Madras High Court
Dadamudy Tatayya And Ors. vs Kelachina Venkatasubbarayya Sastri on 1 March, 1928
Equivalent citations: AIR1928MAD786, AIR 1928 MADRAS 786
JUDGMENT Devadoss, J.
1. It is contended by Mr. Venkatachariar for the appellants that the words " jeroyiti lands " mean ryoti lands and he relies upon a number of decisions of this Court in support of his contention. There are the cases of this Court in which it was held that the term " jeroyoti " does not necessarily mean " ryoti. " It is again urged that in the Kistna District the ward " jerpyoti " is used as meaning " ryoti. " It would not be very satisfactory to decide upon the meaning of this word by reference to cases in which the term was used as denoting ryoti land. I think for a proper disposal of this case there should be a specific finding as to the meaning of the word "jeroyiti" as used in the part of the country in which the plaint land is situated. It is suggested for the respondents by Mr. Raghava Rao that the word "savaram jeroyiti" mean homeform land. The Subordinate Judge will record a finding first as to the meaning of the words " jeroyiti " and " seri "as used in that part of the country in which the plaint lands are situated and also as to the meaning of the expression " savaram jeroyiti " when used in documents executed or prepared in that part of the country. Parties will be allowed to adduce fresh evidence on the point on which the finding is called for. The finding will be returned in two months and seven days will be allowed for objections.
2. [In compliance with the order contained in the above judgment, the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam submitted the following :] Findings
3. I have been called upon to submit a finding as to the meaning of the words " jeroyiti" and " seri " as used in the Vuyyur Zamindari and as to the meaning of the expression "savaram jeroyiti" when used in documents in that estate. Both parties were allowed to adduce fresh evidence on the points above referred to.
4. The original order of the High Court calling for the above findings was dated 17th December 1928 and I was directed to submit the findings within two months from the date of the receipt of the records. As the appellants were not ready, I moved the High Court for an extension of time on 11th April 1927, directing the appellants to pay the costs of the respondent. The High Court was pleased to extend the time till 18th August, and, on 25th April 1927, I adjourned the enquiry to 1st August directing both sides to be ready. On 1st August the appellants were again not ready and had taken no steps but as they undertook to be ready on 10th August, irrespective of service of summonses, I adjourned the enquiry to 10th August on their application (I. A. No. 1093 of 1927), directing them to pay respondent's costs both in connexion with that hearing and the previous hearing before the commencement of the trial on 10th August. When the case was taken up on 10th August the appellants were absent. The costs awarded to the respondent (who had been summoning witnesses each time at a considerable cost) were not paid. The appellant's pleader orally asked for an adjournment; but it was refused. The appellants' pleader had no evidence ready. Without paying the costs ordered on the previous occasion, he wanted permission to cross-examine the respondent's witnesses; but I refused it.
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5. As for the word '' jeroyiti ": one of its meaning is " cultivation " as given in Brown's Dictionary and also in Wilson's Glossary. The word " jeroyiti land " may thus 'mean " cultivable or arable land. " But it may also mean " assessable or assessed land " as opposed to inam land. It is only the context that must decide which meaning is to be given to the word. Lastly, the word " jeroyiti " especially when prefixed to the word "right" or hakku has come to mean " rights of occupancy. "
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6. As for the word "seri" it is always used in this part of the country in the sense in which the word "ryoti" is used in the Estates Land Act. "Seri land" always means "land in which the tenant has an occupancy right."
7. As for the word "savaram " it invariably means the homefarm of the zamindari, and if the expression " savaram jeroyiti' is ever used, it must mean "homefarm cultivation."
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8. So far as the documents Ex. AA and AA1 are concerned, the word "jeroyiti" seems to have been used in the sense of "cultivation or occupation," as I have already mentioned above.
9. In respect of the costs incurred by the respondent in this Court orders may be passed in the appeal at the time of hearing of the appeal
10. [This second appeal coming on for final hearing after the return of the finding of the lower appellate Court upon the issue referred by this Court for trial, the Court delivered the following :] JUDGMENT
11. The only objection urged to the finding of the lower Court is that the Subordinate Judge did not allow the appellant to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses. The appellant was not ready on more than one occasion. When the appellant applied for an adjournment the Subordinate Judge granted the application and directed that the costs of the other side should be paid before the date of the next hearing. The costs were not paid and the Subordinate Judge refused to allow the plaintiff to cross-examine the defendants' witnesses. Mr. Venkatachari for the appellants contends that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in having declined to allow the appellants to cross-examine the witnessess for the other side and relies upon a decision in Virabhadrappa, Chetti v. Chinnamma [1898] 21 Mad. 403. In that case a Bench of this Court set aside an order of the District Court which granted succession certificate to a party as the other side had not paid the costs. On sending for the papers it appears that there was no condition that the costs should be paid before the date of the next hearing. What the learned Judges say is:
Such costs would ordinarily be recoverable in execution and in the absence of a specific order making their payment a condition precedent to hearing the counter-petitioner's evidence, the counter petitioner's failure to pay would not render Section 158 applicable.
12. In this case the Subordinate Judge did make an order that the costs should be paid before the date of the next hearing. That order means that unless the costs were paid before the date of the next hearing the party ordered to pay costs would not be heard. The decision in Virabhadrappa Chetti v. Chinnamma [1898] 21 Mad. 403, is, therefore, distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Mr. Venkatachari urges that if the Court wants to make an order which would be a condition precedent it should say so in so many words, namely, that if the posts are not paid the party in default would not be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses for the opposite side. I do not think it is necessary to express the order in so many words. When the Court grants an adjournment and directs the party applying for the adjournment to pay the costs of the other side before the date of the next hearing, it is well understood that unless the party ordered to pay the costs does pay before the date of the next hearing he would have do right' to be heard. In this view I think the Subordinate Judge was right in declining to allow the counter-petitioner-appellant to cross-examine the witnesses for the other side. There is no other objection to the finding which is based on evidence. The finding is accepted. In the result the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Costs reserved by the lower Court will be costs in the appeal.