Jyotsana Suri vs Union Of India (2025:Rj-Jd:26628) on 30 May, 2025

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Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Jyotsana Suri vs Union Of India (2025:Rj-Jd:26628) on 30 May, 2025

1. The present judgment was pronounced by this Court on 30.05.2025. However, during the course of arguments it was not pointed out that applications for impleadment by three applicants are pending and therefore, the Court could not take note of the same. Even none appeared on behalf of the said applicants. The fact of the applications being pending, was pointed out by the Court Master after the pronouncement of the judgment and hence, this Court deemed it proper to incorporate the order on the said applications too. Therefore, order on applications for impleadment (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (4 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] was incorporated subsequently vide paras No.7 to 17 in the present judgment and hence, the judgment is being uploaded on 11.06.2025 after the said incorporation.

2. All the present revision petitions and the criminal misc. petition arising out of the same impugned orders, are being decided by this common order/judgment. Facts of S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.28/2022; Union of India Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors. are narrated for ready reference.

3. The present revision petition under Section 397 read with Sections 401 & 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) has been preferred seeking revision of orders dated 13.08.2019 and 15.09.2020 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Jodhpur in Final Report Case No.19/2019 whereby the learned Special Judge declined to accept the Final Report as filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and proceeded on to take cognizance against respondents No.2 to 5 and late husband of respondent No.6 under Section 120-B read with Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'the PC Act'). The learned Court further proceeded on to issue arrest warrants against the accused and also directed for seizure of the property in question. Furthermore, the learned Court appointed Collector, Udaipur to be the 'Receiver' of the seized property.

4. The brief facts of the case are as under :

A. On 13.08.2014, on basis of source information and preliminary inquiry, an FIR (bearing No.RC JDH 2014 A 0008) was (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (5 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] registered by the CBI against respondents No.3 to 5, late husband of respondent No.6 and other unknown Government Officers/Officials and private persons for offences under Sections 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC and Sections 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)

(d) of the PC Act qua irregularities committed in disinvestment of M/s Laxmi Vilas Palace Hotel, Udaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'M/s LVPH' or 'the Hotel'). As per the FIR, the Hotel was collusively disinvested in favour of M/s Bharat Hotels Limited (represented by respondent No.6) at a throwaway price of Rs.7.52 Crore. It was alleged that Shri Pradeep Baijal (respondent No.3) being the then Secretary of Department of Disinvestment, Ministry of Finance, Government of India abused his official position and entered into a criminal conspiracy with Shri Ashish Guha (respondent No.4), the then Managing Director of M/s Lazard India Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the Financial Advisor'); Shri Kantilal Karamsey Vikamsey (respondent No.5), Director of M/s Kanti Karamsey & Company (Valuer); authorised representative of M/s Bharat Hotels Limited (the successful bidder); and caused the sale of the Hotel to M/s Bharat Hotels Limited at a price of Rs.7.52 Crore, which led to a loss of about Rs.143.48 Crore to the Government of India and a corresponding wrongful gain to the accused. The FIR also contained allegations of wrongful and illegal appointment of respondent No.4 as the Financial Advisor and respondent No.5 as the Asset Valuer.

B. A detailed investigation was conducted by the CBI and final report/closure report dated 16.04.2019 was filed wherein it was concluded that no material/evidence in the complete process of (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (6 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] disinvestment was found which could make out any offence so as to initiate prosecution against the accused. The CBI although concluded that the proper/adequate asset valuation of the Hotel was not made by respondent No.5-Valuer but parallely also concluded that no evidence to establish any ulterior motive in fixing the lower reserve price of the Hotel, was found. The following findings were recorded by the CBI to conclude that no criminality in the entire process could be made out:

"(i) It was an open bid and no bidder/party objected with regard to bidding process.

(ii) The Disinvestment Commission had suggested 03 methods of valuation but didn't recommended [sic] as to which method of valuation was to be accepted.

(iii) The Government of India had availed the services of Expert Financial Advisor who suggested that the DCF method was an appropriate method of valuation which was accepted by the Evaluation Committee, Inter-

Ministerial Group, Core Group of Secretaries on Disinvestment and finally approval was accorded by the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment.

(iv) The share purchase agreement categorically mentioned that the purchaser shall use the hotel property for hotel and allied operations which in turn restricted the conversion of the use of the property for any other purpose.

(v) The instant disinvestment was for transfer of management and control of hotel business from Government to the private hand through the sale of shares held by the Government in M/s LVPH.

(vi) During investigation no irregularity has come to light quo the appointment of M/s Lazard India Pvt. Ltd. as Financial Advisor by the Ministerial Task Force. (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (7 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

(vii) No irregularity has come forth quo the selection of the M/s Kanti Karamsey & Company, Mumbai as Asset Valuer.

(viii) That M/s Kanti Karamsey & Co. had submitted their asset valuation report to the Financial Advisor which was to be kept confidential and used by the Advisor for determining the value under the liquidation approach. The business was sold as an ongoing concern and thus DCF method was adopted. Moreover, it has to be kept in perspective that at the time of valuation, it was not finalised that M/s Bharat Hotel would be the eventual winner of the bid.

(ix) No evidence has come forth to prove association between the management of M/s Bharat Hotels Ltd., the Asset Valuer, the Advisor or the Senior public servants.

(x) Investigation points out that the asset of M/s LVPH was undervalued by the valuer M/s Kanti Karamsey & Co. But there is absence of any evidence to establish that the same was done with an ulterior motive to facilitate fixing of lower reserve price. This reserve price was decided by the Advisor and Experts selected after a transparent process. Their recommendation was examined by an Inter-Ministerial Evaluation Committee, Inter-Ministerial Group, Core Group of Secretaries on Disinvestment and finally approved by the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment.

(xi) That the circumstance suggests little interest of market to take over ITDC properties during the relevant time.

(xii) That TATA Group which owned 10% of the shares of ITDC was compensated for its equity at exactly the same rate that the Government received through disinvestment. It is a reasonable argument that had the worth of the hotel been Rs.151 crores TATA Group (which is answerable to its shareholders) would not have (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (8 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] accepted 75 lakhs towards its equity as against Rs.15 crores.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is concluded that evidence worth launching prosecution was not found in the entire process of disinvestment of M/s Laxmi Vilas Palace Hotel, Udaipur (Raj.). However, it is found that M/s Kanti Karamsey & Company failed to do a proper valuation of the asset of M/s LVPH for which matter is being referred to the Department of Investment and Public Asset Management, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi.

Therefore, the Final Report as "Closure of the case/ No charge sheet" is being submitted in this Hon'ble Court for kind perusal and acceptance of the Court." C. However, vide order dated 13.08.2019, learned Special Judge, CBI concluded that prima facie, it was proved that a criminal conspiracy was hatched by the respondents so as to cause a willful loss of Rs.244,63,91,000/- to the Government of India and a wrongful gain to themselves. Therefore, learned Judge directed for further investigation in the matter by an officer of Superintendent level.

D. In pursuance to order dated 13.08.2019, further investigation was conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Jodhpur and a supplementary final report/closure report dated 05.06.2020 was filed with the conclusion that not enough evidence in the entire process of disinvestment of the Hotel worth launching prosecution, was found. However, it was concluded that respondent No.5 Company i.e. the Valuer, did not make a proper valuation of the assets of the Hotel and for the same, the matter had already been referred (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (9 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] to Department of Disinvestment and Public Asset Management, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi for taking action at their end. E. However, learned Special Judge disagreed with the supplementary closure report as filed by the CBI and proceeded on to pass order dated 15.09.2020, inter alia,:

(i) Taking cognizance of offences under Section 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC and Section 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)(d), PC Act against Respondent Nos.2-6;

(ii) Issuing process against Respondent Nos.2-6 through warrants of arrest;

(iii) Attaching the property of the Hotel in terms of Section 18(A) of the PC Act to be held by the State Government till final disposal of the matter; and

(iv) Appointing District Collector, Udaipur as receiver of the Hotel directing him to take possession of the same, submit a list of the movable and immovable property therein, handover the management of the Hotel to some other Government of India organization/undertaking involved in the business of hotel management and submit quarterly accounts report of the Hotel.

5. At this stage, it is relevant to note that respondent No.2 Shri Arun Shourie was not a named accused in the FIR but cognizance against him was also taken by the learned Special Judge and prosecution against him was also launched vide order dated 15.09.2020.

6. Aggrieved of orders dated 13.08.2019 and 15.09.2020, the present revision petitions/criminal misc. petition have been preferred.

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7. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that applications for impleadment in the present petitions have been filed by three applicants -Amba Lal Nayak, Laxmi Lal Choudhary and Vinod Singh Parihar, the details of which are as under:-

i). CRLR No.663/20 (IA No.2/2020) Amba Lal Nayak (IA No.3/2020) Laxmi Lal Choudhary Vinod Singh Parihar

ii). CRLR No.665/20 (IA No.1/2020) Amba Lal Nayak

iii). CRLR No.667/20 (IA No.1/2020) Amba Lal Nayak

iv). CRLR No.669/20 (IA No.1/2020) Amba Lal Nayak

v). CRLMP No.2993/20 (IA No.1/2020) Amba Lal Nayak (IA No.2/2020) Laxmi Lal Choudhary Vinod Singh Parihar

8. None appeared on behalf of the above applicants nor have any arguments been raised on their behalf.

9. The application as filed by Amba Lal Nayak reads as under:-

"The humble applicant, most respectfully submits as under:-

1. That, the applicant was working in Laxmi Vilas Hotel, Udaipur and he collected all documents and made complaint to Central Bureau of Investigation and sent the relevant documents through fax.

2. That, on the complaint of the petitioner, CBI conducted preliminary enquiry and thereafter registered FIR in year 2014.

3. That, CBI also enquired the applicant and thereafter CBI submitted closure report before Special Judge, CBI but no notice has been given to applicant.

4. That, since CBI has submitted closure report hence it will support revision petitioner as such applicant is necessary party so that he will bring the true facts before the Hon'ble Court.

5. That, no prejudice will cause to the petitioner if the applicant is impleaded respondent.

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[2025:RJ-JD:26628] (11 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] Therefore, in the interest of justice, applicant may kindly be impleaded as respondent in the aforesaid revision petition."

10. A bare perusal of the above averments reflects that impleadment has been sought by the applicant on the ground that it is on his complaint that a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the CBI and the FIR was registered in the year 2014. The CBI although submitted a closure report before the CBI Court but did not serve any notice on him i.e. the complainant. Therefore, he deserves to be impleaded in the present petitions.

11. Similar applications have been filed by two other persons i.e. Laxmi Lal Choudhary and Vinod Singh Parihar with an averment that being the ex-employees of M/s. LVPH, they are entitled to be impleaded as party respondents. In the alternate, they have prayed to be permitted to intervene in the matters.

12. So far as the applications filed by Amba Lal Nayak are concerned, this Court is not inclined to entertain the same for the following reasons:

i). The supplementary Final Report as filed in the present matter reflects FIR No.RC JDH 2014 A 0008 to have been registered on a source information. It nowhere reflects the applicant Amba Lal Nayak to be the complainant. Therefore, the averment of the applicant that the FIR in question was registered on his complaint proves to be incorrect on the face of it.

ii). The applications as filed by the applicant does not reflect any reason, whatsoever, as to why he is a necessary or essential party.

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iii). As is clear from the record, the said applicant, at the very inception, filed a PIL petition (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.910/2002) before this Court challenging the transfer of the property of M/s LVPH. While dismissing the said PIL petition on 04.04.2002, the Court specifically observed as under:-

"We find that so far as petitioner No.1 is concerned, he had interestingly pursued the litigation about the transfer of property in question as its employee and a member of the hotel workers union of the ITDC, and that interest can be pursued in an adversary litigation, not by way of Public Interest Litigation."

iv). Interestingly, the second PIL petition was again filed by the applicant being D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1678/2006 which stood dismissed on 19.07.2006 at a cost of Rs.5,000/-. The Court while dismissing the petition specifically observed as under:-

"The fact that the petitioner happened to be an employee and member of the Hotel Workers Union of the ITDC has been suppressed in the writ petition. The petitioner has described himself simply as "a permanent resident of Udaipur city and a social worker of the society."

To sum up, the petitioner has challenged sale of the hotel after four years and dismissal of the first writ petition by a speaking order. The ground of challenge is the same, namely, sale of assets worth for alleged paltry sum of Rs.7.52 Crores only. The materials which are the foundation of the petitioner's case, referred to above, were available with the petitioner when the petition came up for final disposal. Above all, bona fides of the public interest litigation at the instance of the petitioner having been doubted, we are of the view that the petitioner ha been pursuing a useless litigation in the garb of public interest litigation."

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v). What can be concluded from the above facts is that the present applicant has already approached this Court twice and his second PIL petition was dismissed at a cost of Rs.5,000/- with a specific observation that the petitioner had been pursuing a useless litigation in the garb of public interest litigation. Once the said finding has been recorded by the Division Bench against the present applicant, the present applications for impleadment are nothing but a misconceived attempt on behalf of the applicant.

13. The applications for impleadment as filed by Amba Lal Nayak are hence, dismissed.

14. So far as the applications filed by the other two applicants namely, Laxmi Lal Choudhary and Vinod Singh Parihar are concerned, a bare perusal of the applications reflects that they too claim themselves to be the ex-employees of M/s. LVPH. In the applications, it has been averred as under:

"That the applicants do not wish to question the Disinvestment Policy of the Government of India but confine their case to the fact that the property, worth crores of Rupees in the year 2001, was transferred to the petitioner for a paltry sum of Rs.75 Crores only, whereas, the land valuation on the basis of regularisation of certain lands out of the same property in the same area in favour of Hindustan Zinc Limited was around Rs.75 Crores but the manner in which disinvestment of Laxmi Vilas Palace Hotel has been transferred by the I.T.D.C. to the petitioner-Company, is attributable to corrupt practices adopted in a well conspired and pre-planned manner, which is evident from a perusal of the impugned order. The learned Special Judge, C.B.I. Court, Jodhpur has passed the impugned order after considering the material available on record. Since a public property has been transferred to the petitioner- Company by way of disinvestment, therefore, the applicants being the members of the public and ex-

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[2025:RJ-JD:26628] (14 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] employees of Laxmi Vilas Palace Hotel seek leave of this Hon'ble Court to be impleaded as party- respondents or in alternative, to intervene in the matter for the purpose of advancing submissions that the impugned order is not only in accordance with law but also as per the material collected by the C.B.I. and the commission of offences under Sec.120-B, 420, IPC and Sec.13(2) read with Sec.13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are clearly made out."

15. The facts as pleaded by Amba Lal Nayak and referred to in Order dated 04.04.2002 in D.B. Civil Writ (PIL) Petition No.910/2002 read as under:-

"The petitioners do not challenge disinvestment policy of the Govt. of India as such. The principal ground of challenge in this petition is that a property worth crores of rupees is being transferred to a private party for paltry sum of Rs.7.5 crores only whereas the land valuation on the basis of regularisation of certain lands out of the same property in the same area in favour of Hindustan Zinc Limited comes around Rs.47 crores. The regularisation charges were @ Rs.576/- per sq.ft. whereas the current price fixed by the State Govt. itself for the purpose stamp duty on market price the valuation is to be made @ Rs.1100/- per sq.ft. or Rs.11,000/- per sq. Mtr. if the land is situated near to road, and @ Rs.875/- per sq.ft. or Rs.8750/- per sq. mtr. if the land is situated away from the Road in the area in question."

16. A bare perusal of the pleadings as made by the present two applicants in their applications and the pleadings made by Amba Lal Nayak in his first PIL petition clearly reveals that the same are ad-verbatim. The petition as filed by Amba Lal Nayak having been dismissed, the present applications by the applicants on the same grounds clearly is a misconceived and malafide attempt. Further, the present applicants too have not been able to portray any (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (15 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] ground as to how they are the necessary and essential parties to the present litigation.

17. The applications as filed by Laxmi Lal Choudhary and Vinod Singh Parihar therefore, deserve to be and are hereby dismissed.

18. Proceeding further, this Court deems it appropriate to narrate the arguments of the counsels in the respective petitions.

19. S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.663/2020; Smt. Jyotsana Suri Vs. Union of India Mr. P.P. Choudhary, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Smt. Jyotsana Suri made the following submissions:

(i) The learned Special Judge erred in not accepting the closure report as submitted by the CBI and exceeded his jurisdiction in observing that the course/method of valuation as adopted was erroneous. It is not within the domain of the Court to decide as to which method/policy ought to have been adopted. Policy decision being a prerogative of the State, it was well within the jurisdiction of the competent/Core Committee to decide as to which method of valuation was to be adopted. It is no one's case that the method as adopted was not a method recommended by the Disinvestment Commission. It was definitely one of the four sanctioned methods as per the recommendations of the Disinvestment Commission and hence, adoption of one of the four sanctioned methods which was completely a policy decision of the State, could not have been said to be illegal by the Court and in concluding so, the Court definitely exceeded its jurisdiction.

(ii) The present was a global tender wherein the complete procedure in terms of law was adopted. In all, 60 tenderers (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (16 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] participated in the process and the bid of the petitioner Company being 20% above the reserve price and the highest, was rightly accepted.

(iii) The learned Court, while exercising its jurisdiction, acted like a Constitutional Court and while deciding the criminality, proceeded on to examine the validity of the disinvestment policy.

The said approach and conclusion as arrived by the learned Judge is even otherwise contrary to the ratio as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India & Ors.; (2002) 2 SCC 333.

(iv) Even otherwise, at the relevant point of time, Ms. Jyotsana Suri, the present petitioner was not even in picture as she was not holding any office of M/s Bharat Hotels Limited. Therefore, no offence is made out against her and cognizance against her is nonest.

(v) The direction for attachment of the property of the Hotel as issued by the learned Court is also in excess of jurisdiction.

20. With the above submissions, learned Senior Counsel prayed for setting aside of the orders impugned and for acceptance of the closure report as filed by the CBI.

21. S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.667/2020; Mr. Arun Shourie Vs. Union of India

(i) Petitioner Mr. Arun Shourie appearing in person, at first and foremost submitted that the learned Special Judge could not have taken cognizance against him without a prior prosecution sanction having been obtained in terms of provisions of the PC Act, he being a retired public servant. He submitted that as per amended (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (17 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] Section 19 of the PC Act, a sanction for prosecution against a retired public servant is also mandatory and the learned Court erroneously held that the said sanction was not essential and wrongly proceeded on to take cognizance against him in total contravention to the provisions of the PC Act.

(ii) Mr. Pradeep Shah, Counsel for Mr. Shourie, assisted by the petitioner himself, further submitted as under:

(a) He was neither named in the FIR nor was there an iota of evidence against him so as to conclude any offence being made out against him. The CBI, during the course of investigation, although examined 60 witnesses and took on record 244 documents, none of them could be co-related to him. Even as per the reply of the CBI, there was no evidence available on record to impute criminality against him.

(b) As a Minister, his role was just to ensure the proper implementation of the layers/stages of the disinvestment policy.

The disinvestment policy was a policy approved by the Parliament which could not have been put to scrutiny by the Court.

(c) It is no one's case that the procedure as prescribed by the said policy was not followed in the present matter. Complete transparency was maintained in the complete process which was approved by the relevant committees as constituted, at each layer/stage. The process comprises of 5 layers/stages and at each stage, a collective decision by a competent committee was taken. The collective decision of the final/Core committee headed by Hon'ble the Prime Minister, resulted into the acceptance of the (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (18 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] final bid and hence, he alone could not have been imputed of any corrupt practice.

(d) So far as the selection of the valuer is concerned, a complete process is prescribed for the purpose. The said process was strictly followed whereby total 81 valuers were invited. After the complete process, the valuer - respondent No.4 was selected and that too, on basis of the collective decision of the committee. He being one of the members of the committee, could not have been solely held responsible for selection of the valuer.

(e) The learned Court, on total assumptions and surmises, concluded that the proper valuation of the property was not done. Even the valuation of Rs.252 Crores as concluded by the CBI was incorrect and based on no material evidence.

(To substantiate his submission, Mr. Shourie referred to the PILs pertaining to the disinvestment of the present Hotel. In the first PIL, the valuation was mentioned to be Rs.50 Crores and in the second PIL, it was mentioned to be Rs.150 Crores).

(f) Even otherwise, calculation of the valuation is a factual aspect which cannot be gone into by the Courts and as held in Balco's case (supra), the Courts cannot interfere on the premise that the method of valuation as adopted is incorrect or that some other method ought to have been adopted.

(g) Further, the valuation method qua an enterprise which is in a working condition, is totally different. Herein, the Hotel was although in a working condition, was running on huge losses and therefore, the Government took a conscious decision to disinvest in the same.

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(h) So far as the finding of the CBI regarding the lesser valuation of the land is concerned, 8 acres of the land in question was already leased out to some other company. Further, only 6% of the land was permitted to be used and even no further construction was permissible on the said land. To substantiate the said fact, he referred to two notifications dated 17.01.1999 and 10.12.1999 of the State Government.

Hence, the reasons given by the valuer for lesser valuation are totally reasonable and correct.

(i) Admittedly, 10% shares of the Hotel in question were held by TATA Group and had the Hotel been undervalued, TATA Group would definitely have raised an objection which it did not, which simply means that the valuation of the Hotel at that point of time was correctly computed and was not questionable.

(j) All the 12 grounds/reasons as assigned by the CBI to conclude that no criminality in the complete process was found, have totally been ignored by the learned Court without any basis or logic.

22. S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.665/2020; Mr. Ashish Guha Vs. Union of India

(i) Mr. Sanjeev Sen, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the role of M/s Lazard India Private Limited (advisor) was only advisory and to provide assistance to the Government to finalize the valuer. However, there was no role of the advisor in the final selection of the valuer. He, in support of his submission, referred to the office memorandum of May, 2001 (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (20 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] whereby the committee for selection of the valuer was constituted. The advisor was neither a member of the said committee nor was it one to make a final selection.

(ii) Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even otherwise the agreement was executed between the Government of India and the Company and no agreement was executed by the petitioner in his personal capacity. Therefore, only because of he being the Managing Director of the Company, cannot be held liable qua any offence, in his personal capacity.

(iii) Learned Senior Counsel submitted that only allegation against Mr. Ashish Guha is that he played a pivotal role in selection of the valuer whereas it is clear on record that neither was he a member of the selection committee nor did he attend any meeting of the said committee and hence, did not have any role in final selection of the valuer.

(iv) None of the ingredients of the offences of which the cognizance has been taken by the learned Court against him, are found and no offence, as rightly held by the CBI, is made out against the petitioner.

23. S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.2993/2020; Pradip Baijal Vs. Union of India Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for Mr. Pradeep Baijal, Secretary for Department of Disinvestment, Ministry of Finance at the relevant point of time, raised the following grounds:

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(i) Admittedly, the petitioner was a public servant at the relevant point of time and hence, in terms of the amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act, prosecution sanction was a mandate before taking cognizance against him. No sanction was there on record permitting prosecution against the petitioner and hence, the order of the learned Court taking cognizance against the petitioner, is bad in the eye of law.

(ii) Vide the order impugned, cognizance of certain offences under IPC has also been taken by the learned Court whereas additional layer of sanction in terms of Section 197, Cr.P.C. was further required before taking cognizance of the said offences against the petitioner.

(iii) The petitioner was discharging his official duties as one of the members of the committee as constituted. Neither did he, in his individual capacity, take any final decision nor was he the sole person to make a final selection of the valuer. Therefore, no criminality whatsoever, could be imputed solely against him.

(iv) The learned Court exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method as adopted for valuation of the Hotel, was incorrect and the Asset Valuation Method (AVM) ought to have been adopted. The said finding of the learned Court is in total contravention to the ratio as laid down in Balco's case (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the discretion to decide the method of valuation lies totally with the Government and the same being a policy decision of the Government, cannot be interfered with by the Courts. In support of his submission, counsel relied upon the Hon'ble Apex Court (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (22 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] judgment in G.L. Sultania v. Securities & Exchange Board of India; (2007) 5 SCC 133.

(v) The petitioner was not a member of the Valuation Committee which comprised of Inter Ministerial Group. He was only one of the members of the Cabinet Committee comprising of Core Group of Secretaries chaired by Hon'ble the Prime Minister himself. The decision, if any, was taken by the Valuation Committee and the Cabinet Committee only approved the recommendations as made by the Valuation Committee. The petitioner being only one of the members of the Cabinet Committee, could not have been imputed for any act so as to constitute any offence.

(vi) It is not comprehensible as to how only two persons out of all the Committee Members have been accused of the offences when there is no material available on record to impute any particular act, action or unlawful gain on their part.

(vii) The learned Court seriously erred in totally ignoring the grounds/reasons as recorded by the CBI while filing the closure report. It is only the personal emotions and assumptions of the learned Judge that has overridden the complete evidence placed on record by the CBI.

24. With the above submissions, learned counsel prayed for acceptance of the closure report and setting aside/quashing of the orders impugned.

25. S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.28/2022; Union of India Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors. (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (23 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

(i) Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India assisted by Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned ASG has put a challenge to the orders impugned on two aspects: its legality and its correctness.

(ii) On the aspect of legality, he submitted that firstly, the order is bad as no sanction for prosecution was obtained by the learned Court before taking cognizance of the offences under the PC Act as well as IPC. Secondly, unless the ingredients of the offences were made out from the closure report of the CBI, no cognizance under Sections 120B r.w. 420, IPC could have been taken.

(iii) On the aspect of correctness, learned Solicitor General submitted that once a closure report was submitted by the CBI, the only option available with the learned Court was either to accept it or to order/direct for further investigation. Learned Court, at the first instance, directed for further investigation which was completely within its jurisdiction. However, after extensive investigation been conducted by the CBI in compliance of order dated 13.08.2019, when the second/supplementary closure report was submitted, the option available with the Court was only to see whether its earlier directions had been followed or not and the investigation as per its directions had been conducted or not. If after further investigation, the second/supplementary closure report was filed, the Court was only required to see whether ingredients of the offences as alleged were made out or not.

(iv) So far as order impugned dated 05.06.2020 is concerned, there is not an iota of discussion on the aspect as to whether any offence was made out or not. The Court did not record any finding as to which offence (of which the cognizance was taken) was (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (24 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] made out against the accused. The closure report specifically indicated that no evidence, whatsoever, to make out any offence against the accused was available on record. Without reaching to any concrete finding regarding the ingredients of the offences under Sections 120B or 420, IPC the Court could not have suo moto proceeded on to take cognizance of the said offences against the accused. Assumptions and surmises cannot be the sole reasons to take cognizance against any person without concluding that the ingredients so as to make out an offence, are available on record.

(v) Learned SGI further submitted that the order of the learned Court ought to meet out all three tests of correctness, legality and propriety. Besides legality and correctness, the order impugned does not pass the test of propriety too as the observations as made by the learned Court, by all means, lack propriety.

(vi) Learned SGI further submitted that the State instrumentality cannot be put to such coercive measures so as to hamper its functionality. If the State, with due diligence, takes a particular decision and acts upon the same, totally within its jurisdiction, the same cannot be subject to judicial review. The approach of learned Special Judge, if allowed to stand, would lay a huge impact on future proceedings of disinvestment to be taken up by the Government. The same would definitely have a nationwide impact and would definitely hinder the future proceedings of disinvestment, if any, to be undertaken by the Government. (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (25 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

26. Learned ASG Mr. S.V. Raju appearing for CBI, while supporting the arguments as raised by learned SGI, raised the following additional grounds:

(i) As per the amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act, prosecution sanction is mandatory even qua a retired public servant. The finding as recorded by the learned Court to the effect that no prosecution sanction was required as the offence related back to a date prior to the amended provision of Section 19 having come into effect, is totally contrary to the settled position of law. It is the date of cognizance and not the date of offence which would decide the applicability of the amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act. As on the date of taking cognizance by the Court, the amended provision of Section 19 had come into effect, the mandate as required vide the said provision qua a retired public servant, would apply.

27. S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.669/2020; Kantilal Vikamsey Vs. Union of India It has been submitted that Mr. Kantilal Vikamsey expired on 24.08.2021 after filing of the present revision petition and hence, the proceedings qua him needs to be dropped.

28. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

29. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note at this stage itself that as Mr. Kantilal Vikamsey (respondent No.5) expired on 24.08.2021, nothing survives against him. The proceedings (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (26 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] against him can even otherwise not be continued and hence, the same are dropped.

30. Respondent No.5 Mr. Kantilal Vikamsey having expired on 24.08.2021, his name is directed to be deleted from the array of respondents in Criminal Revision No.28/2022.

31. One more aspect which deserves to be noted at this stage itself is that although the CBI, at the primary stage and at the stage of interim relief opposed the prayers as made by all the petitioners and supported the orders impugned but during the course of final arguments, learned Senior counsel appearing for the CBI specifically took a stand in favour of the petitioners and prayed for quashing of the orders impugned. Meaning thereby, there is no opposite party in the present litigation and none of the counsels/parties have supported the orders impugned. All the counsels/parties have opposed the orders impugned and prayed for quashing/setting aside of the same.

32. Coming to the merit, the first issue which arise is - Whether a prosecution sanction is mandatory for taking cognizance of any offence under the PC Act against a public servant ?

To find an answer to the said issue, reliance on Hon'ble Apex Court judgments in the case of Dilawar Singh Vs. Parvinder Singh;(2005) 12 SCC 709 and Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka;(2015) 14 SCC 186 would be apt. In Nanjappa's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court specifically held that in absence of valid prosecution sanction in terms of Section 19 of the PC Act, the Trial Court was not competent to take cognizance of any offence under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 & 15 of the said Act. Therein, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held as under: (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM)

[2025:RJ-JD:26628] (27 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] "10. A plain read of Section 19(1) (supra) leaves no manner of doubt that the same is couched in mandatory terms and forbids courts from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 against public servants except with the previous sanction of the competent authority enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Sub-section (1) of Section 19. The provision contained in Sub-

section (1) would operate in absolute terms but for the presence of Sub-section (3) to Section 19 to which we shall presently turn. But before we do so, we wish to emphasise that the language employed in Sub-

section (1) of Section 19 admits of no equivocation and operates as a complete and absolute bar to any court taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act against a public servant except with the previous sanction of the competent authority."

33. In view of the above settled position of law, it can be safely concluded that no cognizance of any offence under Section 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act can be taken against a public servant without a previous valid prosecution sanction.

34. After concluding as above, the very next issue then is - Whether a prosecution sanction is essential in case of a retired public servant too?

35. The admitted position of law is that as per the unamended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act, no prosecution sanction was essential for a retired public servant but, after the amendment in Section 19 been introduced w.e.f. 26.07.2018, prosecution (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (28 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] sanction is essential before taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13 & 15 of the PC Act qua a retired public servant too.

36. The Allahabad High Court in Anil Kumar Shukla Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation; 2020 (4) ALJ 562 (decided on 20.12.2019) while dealing with a similar situation observed and held as under :

"13. As it is evident from the aforesaid provision that before amendment there was no such mandatory provisions for taking previous sanction for prosecuting the Government Officials after his retirement for the offence which was alleged to be taken place during his official discharge of duty but in the amended provision of section 19(1)(B) of P.C. Act, it clearly provides that in case of a person who is employed or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government, the sanction is necessary and without previous sanction no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13 & 15 of the Act."

37. Applying the above ratio to the present matter, the conclusion which can be drawn is that a prosecution sanction was essential before taking cognizance of the offence under Section 13(2) r.w. 13(1)(d) of the PC Act against Mr. Pradeep Baijal & Mr. Arun Shourie who, on the date of taking cognizance, were although not in office, but were definitely retired public servants.

38. The very next issue then would be - Whether the amended provision of Section 19 would apply in Mr. Baijal & Mr. Shourie's (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (29 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] case or they would be governed by the unamended provision of Section 19 as the alleged offence pertained to the year 2014 i.e. prior to amended provision of Section 19 having came into effect. That is to say, what would be the effective date of application of the amended provision of Section 19 - the date of commission of offence or the date of taking cognizance of the offence?

39. The above issue is also no more res integra and came up before various High Courts at different points of time. The Kerala High Court in the case of S.V. Kalesan Vs. State of Kerala; Crl.MC.No.5365/2013 (decided on 01.07.2021) (2021:KER:23488) held that the date relevant for considering the necessity of sanction is the date on which cognizance is taken. Therein, the Court held that inspite of retirement of the petitioner from service, if the Special Judge has to pass a fresh order under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act would be necessary.

40. Similar view was taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mahendra Kumar Dubey Vs. Economic Offence Wing, through its Superintendent of Police; CRR/470/2021 (2021:MPHC-GWL:13288) (decided on 28.10.2021) wherein the Court held as under:

"17. In the conspectus of above discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the date of commission of offence is not the deciding factor but it is the date of taking cognizance of the offence in question which decides the applicability of amended Sec.19 PC Act. Thus, the Trial Court by taking cognizance of the offence in question against petitioner without insisting for (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (30 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] sanction for prosecution from Sanctioning Authority has committed illegality..."

41. The above judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mahendra Kumar Dubey (supra) has been affirmed by Hon'ble the Apex Court in Mahendra Kumar Dubey Vs. Economic Offences Wing, Unit Gwalior; Special Leave petition Criminal Diary No.28462/2022, Special Leave to Appeal Crl. No.9503/2022 (decided on 10.10.2022). The Hon'ble Apex Court while affirming order dated 28.10.2021 of Madhya Pradesh High Court, observed and held as under:-

"Delay condoned.

Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner at length and having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and even considering the amended Section 19 of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988 and the explanation to amended Section 19, upon which the reliance is placed, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. However, all the contentions which may be available to the petitioner may be considered at the time of trial and shall be dealt with and considered in accordance with law and on their own merits. Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of."

42. To reach to a conclusion that the amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act would have a retrospective effect, this Court also places reliance upon the Apex Court judgment in Ramesh Kumar Soni Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh; (2013) 14 SCC 696 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court specifically held that (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (31 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] a case must be deemed to be instituted only when the Court competent to take cognizance of the offence alleged therein, does so. Meaning thereby, after the amended Act/provision having come into effect, the amended act/provision would be applicable even on the cases which had not been instituted till the said date i.e. of which the cognizance had not been taken till the date of the amended provision having come into effect. The Hon'ble Apex Court therein observed as under:-

"7.3. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not, however, provide any definition of "institution of a case". It is, however, trite that a case must be deemed to be instituted only when the court competent to take cognizance of the offence alleged therein does so. The cognizance can, in turn, be taken by a Magistrate on a complaint of facts filed before him which constitute such an offence. It may also be taken if a police report is filed before the Magistrate in writing of such facts as would constitute an offence. The Magistrate may also take cognizance of an offence on the basis of his knowledge or suspicion upon receipt of the information from any person other than a police officer. In the case of the Sessions Court, such cognizance is taken on commitment to it by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf. All this implies that the case is instituted in the Magistrate's court when the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, in which event the case is one instituted on a complaint or a police report. The decision of this Court in Jamuna Singh V. Bhadai Shah, clearly explains the legal position in this regard. 7.4. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (SCC p.257, para 14) where this Court held that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein and that cognizance can be taken in the manner set out in clauses (a) to (c) of Section 190(1) Cr.P.C. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of W.B. where this Court interpreted the provisions of Section 190 CrPC and reiterated the legal position set out in the earlier decisions.

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[2025:RJ-JD:26628] (32 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

8. Applying the test judicially recognized in the above pronouncements to the case at hand, we have no hesitation in holding that no case was pending before the Magistrate against the appellant as on the date the Amendment Act came into force. That being so, the Magistrate on receipt of a charge-sheet which was tantamount to institution of a case against the appellant was duty bound to commit the case to the Sessions as three of the offences with which he was charged were triable only by the Court of Sessions. The case having been instituted after the Amendment Act had taken effect, there was no need to look for any provision in the Amendment Act for determining whether the amendment was applicable even to pending matters as on the date of the amendment no case had been instituted against the appellant nor was it pending before any Court to necessitate a search for any such provision in the Amendment Act. The Sessions Judge as also the High Court were, in that view, perfectly justified in holding that the order of committal passed by the Magistrate was a legally valid order and the appellant could be tried only by the Court of Sessions to which the case stood committed."

43. In view of the above settled position of law, what can be concluded is that the date of commission of offence is not the deciding factor for applicability of the amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act but it is the date of taking cognizance of the offence which would be the deciding factor.

44. From the overall analysis of the above issues, this Court concludes as under:

(i) No cognizance against a public servant of an offence under Section 13 of the PC Act could have been taken in absence of a valid prosecution sanction.

(ii) A valid prosecution sanction was essential even qua a retired public servant if cognizance of any offence under Section 13 of the PC Act was to be taken by the learned Special Judge.

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[2025:RJ-JD:26628] (33 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

(iii) It is the date of taking of cognizance of an offence which would decide the applicability of amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act and not the date of commission of offence.

45. In the present matter, the cognizance of offence under Section 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act had been taken by the learned Special Judge vide order impugned dated 15.09.2020 which clearly is subsequent to 26.07.2018 i.e. the date from which the amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act came into effect. In the specific opinion of this Court, the learned Special Judge was under an obligation to keep into consideration the amended provision of Section 19 of the PC Act. The same having not been done, the finding of the learned Special Judge to the effect that the offence been committed prior to 26.07.2018 no prosecution sanction was essential, being contrary to the settled position of law, deserves to be and is hereby set aside.

46. Consequently, the order of taking cognizance of offence under Sections 13(2) r.w. 13(1)(d) of the PC Act against Mr. Pradeep Baijal and Mr. Arun Shourie being contrary to the settled position of law deserves to be and is hereby quashed and set aside.

47. The very next issue which now arise is - Whether cognizance of offence under Section 120B r.w. Section 420, IPC could also have been taken by the learned Special Judge against the retired public servants without a valid prosecution sanction in terms of Section 197, Cr.P.C.?

(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (34 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

48. This Court is not required to delve much into the above issue in view of the analysis already made in the preceding paras while dealing with the issue of prosecution sanction in terms of Section 19 of the PC Act. The ratio remains the same. The Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with a similar situation in R. Balakrishna Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and Another ; (1996) 1 SCC 478 observed and held as under:-

"7. In the present case, the appellant is charged with having entered into a criminal conspiracy with the co- accused while functioning as a Minister. The criminal conspiracy alleged is that he sold electricity to an industry in the State of Karnataka 'without the consent of the Government of Kerala which is an illegal act' under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Kerala Electricity Board Rules framed thereunder. The allegation is that he in pursuance of the said alleged conspiracy abused his official position and illegally sold certain units to the private industry in Bangalore (Karnataka) which profited the private industry to the tune of Rs.19,58,630.40 or more and it is, therefore, obvious that the criminal conspiracy alleged against the appellant is that while functioning as the Minister for Electricity he without the consent of the Government of Kerala supplied certain units of electricity to a private industry in Karnataka. Obviously, he did this in the discharge of his duties as a Minister. The allegation is that it was an illegal act inasmuch as the consent of the Government of Kerala was not obtained before this arrangement was entered into and the supply was effected. For that reason, it is said that he had committed an illegality and hence he was liable to be punished for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B, I.P.C. It is, therefore, clear from the charge that the act alleged is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty as a Minister and would, therefore, attract the protection of Section 197(1) of the Act."

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[2025:RJ-JD:26628] (35 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

49. The allegations against the retired public servants in the present matter too are almost akin as in R. Balakrishna Pillai's case. The acts alleged against Mr. Pradeep Baijal and Mr. Arun Shourie are directly connected with their official duties as Minister/ public servant and hence, in view of the ratio laid down in R. Balakrishna Pillai's case, it would definitely attract the protection of Section 197(1),Cr.P.C.

50. The cognizance of offence under Sections 120-B r.w. 420, IPC against Mr. Pradeep Baijal and Mr. Arun Shourie without a valid prosecution sanction is therefore held to be bad and is hereby quashed and set aside.

51. The order of taking cognizance against two of the petitioners i.e. Mr. Pradeep Baijal and Mr. Arun Shourie having been set aside, the issue now would be whether the order taking cognizance against the other petitioners can be sustained?

52. Section 3 of the PC Act empowers the Special Judge to try any offence punishable under the said Act. Section 4(3) of the PC Act further empowers the Special Judge to try any offence other than an offence specified in Section 3. Meaning thereby, the Special Judge can try not only an offence punishable under the PC Act but also any other offence qua which the accused can be charged at the same trial.

53. Evidently, in the present matter, cognizance has been taken by the learned Special Judge of offences under Section 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act so also under Section 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC. Section 13 of the PC Act pertains to the offence of criminal misconduct by a public servant.

(Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (36 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022]

54. Once the order of taking cognizance against the public servant has been quashed by this Court, evidently the other petitioners/accused who are/were not the public servants cannot be tried by the Special Judge under the PC Act. True it is that the other petitioners can be tried for the offences under Section 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC but then, they cannot be tried for the said offences by the Special Judge while exercising jurisdiction under the PC Act. The private respondents/petitioners namely Mr. Ashish Guha, Mr. Kantilal Vikamsey and Smt. Jyotsana Suri not being the public servants and the order of taking cognizance under Section 13 of the PC Act having been set aside qua the two retired public servants, the cognizance of offence under Section 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC by the Special Judge cannot be sustained against them being without jurisdiction. The above petitioners can at the best be tried by a competent Criminal Court for the offences under IPC but the CBI Court can definitely have no jurisdiction to try them for any of the offences under IPC after the order of cognizance against the public servants qua the offences under the PC Act having been set aside.

55. In view of the above analysis, the order taking cognizance by the learned Special Judge against Mr. Ashish Guha, Mr. Kantilal Vikamsey and Smt. Jyotsana Suri being in excess of jurisction, is hereby quashed and set aside.

56. In view of the above conclusions, this Court is not required to delve into the issue whether an offence under Section 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC was made out against the petitioners or not. This Court is also not required to delve into the issue whether the (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (37 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] decision of the competent authority as to which method of valuation is to be adopted, is a subject of judicial review or not. As this Court has quashed the orders of taking cognizance against all the petitioners for the reasons as detailed out in the preceding paras, the two issues aforesaid does not require any consideration by this Court and are left open to be considered and decided if the CBI proposes to file a fresh charge-sheet against Mr. Pradeep Baijal and Mr. Arun Shourie after procuring valid prosecution sanction or against the other petitioners before a competent Criminal Court.

57. In view of the above overall analysis and observations, Criminal Revision Petitions No.28/2022, 663/2020, 665/2020 & 667/2020 so also Criminal Misc. Petition No.2993/2020 are hereby allowed. Criminal Revision Petition No.669/2020 is disposed of as having rendered infructuous. Orders impugned dated 13.08.2019 & 15.09.2020 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Jodhpur are hereby quashed and set aside. Petitioners Mr. Pradeep Baijal and Mr. Arun Shourie are discharged of offences under Sections 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act and under Section 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC for want of valid prosecution sanction. Petitioners Mr. Ashish Guha and Smt. Jyotsana Suri are discharged of offences under Sections 120-B r.w. Section 420, IPC and under Section 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act for lack of jurisdiction.

58. However, the CBI shall be at liberty to file a fresh charge- sheet against Mr. Pradeep Baijal and Mr. Arun Shourie after obtaining valid prosecution sanction and against Mr. Ashish Guha (Downloaded on 13/06/2025 at 10:21:29 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:26628] (38 of 38) [CRLR-28/2022] and Smt. Jyotsana Suri before the competent Criminal Court in terms of law.

59. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

(REKHA BORANA),J Vij/praveen/-

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