Jharkhand High Court
Manikant Dubey vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr. on 15 July, 2009
Author: Prashant Kumar
Bench: Prashant Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 686 of 2006
With
Cr. M.P. No. 687 of 2006
Manikant Dubey -----------Petitioner( in Cr.M.P. 686/06)
Pravash Chandra Mishra----Petitioner( in Cr.M.P. 687/06)
Vs.
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Kiran Kumari Mishra @ Kumari Kiran------Opposite Parties
(in both the cases)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR
For the Petitioners: Mr. R. Ranjan (in both the cases)
For the Opposite Parties: Mr. T.N. Verma, APP (in Cr.M.P. 686/06)
Mr.V.K. Prasad, APP (in Cr.M.P. 687/06)
C.A.V. ON 07.07.2009 Delivered On 15.07.2009
9/ 15/07/2009In both these applications, similar question of law is involved and in both cases Kiran Kumari Mishra @ Kumari Kiran is O.P. No. 2, therefore, both the applications heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
2. It appears that the O.P. No. 2 had filed two complaints in the court of CJM, Dumka bearing number P.C.R Case No. 270 of 2005 against the petitioner of Cr.M.P. No. 686 of 2006 and another bearing P.C.R. Case No. 341 of 2005 against the petitioner of Cr.M.P. No. 687 of 2006. In both the complaints, O.P. No. 2 had stated that she had filed an application for maintenance under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. against her husband Uttam Kumar Choubey and the said application was registered as Cr. Misc Case No. 39 of 2002 and is pending in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka. It is further alleged that petitioners Manikant Dubey and Pravash Chandra Mishra had deposed in the aforesaid Cr. Misc case no. 39 of 2002 as D.W. 1 and D.W. 4 respectively. It is alleged that they have given false evidence before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka. Accordingly, she alleged that both the petitioners had committed an offence under section 193, 196, 200, 209, 417, 468 and 469 of the IPC and prayed that the petitioners be punished for the said offences after conducting a full fledged trial. It appears that the learned CJM, Dumka sent both the complaints to 2 Officer-In-Charge, Dumka (T) police station for investigation as per the provisions contained under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. It appears that after receipt of the complaint petitions, two First Information Reports bearing Dumka(T) P.S. Case No. 273 of 2005 dated 18.12.2005 and Dumka ( T) P.S. Case No. 155 of 2005 dated 20.7.2005 instituted under section 193, 196, 200, 209, 417, 468 and 469 of the IPC and police took up investigation. The present applications filed for quashing the aforesaid two First Information Reports and also entire criminal proceeding arising from those First Information Reports.
3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that from perusal of complaint petitions, it appears that the allegation has been made against both the petitioners for adducing false evidence in court and it is alleged that the petitioners had committed an offence under sections 193, 196, 200, 209, 417, 468, 469 of the IPC. It is submitted that under the aforesaid circumstance, section 195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure come into play and as per the said provision the only procedure which could be followed was to make an application to the court in which the alleged false evidence was given. It is submitted that, that court has power under section 340 of the Cr.P.C. to make enquiry and if the said court is of opinion that the offences enumerated in section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been committed, it may file a complaint in a competent court. It is submitted that in view of aforesaid provisions enumerated in section 195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no FIR and/or private complaint can be filed and the police have no power to investigate on the basis of the aforesaid FIR. Accordingly, it is submitted that the CJM, Dumka had committed serious illegality in sending the aforesaid two complaint petitions to Dumka (T) police station for registration of FIR and investigation. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid bar prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the aforesaid two First Information Reports and further criminal proceeding initiated on the 3 basis of said First Information Reports are liable to be quashed by this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention had relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another reported in (2005) 4 SCC 370.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party, submitted that section 195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not control the power of police to investigate a cognizable offence reported to it. It is further submitted that under section 195 of the Cr.P.C. the bar is with regard to the taking of the cognizance. Thus if after investigation police submits charge sheet then in view of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. the court concerned cannot take cognizance on the basis of said charge sheet. But, the court concerned can make enquiry as per the provisions contained under section 340 of the Cr.P.C. and if the court is of opinion that the offences enumerated under section 195 (1)(b) has been committed, it can file complaint. The learned counsel for the opposite party in support of his contention relied upon two judgments of Supreme Court delivered in State of Punjab Vs. Raj Singh and another (1998)2SCC391 and in M. Narayandas Vs. State of Karnataka and others (2003)11SCC251. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, there is no illegality in institution of aforesaid two First Information Reports and therefore the present petitions filed by the petitioners is liable to be dismissed.
5. Having heard the submissions, I have scrutinized the law and the facts of the case. Admittedly the allegation in both the complaint petitions is that the petitioners have falsely deposed in the court of Principal Judge, Family Court in connection with Cr. Misce Case No. 39 of 2002 and therefore the complainant (O.P. No. 2) alleged that the petitioners in both the cases had committed an offence under sections 193, 196, 200, 209, 417, 468 and 469 of the IPC. It is 4 also not in dispute that the offences under section 193, 196, 200, 209, 468 and 469 is covered by section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. From bare perusal of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is clear that it put a bar upon the court from taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. except on the complaint in writing of that court or of some other court to which that court is subordinate.
6. Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribed the procedure regarding lodging of complaint by the court in which the offences enumerated in section 195(1)(b) has been committed. As per the said provision it is incumbent upon the court concerned to make an enquiry and if on enquiry it come to the conclusion that the offences as stated above have been committed it can make a complaint thereof in writing before a competent court.
7. Now the question arose as to whether section 195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure put an embargo on the power of police to investigate a case in which it received information that the offences enumerated in section 195(1)(b) has been committed by some person. The aforesaid question was considered by their Lordships of Supreme Court in State of Punjab vas Raj Singh and another reported in (1998)2SCC391 and their Lordships had held as follows:-
"We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC. prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195CrPC. It is of course true that upon the charge sheet ( 5 challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR ( filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 Cr.PC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon V. D. Raja Reddy on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC."
The same view was again reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Narayandas V. State of Karnataka and others reported in (2003)11SCC251.
8. Thus, in view of the aforesaid law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court, it is clear that section 195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not control or circumscribe the power of police to investigate under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once the investigation is completed then the embargo and/or bar under section 195 Cr.P.C. come into play and in that event on the basis of charge sheet submitted by the police the court would not be competent to take cognizance. However the court concerned could file a complaint taking into account the facts stated in the FIR, the material collected during investigation but before doing so the court concerned is required to follow the procedure laid under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
9. In that view of the matter, I find that learned CJM, Dumka had committed no illegality in sending the complaint petitions to Officer- In-Charge, Dumka (T) Police Station for institution of case and investigation and consequently Officer-In-Charge, Dumka(T) Police Station had also not committed any illegality in lodging First Information Reports.
6
10. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners have of no help, because the question involved before their Lordships of Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioners (2005)4SCC370 is not involved in the present case. The question before their Lordships of Supreme Court in that case was Whether the bar contained in section 195(1)(b)(c) would apply where forgery of a document was committed before the said document was produced in court and the question was answered by their Lordships that the said bar would not be applicable to a case where the forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court. Admittedly in this case the said question is not raised by any of the party. Hence the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable in this case.
11. In view of the discussion made above, I find no reason to quash the concerned First Information Reports as mentioned above and the criminal proceeding arising from the said First Information Reports.
12. In the result, I find no merit in both the applications, hence the same are dismissed.
(Prashant Kumar, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated 15/07/2009 Sharda/NAFR