Karnataka High Court
Workmen Of Bagalkot Udyog Ltd. vs Bagalkot Udyog Ltd. And Ors. on 20 June, 2000
Equivalent citations: (2001)ILLJ621KANT
Author: Manjula Chellur
Bench: Manjula Chellur
ORDER
1. A neat and the only question of law required to be answered in this intra-Court appeal is as to whether the State Government can claim to be the 'appropriate Government' in respect of the 'cement industry' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter, the Act) entitling it to exercise powers under Section 10 of the said Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in the said industry.
2. The Government of Karnataka in purported exercise of powers under Section 10(1) of the Act had issued a notification dated August 29, 1986 (Annexure 'F') prohibiting employment of contract labour in respect of certain operations in establishments in the cement industry in the State of Karnataka. The said notification on being challenged by the respondent cement companies has been quashed by the learned single Judge on the ground that the State Government is not the "Appropriate Government" within the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act and therefore, it (sic) authority to issue the impugned notification.
3. Being aggrieved by the above judgment of the learned single Judge the workmen's union has filed the present intra-Court appeal. According to Sri M.C. Narasimhan, learned counsel appearing the appellants, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court the case of Yovan, India Cement Employees' Union v. Management of India Cement Limited, and the definition of "Appropriate Government" under Section 2(1)(a) of the Act, in the view taken by the learned single Judge is obviously fallacious and therefore, the impugned judgment needs to be set aside thereby upholding the validity of the notification issued by the State Government.
4. On the other hand, Sri M.L.N. Reddy. learned counsel appearing for some of the respondent cement companies, while supporting the judgment of the learned single Judge, has submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Yovan (supra) has no application to the issue involved herein since the said decision pertains to the powers to be exercisable by the State Government under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act alone and cannot be extended beyond what has been said therein so as to embrace even the provisions of the 'Act'.
5. Section 10(1) of the Act, inter alia, provides that the appropriate Government may, after consultation with the Central Board, or as the case may be, a State Board, prohibit, by notification in the Official Gazette, employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Therefore, a notification under Section 10(1) can be issued only by an appropriate Government as defined under Section 2(1)(a) of the Act which is to the following effect:
"Section 2(1)(a)-'Appropriate Government' means-
(i) in relation to an establishment in respect of which the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(14 of 1947), is the Central Government, the Central Government;
(ii) in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situate."
6. From the above definition of the "appropriate Government" under the Act, it becomes further clear that if in relation to an establishment, the Central Government is the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, I.D. Act), then it is the Central Government which will be the appropriate Government for the purposes of the Act as well and only in relation to the remaining establishments, the State Government will be the appropriate Government for the said purposes. In order to ascertain as to which is the appropriate Government for the cement industry under the I.D. Act, one needs to refer to Section 2(a)(i) of the Act, which defines appropriate Government for its purposes. The definition reads as follows:
"Section 2(a) - 'Appropriate Government' means (i) in relation to any Industrial Dispute concerning any industry carried by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government........ the Central Government.
(ii) in relation to any other industrial disputes, the State Government;"
7. Exercising the powers under the above Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act, the Central Government has issued the following notification No. S.O. 757(E) dated November 8, 1977:
"in pursuance of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby specifies, for the purposes of that sub-clause, the controlled industry engaged in the manufacture or production of cement, which has been declared as a controlled industry under Section 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951)."
8. Because of the issuance of the above notification, in respect of the cement industry, the Central Government became the appropriate Government in relation to any industrial dispute concerning the said industry. Nonetheless, for appreciating the tenor of argument advanced on behalf of the appellants in support of the contention that despite the above provisions and the notification, the State Government still remain the appropriate Government both for the purposes of the I.D. Act as well as 'the Act', we have to turn to Section 39 of the I.D. Act which provides for delegation of powers by the appropriate Government.
9. Section 39 of the I.D. Act reads as under:
"The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act or Rules made thereunder shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also:
(a) where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, by such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or by the State Government or by such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government, as may be specified in the notification, and
(b) where the appropriate Government is a State Government, by such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government as may be specified in the notification."
10. Exercising its powers under Section 39 of the I.D. Act, the Central Government delegated powers exercisable by it under the I.D. Act in relation to cement industry to the State Governments by notification No. S.O. 826(E) dated December 8, 1977. The notification is being reproduced hereunder:
"S.O. 826(E): In exercise of the powers, conferred by Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) the Central Government hereby directs that all the powers exercisable by it under that Act and the Rules made thereunder shall, in relation to the Cement Industry be exercised also by all the State Governments, subject to the condition that the Central Government shall continue to exercise all the powers under the said Act and Rules made thereunder:
(i) relating to mines and quarries even where such mines and quarries form part of the Cement Industry; and
(ii) relating to the dispute between the employers who are members of the Cement Manufacturers Association, Express Building, Churchgate, Bombay and their workmen represented by Indian National Cement and Allied Workers Federation, Mazdoor Karyalaya, Congress House Bombay, which has been referred for arbitration in pursuance of Section 10-A of the said Act, read with Notification No. S.O. 757-E dated November 8, 1977 (No. S. 11025/9/77/DI/(A), in terms of the arbitration agreement published by the notification by the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour Order No. L.29013/2/77-D.O. 1II(B) dated November 28, 1977."
11. It is amply clear from Section 39 of the I.D. Act and the above notification issued by the Central Government that the State Government has been delegated with certain powers exercisable by the Central Government under the I.D. Act and nothing beyond. Pursuance to the above provisions, the State Government's status as relating to the cement industry remains that of a delegatee of the Central Government being the appropriate Government. It is well established that a delegatee cannot acquire a status equivalent to that of delegator because despite delegating its powers the delegator is never denuded of the same. On the other hand, it has an unrestricted right to strip off the powers of its delegatee. Consequently, it has to be held that even for the purpose of the I.D. Act, the State Government cannot be treated as an appropriate Government in relation to an industrial dispute concerning cement industry in terms of the definition of appropriate Government as set out in Clause (a) of Section 2 of the I.D. Act.
12. Now, let us come to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Sri Yovan (supra) which appears to be the sheet anchor of the appellants. In this case, an industrial dispute referred by the Government of Tamil Nadu under Section 10(1)(c) of the I.D. Act in relation to the cement industry of the respondent was rejected by the Labour Court, Madurai, on the ground that in relation to cement industry, the Central Government is the appropriate Government and therefore, the State Government could have made the reference. On an appeal preferred by the employees union, the Supreme Court, after referring to Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act, the notification dated November 8, 1977 issued thereunder (supra), Section 39 of the I.D. Act and the delegating notification dated December 8, 1977 (supra), held that the State Government as well was competent to make the questioned reference and accordingly, allowed the appeal of the employees union. While so holding, in para (8) they have observed that, "therefore it is clear that both the Central Government and the State Government are appropriate Government under the Act." The question is whether these observations of the Supreme Court are to be understood in the context in which it had been made or it has to be taken as a declaration of a statutory state of affairs devoid of the context.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of C. I. T. v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 43 : 1992 (4) SCC 363, has observed that "it is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by the Supreme Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the question which were before the Supreme Court." It is also well settled that the words in the judgment of the Court cannot be interpreted as the words in a statute. See General Electric Company v. Renusagar Power Company, and also R. Gandhi v. Union of India, .
14. Keeping in view the question raised before the Supreme Court, the only reasonable inference can be that the Supreme Court has held that both the Central Government and the State Government can exercise the powers of an appropriate Government in relation to the cement industry under the I.D. Act, the former being itself the appropriate Government under Section 2(a)(i) and the latter being its delegatee.
15. For the reasons aforesaid, since the State Government cannot be held to be an appropriate Government in relation to cement industry as per the definition under Section 2(a)(i) of the I.D. Act, therefore, it cannot be an appropriate Government in relation to the said industry even under the Act. Accordingly, it is held that the State Government had no competence to issue a notification like the impugned one under Section 10(1) of the Act which has rightly been quashed by the learned single Judge.
16. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.