Kerala High Court
Chakkiparambath Abdul Rasheed vs Chenakkal Juma-Ath Palli Paripalana on 30 March, 2012
Bench: K.M.Joseph, M.L.Joseph Francis
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.M.JOSEPH
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS
FRIDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF MARCH 2012/10TH CHAITHRA 1934
CRP.No. 247 of 2011 ( )
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OP.14/2007 of WAKF TRIBUNAL, KOZHIKODE
REVISION PETITIONER(S):
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CHAKKIPARAMBATH ABDUL RASHEED
S/O. BEERAN, AGED 42 YEARS, MOONNIYYUR
THIRURANGADI TALUK, MALAPPURAM DISTIRCT.
BY ADVS.SRI.V.B.UNNIRAJ
SMT.A.S.BEENU
SRI.R.K.MURALEEDHARAN
RESPONDENT(S):
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1. CHENAKKAL JUMA-ATH PALLI PARIPALANA
COMMITTEE,MOONNIYOOR,TIRURANGADI TALUK
MALAPPURAM.
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY ERANHIKKAL MUHAMMED HAJI,S/O
AHAMMED KUTTY, AGED 65 YEARS,RESIDING AT PARAMMAL
HOUSE, A.C.BAZAR,POST MOONNIYOOR
TIRURANGADI TALUK, MALAPPURAM DIST.
2. ERANHIKKAL MUHAMMED HAJI,S/O.AHAMMED
KUTTY,AGED 65,RESIDING AT PARAMMAL HOUSE
A.C.BAZAR
POST MOONNIYOOR IN MOONNIYOOR AMSOM AND DESOM OF
TIRURANGADI TALUK,MALAPPURMA DIST. SECRETARY OF
CHENAKKAL JUMA-ATH PALLI PARIPALANA COMMITTEE, MOONNIYOOR.
3. KERALA WAKF BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND HAVING ITS PRINCIPAL
PLACE OF BUSINESS AND OFFICE SITUATED AT KALOOR
STADIUM, KOCHI IN ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
4. OLAPPILAKKAL MOIDEEN HAJI,
S/O. ALAVIKUTTY HAJI, AGED 73 YEARS, PRESIDENT,
MOONNIYOOR CHENAKKAL JUMA-ATH PALLI PARIPALANA
COMMITTEE, SALAMATH NAGAR, MOONNIYOOR SOUTH,
TIRURANGADI TALUK, MALAPPURAM DIST.
5. NARIKKOT MECHERI HASSANKUTTY HAJI,
S/O. KUNCHEEN AGED 63 YEARS, GENERAL SECRETARY
MOONNIYOOR CHENAKKAL JUMA-ATH PALLI PARIPALANA
COMMITTEE, MECHERI HOUSE, TIRURANGADI TALUK
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
6. AVARANKUTTY, S/O. ALI, AGED 60 YEARS,
RESIDING AT AZHUVALAPPIL HOUSE, MOONNIYOOR AMSOM
AND DESOM OF TIRURANGADI TALUK MALAPPURAM DISTRICT
7. AHAMMED, S/O. MUHAMMED AGED 54 YEARS,
RESIDING AT MUSTHAFA MANZIL IN MOONNIYOOR AMSOM
AND DESOM OF TIRURANGADI TALUK, MALAPPURAM
DISTIRCT.
BY ADV. SRI.BIJU ABRAHAM
BY ADV. SRI.R.RAMADAS
BY ADV. SRI.B.G.BHASKAR
BY ADV. SRI.A.A.ABUL HASSAN, SC, WAKF BOARD
BY ADV. SRI.T.SETHUMADHAVAN
BY ADV. SRI.PUSHPARAJAN KODOTH
THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 15-03-
2012, THE COURT ON 30.3.2012 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
K.M.JOSEPH & M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS, JJ.
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C.R.P. No.247 of 2011
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Dated 30th March, 2012.
O R D E R
Joseph Francis, J.
This revision petition is filed by a third party, who is a member of Chenakkal Juma-ath Palli Paripalana Committee, against the order in O.P.14 of 2007 on the file of Wakf Tribunal, Kozhikode.
2. That Original Petition was filed by two of the members of the general body of the above Committee under Sections 83 and 94(2) of the Kerala Wakf Act, 1995. The petitioners in the above Original Petition are the respondents 6 and 7 in this Civil Revision Petition. Respondents 1 to 5 herein are the respondents 1 to 5 in that Original Petition. The facts of the case as mentioned in the C.R.P. are briefly as follows :
3. O.P.14/2007 was filed for preparing a voters list of the first respondent Mahal committee and for conducting election to the same. That petition was a representative petition filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short, 'C.P.C.'). The revision petitioner had been a party to an earlier petition filed for similar reliefs before the very same C.R.P.247/11 2 Wakf Tribunal, which was dismissed as the first respondent Committee was not made a party therein. The revision petitioner alleges that O.P.14/07 was disposed of by the Wakf Tribunal, by order dated 30.11.2009, by appointing an Advocate Commissioner and directing him to conduct election, on the basis of the compromise entered into by the petitioners and respondents, without complying with the provisions of Order I Rule 8 C.P.C. The revision petitioner alleges that even though he is not a party to that Original Petition, he is substantially interested in the subject matter.
4. Heard learned counsel for the revision petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents.
5. At the time of argument, learned counsel for the revision petitioner raised the following contentions :
O.P.14/2007 is one filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petition filed in a representative character was compromised without following the procedure laid down in Order 1 Rule 8 sub-rule (4) of the Civil Procedure Code and while recording the compromise the Wakf Tribunal did not keep in mind the welfare of the residents of the Mahal. The Tribunal C.R.P.247/11 3 ought not to have merely disposed of the matter by appointing a Commissioner and ought to have directed the election to be conducted under the supervision of the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the original petitioners supported the order of the Wakf Tribunal.
6. On perusing the order under challenge, it is seen that respondents 4 and 5 filed counter statement in the Original Petition. When the case was listed for trial before the Wakf Tribunal, learned counsel for the petitioners in that Original Petition made a proposal to conduct election by appointing an Advocate Commissioner as prayed for, as an alternative relief. Learned counsel for respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 had also agreed to dispose of the O.P. as prayed for by the counsel for the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners has made an endorsement on the reverse side of the petition endorsing this prayer and that had been acknowledged by learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and the learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5. On the basis of that endorsement, the Wakf Tribunal allowed the petition, as agreed by the parties concerned, as follows :-
C.R.P.247/11 4
"1) Advocate Sri.Abubacker Sidhique Parappanangadi is appointed as Commissioner to conduct election in the office of the first respondent society after preparing voters list of the mahal members who are permanently residing within the jurisdiction of the mahal.
2) All respondents shall provide necessary assistance to conduct the election peacefully.
3) Initial batta Rs.4,000/- shall be given directly to the Commissioner. No order as to costs."
7. In this connection, learned counsel for the revision petitioner invited our attention to paragraphs 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the decision reported in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan [(1999) 8 Supreme Court Cases 396], which read as follows :
"24. In Rezia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum it was held that Order 12 Rule 6 has to be read along with the proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8. That is to say, notwithstanding the admission made by the defendant in his pleading, the court may still require the plaintiff to prove the facts pleaded by him in the plaint.
25. Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made by a party to the suit, the court may still require the plaintiff to prove the fact which has been admitted by the defendant. This is also in consonance with the provisions C.R.P.247/11 5 of Section 58 of the Evidence Act which provides as under :
"58. Facts admitted need not be proved.-- No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings :
Provided that the court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions."
26. The proviso to this section specifically gives a discretion to the court to require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. The proviso corresponds to the proviso to Rule 5(1) Order 8 CPC.
27. In view of the above, it is clear that the court, at no stage, can act blindly or mechanically. While enabling the court to pronounce judgment in a situation where no written statement is filed by the defendant, the court has also been given the discretion to pass such order as it may think fit as an alternative. This is also the position under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC where the court can either pronounce judgment against the defendant or pass such order as it may think fit."
8. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner also invited our attention to the decision reported in Uttam Singh C.R.P.247/11 6 Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India [(2000) 7 Supreme Court Cases 120], in which it was held, "Admissions generally arise when a statement is made by a party in any of the modes provided under Sections 18 to 23 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Admissions are of many kinds; they may be considered as being on the record as actual if they are either in the pleadings or in answer to interrogatories or implied from the pleadings by non- traversal. Secondly, as between parties by agreement or notice. Since it has been considered that admission for passing the judgment is based on pleadings itself it is unnecessary to examine as to what kinds of admissions are covered by Order 12 Rule 6 CPC."
9. The main prayer in O.P.14/07 is to direct the second respondent to convene the general body meeting of the first respondent Committee, after preparing the voters list of the Mahal members, who are permanently residing within the jurisdiction of the Mahal or in the alternative, to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to conduct election to the office of the first respondent Committee, after preparing a voters list of the Mahal members, who are permanently residing within the jurisdiction of the Mahal.
10. Respondents 1 and 2 filed counter, stating that C.R.P.247/11 7 they have no objection in convening a general body meeting to elect the office bearers of the Committee and that they have no objection in allowing the Original Petition as prayed for. Respondents 4 and 5 filed counter, raising various allegations against second respondent. In para 11 of the counter affidavit it is stated as follows:
"In this context it is necessary to point out that the boundaries of the Mahal as set out in para 7 of the petition are not only incorrect but are carefully chosen to support the second respondent. In the absence of the alleged minutes of the undated meeting in 2001-02, it is not possible to ascertain which are the wards intended by the petitioners. The list of Mahal members got prepared behind the back of these respondents in OP 7 of 2006 is also not a true and correct list. These respondents submit that this Tribunal may be pleased to depute a commissioner to ascertain the contours of the Mahal of the mosque, identify the permanent residents, in accordance with the custom and precedents of this Mosque, and convene a proper general body meeting, with identity cards and elect lawful office bearers to the first respondent committee."
11. It is the submission of the learned counsel for C.R.P.247/11 8 the petitioner that respondents 4 and 5 had clearly pointed out the boundaries as pointed are not only incorrect but are carefully chosen to support the second respondent, and that the Tribunal should have decided the issue relating to the boundaries. It is without doing that the parties have compromised and agreed for the order which is ultimately passed by the Tribunal. This attracts Order 1 Rule 8(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, he submits. As it was a compromise and it was not preceded by issuance of notice as required under Order 1 Rule 8 (4) read with Order 1 Rule 8 (2) a clear illegality was committed. Reference is made to the decision reported in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006 (5) SCC 566). Therein the Court inter alia held as follows:
"23. We will first consider the meaning of the words "signed by parties". Order 3 Rule 1 CPC provides that any appearance, application or act in or to any court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his C.R.P.247/11 9 behalf. The proviso thereto makes it clear that the court can, if it so desires, direct that such appearance shall be made by the party in person. Rule 4 provides that no pleader shall act for any person in any court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power of attorney to make such appointment. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provides that every such appointment shall be filed in the court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1) , be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in the court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. The question whether "signed by parties"would include signing by the pleader was considered by this Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India with reference to Order 3 CPC: (SCC pp.44 & 46-47, paras 30, 35 & 37-39) "30. There is no reason to assume that the legislature intended to curtail the implied authority of counsel, engaged in the thick of proceedings in court, to compromise or agree on C.R.P.247/11 10 matters relating to the parties, even if such matters exceed the subject-matter of the suit. The relationship of counsel and his party or the recognized agent and his principal is a matter of contract; and with the freedom of contract generally, the legislature does not interfere except when warranted by public policy, and the legislative intent is expressly made manifest. There is no such declaration of policy or indication of intent in the present case. The legislature has not evinced any intention to change the well recognized and universally acclaimed common law tradition.....
35. So long as the system of judicial administration in India continues unaltered, and so long as Parliament has not evinced an intention to change its basic character, there is no reason to assume that Parliament has, though not expressly, but impliedly reduced counsel's role or capacity to represent his client as effectively as in the past....
37. We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent for counsel not to act on implied authority except when warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding immediate adjustment of suit by agreement or compromise and the signature of the party cannot be obtained without undue delay. In C.R.P.247/11 11 these days of easier and quicker communication, such contingency may seldom arise. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever doubted.....
38. Considering the traditionally recognized role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorized agents.
39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non- resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorized representative. If a power-of- C.R.P.247/11 12 attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client....If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated." (emphasis supplied) The above view was reiterated in Jineshwardas v. Jagrani. Therefore, the words "by parties"
refer not only to parties-in-person, but their attorney-holders or duly authorized pleaders.
24. Let us now turn to the requirement of "in writing" in Rule 3. In this case as notice above, the respective statements of the plaintiffs' counsel and the defendants' counsel were recorded on oath by the trial court in regard to the terms of the compromise and those statements after being read over and accepted to be correct, were signed by the said counsel. If the terms of a compromise written on a paper in the form of an application or petition is considered as a compromise in writing, can it be said that the specific and categorical statements on oath recorded in writing by the court and duly read over and accepted to be correct by the person making the statement and signed by C.R.P.247/11 13 him, can be said to be not in writing? Obviously, no. We may also in this behalf refer to Section 3 of the Evidence Act which defines a "document" as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording the matter. The statements recorded by the court will, therefore, amount to a compromise in writing."
12. Since in this case what was done by the parties amounted to a compromise and it was recorded as the counsel had signified their assent to the compromise, clearly Order 1 Rule 8 (4) is attracted, petitioner submits.
13. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents Sri.T.Krishnanunni makes the following submissions. He would submit that, this is a case where the plaintiff/petitioner had sought for permission to sue under Order 1 Rule 8 in a representative capacity and the court issued notice under Order 1 Rule 8 (2). The plaintiff has not compromised the matter as the relief granted is one the petitioner sought by way of alternative relief. It is therefore not open to the petitioner on behalf of whom also the plaintiff had C.R.P.247/11 14 instituted the proceedings seeking specific relief which was in fact granted to complain that there is a compromise which is illegal in law in terms of Order 1 Rule 8 (4). In this connection it is specifically pointed out that respondents 4 and 5 in the petition had been impleaded not in a representative capacity but in their individual capacity. Reference is made to the order impleading them in this connection. Therefore, the argument that Order 1 Rule 8 (4) is attracted will not stand. It is further contended that the judgment which was passed must be treated as a judgment on admission of the parties within the meaning of Order 6 Rule 12 and that takes the case out of the boundaries of Order 1 Rule 8 (4). Learned senior counsel would submit that, the words used in Order 1 Rule 8 (4) are clearly borrowed verbatim from the phraseology used in Order 23 Rule 3. There is no compromise in writing as contemplated in Order 23 in this case. Learned senior counsel would place reliance on Jineshwardas v. Jagrani (2003 (11) SCC 372) as also the judgment reported in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006 (5) SCC 566) in this regard. In 2006 (5) SCC 566 he invited our attention to para 26.
C.R.P.247/11 15
"26. The matter can be viewed from a different angle also. After the issues were framed by the trial court, the plaintiffs had examined two witnesses and closed their evidence and thereafter the matter was set down for the evidence of the defendants. The first defendant was treated as ex parte. As Defendants 2 and 3 did not lead any evidence in spite of numerous opportunities, their evidence was treated as closed. On 17.5.2001, the matter was finally adjourned to 23.5.2001 for the evidence of Defendants 4 and 5 with a condition that if they did not lead evidence on that date their evidence will be closed. On 23.5.2001, Defendants 4 and 5 did not lead any evidence. On the other hand, the counsel for the defendants made a statement on oath that the premises will be vacated on 22.1.2002. Thereafter, counsel for the plaintiff also made a statement agreeing to grant of time till 21.1.2002. There was also agreement that the plaintiffs will be entitled to the payment of only Rs.4800 per month (equivalent to the rent) and nothing more up to 22.1.2002. The effect of it is that the parties have gone to trial on the issues and the only evidence led by the defendants is that they will vacate the premises on 22.1.2002. No other evidence being led, the C.R.P.247/11 16 necessary conclusion is that the defendants admitted the plaintiffs' claim and merely sought time to vacate. Therefore, the suit can be said to have been decreed on the basis of evidence and the admissions made by the defendants................."
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner would however point out that even if it is true that respondents 4 and 5 were impleaded not in a representative capacity but in individual capacity this would be a representative suit in so far as admittedly the petitioner had obtained permission for suing in a representative capacity. The provisions of order 1 Rule 8 (4) would still come into play and once it is found that there is a compromise, without taking out notice under Order 1 Rule 8 (2) the court acted illegally, he submits.
15. The petitioner has a complaint that the Advocate Commissioner who has been appointed had been enrolling members without any basis. In this connection it is pertinent to note the stand of the contesting respondents. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents would point out that it is not as if the court becomes powerless once the C.R.P.247/11 17 Commissioner is appointed. The court is in seisin of the matter. If the petitioners point out any illegality which is committed by the Commissioner in the course of his action in pursuance of the order it is always open to the parties to bring it to the notice of the court and the court would necessarily have to go into the question. When we asked the learned counsel for the petitioner as to what he meant by the contours of the Mahal he was not able to specifically assist us in determining the boundaries of the Mahal. He would submit that the bye laws do not indicate what are the boundaries. He would only say that the matter should be decided on the basis of evidence. No doubt, he would say that the contours of Mahal be possibly determined after determining the boundaries of the adjoining Mahals. The case of the petitioner before the Tribunal, no doubt as pointed out in para 7 is as follows.
"7. The boundaries of the Mahal are as follows:-- In the east, the boundary is Patissery Padam. In the north Vadakkeppadam and Thalappaya, in the west C.R.P.247/11 18 Kunnath paramba, old post office and in the south Thekkeppadam and Payakkadavu. The Mahal was divided into 4 wards by the present committee in 2001. The petitioners are producing herewith a rough sketch showing the boundaries of the Mahal and the four different wards within the Mahal. If the first and second respondents are producing the original Minutes Book of the Committee pertaining to the period of 2001-2002, then it will be clear that the Mahal was divided into 4 wards as claimed by the petitioners."
Order 1 Rule 8 CPC reads as follows:
"8. One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest-(1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,--
(a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested;
(b) the Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested.
(2) The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under sub-rule C.R.P.247/11 19 (1), at the plaintiff's expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or, where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by pubic advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct.
(3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, under sub-rule (1), may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit.
(4) No part of the claim in any such suit shall be abandoned under sub-rule (10, and no such suit shall be withdrawn under sub-rule (3), of Rule 1 of Order XXIII, and no agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded in any such suit under Rule 3 of that Order, unless the Court has given, at the plaintiff's expense, notice to all persons so interested in the manner specified in sub-rule (2).
(5). Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit.
(6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or C.R.P.247/11 20 defended, as the case may be.
Explanation.--For the purpose of determining whether the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit,it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be.)"
16. The object of Order 1 Rule 8 is obviously to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Ordinarily, the persons who are affected are to be made parties to a litigation. Order 1 Rule 8 provides for an exception to the said concept. Thus, when a plaintiff having common interest with others with the permission of the court sue, the decree passed in such a suit would be a decree passed in a representative suit. It would be clothed with the attribute of adjudication as against all persons whose interest the plaintiff represented. The Code mandates that notice must be served on persons affected and when the persons are numerous the court may order notice by publication as the court may direct. Once the court pronounces its decision in such a suit it will be binding on all the persons C.R.P.247/11 21 whose interests the plaintiff purports to represent. Furthermore, Order 1 Rule 8 (1) also permits the plaintiff to sue one or more defendants by making eo nominee defendants as representative parties which means that the plaintiff/plaintiffs is not claiming representative status in him or them but as there are many persons he chooses one or more as eo nominee defendants and clothe them with a representative character. If permission is granted and procedure is complied with all the persons who have identity of interest with representative defendants would be bound by the judgment. The third category of situation contemplated under Order 1 Rule 8 is where there are many defendants, one or more defendants may be permitted to represent others. These are the three categories of cases contemplated under Order 1 Rule 8 (1). The facts of this case will bring the case within the ambit of first category as this is a case where the petitioner in the O.P. sought to sue in a representative capacity. We have already referred to the prayers sought for in the petition. The alternative prayer sought has been granted. He has not therefore either abandoned or withdrawn from the suit. Nor can C.R.P.247/11 22 be said that he has compromised the suit for he has been given the decree as prayed for no doubt as an alternative relief. Respondents 4 and 5 in the OP were not impleaded as already noted in a representative capacity but they were impleaded in their individual capacity. They would say in para 2 as follows:
"These respondents submit at the outset that they have no objection and would welcome the convening of the general body of members of the Mahal of the Chenakkal Jumayath Palli, and election of office bearers of the first respondent committee through a commissioner appointed and functioning under the supervision of this Tribunal."
17. The question is as the plaintiff has sued in a representative capacity and therefore the petitioners in the revision petition were sought to be represented by the plaintiff could it be said that there is a compromise entered into by the petitioner. We are of the view that there is no compromise entered into by the petitioner in the OP as such. It may be different if the respondents 4 and 5 had been impleaded in a representative capacity. It would have been also different if the defendants in the proceeding were sued in a representative C.R.P.247/11 23 capacity. We may also notice that this is a case where the petitioner is unable to specifically point out what according to him are the boundaries of Mahal. In the light of this reasoning we are of the view that there is no merit in the revision and it is accordingly dismissed. There is no order as to costs.
18. We make it clear that this will not stand in the way of the petitioner approaching the court and pointing out any illegality committed by the Commissioner in the matter of preparation of the voters list including the matter of determination of contours of Mahal.
Sd/-
K.M.JOSEPH, JUDGE.
Sd/-
M.L.JOSEPH FRANCIS, JUDGE.
tgs/MS (true copy)