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Madhya Pradesh High Court

Dakkho Bai vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 6 May, 2015

                 1   Dakkho Bai v. State of M.P and Ors.
                                                           WP.2437/2015

6.05.2015
        Shri Ashish Singh, Advocate for the petitioner.
               The petitioner in this petition prays for the following
reliefs:-
              "That the respondent be directed to initiate

the procedure for the construction of road as approved and accepted by the respondent no. 2 in order dated 20.5. 2014 in case no.

03/2013-14/A-60, and the procedure shall be completed within the time as may be fixed by this Hon'ble High Court".

2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India prays for the execution of the order passed by the Collector dated 20.5.2014 contained in Annexure P/1 whereby direction u/ S. 234-237 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code is issued to the Tehsildar, Sheopur to carry out necessary amendment and entries in the map and other related revenue records in respect of the lands shown in the said order. Undoubtedly, the petitioner had invoked jurisdiction of the Collector u/Ss. 234-237 of MPLRC which led to passing of the above said order dated 20.5. 2014.

3. The grievance of the petitioner appears to be that despite the order of the Collector dated 20.5. 2014 contained in Annexure P-1 having been implemented by Tehsildar amending the Revenue Records including the Map as is reflected from page 24 of this petition, no change in actuality at the spot has taken place.

2 Dakkho Bai v. State of M.P and Ors.

4. It is thus contended that the road as shown in the amended Revenue Records based upon the order dated 20.5. 2014 actually does not exist on the ground.

5. Apparently, the M.P. Land Revenue Code does not provide any independent provision vesting power upon any Revenue Authority to execute an order passed by Revenue Authorities under the Code.

6. However, Sec. 32 of the Code deals with inherent powers with all Revenue Courts to be exercised for ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of Court.

7. For convenience and ready reference Sec. 32 of M.P. Land Revenue Code is reproduced herein below:-

32. Inherent power of Revenue Courts:

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.

8. In view of the above, the Court of the Collector who is a Revenue Authority under the M.P. Land Revenue Code has inherent powers to make such orders which are necessary for the ends of justice. It is settled principle of law that inherent powers of the court provided by an express provision are meant to achieve the object of doing complete justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. It is further settled law that such inherent powers ought not to be exercised where the 3 Dakkho Bai v. State of M.P and Ors.

grievance can be addressed by any other express provision of the statute. The following decisions can profitably be referred to for elucidating the scope, ambit, sweep and restrictions of exercise of inherent powers of the court prescribed in different statutes:-.

Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal reported in AIR 1962 SC 527, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Mohit v. State of U.P reported in (2013) 7 SCC 789. Relevant Paragraph in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra (supra) is reproduced herein below:-

"43..... The inherent jurisdiction of the court to make orders ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section affirmed by Section 151 of the Code, but [ inherent ] jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where the Code of Civil Procedure deals expressly with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive.

Relevant Paragraph in the case of Gian Singh (supra) is reproduced herein below:-

"53. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure 4 Dakkho Bai v. State of M.P and Ors.

the ends of justice. It begins with the words, " nothing in this Code" which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on the High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

55. In the very nature of its Constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorized in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection".

Relevant Paragraph in the case of Mohit (supra) is reproduced herein below:-

"28. So far as the inherent power of the High Court as contained in Section 482 CrPC is concerned, the law in this regard is set at rest by this Court in a catena of decisions. However, we would like to reiterate that when an order, not 5 Dakkho Bai v. State of M.P and Ors.

interlocutory in nature, can be assailed in the High Court in revisional jurisdiction, then there should be a bar in invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In other words, inherent power of the Court can be exercised when there is no remedy provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redressal of the grievance. It is well settled that the inherent power of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision in the Code under which order impugned can be challenged".

9. In the present case there is no express provision in the Code for implementation of an order passed by a Revenue Authority and thus a Revenue Authority can very well exercise power of execution of an order already passed by invoking it's inherent powers u/S. 32 to do complete justice.

10. In view of the above, the petitioner can very well approach the Collector/ or any other appropriate Revenue Authority for passing necessary orders for implementing the order of the Collector dated 20.5. 2014 so that there is no difference between the amended map prepared pursuant to the order of the Collector and the ground reality.

11. This petition is thus disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to invoke the inherent powers of the Collector/any other appropriate authority u/S. 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code,

12. Needless to emphasize that in case any application is moved by the petitioner u/S. 32 of M.P. Land Revenue Code before the Collector, District Sheopur/or any other appropriate authority the same shall be considered in accordance with the 6 Dakkho Bai v. State of M.P and Ors.

law as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order without being influenced by the fact of the petitioner having approached this court.

(Sheel Nagu) Judge ar