Punjab-Haryana High Court
Bhupinder Singh vs Ram Niwas And Anr. on 23 April, 2007
Equivalent citations: (2007)4PLR230
JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J.
1. The present revision petition has been filed against the order dated 21.8.2003 passed by the learned Rent Controller as confirmed by the learned Appellate Authority ordering eviction of the petitioner-tenant from Booth No. 4, Sector 15, Chandigarh, on the ground of bona fide necessity.
2. The landlord-petitioners had brought the ejectment petition on the ground that petitioner No. 2 along with the adopted son of petitioner No. 1 wants to do business as she was finding it difficult to pull on the meager pension being drawn by her.
3. Both the learned courts below on appreciation of evidence on record have recorded a finding of fact that the premises in dispute is required bona fide for personal use by the landlord-respondents herein.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant contended that Ram Niwas was already running the business in both No. 54, Sector 8-B, Chandigarh, which is owned by him. It was further pleaded that the landlord-respondents failed to plead the necessary ingredients of personal necessity on record.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant further contends that the son of Kamala Gupta was a Class I Officer and therefore, it cannot be pleaded that she has no sufficient income as admittedly she is living with her son. Therefore, it cannot be said that the demised premises is required by the respondents-landlord for their personal need.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant further submit that as the respondent Kamia Gupta was aged about 60 years, it could not be accepted that she would start a business at this stage of life particularly when she had no experience of any business.
7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and find no force in the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant. The mere fact that Ram Niwas was running his cloth business in some other premises in Sector 8, would not disentitle Kamia Gupta to start business in the premises belonging to them which is bona fide required for their personal use.
8. So far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant regarding failure to plead and prove the necessary ingredients of personal necessity are concerned, it has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondents that the petition was amended and the amended petition is on record in which the necessary ingredients of Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Act stood complied with.
9. The arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant have been duly considered by the learned Courts below and a concurrent finding of fact on the basis of evidence brought on record by the parties has been recorded that the premises in dispute is required bona fide and accordingly the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant was ordered.
10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Man Singh v. Brij Lal 1980 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 682 : 1980 (1) R.L.R. 738 to contend that mere wish of the landlord cannot entitle him to get the eviction order as something more than that is required to be proved. There can be no dispute with the proposition and a landlord seeking eviction is required to prove that his need is bona fide. In order to prove the personal need to run the business in the demised premises, Kamla Gupta appeared herself in the witness box and stated that she was not being given any money by her son and the pension being received by her is very meager and, therefore, she wanted personally to do business in the demised premises along with adopted son of respondent No. 1 Ram Niwas. It was proved on record that the premises are bona fide required and the statement qua personal necessity of the landlord could not be disbelieved on the basis of presumption as is sought to be projected by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant.
11. The concurrent finding of fact is not open to challenge in the revisional jurisdiction.
Dismissed.
However, the petitioner-tenant is granted three months' time to vacate the demised premises, however, this shall be subject to payment of arrears of rent and further the petitioner's paying the rent of the demised premises in advance on 7th of each month during this period.