil court has no jurisdiction to try such type of cases when statutory remedy available under the Act.
13.As regards the allotment of EPF Code is concerned, the appellant having received the coverage notice followed by enquiry, cannot raise this ground at all. In any event, as pointed out earlier, when remedy is available under the statute, the appellant society cannot wriggle out their responsibilities.
14. yet another contention of the appellant Society that the employees are shareholders of the Society, it is also relevant to point out that in the case of Pondicherry State Weavers' Co-operative Society v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (1983-I-LLJ-17) a Division Bench of this Court has held that at p. 19:
"It is well established that a co-
operative society, on registration, becomes a body corporate with a perpetual succession and it is legally independent of its members who constitute the society. This is made clear by Section 38 of the Pondicherry Co- http://www.judis.nic.in 25 operative Societies Act, 1972. Once the society is independent of its members and has a separate legal existence apart from its members, then there is no bar for the society employing its members and there being a contract of employment between the society and its members. If such a contract of employment is entered into between the society and its members, then the members so employed should be taken to have two independent capacities - one as a member of the society and the other as an employee of the society. We do not think that there is any merger of the said two positions or capacities. One's position as a shareholder is different from one's position as an employee of the society".
Again, after analysing the decision of the Privy Council as well as the Supreme Court, the Bench has further held at paragraph 20 held as follows:-
"Having regard to the legal position enunciated in the decisions referred to above, it is clear that a shareholder of a co- operative society registered under the Pondicherry Co-operative Societies Act, 1972, can also be its employee if a contract http://www.judis.nic.in 26 of employment is established. The fact that an employee happens to be a shareholder of a co- operative society does not make him any the less of an employee. In this case that there was an employment of persons who were shareholders of the co-operative society is clear from the registers of the society wherein the amounts paid to the employees as wages, have been debited against the company and the employees' names also find a place in the attendance register, therefore, can it be said that merely because the employees were members holding shares in the co-operative society, they cease to be its employees? Thus, it cannot be said that they are not entitled to be covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act. In this view of the matter, we have to uphold the decision of the Employees' Insurance Court and dismiss the appeal."
The afore-said decision is directly on this point and therefore, I am of the view that the principle laid down by the Bench that merely because the employees were members holding shares in the co-operative society, it cannot be said that they are not entitled to be covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act. http://www.judis.nic.in 27
12. Yet another contention that the work given by the Society is executed at home and it could be done by relatives and therefore, they cannot be brought under the EPF Act also has no legs to stand. In P.M. Patel and Sons v. Union of India, , their Lordships with regard to home workers have concluded thus:
"In our opinion, the home workers are 'employees' within the definition contained in Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act."
The Act was brought on the statute book for providing for the institution of a provident fund for the employees in factories and other establishments. The basic purpose of providing for provident funds appears to be to make provision for the future of the industrial worker after his retirement or for his dependents in case of his early death. To achieve this ultimate object the Act is designed to cultivate among the workers a spirit of saving something http://www.judis.nic.in 28 regularly, and also to encourage stabilisation of a steady labour force in the industrial centres. Just because the appellant Society contributes the other welfare schemes, like Tamil Nadu Savings and Security Scheme etc, it does not mean that they can ignore the EPF Act. There is no reason why the provisions of the Act and Scheme should not apply when they already contribute to the Central and State Schemes.
13. This Court keeps in mind that the EPF Act is a beneficial social welfare legislation which was enacted by the Legislature for the benefit of the workmen. It is meant for the protection of weaker sections of society, namely, workmen who had to eke out their livelihood from the meagre wages they receive after toiling hard for the same. Hence, the provisions under the EPF Act have to be interpreted in a manner which is beneficial to the workmen. A harmonious construction alone would help carry out the purpose of the Act.
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14. Accordingly, this Court rejects the contention that the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds Act and the Schemes cannot be implemented at all in respect of appellant Society. This Court is fully satisfied that the decisions arrived at by the Courts below does not require interference by this Court.
15. Further, there is no dispute that during the enquiry under Section 7-A, the petitioner-society was given ample opportunity to put forth their case. As earlier pointed out that the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, is a piece of legislation intended for conferring certain benefits on the working class of people. May be the methodology adopted by the appellant-Society in getting the work from the workers community would be different. But, they cannot wriggle out their dutiful responsibility towards paying EPF dues to the workers. Once wages are paid by the establishment either directly or indirectly as stated in the statute, it goes without saying that the workers fell http://www.judis.nic.in 30 within the definition of 2(f) of the EPF Act. The founding fathers of the Constitution of India thought it fit that it is a beneficial enactment pursuant to the constitutional mandate keeping in view the basic human rights of the individual in a democratic country. Therefore, it has been carefully worded that wages paid either directly or indirectly, the establishment will fall within the definition of the EPF Act.
16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the concurrent judgment passed by the Courts below stand confirmed in all respects and consequently, the appellant Society is directed to deposit the amount along with the interest assessed by respondents towards Provident Fund dues of the workers within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. Since the litigation has been pending for two decades, the first respondent is directed to ensure that the provident fund amount reaches to the retired workers/ working class community within a period of two months thereafter. In this regard, the http://www.judis.nic.in 31 appellant-Society is directed to co-operate with the respondents to work out the EPF amount as on date. Eventually, the Second Appeal is dismissed and substantial and additional substantial questions of law are answered as indicated above. All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
11.12.2019 Index:Yes/No Internet:Yes/No bala http://www.judis.nic.in 32 J.NISHA BANU,J.
bala To,
1.The Sub-Judge, The Sub-Court, Padmanabapuram.
2.The Principal District Munsif Court, Padmanabapuram Copy to:-
The Section Officer, VR Section, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.
Pre-delivery order made in S.A(MD)No.2120 of 2003 11.12.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in