Allahabad High Court
Dwarika And Others vs State on 27 April, 2026
Author: Santosh Rai
Bench: Santosh Rai
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Reserved on 26.03.2026
Delivered on 27.04.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2168 of 1988
Dwarika and others
..Appellant(s)
Versus
State
..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Rajesh Kumar Vishwakarma, V.c.katiyar
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
A.G.A.
Court No. - 91
HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Shri Rajesh Kumar Vishwakarma, Advocate assisted by Shri Ashish Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, learned AGA, Shri Shyam Narayan Rai for State and perused the material on record.
2. The present appeal is preferred under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. by the accused-appellants Dwarika @ Durga Prasad and Hori Lal (died) to set aside the judgment and order dated 15.09.1988 passed by 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun in Sessions Trial No.161 of 1987 under Section 436 IPC, Police Station- Raipura, DistrictBudaun, whereby the appellant no.1 has been awarded three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 436 IPC and appellant no.2 has been given the benefit of Section 4 of U.P. Probation of First Offenders Act and it was directed that he may be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.5,000/- and two sureties each in the like amount for a period of three years to main peace and be of good conduct.
3. Tersely, as per the prosecution case, the complainant, Bhagwan Singh, purchased a house from Balram via a sale deed dated December 9, 1986. As per the agreement, the seller (Balram) was allowed to remove the Karih (beams), Kiwarh (doors), and Bhusa (straw/fodder) from the house. On December 14, 1986, at approximately 9:00 A.M., while the complainant was opening the door and Balram was removing the agreed-upon items, the accused (Hori Lal and Dwarika) arrived and questioned how the house was purchased by the Bhagwan Singh and why Balram sold it without their consent. Following the argument, Hori Lal and Dwarika committed mischief by setting fire to a Chhappar (thatched roof/shed) situated in front of the complainant's house. The fire resulted in the destruction of the Chhappar and various articles kept beneath it, including cots and clothes. After the incident, Bhagwan Singh lodged a written F.I.R. at P.S.- Rajpura on the same day at 10:30 A.M.
4. After registration of F.I.R., the investigation was assigned to the Investigating Officer P.W.-5. He conducted the investigation, collected oral evidence and documentary evidence and submitted the chargesheet before the court on the basis of sufficient evidence. Thereafter, cognizance was taken and matter was committed to Sessions Court for trial.
5. The 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Badaun, after perusal of the case diary and other relevant papers, had framed the charge against the accused-appellant under Section 436 IPC on 08.03.1988. the prosecution examined Bhagwan Singh, the complainant P.W.-1, Sahib Singh P.W.-2, Thamman Singh P.W.-3, Constable OM Prakash P.W.-4 and S.I. Kaushan Kumar Misra P.W.-5.
6. P.W.1, Bhagwan Singh (the complainant), duly proved the written F.I.R. (Ext. Ka-1). P.W.4, Constable Om Prakash, proved the chick report (Ext. Ka-2) and the copy of the General Diary (Ext. Ka-3). The Investigating Officer, P.W.5 S.I. Kaushal Kumar Misra, proved the site plan (Ext. Ka-4), the recovery memo of ash (Ext. Ka-5), the copy of the General Diary (Ext. Ka-6), and the charge-sheet (Ext. Ka-7).
7. The accused-appellant were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they stated that they have been falsely implicated in this case due to enmity, and that all the witnesses are relatives of the complainant.
8. P.W.1, Bhagwan Singh, deposed that the entire house originally belonged to Hori Lal, who transferred half share thereof to Dwarka (accused) and the remaining half to Balram. It was further stated that Balram and Dwarka are related inter se, and that Hori Lal resides with Dwarka. Dwarka had purchased the northern portion of the house, whereas Balram had purchased the southern portion. Subsequently, Balram transferred half of his share to Dwarka and the remaining half to the complainant, whereby the complainant acquired the western half share of the property. According to the witness, Hori Lal and Dwarka were aggrieved by such transfer in favour of the complainant. It was further stated that certain articles, including Karih and Kiwarh, were to be removed by Balram, while the remaining articles were to remain with the complainant. The witness further deposed that after about five days of the execution of the said sale deed, at approximately 9:00 A.M., when the complainant was opening the door on the western side of the purchased house, Balram was removing his belongings (bhusa). At that time, Hori Lal and Dwarka arrived at the spot and questioned the complainant as to how the property had been purchased without their consent and further asked Balram as to why he had transferred the property without their consent. It is then alleged that, at that point of time, Dwarka and Hori Lal committed mischief by setting the chhappar on fire with the help of fire taken from an oven, as a result whereof the chhappar caught fire and started burning. Upon hearing the cries of the complainant, Sahib Singh, Thamman Singh and Malooki reached the spot. By that time, the chhappar had been completely burnt and all the articles kept beneath it were also reduced to ashes. Thereafter, the complainant proceeded to the police station, where the written F.I.R. was scribed by Iliyas Mian on his instructions, which was subsequently lodged.
9. P.W.2 narrated the prosecution story, and P.W.3 also supported the same. P.W.4, Om Prakash proved Ext. Ka-1, Ka-2 and Ka-3. P.W.5 S.I. Kapil Kumar Mishra proved the relevant prosecution papers pertaining to the case. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the case stands fully proved.
10. In brief the grounds of appeal are that the judgement and order of conviction is against the fact and circumstances of the case concerned or it is against the facts on the record of the case. The conviction and sentence is bad in law.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that material contradictions exist in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly PW-1 and PW-2. It is further submitted that, on the basis of the same set of evidence, accused persons Dwarika and Hori Lal were tried by the learned trial court. However, co-accused Hori Lal, considering his advanced age of about 70 years, was released on probation, despite being found guilty under Section 436 IPC, for which the maximum sentence awarded was three years' rigorous imprisonment. Learned counsel further contends that the accused-appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case due to civil dispute between the parties. It is submitted that a sale deed was said to be executed by Balram in favour of the complainant and it has been stated that the accused persons Dwarika and Hori Lal were annoyed with the execution of the sale deed and objected to the same. The alleged incident is stated to have occurred, on this sole ground, wherein the dwelling house of the informant was set on fire by both of the accused persons. It is also submitted that there is no material evidence on record to substantiate the extent of damage caused in the alleged incident. During the course of trial, no concrete or reliable evidence was adduced to establish the value or quantity of the articles allegedly burnt. There was no loss of life, and only a cot and certain minor items were stated to have been burnt. It is submitted that PW-2 and PW-3 were not present on the spot at the time of the alleged incident and reached the place of occurrence only after hearing the hue and cry. In such circumstances, the statements of PW-2 and PW-3 cannot be said to be wholly reliable. Furthermore, some material contradictions are also available in the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of PW-1, Makhan Singh. It is also submitted that in the event that this Honble Court arrives at a finding of guilt, it is prayed that the accused-appellant be extended the benefit of probation, considering that the co-accused Hori Lal, who was similarly situated, has already been granted such benefit on account of his advanced age. The present appellant is also an elderly person, approximately 60 years of age, and is suffering from many physical ailments.
12. Though, learned AGA fairly admits that one of the co-accused, namely Hori Lal, was released on probation at the stage of sentencing despite being held guilty under Section 436 IPC, for which the maximum sentence awarded was only three years rigorous imprisonment, he is unable to point out that the present accused-appellant has any previous criminal history. He further admits the fact that at the time of trial, the accused-appellant was about 20 years of age and the present criminal appeal has been pending since 1988, and the judgment of the trial court was delivered on 15.09.1988. In view of the said facts, the accused-appellant is now approximately 58-60 years of age.
13. From a perusal of the FIR, it is evident that both the accused persons, namely Dwarika and Hori Lal, are specifically named therein. In the FIR itself, it has also been clearly stated that a civil dispute existed between the informant and the accused persons. The prosecution case further indicates that the accused persons were aggrieved by the execution of sale deed by Balram in favour of the informant, and on account of such grievance, they allegedly set the informants house on fire.
14. PW-2 stated specifically in his statement recorded before the trial court that both the accused persons committed the act of mischief by setting the house ablaze. However, in his cross-examination, he stated that it was only Hori Lal who had committed mischief by setting fire to the house of the informant. Though, the learned trial court stated minor contradictions whereas PW-1 has supported the prosecution case clearly and specifically in his statement recorded before the trial court and identified both the accused persons regarding causing mischief.
15. It is also evident that both the accused persons and the informant are residents of the same village and are neighbours. Since, the incident is alleged to have taken place in broad daylight, therefore, there is no doubt about identification etc. Although PW-2 and PW-3 have stated that they reached the spot after hearing the hue and cry, and they are related to the informant and are interested witnesses, but statement of any witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that such witness is interested or related. If the evidence adduced by the witnesses before the trial court is true, real and genuine and no major contractions are available, it should be accepted. It may be possible that some contradictions may arise in their statements when witnesses have been examined before the trial court after a lapse of time. We agree with the finding of the trial court that no material contradiction is available in the statements of the witnesses, who have been produced before the trial court. Formal documents have been duly proved by the formal witnesses (PW-4 and PW-5), it also strengthen the prosecution case.
16. Thus, the learned trial court has rightly held both the accused persons guilty under Section 436 IPC, the grant of probation to the co-accused Hori Lal appears to be justified. In the present case, no separate or distinct role has been specifically attributed to the accused appellant either in the FIR or in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses examined during trial.
17. However, insofar as the quantum of sentence awarded to the accused appellant Dwarika is concerned, he has been sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 436 IPC. It would be just and proper to quote the provisions of Section 436 IPC:
"436. Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy house, etc.Whoever commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, the destruction of any building which is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
18. Thus, from perusal of the above provision, it clearly appears that the punishment for the offence under Section 436 IPC is imprisonment for life or imprisonment, which may extend to ten years, and the offender shall also be liable to fine.
19. The Apex Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation vs. A.K. Abdul Samad and Another, (2016) 4 SCC 785 held that:
9. In our considered view, the clause "shall also be liable to fine", in the context of the Penal Code may be capable of being treated as directory and thus, conferring on the court, a discretion to impose sentence of fine also in addition to imprisonment although such discretion stands somewhat impaired as per the view taken by this Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar. But clearly no minimum fine is prescribed for the offences under IPC nor that the Act was enacted with the special purpose of preventing economic offences as was the case in Chern Taong Shangs. The object of creating offence and penalty under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 is clearly to create deterrence against violation of provisions of the Act which are beneficial for the employees. Non-payment of contributions is an economic offence and therefore the legislature has not only fixed a minimum term of imprisonment but also a fixed amount of fine of five thousand rupees under Section 85(a)(i)(b) of the Act. There is no discretion of awarding less than the specified fee, under the main provision. It is only the proviso which is in the nature of an exception whereunder the court is vested with discretion limited to imposition of imprisonment for a lesser term. Conspicuously, no words are found in the proviso for imposing a lesser fine than that of five thousand rupees. In such a situation the intention of the legislature is clear and brooks no interpretation. The law is well settled that when the wordings of the statute are clear, no interpretation is required unless there is a requirement of saving the provisions from vice of unconstitutionality or absurdity. Neither of the twin situations is attracted herein.
20. Thus, imposition of fine is integral part and fundamental aspect of the punishment, whereas the learned trial court, while awarding sentence, has overlooked the aforesaid legal provision and committed legal error, but so far as the finding of conviction recorded against the accused appellant is concerned, it appears to be just and proper.
21. Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are reproduced below for ready reference:
4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.
5. Power of court to require released offenders to pay compensation and costs.(1) The court directing the release of an offender under section 3 or section 4, may, if it thinks fit, make at the same time a further order directing him to pay
(a) such compensation as the court thinks reasonable for loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of the offence; and
(b) such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks reasonable.
(2) The amount ordered to be paid under sub-section (1) may be recovered as a fine in accordance with the provisions of sections 386 and 387 of the Code.
(3) A civil court trying any suit, arising out of the same matter for which the offender is prosecuted, shall take into account any amount paid or recovered as compensation under sub-section (1) in awarding damages.
22. In Sitaram Paswan and Another vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 13 SCC 110, the Apex Court has held as under:
For exercising the power which is discretionary, the court has to consider the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. The benefit available to the accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and the word "may" clearly indicates that the discretion vests with the court whether to release the offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vest with the court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the courts while finding the person guilty and if the court thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power can be exercised by the court even at the appellate or revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
23. In Lakhanlal alias Lakhan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 100, the Apex Court held as under:
10. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, while examining the provisions of the 1958 Act held that in case the offenders are below 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act but in respect of offenders who were above age of 21 years, the Court has absolute discretion to release such offenders either after admonition or on probation of good conduct. The Court held as under:
"4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act."
11. This Court in Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 633 explained the rationale of the provision as to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The Court held as under:
"6. The Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958 with a view to provide for the release of offenders of certain categories on probation or after due admonition and for matters connected therewith. The object of the Act is to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The above object is in consonance with the present trend in the field of penology, according to which effort should be made to bring about correction and reformation of the individual offenders and not to resort to retributive justice. Modern criminal jurisprudence recognises that no one is a born criminal and that a good many crimes are the product of socio-economic milieu. Although not much can be done for hardened criminals, considerable stress has been laid on bringing about reform of young offenders not guilty of very serious offences and of preventing their association with hardened criminals. The Act gives statutory recognition to the above objective. It is, therefore, provided that youthful offenders should not be sent to jail, except in certain circumstances. Before, however, the benefit of the Act can be invoked, it has to be shown that the convicted person even though less than 21 years of age, is not guilty of an offenec punishable with imprisonment for life. This is clear from the language of Section 6 of the Act."
24. In Mohd. Hashim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 2 SCC 198, the Apex reiterated the exercise of discretionary power of the court under Probation of Offenders Act as under:
21. In this regard, it is also seemly to refer to other authorities to highlight how the discretion vested in a court under the PO Act is to be exercised. In Ram Parkash v. State of H.P., (1972) 4 SCC 46, while dealing with Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court opined that the word "may" used in Section 4 of the PO Act does not mean "must". On the contrary, as has been held in the said authority, it has been made clear in categorical terms that the provisions of the PO Act distinguish offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age and offenders who are guilty of committing an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to observe:
"7.... While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years. absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. (Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 and Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088.)"
Be it noted, in the said case, keeping in view the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court declined to confer the benefit under Section 4 of the PO Act.
22. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to stress the point that the court before exercising the power under Section 4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4 of the PO Act. Be it stated in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82, it has been held that Parliament has made it clear that only if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release the convict on probation for the good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case and one of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is "the nature of the offence". The Court has further opined that though the discretion has been vested in the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient. Explaining the word "expedient", the Court held thus:
9. The word "expedient" had been thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it as "apt and suitable to the end in view". In Black's Law Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as "suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object" besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabril, (1975) 1 SCC 138, a two-Judge Bench of this Court has considered the word "expedient". The learned Judges have observed in para 21 thus:
21.... Again, the word "expedient" used in this provision, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, "expedient" (adj.) means "apt and suitable to the end in view", "practical and efficient": "politic"; "profitable"; "advisable", "fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case". In another shade, it means a device "characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right" (see Webster's New International Dictionary)'.
10. It was then held that the court must construe the said word in keeping with the context and object of the provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word "expedient" is used in Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account "the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence...". This means Section 4 can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct."
25. In Chellammal and Another vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 461, where the Sessions Judge has acquitted the appellants (mother-in-law and husband) of the charge under Section 304-B IPC but convicted them under Section 498-A, the Apex Court has held as under:
Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record ord the reasons therefor.
26. At present, the accused-appellant is an elderly person, aged about 5859 years. The appeal has remained pending since the year 1988. Considering the principle of parity with the co-accused, the absence of any criminal antecedents, the long passage of time, and the admitted fact that no loss of life occurred in the incident, the matter is not related to organized crime, property dispute is admitted fact between the parties. Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellant has not assailed the conviction on merits but has confined his argument particularly to the question of sentence and prayed for extending the benefit of probation as provided under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
27. Having considered the submissions advanced by the parties and material evidence available on record, admittedly, the age of the accused-appellant Dwarika was only 20 years old at the time of incident meaning thereby, he was below 21 years of age. No Reliable evidence is placed before this court which shows that the accused-appellant has any previous criminal antecedent. There is no evidence of habitual criminality. The possibility of reformation cannot be ruled out. Presently, the age of the accused-appellant is about 58-59 years, this Court is of the opinion that the benefit of probation deserves to be extended to the accused-appellant under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
28. Thus, in view of the above specific facts and circumstances, it would be just and proper to release the accused-appellant on probation. The appeal is, thus, partly allowed with modification in sentence. The conviction of the appellant Dwarika under Section 436 IPC is hereby affirmed. However, the sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment is set aside.
29. In view of the modification of sentence and release of the appellant on probation, the bail bonds and sureties furnished earlier during trial/appeal shall stand discharged.
30. Let the accused-appellant Dwarika be released on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, subject to the following conditions:
(i) The accused-appellant shall execute a fresh personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned for a period of one year with an undertaking that he shall maintain peace and good behaviour and will not involve in any criminal activity.
(ii) Invoking Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the appellant shall pay compensation of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) to the informant/victim within a period of one month from today. In case of death of injured/victim, the appellant shall pay the same to their legal representatives.
(iii) In the event of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, the accused-appellant shall be liable to undergo the sentence as awarded by the trial court to serve the original sentence.
31. Trial court shall ensure compliance and seek report from the Probation Officer for supervision.
32. The appellant is directed to appear before the trial court within one month from today to furnish the requisite bonds. In case of default, the trial court shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law, including issuance of coercive process.
33. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted forthwith to the trial court concerned along with trial court record for compliance.
(Santosh Rai,J.) April 27, 2026 Ankit.