Orissa High Court
Ramesh Chandra Behera vs Union Of India on 30 November, 2023
Author: B.R. Sarangi
Bench: B.R. Sarangi
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020
In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, 1950
---------------
1. Ramesh Chandra Behera Aged about 42 years Son of Late Duryadhan Behera At: Subalaya, P.O.: H.Burudi Via: Humma - 761 027 District: Ganjam
2. Bhagirathi Das Aged about 32 years Son of Yudhistir Das At: Bhagirathipur, P.O.: Rukunigaon, P.S.: Chhatrapur, District: Ganjam
3. Dillip Kumar Sahu Aged about 37 years Son of Udayanath Sahu At/P.O.: Munispenth P.S.: Chhatrapur District: Ganjam ... Petitioner
-VERSUS-
1. Union of India represented through Secretary, Department of Posts Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi
2. Chief Post Master General Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar At/P.O.: PMG Square, Bhubaneswar District: Khordha W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 1 of 100
3. Post Master General Berhampur Region, Berhampur At/P.O.: Berhampur, District: Ganjam
4. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices Berhampur Division, Berhampur At/P.O.: Berhampur, District: Ganjam
5. Assistant Superintendent of Posts Chhatrapur Sub-Division, Chhatrapur At/P.O.: Chhatrapur, District: Ganjam
6. Miss Sunita Sethi GDS MD, Sankuda Branch Office Sankuda, At/P.O.: Sankuda, District: Ganjam
7. Rakesh Kumar Sahu GDS MC, Paladhuapali Branch Office Paladhuapali, At/P.O.: Paladhuapalli District: Ganjam ... Opposite parties Counsel appeared for the parties in the writ appeals:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Sukanta Kumar Dalai, Satyabrata Mahapatra and P.N. Swain, Advocates For the Opposite parties : Mr. Prasanna Kumar Parhi Deputy Solicitor General of India, Orissa High Court and Mr. Chandrakanta Pradhan, Senior Panel Counsel Government of India for Opposite party Nos.1 to 5.
P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE DR. B.R. SARANGI AND THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Date of Hearing : 24.11.2023 :: Date of Judgment : 30.11.2023 W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 2 of 100 J UDGMENT MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.--
THE CHALLENGE:
Beseeching issue of writ of certiorari invoking provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, applicants for the post of Gramin Dak Sevak, Mail Deliverer, Karapada Branch Post Office, Ganjam, questioned the propriety and legality of Order dated 04.06.2020 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No.630 of 2018 filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, with the following prayer(s):
<Under such circumstances it is, therefore, humbly prayed that this Hon9ble Court may kindly graciously be pleased to admit the petition and issue notice to the opposite parties and hearing upon them further be pleased to quash the Order dated 04.06.2020 under Annexure-9 passed in O.A. No.630 of 2018 and direct the opposite parties to publish the result of the petitioners in view of the advertisement under Annexure-1 and to give appointment considering their eligibility with retrospective service benefits to secure ends of Justice;
And pass any other order/orders, or direction/directions as this Hon9ble Court deem just and proper.
And for this act of kindness the petitioners as in duty bound shall ever pray.= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 3 of 100 1.1. Though in O.A. No.630 of 2018 before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack, the opposite party Nos.6 and 7 were not arrayed as parties to the proceeding, the petitioners impleaded them as parties in the present writ application. However, by filing I.A. No.5647 of 2023, the petitioners affirming that <the opposite party Nos.6 and 7 have been made parties and despite notices they are not appearing, at this stage the petitioners have no grievance against them, hence their names may kindly be deleted for expeditious hearing of the matter=, made prayer for deletion of names of the opposite party Nos.6 and 7 from the array of parties. Considering such prayer, this Court vide Order No.11, dated 19.04.2023, passed the following:
<2. This application has been filed by the petitioner for deletion of the name of opposite parties No.6 and 7. Copy of the application has already been served on Mr. C. Pradhan, learned Senior Panel Counsel, Govt. of India.
3. Mr. S.K. Dalai, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that opposite parties No.6 and 7 were not parties before the tribunal. But, when the matter is pending before this Court, it was brought to the notice of the Court by learned Senior Panel Counsel, Govt. of India that these two persons have been appointed in two different posts. Therefore, as an abundant caution, opposite parties No.6 and 7 have been made as parties to the writ petition. It is contended that though notice was issued to the said W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 4 of 100 opposite parties twice, but till date they have not appeared. Therefore, the petitioner has filed this application for deletion of their names from the cause title of the writ petition. More so, the petitioner has not asked any relief against opposite parties No.6 and 7, as they have been appointed in different posts than that of the post claimed by the petitioner.
4. Mr. C. Pradhan, learned Senior Panel Counsel, Govt.
of India has no objection for deletion of the name of opposite parties No.6 and 7.
5. Considering the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and after going through the records, it is directed that the names of opposite parties No.6 and 7 be deleted from the cause title of the writ petition at the risk of the petitioner.
6. I.A. stands disposed of.= FACT OF THE CASE:
2. As the facts pleaded in the writ petition with documents enclosed thereto reveal that in response to Advertisement bearing Notification No. PF/GDSMD, Karapada BO, dated at Chhatrapur, the 3rd October, 2013, issued by the Government of India in Department of Posts, Office of the Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices/Inspector of Posts, Chhatrapur Sub-Division inviting applications in prescribed pro forma from intending candidates for the post of <Gramin Dak Sevak, Mail Deliverer, Karapada SO/SO/HO in account with Ganjam SO/HO= with pay scale of 3,330/- + admissible W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 5 of 100 D.A. (for short hereinafter referred to as <GDSMD=), the petitioners made applications.
2.1. It is asserted that having not received any information with regard to fate of such applications even after much persuasion, the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur acting on the application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, on 22.09.2015 furnished information that out of 12 cases, only one vacancy has been filled up, but others have not been filled up due to non-receipt of administrative approval. In the appeal against such information provided by the Central Public Information Officer-cum-
Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur, the Assistant Director-I, Office of the Post Master General, Berhampur Region, Berhampur-I, on 27.01.2016 disposed of RTI/Appeal- 72/R.Ch.Behera/ BF/2015, by confirming that <11 (eleven) numbers of vacant posts are yet to be finalised=.
2.2. As it seems after two years, the petitioners having approached, the Assistant Director (PG), Office of the Central Post Master General, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar - 751 001 vide Letter No.PG/27- 1391/2018, dated 07.05.2018 instructed the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur to inquire into the matter and take necessary action to resolve the grievance with respect to W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 6 of 100 <complaint letter No. NIL, dated 23.03.2018 received from Sri Ramesh Chandra Behera, at: Subalaya, P.O.: H. Burudi, via Humma, District: Ganjam - 761 027=.
2.3. No fruit having been yielded by said instruction of the Assistant Director (PG), the petitioners approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack, in O.A. No.630 of 2018. While issuing notice, following Order has been passed on 27.12.2018 in M.A. No.454 of 2018:
<Heard learned counsel for the applicant and the learned counsel for the respondents. This matter pertains to selection of GDS by virtue of notification dtd.3.10.2013 (A/1) it is submitted by the learned counsel that letter Page-22 of the O.A. shows that 11 out of 12 GDS posts which have been advertised to be filled up vide A/1 dated
03.10.2013 have not yet been filled up as would be seen from A/5.
It appears that the matter is delayed. However, learned counsel for the respondents is to obtain instructions as to whether the issue relating to the selection of GDS vide Letter dtd.3.10.2013 is open as on date or the matter is closed. Call on 15.01.2019. M.A.No.454/2018 shall be considered on the next date.
Free copy of this order be made over to learned counsel for the respondents.
Sd/-
Gokul Chandra Pati Member (A)= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 7 of 100 2.4. The opposite parties in compliance of aforesaid order, filed <short reply= dated 08.03.2019, through Sri Subash Chandra Barik, Senior Superintendent of Posts, Berhampur (Gm.) Division, Berhampur (Ganjam) - 760 001, as follows:
<3. That it is pertinent to mention here that prior permission is required from the competent authority to appoint the eligible candidates in Branch Post Offices but no prior permission is required to appoint in Sub-Post Offices.
4. That out of 12 notifications the Respondents have given one engagement, i.e., GDSMD in Khalikote RS Sub-Post Office after completion of scruitinization of the applications/recruitment process as there was no prior permission of the competent authority is required to fill up the GDS post of Sub-Post Office on operational ground.
5. That while the scruitinization/recruitment process as well as correspondence with the authority was under process for filling up the other vacant posts in Branch Post Offices, one instruction from Postal Directorate vide Letter No-17-39-7-2012-GDS dated 28.05.2015 was received where instructed to all concerned to fill up all vacancies of GDS post latest by 30.06.2015 in case notifications has already been issued on or before 30.03.2015 adopting the old engagement procedure applicable prior to 01.04.2015 otherwise notifications will be cancelled and the vacancies will be filled under new engagement process. The copy of the said letter is filed herewith as ANNEXURE-R/1.W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 8 of 100
6. That further instruction of the Directorate issued vide L.No.17-23/2016-GDS dated 01.08.2016 was received where it is directed to stop selection/engagement of all types of GDS and to stop all cases of engagement which are under process. The copy of the said letter is filed as ANNEXURE-R/2.
7. That the scrutiny/recruitment process of 11 numbers of vacant post of GDS was not completed for which the notifications for the said posts have stand cancelled in view of the Directorate letter dated 28.05.2015.
8. That in accordance with the Directorate letter dated 28.05.2015, the notifications to fill up the remaining 11 numbers vacant posts for GDS including the notifications dated 03.10.2013 have been closed with effect from 30.06.2015.= 2.5. In consideration of aforesaid fact as submitted in the <short reply= of the opposite parties, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal passed the following Order on 24.04.2019:
<Learned Counsel for the applicant has filed M.A.No.315/19 by which the post for which the applicant has applied is proposed to be filled up by notification dated 10.03.2019 (Annexure-A/6). Respondents counsel is not present today. Hence list on 30.04.2019 for consideration of Μ.Α.No.315/19. Till next date the respondents, may proceed as per notification dated 10.03.2019 (Annexure- A/6) but no final decision shall be taken in respect of three posts which are in question in this O.A. till next date. ***= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 9 of 100 2.6. Subsequent thereto final counter reply dated 18.09.2019 being filed by the opposite parties, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal upon hearing passed the following Order on 04.06.2020:
<20. It is settled principle of law that the authorities have got the right to cancel any recruitment by assigning reason and the said cancellation should not be with any oblique motive or mala fide intention. In the present case no appointment letter was issued in favour of the applicant and no selection list was also published. It is the specific case of the respondents that in view of the subsequent circular dated 28.05.2015 vide Annexure R/1 which provided the cut off date to be 30.03.2015 for inviting applications online, therefore, there was sufficient reasons not to issue any selection list or appointment letter in favour of the applicant in pursuance to the earlier advertisement in question. The applicant at that stage cannot claim that he had any right for appointment to any particular post in question. The applicant has failed to prove that the authorities have cancelled the recruitment process or had stopped it with any mala fide intention or oblique motive. The fact remains that no separate order has been issued mentioning that the recruitment process has been cancelled. But this Tribunal cannot overlook further fact that there was subsequent notification for receiving online application for the recruitment in order to fill up the post in question.
Thus by necessary implication the earlier recruitment process has been deemed to be cancelled.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 10 of 10021. The applicant has also not approached this Tribunal in time and there has been delay by him in approaching this Tribunal in this OA in which he has challenged the order dated 22.09.2015.
22. Therefore the OA is barred by limitation and also devoid of merit. Hence the OA is dismissed but in circumstances without any cost.= 2.7. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have knocked the doors of this Court by way of the present writ application contending that as per information communicated vide Letter No.BFCCC/RTI/344, dated 24.09.2020 under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (Annexure-10), it is made known that out of 11 posts, only 2 posts in respect of Sankuda B.O. and Paladhuapalli B.O. are filled up and rest 9 posts are not filled up as yet. Out of these 9 posts, the petitioners are interested for 3 posts relating to Sindurpur B.O., Karapada B.O. and Khojapalli B.O. which are shown to be <vacant=.
3. Notices are issued on 06.04.2021 by this Court in the said writ application, and passed Order in I.A. No.15244 of 2020 to the following effect:
<05. 06.04.2021 Issue notice as above. Accept one set of process fee.
In the interim, the opposite parties are directed to keep three posts vacant in respect of petitioners, till the next date.= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 11 of 100
4. Counter affidavit dated 10.07.2022 has been filed sworn to by the Senior Superintendent of Post Office, Berhampur Division, Berhampur bringing on record the fact that <the recruitment process in respect of remaining eleven vacant posts of Gramin Dak Sevak was not completed by 30.06.2015, for which the notifications for the said posts stand cancelled in accordance with Directorate Letter dated 28.05.2015= and later vide Letter No.17-23/2016-GDS, dated 01.08.2016, it was directed to stop selection/engagement of all types of GDS and stop all cases of engagement which are under process. Consequent upon Notification No.EST/1- 151/2019 (B3), dated 10.03.2019, online recruitment process has been started centrally by the Circle Office, Bhubaneswar.
4.1. The opposite parties specifically pleaded that as the selection process could not be completed by the opposite party No.5 (Assistant Superintendent of Posts of Chhatrapur Sub-Division, Chhatrapur) on or before the stipulated date, i.e., 30.06.2015, the notification dated 03.10.2010 stands cancelled in conformity with the Order contained in Directorate Letter No.17-39/7/2012- GDS, dated 28.05.2015. It is explained that the post of GDS, Khallikote RS Sub-Post Office could be filled up without prior permission by said opposite party No.5 as there was no requirement for administrative approval for filling up post in Sub-Post Office; however, while W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 12 of 100 correspondences were being made to fill up other vacancies related to Branch Offices, Letter No.17- 39/7/2012-GDS, dated 28.05.2015 was issued by the Government of India in Ministry of Communication & IT, Department of Posts (GDS Section), whereby instruction contained to fill up vacancies by 30.06.2015, or else, the earlier notification would stand cancelled. Said letter stipulated that <the vacancies should be filled under the new Engagement Process (Aptitude Test Method) applicable with effect from 01.04.2015=. Subsequently Letter No.17-23/2016-GDS, 01.08.2016, was issued containing instruction to <stop selection/ engagement of all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks with immediate effect=. The Original Application being filed with delay, in view of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the same has appropriately been held to be barred by limitation by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Therefore, the writ petition, being devoid of merit consideration, is liable to be dismissed.
4.2. It has been brought to fore by the opposite parties that after dismissal of O.A. No.630 of 2018 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack, out of three posts, i.e., GDSMD, Sindurpur B.O., GDSMD, Karapada B.O., GDSMD, Khojapalli B.O., the post of GDSMD, Karapada B.O. has been filled up on compassionate ground and other two posts are lying vacant.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 13 of 1004.3. Laying stress upon Letter No.17-39/7/2012-GDS, dated 28.05.2015 issued by the Government of India in Ministry of Communication & IT, Department of Posts (GDS Section), the opposite parties specifically took stance that new engagement process, i.e., (Aptitude Test Method), being put in place with effect from 01.04.2015, publication of result pertaining to earlier Notification bearing No.PF/GDSMD, Karapada BO, dated 03.10.2013 did not survive. As such in the process, there is no involvement of mala fide or oblique motive as alleged by the petitioners.
5. Raking up the issue of need for according administrative approval, rejoinder affidavit dated 17.10.2022 has been filed asserting that it is with mala fide intention and calculated to frustrate appointment of subject-GDS, the opposite parties attempted to take shelter of non- availability of approval in respect of Branch Office. Referring to non-requirement of such administrative approval in respect of Sub-Post Offices, it is contended that it hits at discrimination qua Branch Office vis-à-vis Sub-Post Office and it is affirmed by the petitioners that there was no such stipulation provided in the notification dated 28.05.2015.
5.1. By way of the rejoinder affidavit the petitioners raised voice against manner of doing things and questioned the W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 14 of 100 process of cancellation in respect of eleven posts of GDS while allowing GDSMD, Khallikote RS Sub-Post Office.
6. Clarifying further in reply to rejoinder affidavit dated 02.12.2022 filed by the petitioners, the opposite parties have made the submission that <regarding contention of the petitioners as to non-mention of any such stipulation towards obtaining prior permission for filling up GDS posts of Branch Post Offices, it is to submit that these are internal affairs of the Department and pre- notification formalities which need no reflection in the notification=.
6.1. At paragraph 8 of the reply affidavit dated 02.12.2022, the opposite parties have made it clear that <Conditions stipulated in Advertisements are generally for the information/guidance of candidates, but seeking prior permission/Administrative approval from higher authority for filling up GDS post is purely internal affairs of the Department and pre-notification formalities which need no reflection in the Advertisement. As per instruction contained in Letter No.17-23/2016-GDS, dated 01.08.2016 (Annexure-R/4) selection/engagement of all types of GDS were stopped=.
6.2. Taking strong exception to the contention of the petitioners in their rejoinder affidavit (paragraph 4) that <In this sub-para the opposite parties have replied the rest eleven numbers of vacant posts could not be W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 15 of 100 completed accordingly cancellation notification was displayed in the office notice board of the Assistant Superintendent of Post Office, Chhatrapur Sub-Division, which is not only the false statement but also in the other hand they have admitted there is no such cancellation in regard=, the opposite parties refuting such fact made affirmative statement to the effect that <nowhere in paragraph 3 of the counter the opposite parties have replied that the cancellation notice was displayed in the office notice board of the Assistant Superintendent of Posts, Chhatrapur Sub-Division. Rather it is the false statement of the petitioners to mislead the Hon9ble Court.= 6.3. In paragraph 9 of the said reply affidavit dated 02.12.2022, it has been emphasized by the opposite parties that <In accordance with the Directorate letter dated 28.05.2015 (Annexure-R/3), the notifications to fill up the remaining eleven vacant GDS posts stand cancelled automatically with effect from 01.07.2015. There is no such provision to intimate the applicants individually as to cancellation of notifications.= 6.4. Repelling the assertion of the petitioners that they are meritorious candidates in comparison to other eligible candidates qua Khallikote RS Sub-Post Office, it has been placed on record that as per the check list (Annexure-R/5 enclosed to reply to rejoinder affidavit) W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 16 of 100 whereas the petitioner No.1 (Ramesh Chandra Behera) is positioned at serial No.13, the petitioner No.2-Bhagirathi Das at serial No.5 and the petitioner No.3 at serial No.7.
HEARING OF WRIT PETITION BEFORE THIS COURT:
7. On the pleadings being exchanged among counsel for the respective parties, on their consent, the matter is taken up for final hearing at the stage of admission. This Court heard Sri Sukanta Kumar Dalai, learned Advocate for the petitioners and Sri Chandrakanta Pradhan, learned Senior Panel Counsel for the opposite party Nos. 1 to 5.
SUBMISSIONS AND ARGUMENTS OF RESPECTIVE PARTIES:
8. Main plank of argument of Sri Sukanta Kumar Dalai, learned Advocate proceeded on the ground that the petitioners have been kept in dark by not publishing the result even though they have been waiting since 2013 and they were pursuing the matter diligently for having a scope to eke out livelihood by getting appointment as GDS on consideration of their applications. Showing peeve against the ground of dismissal of O.A. No.630 of 2018 by the Central Administrative Tribunal vide Order dated 04.06.2020, it is submitted that the same is passed without application of mind and the ground of limitation is contrary to the records. He went on to submit that it is <only after issuance of letter dated 07.05.2018 and so also information under the Right to W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 17 of 100 Information Act=, the cause of action to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal arose.
8.1. It is next contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the opposite parties have not only acted irresponsibly, but also with mala fides <by giving appointment in respect of one of the candidates for the same advertisement=. Referring to contents of paragraph 24 of the writ petition, he further submitted that mala fide is manifest as the opposite parties did not publish result of applications submitted by the present petitioners, whereas they have filled up one of the posts, namely GDSMD, Khallikote RS Sub-Post Office under <unreserved category=. Therefore, the petitioners have been discriminated against and Sri Sukanta Kumar Dalai, learned Advocate in his usual style of vehemence made attempt to persuade this Court by submitting that ends of justice would subserve best if the opposite parties are directed to publish the result in consideration of applications made in connection with Advertisement dated 03.10.2013.
9. Sri Chandrakanta Pradhan, learned Senior Panel Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party Nos.1 to 5 stuck to the stand taken in the counter affidavit as also the reply to the rejoinder affidavit and would submit that by virtue of instructions contained in Letter No.17-
39/7/2012-GDS, dated 28.05.2015 issued by the W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 18 of 100 Government of India in Ministry of Communication & IT, Department of Posts (GDS Section), the vacancies having not been filled up by the cut-off date, i.e., 30.06.2015, the earlier notification stood cancelled. There was no necessity or requirement to intimate the result of the applications individually.
9.1. It is further submitted that Khollikote RS being a Sub-
Post Office, the post of GDSMD to said post office is finalized which required no administrative approval. For the rest of the eleven numbers of posts, the same being Branch Post Office required approval of higher authority, as such, the applications could not be finalized. In the meantime Letter No.17-23/2016-GDS, dated 01.08.2016 has been issued by Government of India, Ministry of Communication & IT, Department of Posts (GDS Section) restricting <selection/engagement of all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks with immediate effect= and instructed to go ahead with the matters which have already been finalized. Such being the position, there is no scope for issue of writ of mandamus vacating the impugned Order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, which is just, illogical and with due appreciation of evidence on record.
DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS:
10. In supersession of <THE DEPARTMENT OF POSTS, GRAMIN DAK SEVAKS (CONDUCT AND EMPLOYMENT) RULES, 2001= except as respects things done or omitted to be done before W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 19 of 100 such supersession, <THE DEPARTMENT OF POSTS, GRAMIN DAK SEVAKS (CONDUCT AND ENGAGEMENT) RULES, 2011= has been brought to force with effect from the date of circulation by virtue of Letter No.21-8/2010-GDS, dated 18.04.2011. In the said Rules, the term <Gramin Dak Sevak= has been defined under Rule 3(d) as follows:
<Graamin Dak Sevak means4
(i) A Gramin Dak Sevak Branch Postmaster;
(ii) A Gramin Dak Sevak Mail Deliverer;
(iii) A Gramin Dak Sevak Mail Carrier;
(iv) A Gramin Dak Sevak Mail Packer;
(v) A Gramin Dak Sevak Stamp Vendor.
Note.4
1. The category of Gramin Dak Sevak Sub-Postmaster is no more in existence on implementation of orders issued under No.5-7/2009-PE-II, dated 14.01.2010.
2. The category of Gramin Dak Sevak Mailman is declared a wasting group vide letter No.6-23/2010-
PE-II dated 21.07.2010.
3. The category of Gramin Dak Sevak Mail Messenger was ordered to be phased out vide Order dated 10.10.2005.=
11. The entire case of the petitioners and the opposite parties rests on the following instructions, which are reproduced in extenso:
<No.17-39/7/2012-GDS Government of India W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 20 of 100 Ministry of Communication & IT Department of Posts (GDS Section) Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg New Delhi-11000 Date 28.05.2015 To All Chief Postmasters General Sub.: Revised selection process for engagement to all approved categories GDS posts In continuation to this Directorate OM of even number dated 14.01.2015 on the subject mentioned above, the following instructions are issued:
All vacancies of GDS posts for which notification has already been issued on/or before 31.03.2015 by the concerned recruiting authority should be filled up latest by 30.06.2015 by adopting the old engagement procedure applicable prior to 01.04.2015.
In case any of these vacancies are not filled up latest by 30.06.2015, the notification should be cancelled and the vacancies should be filled under the new engagement process (Aptitude Test Method) applicable with effect from 01.04.2015.
This may be brought to the notice of all concerned.
Sd/-
(Surender Kumar) Assistant Director General (GDS)= *** W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 21 of 100 <Government of India Ministry of Communication & IT Department of Posts (GDS Section) Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg New Delhi-1100001 No. 17-23/2016-GDS Dated: 1, Aug 2016 To All Head of Circles Sub.: Proposed online selection of all categories of GDS4 reg.
I am directed to request you to stop selection/ engagement of all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks with immediate effect. It is further requested to stop all cases of engagement which are under process. Cases where selection has already been finalized and communicated to candidates only need not be withheld.
2. These orders are issued in view of proposal for online selection of Gramin Dak Sevaks. Further orders in this regard may kindly be awaited.
3. This issues with the approval of competent authority.
(RL Patel) Asstt. Director General (GDS)= 11.1. The aforesaid instructions clearly mandated that all vacancies of GDS posts for which notification had already been issued on/or before 31.03.2015 by the concerned recruiting authority should be filled up latest by 30.06.2015 with stipulation that non-filled up post by W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 22 of 100 said date would be cancelled. Further Letter dated 01.08.2016 interdicted by making request to stop selection/engagement of all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks with immediate effect.
11.2. The fact as placed by the petitioners reveals that they were made to inform under the Right to Information Act, 2005 by disposal of appeal under Section 19 thereof vide Order dated 12.02.2016 that <the CPIO-cum-SSPOs Berhampur Division, Berhampur vide Letter No.BFCCC/RTI-75 dated 08.01.2016 replied that the information available materially has already been supplied to the appellant vide SSPOs Berhampur Division Letter No.BF-CCC/RTI-75, dated 22.09.2015. It is within the knowledge of the petitioners by way of communication made by Assistant Director-I, Office of Post Master General, Berhampur Region, Berhampur-I vide No.RTI/Appeal-72/R.Ch.Behera/BF/2015, dated 27.01.2016 that <Out of 12 numbers of vacant posts of GDS official only 01 (one) post has been filled up. As 11 (eleven) numbers of vacant posts yet to be finalized.= 11.3. The Central Administrative Tribunal has recorded the following objection of the opposite parties taken in the original application at paragraph 4 of its Order dated 04.06.2020:
<*** Besides the above, the respondents have stated that the present O.A. is barred by limitation in view of the fact W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 23 of 100 that the applicants prayer for appointment basing upon the notification dated 03.10.2013 having been cancelled by virtue of the Postal Director Letter dated 28.05.2015 as the recruitment process had not been completed till 31.03.2015 and the said letter was also affixed on the notice board of respondent No.5 for information.
Therefore, the Respondents have pointed out that after cancellation of the notification on 28.05.2015, the cause of action arose for the applicants to approach this Tribunal, whereas they, without doing so sought information through RTI application, which was provided to them on 22/23.09.2015. Respondents have pleaded that presuming that the cause of action for approaching this Tribunal arose on 22/23.03.2015 when they received information under the RTI Act, the applicants should have approached this Tribunal thereafter, instead, they went on filing repeated RTI applications. Respondents have submitted that as per the settled position of law getting information under RTI Act does not erase and cure the delay. ***= 11.4. On consideration of contentions and averments contained in the original application and the replies of the other side, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal has confined its investigation into the appointment so far as post of GDSMD of Karapada Sub- Post Office is concerned. Vide Paragraph 15 of its Order it is made clear that by seeking relief the petitioners insisted for issue of direction to publish result in connection with Advertisement dated 03.10.2013 and it has been noted as follows:
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 24 of 100<Advertisement under Annexure-A/1 is for filling up the vacancy of GDSMD, Karapada. Therefore, this Tribunal is confined to the filling up the post in question as per Annexure-A/1 and not beyond that=.
11.5. On analysis of facts, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal came to conclude taking into account the tenor of Letter No.17-39/7/2012-GDS, dated 28.05.2015 issued by the Government of India in Ministry of Communication & IT Department of Posts (GDS Section), that the petitioners have no right for appointment to any particular post in question and they have failed to prove that the authorities have cancelled the recruitment process or had stopped it with any mala fide intention or oblique motive.
11.6. This Court examining the averments in pleadings of respective parties found that the petitioners have laid much emphasis on the ill-intention of the opposite parties in not finalizing their applications stated to have been filed in response to Advertisement dated 03.10.2013. Not only in the writ petition, but also in the rejoinder affidavit the petitioners have used expressions like <false statement=, <misleading averment=, <based upon mala fide= and <oblique intention= against the opposite parties, but without any material particulars. It is observed by this Court that on the contrary, the opposite parties throughout have impressed upon that out of twelve posts, only one post was filled up with W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 25 of 100 respect to post of GDSMD of Khallikote RS Sub-Post Office, since it is <Sub-Post Office= which required no approval from the higher authorities. It is asserted by the opposite parties that in order to fill up vacant posts in the Branch Post Office, there is requirement of administrative approval, which is internal process. It is further clarified by adducing evidence like Letter No.17-
39/7/2012-GDS, dated 28.05.2015 issued by the Government of India in Ministry of Communication & IT Department of Posts (GDS Section) read with Letter dated 01.08.2016, that on account of introduction of revised selection process, the vacancies which could not be filled up by 30.06.2015, all cases of selection/ engagement, which were under process, were directed to be stopped. Production of such letters along with explanation proffered evinced that the petitioners could not prove mala fide intention or oblique motive on the part of the opposite parties. Therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, it is not possible to hold that the impugned action of the opposite parties is unfair or unjust or irrational or arbitrary or tainted with any mala fide intention.
11.7. Nonetheless, the legal position as to substantiate the allegation of mala fide intention and oblique motive has, by now, been clearly laid down in different judicial pronouncements. There is no cavil for the proposition that when a party alleges mala fide against a statutory W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 26 of 100 authority, burden falls heavy on him who alleges it. It is a settled law where a mala fide is alleged, the authority, who has passed the order, which is said to be the result of the mala fide exercise of power, has to be impleaded eo nominee. In the absence of such impleadment, the Court neither can look into the plea of mala fide nor can consider the issue raising mala fide. In the case at hand, none of the persons/authorities, against whom unsubstantiated, uncalled for and unwarranted allegations have been made, has been impleaded. Thus, such allegations as levelled by the petitioners cannot be entertained. In First Land Acquisition Collector Vrs. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli, (2002) 4 SCC 160; and Jasvinder Singh Vrs. State of J&K, (2003) 2 SCC 132, the Supreme Court of India held that burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the Court to substantiate the said allegations.
11.8. The issue of <malus animus= was considered in Tara Chand Khatri Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 567, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegation of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition and burden W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 27 of 100 of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and there must be sufficient material to establish malus animus.
11.9. In J.N. Banavalikar Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 326 = 1995 Supp.4 SCR 1 it has been observed as follows:
<If the administration of a public body or a Government takes a decision which can be demonstrated as lacking in reasonableness and fair-play or tainted with mala fide or arbitrariness, such administrative action even if made by a competent authority, offends the pervasive protection under Article 14 of the Constitution of India against mala fide and arbitrariness in the Governmental action and action of the public bodies, in our view, the appellant would be entitled to ask for quashing the impugned action of his removal from the post of Medical Superintendent if it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that such action had been taken without any reasonable basis and not being informed by administrative exigency but merely on the caprice and ipse dixit of the concerned authority or being actuated by mala fide intention.
*** The contention of the appellant that in order to accommodate a junior doctor as Medical Superintendent in I.D. Hospital, Dr. Patnaik had been moved out from the said hospital to replace the appellant as Medical Superintendent of RBTB Hospital, is not only vague but lacks in particulars forming the foundation of such contention. Further, in the absence of impleadment of the junior doctor who is alleged to have been W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 28 of 100 favoured by the course of action leading to removal of the appellant and the person who had allegedly passed mala fide order in order to favour such junior doctor, any contention of mala fide action in fact i.e. malice in fact should not be countenanced by the court.= 11.10. The conceptual understanding of allegation of mala fide against authority as re-affirmed in the case of Rajneesh Khajuria Vrs. M/s. Wockhardt Ltd., (2020) 1 SCR 1005 may have significance in the present context.
The following observations as find place in said reported Judgment is reproduced hereunder:
<14. *** In a Judgment reported as State of Bihar Vrs.
P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222, this Court held that mala fide means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely
(i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and
(ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.
As far as second aspect is concerned, there is a power of transfer vested in the employer in terms of letter of appointment. Even in terms of the provisions of the Act, the transfer by itself cannot be said to be an act of unfair labour practice unless it is actuated by mala fide. Therefore, to sustain a plea of mala fide, there has to be an element of personal bias or an oblique motive. This Court held as under:
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 29 of 100850. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith.
An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely
(i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and
(ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.
51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 30 of 100***
59. Malice in law could be inferred from doing of wrongful act intentionally without any just cause or excuse or without there being reasonable relation to the purpose of the exercise of statutory power. Malice in law is not established from the omission to consider some documents said to be relevant to the accused. Equally reporting the commission of a crime to the Station House Officer, cannot be held to be a colourable exercise of power with bad faith or fraud on power. It may be honest and bona fide exercise of power. There are no grounds made out or shown to us that the first information report was not lodged in good faith. State of Haryana Vrs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 = JT 1990 (4) SC 650 is an authority for the proposition that existence of deep seated political vendetta is not a ground to quash the FIR. Therein despite the attempt by the respondent to prove by affidavit evidence corroborated by documents of the mala fides and even on facts as alleged no offence was committed, this Court declined to go into those allegations and relegated the dispute for investigation. Unhesitatingly I hold that the findings of the High Court that FIR gets vitiated by the mala fides of the Administrator and the charge-sheets are the results of the mala fides of the informant or investigator, to say the least, is fantastic and obvious gross error of law.9
15. In another judgment reported as Prabodh Sagar Vrs.
Punjab State Electricity Board, (2000) 5 SCC 630, it W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 31 of 100 was held by this Court that the mere use of the expression <mala fide= would not by itself make the petition entertainable. The Court held as under:
813. *** Incidentally, be it noted that the expression <mala fide= is not meaningless jargon and it has its proper connotation. Malice or mala fides can only be appreciated from the records of the case in the facts of each case. There cannot possibly be any set guidelines in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own facts and circumstances. We ourselves feel it expedient to record that the petitioner has become more of a liability than an asset and in the event of there being such a situation vis-à-vis an employee, the employer will be within his liberty to take appropriate steps including the cessation of relationship between the employer and the employee. The service conditions of the Board9s employees also provide for voluntary (sic compulsory) retirement, a person of the nature of the petitioner, as more fully detailed hereinbefore, cannot possibly be given any redress against the order of the Board for voluntary retirement. There must be factual support pertaining to the allegations of mala fides, unfortunately there is none. Mere user of the word <mala fide= by the petitioner would not by itself make the petition entertainable.
The Court must scan the factual aspect and come to its own conclusion i.e. exactly what the High Court has done and that is the reason why the narration has been noted in this judgment in extenso. ***9 W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 32 of 100
16. In a Judgment reported as HMT Ltd. Vrs. Mudappa (2007) 9 SCC 768, quoting from earlier judgment of this Court reported as State of A.P. Vrs. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC 739, it was held that 8legal malice9 or 8malice in law9 means 8something done without lawful excuse9. It is an act done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. The Court held as under:
824. The Court also explained the concept of legal mala fide. By referring to Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd Edn., London Butterworths, 1989 the Court stated:
(Goverdhanlal case, (2003) 4 SCC 739, SCC p. 744, para 12)
812. The legal meaning of malice is 8ill will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action9. This is sometimes described as 8malice in fact9.
8Legal malice9 or 8malice in law9 means 8something done without lawful excuse9.
In other words, 8it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of others.9 It was observed that where malice was attributed to the State, it could not be a case of malice in fact, or personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. It could only be malice in law i.e. legal mala fide. The State, if it wishes to acquire land, could exercise its power bona fide for statutory purpose and for none other. It was W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 33 of 100 observed that it was only because of the decree passed in favour of the owner that the proceedings for acquisition were necessary and hence, notification was issued. Such an action could not be held mala fide.9
17. In a Judgment reported as Union of India Vrs. Ashok Kumar, (2005) 8 SCC 760, it has been held that allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. The Court held as under:
821. Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the authority of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man9s mind, for that is what the employee has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done. The difficulty is not lessened when one has to establish that a person apparently acting on the legitimate exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the sense of pursuing an illegitimate aim. It is not the law that mala fides in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts. (S. W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 34 of 100 Pratap Singh Vrs. State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 733 = AIR 1964 SC 72). It cannot be overlooked that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. As noted by this Court in E.P. Royappa Vrs. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 = AIR 1974 SC 555, Courts would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before them by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. (See Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. Vrs. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579).9
18. In another Judgment reported as Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited Vrs. RDS Projects Limited, (2013) 1 SCC 524, this Court held that when allegations of mala fides are made, the persons against whom the same are levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings to enable them to answer the charge. A judicial pronouncement declaring an action to be mala fide is a serious indictment of the person concerned that can lead to adverse civil consequences against him. The Court held as under:
827. There is yet another aspect which cannot be ignored. As and when allegations of mala fides are made, the persons against whom the same are levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings to enable them to answer the charge. In the absence of the person concerned W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 35 of 100 as a party in his/her individual capacity it will neither be fair nor proper to record a finding that malice in fact had vitiated the action taken by the authority concerned. It is important to remember that a judicial pronouncement declaring an action to be mala fide is a serious indictment of the person concerned that can lead to adverse civil consequences against him.
Courts have, therefore, to be slow in drawing conclusions when it comes to holding allegations of mala fides to be proved and only in cases where based on the material placed before the Court or facts that are admitted leading to inevitable inferences supporting the charge of mala fides that the Court should record a finding in the process ensuring that while it does so, it also hears the person who was likely to be affected by such a finding.9 ***= 11.11. The Hon9ble Supreme Court of India in All India State Bank Officers9 Federation Vrs. Union of India, (1997) 9 SCC 151 observed as follows:
<21. In view of the aforesaid explanation of the respondent-Bank, which we see no reason to disbelieve, it is clear that the petitioners have made baseless and reckless allegations of mala fides. Respondents 4 and 5 obviously had no direct or indirect role to play either in the formulation of the policy or in the memorandum being placed as a table item to be taken up for consideration in the meeting held on 07.03.1989. The modification was approved by the Chairman and all the Directors who were present in the meeting of the Board. For an W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 36 of 100 allegation of mala fide to succeed it must be conclusively shown that Respondents 4 and 5 wielded influence over all the members of the Board who were present in the said meeting. No such allegation has been made. The decision to modify the promotion policy was taken by a competent authority, namely, the Central Board in a duly constituted meeting held on 07.03.1989 and we are unable to accept that this change in the policy was brought about solely with a view to help Respondents 4 and 5.
22. There is yet another reason why this contention of the petitioners must fail. It is now settled law that the person against whom mala fides are alleged must be made a party to the proceeding. The allegation that the policy was amended with a view to benefit Respondents 4 and 5 would amount to the petitioners contending that the Board of Directors of the Bank sought to favour Respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the proposal put before it.
Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This being so the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala fides, which allegations, in fact, are without merit.= 11.12. In Federation of Railway Officers Association Vrs.
Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344, it has been held as under:
<That allegations regarding mala fides cannot be vaguely made and it must be specified and clear. In this context, the concerned Minister who is stated to be involved in the formation of new Zone at Hazipur is not made a party who can meet the allegations.= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 37 of 100 11.13. Therefore, essentially in Federation of Rly. Officers Association Vrs. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344, the Hon9ble Supreme Court has held that the allegation of mala fide has to be specifically made and the person against whom such allegations are made has to be impleaded and in his absence such allegations cannot be taken into consideration.
11.14. It has been settled legal proposition that in case allegations of mala fide are made against any person he is to be impleaded by name, otherwise the allegations cannot be considered. [Vide State of Bihar Vrs. P.P. Sharma, IAS of Delhi and another, AIR 1996 SC 326; All India State Bank Officers Federation and others Vrs.
Union of India and others, (1997) 9 SCC 151; and I.K. Mishra Vrs. Union of India and others, (1997) 6 SCC 228].
11.15. In E.P. Royappa Vrs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555, the Supreme Court observed as under:
<Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it... The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against ministers and other, not because of any special status... but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy.= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 38 of 100 11.16. The Supreme Court, in Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar Vrs. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 65; and Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil Vrs. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi, AIR 1987 SC 294; has made similar observations.
11.17. In M. Sankaranarayanan, IAS Vrs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 SC 763, the Supreme Court observed that the Court may <draw a reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of insinuation, surmise or conjecture.= 11.18. In N.K. Singh Vrs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 98, the Supreme Court has held that <the inference of mala fides should be drawn by reading in between the lines and taking into account the attendant circumstances.= 11.19. There has to be very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically alleged in the petition as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material. [Vide, State of UP Vrs. Dr. V.N. Prasad, 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 151; Arvind Dattatraya Dhande Vrs. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 6 SCC 169; Utkal University Vrs.
Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, (1999) 2 SCC 193; Kiran W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 39 of 100 Gupta Vrs. State of U.P., (2000) 7 SCC 719; and Netai Bag Vrs. State of W.B., (2000) 8 SCC 262].
11.20. In State of Punjab Vrs. V.K. Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330, the Apex Court examined the issue of bias and mala fide, observing as under:
<Whereas fairness is synonymous with reasonableness4 bias stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the word 8malice9 which in common acceptance means and implies 8spite9 or 8ill will9. One redeeming feature in the matter of attributing bias or malice and is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purpose of indication of ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on record to come to the conclusion as to whether in fact, there was existing a bias or a mala fide move which results in the miscarriage of justice... In almost all legal inquiries, 8intention as distinguished from motive is the all important factor9 and in common parlance a malicious act stands equated with an intentional act without just cause or excuse.= 11.21. Similar view has been reiterated in Samant Vrs.
Bombay Stock Exchange, (2001) 5 SCC 323.
11.22. At paragraph 18 of the writ petition, the petitioners have alleged as follows:
<Rather on their reply it is very clear the irresponsible and negligence of the authorities have been pointed out and more specifically they have worked out on their own choice by giving appointment in respect of one of the candidates for the same advertisement, the petitioners have been singled out due to mala fide intention of the opposite parties.= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 40 of 100 11.23. Such scurrilous attack by the petitioners cannot be countenanced as it is fact on record that GDSMD of Khallikote RS Sub-Post Office is allowed as appointment/engagement to Sub-Post Office requires no prior approval of the higher authority and GDSMD of Karapada, being Branch Post Office, required administrative approval. As the finalization could not be made prior to cut-off date, i.e., 30.06.2015 as per instructions vide Letter dated 28.05.2015 read with Letter dated 01.08.2016, it could not be said that the opposite parties have oblique motive in stopping selection/engagement of all types of GDS on or after 01.08.2016.
11.24. In the instant case, no factual foundation has been laid to substantiate the scandalous allegation of mala fide against the opposite parties. The petitioner having not impleaded the person by name, thereby as the pleadings fall short of taking note of such an issue, this Court is not inclined to entertain such baseless pleas.
12. After analyzing the factual matrix of the matter with legal position in the foregoing paragraphs, it is now expedient to consider as to whether making application for appointment/engagement as GDSMD in respect of Karapada Branch Post Office would confer right to claim for the post? Definitely the answer is <NO=. The service jurisprudence has acknowledged that even after name of W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 41 of 100 a candidate finds place in the select list, it would not entail any indefeasible right to claim for the post.
12.1. The principle regarding selection of candidate has been well established; suffice it to quote the following lines from Manoj Manu Vrs. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCR 8:
<14. It is, thus, manifest that though a person whose name is included in the select list, does not acquire any right to be appointed. The Government may decide not to fill up all the vacancies for valid reasons. Such a decision on the part of the Government not to fill up the required/advertised vacancies should not be arbitrary or unreasonable but must be based on sound, rational and conscious application of mind. Once, it is found that the decision of the Government is based on some valid reason, the Court would not issue any Mandamus to Government to fill up the vacancies.= 12.2. In Shankarsan Dash Vrs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India held that:
<7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 42 of 100 or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana Vrs. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220, Neelima Shangla Vrs. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 268, or Jatindra Kumar Vrs. State of Punjab, (1985)1 SCC 122.= 12.3. In a Judgment reported as S.S. Balu Vrs. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479, it was held that:
<12. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot also be lost sight of. A person does not acquire a legal right to be appointed only because his name appears in the select list. (See Pitta Naveen Kumar Vrs. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti, (2006) 10 SCC
261. The State as an employer has a right to fill up all the posts or not to fill them up. Unless a discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or an arbitrariness is committed, the candidate concerned will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. See Batiarani Gramiya Bank Vrs. Pallab Kumar, (2004) 9 SCC 100.= 12.4. In Pitta Naveen Kumar Vrs. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti, (2006) 10 SCC 261, it was held as follows:W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 43 of 100
<32. *** A candidate does not have any legal right to be appointed. He in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India has only a right to be considered therefor. Consideration of the case of an individual candidate although ordinarily is required to be made in terms of the extant rules but strict adherence thereto would be necessary in a case where the rules operate only to the disadvantage of the candidates concerned and not otherwise.= 12.5. In another Judgment reported in Kulwinder Pal Singh Vrs. State of Punjab, (2016) 6 SCC 532, it was held as under:
<10. It is fairly well settled that merely because the name of a candidate finds place in the select list, it would not give him indefeasible right to get an appointment as well. The name of a candidate may appear in the merit list but he has no indefeasible right to an appointment vide Food Corporation of India Vrs. Bhanu Lodh, (2005) 3 SCC 618, All India SC & ST Employees9 Association Vrs. A. Arthur Jeen, (2001) 6 SCC 380 and UPSC Vrs. Gaurav Dwivedi, (1999) 5 SCC 180.
11. This Court again in State of Orissa Vrs. Rajkishore Nanda (2010) 6 SCC 777, held as under:
814. A person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at best is a condition of eligibility for the purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed. The vacancies have to be filled up W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 44 of 100 as per the statutory rules and in conformity with the constitutional mandate.
***
16. A select list cannot be treated as a reservoir for the purpose of appointments, that vacancy can be filled up taking the names from that list as and when it is so required.9 ***= 12.6. It may be apt to have regard to the following ratio laid down in Government of Orissa Vrs. Haraprasad Das, (1998) 1 SCC 487 = (1997) 5 SCR 338 = 1997 INSC 752:
(Paragraph 9 of SCC) <It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant-State that the Tribunal in giving the aforesaid directions has acted beyond its jurisdiction and that the said directions are illegal inasmuch as they are contrary to Rule 11 of the Rules. In our opinion, the contention deserves to be accepted. Merely because there were some vacant posts of Copyholders and the Director of the Press had recommended to the Government to fill up those posts it was not open to the Tribunal to direct the Government to fill up those posts even though it had good reasons not to do so. It should have been appreciated by the Tribunal that mere empanelment or inclusion of one9s name in the selection list does not give him a right to be appointed. So also if the Government decides not to make further appointments for a valid reason, it cannot be said that it has acted arbitrarily by not appointing those whose names are included in the selection list. Whether to fill up a post or not is a policy decision and unless it is shown to be arbitrary it is not open to the Tribunal to interfere with such decision of the Government W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 45 of 100 and direct it to make further appointments. The Tribunal in directing the Government to make further appointments on the efficiency ground of public administration went beyond its jurisdiction. While giving such a direction what the Tribunal failed to appreciate was that the decision of the Government not to make further appointments was not challenged as arbitrary and it was challenged only on two grounds viz.: (1) In between 09.08.1994 and
13.01.1995 there was no ban and, therefore, the Government could have appointed the respondents on the vacant posts, and (2) the Government had made appointments in the same Press from out of a panel of Distributors, Builders, Type Suppliers, etc. which was prepared about 7 years back and, therefore, the Government had meted out discriminatory treatment to the respondents. The Tribunal did not find the action of the Government discriminatory possibly because as pointed out by the State in its counter filed before the Tribunal the selection list, prepared for Distributors, Binders, Type Suppliers, was of a different nature and character as it was prepared on the basis of a trade test which was confined to the in-service employees eligible for promotion to those posts under Rule 17 of the Rules. It may be recalled at this stage that the posts of Copyholders in the Government Press are base level Class III posts and are required to be filled up by direct recruitment from open market under Rules 10 and 11 of the Rules.= 12.7. Another Judgment of the Hon9ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of State of Odisha Vrs. Bhikari Charan Khuntia, (2003) Supp 3 SCR 986 may be referred to, where the following is the observation:
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 46 of 100<It cannot be lost sight of that because of certain circumstances and policy decision which were also brought to the notice of the High Court, appointments could not be made. The reasons which persuaded the Government to absorb those who were rendered surplus on account of abolition of octroi and the decision taken to abolish substantial number of posts to minimize expenditure cannot be said to be either extraneous or irrelevant for the purpose, to be ignored by the Court in according relief to the writ petitioners. But the High Court notwithstanding chose to give directions as quoted above. The appointments made in respect of some who got empanelled on regular selections made by the recruitment Board pursuant to the selection process undertaken does not give any sustenance to the writ petitioners to claim parity of treatment when their claims cannot be equated to those of such empanelled candidates.= 12.8. In the instant case, the undisputed fact rests on the evidence adduced by the opposite parties that the selection process has not been completed in respect of eleven posts out of twelve posts as advertised vide Notification No.PF/GDSMD, Karapada Branch Post Office, dated, at Chhatrapur, the 3rd October, 2013 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) issued by the Government of India, Department of Posts in the Office of the Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices/Inspector of Posts, Chhatrapur Sub-Division in Ganjam District.
Plausible explanation has been offered by the opposite parties justifying stopping of selection/engagement of all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks with effect from W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 47 of 100 01.08.2016, supported by Letter No.17-23/2016-GDS, dated 01.08.2016 vide Annexure-R/4. Such action is not without any cogent purpose inasmuch as there has been <revised selection process for engagement to all approved categories of GDS posts= pursuant to instruction of Government of India, Ministry of Communication & IT, Department of Posts (GDS Section) vide Letter No.17- 39/7/2012-GDS, dated 28.05.2015.
12.9. It transpired from reading of reasons ascribed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal in its Order dated 04.06.2020 that it is specific case of the opposite parties that in view of the subsequent circular dated 28.05.2015 which provided the cut-off date to be 30.06.2015 for inviting applications online, therefore, there was sufficient reasons not to issue any selection list or appointment letter in favour of the applicants- petitioners in pursuance of earlier advertisement in question. It is also recorded as a fact by the Central Administrative Tribunal that the petitioners at that stage cannot claim that they had any right for appointment to any particular post in question. Thus, it has come to the conclusion that the petitioners have failed to prove that the authorities have cancelled the recruitment process or had stopped it with any mala fide intention or oblique motive.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 48 of 10012.10. The allegations are against the persons who have power and authority to engage GDS, but there is no allegation against the person who has issued instruction(s). None of the persons involved in stoppage of engagement of <all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks= have been impleaded as parties to rebut such allegations. Since the impugned Order of the Central Administrative Tribunal is in terms of the instructions contained in Letter dated 28.05.2015 read with Letter dated 01.08.2016, mere fact that selection process in connection with Advertisement dated 03.10.2013 has been directed to be stopped will per se not lead to say that the action is tainted with mala fides. The allegations of mala fide are easier to levy than to prove.
12.11. Therefore, the allegation that the appointment in respect of Khallikote RS Sub-Post Office is tainted with mala fides ignoring the candidature of petitioner No.3, who is claimed to be meritorious and eligible and <the authorities with a mala fide intention did not complete the selection procedure and waited till the Letter dated 01.08.2016= without impleading the person, who is said to have acted in a mala fide manner, is not sustainable.
13. Another pertinent aspect which is harped by Sri Sukanta Kumar Dalai, learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Central Administrative Tribunal misconstrued and misdirected while considering the W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 49 of 100 objection of the opposite parties with respect to delay and laches on the part of the petitioners. By referring to paragraph 21 of the writ petition, it is strenuously urged by him that it is only after issue of Letter No.PG/27- 1391/2018, dated 07.05.2018 by the Department of Posts, India, Office of the Chief Post Master General, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur, Ganjam District, instructing him to <enquire into the matter and take necessary action to resolve the grievance= of the petitioner No.1 with reference to complaint lodged by him on 23.03.2018, the cause of action for questioning inaction of the opposite parties arose. This triggered the petitioners to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack, by way of filing O.A. No.630 of 2018. Sri Chandrakanta Pradhan, learned Senior Panel Counsel appearing for the opposite party Nos.1 to 5, would argue that in accordance with Letter dated 28.05.2015, the notification to fill up the remaining eleven vacant GDS posts stood cancelled automatically, as the selection process could not be concluded on or before the cut-off date, i.e., 30.06.2015, as stipulated in said instruction. Therefore, Sri Chandrakanta Pradhan made submission that the petitioners having not filed petition for condonation of delay as contemplated under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, there is no W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 50 of 100 scope for this Court to interfere with the Order dated 04.06.2020 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal whereby it has been held that there has been delay by the petitioners in approaching the Tribunal by way of filing Original Application in which challenge has been made to Order dated 22.09.2015.
13.1. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack at paragraphs 21 and 22 of its Order dated 04.06.2020 observed thus:
<21. The Applicant has also not approached this Tribunal in time and there has been delay by him in approaching this Tribunal in this OA in which he has challenged the Order dated 22.09.2015.
22. Therefore, OA is barred by limitation and also devoid of merit. Hence the OA is dismissed but in circumstances without any cost.= 13.2. To ascertain the veracity of assertion of the petitioners that the original application was filed within time, vide Order dated 09.10.2023, this Court directed as follows:
<Mr. Dalai, learned counsel for the petitioners is directed to produce the copy of the original application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack (Tribunal) in this Court, which will reveal what relief was sought for from the Tribunal, so that the matter can be considered by this Court at this stage.= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 51 of 100 13.3. In obedience to such direction, on 12.10.2023 by way of Memo, the learned Counsel furnished copy of original application, which was before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal.
13.4. Scrutiny of said copy of original application depicts as follows:
<3. Limitation.4 That the Applicants further declare that the application is within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals9 Act, 1985.
8. Relief sought for.4 Under the circumstances it is most that this Hon9ble Tribunal may kindly graciously be pleased to allow this original application and calling the Respondents and upon hearing them to direct the Respondents to publish the result of the applicants in view of the advertisement under Annexure-1 and to give appointment considering their eligibility with retrospective service benefits.
And pass such other relief/reliefs as would be deem fit and proper;
9. Interim order, if any prayed.4
i) To pass appropriate direction not to proceed with further appointment in respect of aforesaid posts during pendency of the original application.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 52 of 100ii) To pass such other order/orders as would be deem fit and proper.= 13.5. A document forming part of said original application with heading <Synopsis and date chart= inter alia reveals the following:
<18.10.2013 (Annexure-A/2) The applicants have applied for the post of GDS and the postal receipts are annexed herewith for kind perusal.
22.09.2015= (Annexure-A/3) Information under RTI Issued to the applicants showing the appointment in respect of one post and awaiting administrative approval in respect of other posts I.e. in respect of other 11 posts.
7.5.2018 = (Annexure-A/5):
The Asst. Director (P.G.), Office of the CPMG, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar in considering the representation of the applicants directed to the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur to enquire into the matter and to take necessary action to resolve the grievance of the applicants.= 13.6. Glance at pleadings of the original application it is found explained as follows:
<4.4. That, as it appears that the advertisement conditions speaks of the conditions of service and the procedure for selection and as the applicants were eligible for the aforesaid posts and with a hope to W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 53 of 100 get a job to eke out their livelihood had applied for the same awaiting the result of the advertisement. When the authorities did not communicate any result thereto, the applicants approached before the Respondents to obtain information in relate to result of the advertisement but in vain. Lastly in the year 2015 i.e. on 22.9.2015 the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur, in giving reply to the queries made by the applicant under RTI Intimated that they have given appointment in respect of one centre and in respect of others administrative approval has not been received. Copy of the Letter dated 22.9.2015 is annexed herewith as Annexure-A/3.
4.5. That, it is also pertinent to mention here that In the meantime the applicants have approached from pillar to posts to obtain instruction about their result, but reason best known to the authorities, the grievance of the applicants is yet to be mitigated.
Copies of the relevant documents are annexed herewith as Annexure- A/4 series.
4.6. That, while this was the position on 7.5.2018, the Asst. Director (P.G.), Office of the CPMG, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar in considering the representation of the applicants directed to the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur to enquire into the matter and to take necessary action to resolve the grievance of the applicants. Copy of the letter dated 7.5.2018 is annexed herewith as Annexure-A/5.
4.7. That, the cause of action arose to approach this Hon9ble Court, when inaction of the respondents noticed by the applicants in not taking action in W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 54 of 100 pursuant to the letter dated 07.05.2018 and compelled the applicants to approach this Hon9ble Court by way of present form.= 13.7. Perusal of the aforesaid contents of the original application it is emerged that the petitioners were within their knowledge that their applications were not considered due to want of necessary administrative approval as contained in Letter dated 22.09.2015. It seems in order to cover up the limitation and by-pass requirement of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, they have approached the Assistant Director (PG), Office of the CPMG, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar on 23.03.2018, as is revealed from the Letter bearing No.PG/27-1391/2018, dated 07.05.2018 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition), whereby said authority had directed the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Berhampur Division, Berhampur to inquire into the grievance of the petitioners. However, it has been admitted case of the petitioners, as is apparent from the narration in the original application as referred to above, that they have been made aware of non-consideration of their applications on account of necessary approval from higher authority on or around 22.09.2015.
13.8. Further scrutiny of the original application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, copy of which is made available to the Court as furnished by the petitioners, does not show filing of any application W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 55 of 100 praying for condonation of delay. Since the learned Central Administrative Tribunal observed as a matter of fact that the petitioners have questioned the action of 22.09.2015, the Original Application was apparently beyond the prescribed period of limitation as provided under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. As regards the limitation in paragraph 3 of the Original Application, it is contained as <the Applicants further declare that the application is within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals9 Act, 1985=. This averment clearly indicates that the petitioners were all along asserting that they had filed original application within period of limitation stipulated in the statute, but in fact, it was not so.
13.9. The Hon9ble Supreme Court of India in Secy. to Govt. of India Vrs. Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 231, taking cognizance of requirement of disclosure of limitation in terms of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, held as follows:
<The learned counsel for the Union of India raised a preliminary contention, namely, that the application was filed almost after about four years from the date of discharge and, therefore, it was clearly barred by Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. *** When we turn to the Judgment of the Tribunal we find that there is no mention about the question of limitation even though it stared in the face. It would immediately occur to anyone W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 56 of 100 that since the order of discharge was of 07.10.1986 and the application was filed in 1990, it was clearly barred by limitation unless an application for condoning the delay was made under Section 21(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. No such application was in fact made. Even if it was the contention of the employee that he was suffering from schizophrenia, that could have been projected as a ground for condonation of delay under sub-
section (3) of Section 21 of the said statute. Even otherwise without insisting on the formality of an application under Section 21(3) if the Tribunal had dealt with the question of limitation in the context of Section 21 we may have refrained from interfering with the order of the Tribunal under Article 136, but it seems that the Tribunal totally overlooked this question which clearly stared in the face. Even the employee made no effort to explain the delay and seek condonation. We find no valid explanation on record for coming to the conclusion that the case for condonation of delay is made out. In the circumstances, there is no doubt that the application was clearly barred by limitation. It is also difficult to understand how the Tribunal could have awarded full back wages even for the period of delay for which the employee was solely responsible. However, since application itself is barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, it deserves to be dismissed.= 13.10. In this case the learned Central Administrative Tribunal took note of the delay in approaching it by the petitioners and held that the original application is hit by limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. It is, therefore, necessary to have a look at the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 57 of 100 the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which stand thus:
<20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted.4 (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,4
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or
(b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired.
(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be of one of the remedies which W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 58 of 100 are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial.
21. Limitation.4 (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,4
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub- section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where4
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal, if it is W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 59 of 100 made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub- section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.= 13.11. In the context of delay in approaching the forum, in order to institute duly constituted lis it is the petitioners who are to explain the same with cogent material and pleading germane fact with a separate application. Discussing the gamut and purport of <sufficient cause= as envisaged under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, this Court in Union of India Vrs. Biswanath Kumar, 2023 SCC OnLine Ori 5222, made the following observation:
<16. In State of U.P. Vrs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912, the apex Court held that the use of word <shall= is a presumption that the particular provision is imperative. As such, instances have been taken on Rule 57(2) of the Schedule-II to the Income Tax Act, 1961, which provides that the full amount of purchase of money payable <shall= be paid by the purchaser to the Tax Recovery Officer on or before the fifteenth day from the date of sale of property. Thereby, by using the word <shall=, the W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 60 of 100 apex Court held that it is mandatory on the part of the purchaser to pay the full amount to the Tax Recovery Officer. As such, following this principles, the apex Court time and again held similar view in various subsequent judgments and ultimately got approval in the case of Pesara Pushpamala Reddy Vrs. G. Veera Swamy, (2011) 4 SCC 306.
17. In C.N. Paramsivam Vrs. Sunrise Plaza, (2013) 9 SCC 460, the apex Court relying upon the word <shall= as well as the earlier decision of the Court on pari materia provision in Order XXI of the CPC, held that making of the deposit by the intending purchaser is mandatory.
18. In Sainik Motors Vrs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1480, Hon9ble Justice Hidayatullah observed that the word <shall= is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands and points out.
19. In State of U.P. Vrs. Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 751, Hon9ble Justice Subarao, observed that when a statute uses the word <shall=, prima facie it is mandatory, but the court may ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute.
20. In Vijay Dhanuka Vrs. Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638, the apex Court, while interpreting Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., which provides that the Magistrate <shall= in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 61 of 100 he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding, held that the word <shall= is ordinarily mandatory but sometimes, taking into account the context or the intention, it can be held to be directory. However, on looking at the intention of the Legislature, the Court found that the provision is aimed at preventing innocent persons from being harassed by unscrupulous persons making false complaints, and therefore the inquiry or investigation contemplated by the provision before issuing summons was held to be mandatory.
21. Taking into consideration the aforementioned analogy, applying the provisions under Section 21(1) and considering the legislative intent attached to the provisions, it is made clear that using the word <shall= the legislature have put a mandate, i.e., mandatory condition on the Tribunal to entertain the Original Application in connection with the grievance of the applicant within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. On perusal of the provisions contained under Section 21(1) and (2), it is crystal clear that in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period, the Tribunal can admit an application, whereas Sub-
section (2) of Section 21 makes clear that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) where the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 62 of 100 jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates, but no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court. The application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or as the case may be, clause (b), of Sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. Sub- section (3) of Section 21 states by using non- abstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of Sub- section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in Sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. The using of word <notwithstanding=, a non-obstante clause, under Sub-section (3) of Section 21 gives overriding effect over the provisions.
22. In Union of India Vrs. G.M. Kokil, 1984 Supp SCC 196 = AIR 1984 SC 1022, the apex Court held that a clause beginning with <notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force=, is sometimes appended to a section in the beginning, with a view to give the enacting part of the section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause.
23. In T.R. Thandur Vrs. Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 690 = AIR 1996 SC 1643, the apex Court held that a W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 63 of 100 non-obstante clause may be used as a legislative device to modify the ambit of the provision or law mentioned in the non-obstante clause or to override it in specified circumstances.
24. In Central Bank of India Vrs. State of Kerala, (2009) 4 SCC 94, the apex Court held that while interpreting a non-statute clause the court is required to find out the extent to which the Legislature intended to give it an overriding effect.
25. In P. Virudhachalam Vrs. Management of Lotus Mills, (1998) 1 SCC 650 = AIR 1998 SC 554, the apex Court held that the expression <notwithstanding anything in any other law= occurring in a section of an Act cannot be construed to take away the effect of any provision of the Act in which that section appears.
26. Therefore, the effect of provisions contained under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 with regard to condonation of delay is dependent upon the satisfaction of the Tribunal if the application shows the sufficient cause.
27. The pari materia provisions for condonation of delay are derived from Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the word <sufficient cause= under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction, nor want of bona fide, is imputable to the appellant. The term <sufficient cause= under Section 5 of the Limitation Act apparently covers not only those circumstances (such as the Courts being closed or time being spent in obtaining copies, or the party being a minor or insane) which the law expressly recognizes as W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 64 of 100 extending the time, but also such circumstances as are not expressly recognized but which may appear to the Court to be reasonable.
28. In Sitaram Ram Charan Vrs. M.N. Nagrasharma, AIR 1960 220, the apex Court held that <sufficient cause= means the appellant9s explanation for the delay has to cover the whole period of the delay.
29. In Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat Vrs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222=(1967)3 SCR 774, the apex Court held that the word <sufficient cause= should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable.
30. In State of West Bengal Vrs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366, the apex Court held that the expression <sufficient cause= occurring in Section 5 of the Act would mean that <no negligence=, <no inaction= or mala fides is imputable to the party.
31. Similar view has also been taken by the apex Court in Ram Nath Sao Vrs. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC
195.
32. In Sankaran Pillai Vrs. V.P. Venguduswami, (1999) 6 SCC 396 = AIR 1999 SC 3060, while construing the provisions contained under Section 11(4) of the T.N. Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the apex Court held that the expression <sufficient cause= under Section 11 (4) of the Act necessarily implies an element of sincerity, bona fides and reasonableness.
33. In State of Bihar Vrs Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94 = AIR 2000 SC 2306, the apex W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 65 of 100 Court held that the expression <sufficient cause= occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act would mean that a liberal approach be given for sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
34. In State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 = AIR 2005 SC 2191, the Court referred to several precedents on the subject and observed that the proof of <sufficient cause= is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion vested in the Court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. The Court also took cognizance of the usual bureaucratic delays which take place in the functioning of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities and observed:
8Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non- grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal.9
35. The apex Court in Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs.
Muinicipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 66 of 100 SCC 157, held in paragraphs 24 and 25 to the following effect:4
824. What colour the expression <sufficient cause= would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.
25. In case involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.9
36. After holding as above, in paragraph 28 the apex court has stated as follows:
828. The application filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of Shri Sirsikar are W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 67 of 100 conspicuously silent on the following important points:
(a) The name of the person who was having custody of the record has not been disclosed.
(b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not been disclosed.
(c) The date on which the papers were traced out or recovered and name of the person who found the same have not been disclosed.
(d) No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why the applications for certified copies of the judgments of the trial court were not filed till 23.08.2010 despite the fact that Shri Sirsikar had given intimation on 12.05.2003 about the judgments of the trial court.
(e) Even though the Corporation has engaged a battery of lawyers to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an impediment in the making of applications for certified copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against.9
37. In Amalendu Kumar Bera Vrs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52, the apex Court in paragraph-9 held as follows:
8We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State. There is no dispute that the expression <sufficient cause= should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 68 of 100 than the technical detection of <sufficient cause= for explaining every day's delay. However, it is equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India Vrs. Nripen Sarma, (2013) 4 SCC 57 = AIR 2011 SC 1237, the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the appellant Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation.9
38. In Office of the Chief Post Master General Vrs. Living Media India Ltd., AIR 2012 SCW 1812 = (2012) 3 SCC 563 = (2012) 1 SCR 1045, it has been held as follows:
813. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies; their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 69 of 100 procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dated, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.9
39. It is apt to mention here that referring to the judgment of this Court in State of Odisha Vrs. Bishnupriya Routray, 2014 SCC OnLine Ori 160 = 118 (2014) CLT 580, which was authored by one of us (Dr. Justice B.R. Sarangi), similar orders were passed by this Court and challenging those orders the State had moved the apex Court in large number of S.L.Ps., which were dismissed by confirming the orders passed by this Court refusing to condone the delay in preferring the appeal.
40. In State of Odisha Vrs. Miss Sumitra Das, 2021 (II) ILR-CUT 241, the Division Bench of this Court had relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, decided on 15.10.2020 in SLP(C) Dairy No. 9217 of 2020, wherein the SLP was dismissed as time barred and the apex Court awarded cost of Rs.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 70 of 10025,000/- on the State of M.P. and, as such, the judgment of the apex Court was also relied upon by this Court in paragraph-6 of the judgment to the following effect:4
86. Thereafter the aforementioned decision has been referred to and reiterated in a number of orders of the Supreme Court. A sampling of such orders is as under:
(i) Order dated 13th January 2021 in SLP No. 17559 of 2020 (State of Gujarat Vrs.
Tushar Jagdish Chandra Vyas) : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3517.
(ii) Order dated 22nd January 2021 in SLP No. 11989 of 2020 (The Commissioner of Public Instruction Vrs. Shamshuddin) :
2021 SCC OnLine SC 3518.
(iii) Order dated 22nd January 2021 in SLP No. 25743 of 2020 (State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Sabha Narain) : (2022) 9 SCC 266.
(iv) Order dated 4th February 2021 in SLP No. 19846 of 2020 (Union of India Vrs.
Central Tibetan Schools Admin) : (2021) 11 SCC 557.
(v) Order dated 11th January 2021 in SLP No. 22605 of 2020 (The State of Odisha Vrs. Sunanda Mahakuda) : (2021) 11 SCC 560.9
41. From the above it would be evident that by order dated 11.01.2021 passed in SLP No. 22605 of 2020 (State of Orissa Vrs. Sunanda Mahakuda) filed by the State of Odisha, the apex Court dismissed the W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 71 of 100 SLP imposing cost of Rs. 25,000/- for filing a belated SLP without offering any credible explanation.= 13.12. This Court would wish to take note that litigations are expected to be filed within the period of limitation contemplated under the Statutes. Rule is to follow limitation. Condonation of delay is an exception. Exceptions are to be exercised discreetly, if the reasons furnished are genuine and acceptable. The Courts are vested with the power of discretion to condone the delay, that does not mean that enormous delay in instituting the case is to be condoned mechanically. Undoubtedly, if the reasons are candid and convincing, then the Courts are empowered to exercise its power of discretion for the purpose of condoning the delay. Power of discretion is a double-edged weapon. Thus, discretionary powers are to be exercised cautiously and uniformly so as to avoid any prejudice to either of the parties. Exercise of power of discretion if made excessively, it would defeat the purpose and object of the law of limitation. The Courts are expected not to travel beyond the permissible extent, so as to condone the enormous delay in a routine or mechanical manner. Power of discretion is to be exercised to mitigate the injustice, if any occurred to the litigants.
13.13. Any citizen, who slept over his right, cannot wake up one fine morning and knock the doors of the Court for redressal of his grievances. The person, who slept W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 72 of 100 over his right, has to necessarily lose his right on account of efflux of time, which caused expiry of the cause. In the event of institution of appeal or litigation after a prolonged period, the right of defence will also be affected and further it will lead to unnecessary harassment for a prolonged period. All these mitigating factors are to be considered while condoning the huge delay in instituting the litigations/appeals. Thus, the law of limitation has got a definite reasoning and logic. Various time limitations prescribed under many statutes are adopting the <Doctrine of Reasonableness=. The principles of reasonableness would be adopted with reference to the nature of litigations to be instituted. Various time limits are prescribed for civil litigations, appeals and other varieties of litigations, considering various factors and by applying the doctrine of reasonableness. Thus, the law of limitation became substantive and to be followed scrupulously in all circumstances and on exceptional cases, the delay is to be condoned, if the reasons are genuine and acceptable.
13.14. A fine distinction is to be drawn in respect of 8acceptability9 and 8unacceptability9, as far as the condonation of delay is concerned. The reasons and its genuinity are important for condoning the delay. It became unnecessary that the Courts have to consider the precedents and condone the delay thereafter or reject the same. There are judgments for and against, but W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 73 of 100 predominantly the facts, circumstances and the genunity of the reasons of each case plays a pivotal role in considering the relief of condonation of delay. It is, therefore, trite to say that Judgments dealing with the condonation of delay may not lay down any standard or objective test but is purely an individualistic test. The Court is required to examine individual facts involved while adjudicating the matter relating to condonation of delay on exercising judicial discretion. There does not exist any exhaustive list constituting sufficient cause. The applicant/petitioner is required to establish that in spite of acting with due care and caution, the delay had occurred due to circumstances beyond his control and was inevitable.
13.15. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vrs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 = AIR 2014 SC 1141 the Supreme Court of India held as under:
<16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 74 of 100 delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal lay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant4 a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, <procrastination is the greatest thief of time= and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years9 delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons- who compete with 8Kumbhakarna9 or for that matter 8Rip Van Winkle9. In our considered opinion, such dealy does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.= 13.16. Doctrine of equality demands that all litigants are treated equally and that whether an application for W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 75 of 100 condoning delay is filed by a private person or a State body will have no bearing on the outcome. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vrs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed that the Court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and <do not slumber over their rights=.
13.17. In the case of Basawaraj Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is observed and held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression <sufficient cause= cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction, then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. Each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by the Supreme Court.
It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 76 of 100 statutory principles and showing utter disregard to Legislature.
13.18. In the instant case, no application for condonation of delay was filed. Furthermore, by virtue of instructions vide Letter dated 28.05.2015 read with Letter dated 01.08.2016 issued by the Government of India, referred to supra, the selection/engagement of <all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks= has been stopped <with immediate effect=. As has been observed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal in its Order at paragraph 15 it is clear from the prayer of the petitioners that they seek relief in connection with publication of results of Advertisement dated 03.10.2013 in pursuance of which they have claimed to have applied for the post of GDSMD, Karpada Sub-Post Office. Record reveals that by communicating information vide RTI/Appeal-72/ R.Ch. Behera/BF/2015, dated 27.01.2016 (Annexure-4), the petitioners came to be aware of the factual position as to their applications. Therefore, there was no point, it appears, to further approach the Assistant Director (PG), Office of the CPMG, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar (Annexure-5) wherein it is stated that the grievance has been made on 23.03.2018 by the petitioner-Ramesh Chandra Behera. It appears these petitioners have been in deep slumber for over two years and woke up to pursue their matter after the revised selection process for engagement to all approved categories of GDS posts W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 77 of 100 has been put in place with effect from 01.04.2015 vide Letter No.17-39/7/2012-GDS, dated 28.05.2015 (Annexure-R-3 of the counter affidavit) with mandate that <in case any of these vacancies are not filled up latest by 30.06.2015, the notification should be cancelled and the vacancies should be filled under the new engagement process (Aptitude Test Method) applicable with effect from 01.04.2015= and request to <stop selection/engagement of all types Gramin Dak Sevaks with immedicate effect= has been circulated vide Letter No.17-23/2016-GDS, dated 01.08.2016 (Annexure-R/4 of the counter affidavit). Therefore, in the absence of any application under sub-Section (3) of Section 21 praying for condonation of delay, the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the Original Application, as it has no jurisdiction to admit and dispose of original application on merits. Notwithstanding the same, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal evaluating the merit of the matter, passed Order dated 04.06.2020 dismissing the original application on merits as well as limitation.
14. The scope of showing indulgence by exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction delineated under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to review the decision taken by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal taking cognizance of the evidence available on record and in consideration of mixed question of fact W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 78 of 100 and law with respect to limitation contained in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is limited. Thus, this Court, in the aforesaid emerging factual matrix, need not go into the details of evidence to upset the settled factual position as that is not required while sitting in this jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
14.1. The Hon9ble Supreme Court of India stated in Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Association Vrs. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCR 731 as follows:
<The effect of Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, therefore, was that appeals from the OAT lay directly to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. However, this changed with the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar Vrs. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261. In its decision in that case, this Court inter alia ruled that:
a. Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B were unconstitutional to the extent that they excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution; b. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act was unconstitutional as were 8exclusion of jurisdiction9 clauses in all other legislation enacted under Articles 323-A and 323- B;
c. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution form a part of the basic structure of the Constitution; and d. Other courts and Tribunals may perform a W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 79 of 100 supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution.
As a consequence of this decision, challenges under Article 226 of the Constitution to the decisions rendered by the SATs lay to Division Benches of the respective High Courts within whose jurisdiction the SATs operated. The Supreme Court9s jurisdiction could be invoked under Article 136 against the decisions of the High Courts.= 14.2. Thus, in exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not required to re-examine the evidence to find out as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority is right or wrong. It is only required to examine as to whether the correct procedure has been followed and the principles of natural justice have been applied.
14.3. In Union of India Vrs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545, the Hon9ble Supreme Court of India propounded the following guidelines:
<The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 80 of 100
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.= W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 81 of 100 14.4. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vrs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, the Hon9ble Supreme Court made the following observations:
<The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent Officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or; where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 82 of 100 Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.= 14.5. Having noticed aforesaid observation in S. Sree Rama Rao (supra), in Ram Lal Bhaskar Vrs. State Bank of India, (2011) 12 SCR 1036, it has been enunciated as follows:
<8. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has re-appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations leveled against the respondent No.1 do not constitute any misconduct and that the respondent No.1 was not guilty of any misconduct.= 14.6. Pertinent here to have regard to the following observations made in State of Karnataka Vrs. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 1 SCR 616:
<8. In State of Andhra Pradesh Vrs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 83 of 100 concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under:
87. *** The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence....9
9. In B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, again, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 84 of 100 evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under:
812. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with.
Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 85 of 100 inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the Appellate Authority has co-extensive power to re- appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India Vrs. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 781, this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.9
10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar Vrs. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416, this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 86 of 100 regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under:
816. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.9 W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 87 of 100
11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vrs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:
87. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record.
If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 88 of 100 considerations. (vide B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India Vrs. G. Gunayuthan, (1997) 7 SCC 463, and Bank of India Vrs. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762, High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vrs. Shashi Kant S Patil, (2001) 1 SCC
416).
***
12. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.
*** W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 89 of 100
14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank Vrs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, 2017 2 SCC 308, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 90 of 100Accordingly, appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is restored.= 14.7. The Hon9ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 while dealing with standard of proof and evidence applicable in the domestic inquiry, held as under:
<4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. Ail materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. *** The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept.W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 91 of 100
Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a ending is certainty available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. ***= 14.8. The Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani Vrs. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88 laid down as under:
<25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.= 14.9. Following observation in General Manager (Operations), State Bank of India Vrs. R. Periyasamy, (2015) 3 SCC 101 may be relevant:W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 92 of 100
<11. It is interesting to note that the learned Single Judge went to the extent of observing that the concept of preponderance of probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries. On the contrary, it is well known that the standard of proof that must be employed in domestic enquiries is in fact that of the preponderance of probabilities. In Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 this Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. This view was upheld by this Court in State Bank of India Vrs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212. More recently, in State Bank of India Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 SCC 740, this Court observed that a disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges leveled against a bank-officer on the preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt.= CONCLUSION & DECISION:
15. In the present case, the plea of mala fide has been raised without giving the details or material particulars and substantiating the same by furnishing the relevant evidence. In the absence of any such material the said plea cannot be looked into and has to be rejected. Furthermore, the petitioners having not impleaded the person by name against whom the petitioners alleged mala fide. Under such premise, this Court desists to entertain such baseless pleas and does not warrant it necessary to exercise its discretionary power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 93 of 10015.1. In view of instructions vide Letter dated 28.05.2015 read with Letter dated 01.08.2016 issued by the Government of India, referred to supra, that the selection/ engagement of <all types of Gramin Dak Sevaks= has been stopped <with immediate effect=, it is held that there is no infirmity or irregularity committed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack to come to just and apt conclusion.
15.2. Since the information divulged by the opposite parties with regard to non-consideration of applications on account of absence of approval was made know to the petitioners on 22/23.09.2015, there is nothing on record to suggest as to why there was delay in approaching Assistant Director (PG), Office of the CPMG, Odisha Circle, Bhubaneswar by way of representation dated 23.03.2018 (as reflected in the Letter dated 07.05.2018 vide Annexure-5 to the writ petition). No separate application being filed as required under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal committed no error apparent on the face of the record, warranting interference of this Court.
15.3. In the case of N. Balakrishnan Vrs. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Court held that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the substantive rights of W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 94 of 100 parties. They exist to ensure parties do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek their remedy promptly.
15.4. It is made clear that the delay, which was caused in approaching the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, should not be lightly interfered with by condoning the same; more so, in absence of separate application for condonation of delay under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, narrating the circumstances. In the instant facts and circumstances, no explanation has been rendered; nonetheless, the petitioners declared in the original application that <the application is within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985=. The learned Tribunal has delved not only into merit of the matter, but also considered the delay aspect which was hit by limitation prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
15.5. The scope of judicial review against Order of the Central Administrative Tribunal is very restricted and limited. Unless glaring mistake apparent on the face of the record is demonstrated, the Order of the Central Administrative Tribunal cannot be faulted with.
In M.P. State Coop. Dairy Federation Ltd. Vrs. Rajnesh Kumar Jamindar, (2009) 15 SCC 221, the Court held as:
<44. The power of judicial review of a superior court although a restricted one, has many facets. Its W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 95 of 100 jurisdiction is not only limited in the cases where the administrative orders are perverse or arbitrary but also in the cases where a statutory authority has failed to perform its statutory duty in accordance with law. An order which is passed for unauthorised purpose would attract the principles of malice in law. (See Govt. Branch Press Vrs. D.B. Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 = 1979 SCC (L&S) 39 = AIR 1979 SC 429; S.R. Venkataraman Vrs. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 491 = 1979 SCC (L&S) 216 = AIR 1979 SC 49; and P. Mohanan Pillai Vrs. State of Kerala, (2007) 9 SCC 497 = (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 542).
The scope of judicial review in service matters has been elaborately discussed in Amarendra Kumar Pandey Vrs. Union of India, (2022) 11 SCR 223, which is extracted hereunder:
<30. The doctrine of reasonableness thus may be invoked. Where there are no reasonable grounds for the formation of the authority9s opinion, judicial review in such a case is permissible. [See Director of Public Prosecutions Vrs. Head, (1959) AC 83 (Lord Denning)].
31. When we say that where the circumstances or material or state of affairs does not at all exist to form an opinion and the action based on such opinion can be quashed by the courts, we mean that in effect there is no evidence whatsoever to form or support the opinion. The distinction between insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence and no evidence must of course be borne in mind. A finding based on no evidence as opposed to a finding which is merely against the weight of the evidence is an W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 96 of 100 abuse of the power which courts naturally are loath to tolerate. Whether or not there is evidence to support a particular decision has always been considered as a question of law. [See Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Armah, Ex Parte, (1966) 3 WLR 828 at p. 841].
32. It is in such a case that it is said that the authority would be deemed to have not applied its mind or it did not honestly form its opinion. The same conclusion is drawn when opinion is based on irrelevant matter. [See Rasbihari Vrs. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 SC 1081].
33. In the case of Rohtas Industries Ltd. Vrs. S.D. Agarwal and another, AIR 1969 SC 707, it was held that the existence of circumstances is a condition precedent to form an opinion by the Government. The same view was earlier expressed in the case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. and another Vrs. Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295.
34. Secondly, the court can inquire whether the facts and circumstances so found to exist have a reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. In other words, if an inference from facts does not logically accord with and flow from them, the Courts can interfere treating them as an error of law. [See Bean Vrs. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, (1944) 2 All ER 279 at p.
284]. Thus, this Court can see whether on the basis of the facts and circumstances found, any reasonable man can say that an opinion as is formed can be formed by a reasonable man. That would be a question of law to be determined by the Court. [See Farmer Vrs. Cotton9s Trustees, 1915 AC 922]. Their Lordships observed:
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 97 of 100<*** in my humble judgment where all the material facts are fully found, and the only question is whether the facts are such as to bring the case within the provisions properly construed of some statutory enactment, the question is one of law only.= [See also Muthu Gounder Vrs. Government of Madras, (1969) 82 Mad LW 1].
35. Thirdly, this Court can interfere if the constitutional or statutory term essential for the exercise of the power has either been misapplied or misinterpreted.
The Courts have always equated the jurisdictional review with the review for error of law and have shown their readiness to quash an order if the meaning of the constitutional or statutory term has been misconstrued or misapplied. [See Iveagh (Earl of) Vrs. Minister of Housing and Local Govt., (1962) 2 QB 147; Iveagh (Earl of) Vrs. Minister of Housing and Local Govt. (1964) 1 AB 395].
36. Fourthly, it is permissible to interfere in a case where the power is exercised for improper purpose. If a power granted for one purpose is exercised for a different purpose, then it will be deemed that the power has not been validly exercised. If the power in this case is found to have not been exercised genuinely for the purpose of taking immediate action but has been used only to avoid embarrassment or wreck personal vengeance, then the power will be deemed to have been exercised improperly. [See Natesa Asari Vrs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 481].
37. Fifthly, the grounds which are relevant for the purpose for which the power can be exercised have W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 98 of 100 not been considered or grounds which are not relevant and yet are considered and an order is based on such grounds, then the order can be attacked as invalid and illegal. In this connection, reference may be made to Ram Manohar Vrs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740; Dwarka Das Vrs. State of J. and K., AIR 1957 SC 164 at p. 168 and Motilall Vrs. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1509. On the same principle, the administrative action will be invalidated if it can be established that the authority was satisfied on the wrong question: [See (1967) 1 AC 13].= 15.6. In the light of the principles propounded supra for exercising power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India when the Order dated 04.06.2020 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.630 of 2018 is examined, it is conceived that there has been due application of mind to the relevant and related material on record as placed before it by way of pleadings supported by documents.
16. This Court, thus, finds no reason to show indulgence in the decision taken by the Central Administrative Tribunal as the petitioners could not succeed in persuading this Court by showing any procedural irregularity being committed in the proceeding before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal. No illegality being pointed out with reference to material irregularity in considering the evidence on record, there is no merit in the writ petition.
W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 99 of 10017. In the wake of the above analysis and for all the reasons ascribed in the foregoing paragraphs with discussions, the impugned Order dated 04.06.2020 of the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No.630 of 2020, does not warrant interference. In fine, the writ petition, sans merit, is dismissed in the above terms, without any order as to costs.
18. Needless to say that with such disposal, the interim order dated 06.04.2021 passed by this Court in the instant writ petition, as extended from time to time, stands vacated accordingly.
(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
JUDGE
DR. B.R. SARANGI, ACJ. I agree.
(DR. B.R. SARANGI)
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 30th November, 2023//Aswini/MRS Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY Designation: PA(SECRETARY-IN-CHARGE) Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 30-Nov-2023 20:26:44 W.P.(C) No.35330 of 2020 Page 100 of 100