Gujarat High Court
Sureshbhai Makanbhai Pal vs Section Officer Sathra Section on 15 February, 2022
Author: A. S. Supehia
Bench: A.S. Supehia
C/SCA/3320/2022 ORDER DATED: 15/02/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3320 of 2022
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SURESHBHAI MAKANBHAI PAL
Versus
SECTION OFFICER SATHRA SECTION & 5 other(s)
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Appearance:
CHINTAN K GANDHI(8600) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
Date : 15/02/2022
ORAL ORDER
1. The petitioner-workman was serving as a Labourer in the Sathra Section under the respondents from 01.11.1996 and it is his case that he was illegally terminated in December, 2000. Thereafter, he raised industrial dispute in the year 2019, which culminated into Reference (LCB) No.42 of 2019. After placing reliance on various judgements, vide impugned order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Labour Court, Bhavnagar, the reference is rejected on the ground of delay, as the dispute has been raised after a period of 19 years.
2. Learned advocate Mr.Chintan Gandhi is unable to dispute the fact that the industrial dispute has been raised after a period of 19 years by the petitioner-workman. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of U.P. Electricity Board vs. Rajesh Kumar, 2003 (12) S.C.C. 548.
3. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court on the Page 1 of 5 Downloaded on : Fri Feb 18 20:57:05 IST 2022 C/SCA/3320/2022 ORDER DATED: 15/02/2022 aforesaid decision in the case of Prabhakar vs. Joint Director Sericulture Department, AIR 2016 SC 2984, on which reliance is placed by the Labour Court. The Apex Court, after survey of various judgments on the issue, has held thus:-
"36. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 1-4-1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a "dispute" what had otherwise become a buried issue.
37. Let us examine the matter from another aspect viz. laches and delays and acquiescence.
38. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable Page 2 of 5 Downloaded on : Fri Feb 18 20:57:05 IST 2022 C/SCA/3320/2022 ORDER DATED: 15/02/2022 delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities".
39. This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction, appointment of Receiver, etc. These principles are also applied in the writ petitions filed under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India. In such cases, courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioner's part has prejudiced the respondent even though the petitioner might have come to court within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act.
40. Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case the party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.
41 XXXXX 42 XXXXX 42.1 XXXXX 42.2. XXXXX 42.3. XXXXX
43. XXXXX
44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry."
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that though there is no limitation prescribed under the Page 3 of 5 Downloaded on : Fri Feb 18 20:57:05 IST 2022 C/SCA/3320/2022 ORDER DATED: 15/02/2022 Limitation Act, 1963 for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (I.D. Act) yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. It is further held that the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay. It is held that in case unexplained delay, the workman can be said to have acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination and he cannot, after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a "dispute" what had otherwise become a buried issue. The Apex Court has also referred to doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity " delay defeats equities", and finally it is held that "although there is no limitation prescribed under the I.D. Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the I.D.Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the I.D. Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is Page 4 of 5 Downloaded on : Fri Feb 18 20:57:05 IST 2022 C/SCA/3320/2022 ORDER DATED: 15/02/2022 satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time". The petitioner is unable to show that for 19 years, he had kept the dispute alive. No material is produced which can convince this Court that the petitioner has kept on agitating his alleged wrongful termination for 19 years. It is not in dispute that the petitioner, for the first time raised the demand by issuing notice on 08.01.2019 for his termination in December, 2000. Any interference at this stage will resurrect a stale and dead dispute. The judgement in case of Rajesh Kumar (supra) cannot rescue the petitioner in view of the subsequent decision in case of Prabhakar (supra). Moreover, in the judgment in case of Rajesh Kumar (supra), the contention of delay was not raised before the Labour Court.
4. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Labour Court dismissing the Reference (L.C.B) No.42 of 2019.
5. The petition is summarily rejected.
Sd/-
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J) NVMEWADA Page 5 of 5 Downloaded on : Fri Feb 18 20:57:05 IST 2022