Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Gaddam Mohan Reddy And Ors. vs Special Court Under A.P. Land Grabbing ... on 10 July, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002 A I H C 4633
JUDGMENT
1. All these writ petitions are directed against the common judgment and order made by the Special Court constituted under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, the Act), at Hyderabad, hereinafter shortly referred to as the 'Special Court', dated 24.12.1997 made in L.G.C. Nos. 215 of 1995 to 220 of 1995, holding the petitioners herein as the land grabbers within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act and directing them to deliver possession of the application schedule lands to the contesting non-official respondents in each of these writ petitions. The petitioners are the respondents in the L.G.Cs. Respondents 2 to 4 in each of the writ petitions are the applicants in the concerned L.G.Cs., before the Special Court.
2. The case of the applicants, as set out in their applications filed under Section 8(1) of the Act, shorn off unnecessary details, can briefly be stated as under: The applicants purchased different extents of lands comprised in S.No. 54 admeasuring Ac.10-24 guntas of Uppal Khalsa village from one Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy (P.W.7) under registered sale deeds executed on 25.3.1968 and 21.5.1968 for valuable consideration. All these sale deeds were attested by Gaddam Ram Reddy, the father of respondents 2 to 5 and Gaddam Lakshma Reddy, father of respondent No.1, and since the date of purchase, they and their predecessors in title have been in actual possession and enjoyment of the application schedule lands. In the year 1991, when respondents 1 to 3 in the L.G.Cs. and their men tried to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the application schedule lands, Mr. A.Narasimha, the husband of the first applicant and father of applicants 2 to 4 in L.G.C. No. 215/95, LGC. No. 217/95 and LGC. No. 218/95 filed O.S.No. 218 of 1991 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, East and North, Ranga Reddy District for permanent injunction restraining respondents 1 to 3 in the L.G.Cs. from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the application schedule lands in L.G.C. Nos. 15, 217 and 218 of 1995. The said suit was contested by respondents 1 to 3.However, the civil Court decreed the said suit by judgment and decree dated 13.8.1993 (Ex.A.2) and the said decree has become final. Despite the said decree, the petitioners herein, who are the respondents in the L.G.Cs., had grabbed the application schedule lands in the year 1994. The petitioners are also attempting to make constructions to change the nature of the application schedule lands.So alleging, the respondents 2 to 4 in each of these writ petitions, who are the applicants before the Special Court, filed the above noticed L.G.Cs. for the following reliefs: (i) to deliver vacant possession of the application schedule lands to the applicants after removing the constructions thereon; (ii) to award mesne profits to the applicants from the date of occupation of the application schedule lands by the petitioners till the applicants are put in possession of the same; (iii) to punish the petitioners under the provisions of the Act; (iv) to direct the petitioners to pay the costs of the applications to the applicants, and (v) to grant such other relief or reliefs as the Special Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
3. The L.G.Cs were contested by the petitioners herein. Their case is: S.No. 54 of Uppal Khalsa village admeasuring Ac.10-24 guntas is the ancestral property of Gaddam Lakshma Reddy who is the father of the 1st respondent in the L.G.Cs (RW 1) and Gaddam Ram Reddy who is the father of the respondents 2 to 5 in the L.G.Cs., and that after the death of Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy, the respondents 1 to 5 became entitled to the above land. Even the grand father of the petitioners herein viz., Gaddam Papa Reddy was personally cultivating the said land.All the revenue records and pahanees with regard to S.No. 54 of Uppal Khalsa village for the years 1964-65 to 1989-90 stand in their names and their predecessors'. The petitioners also contended that they have perfected their title to the application schedule lands by adverse possession.
4. In view of the pleading of the parties, the Special Court settled the following issues for trial in each of the L.G.Cs.
1. Whether the applicants are the owners of the application schedule property?
2. Whether respondents have perfected title to the application schedule property by adverse possession?
3. Whether the respondents are land grabbers within the meaning of Section 2(d) and 2(e) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act XII of 1982?
4. To what relief?
5. The second applicant in L.G.C. No. 215 of 1995 got himself examined as P.W.1, third applicant in L.G.C. No. 216 of 1995 as P.W.2, the applicant in L.G.C. No. 217 of 1995 as P.W.3, the applicant in L.G.C. No. 218 of 1995 as P.W.4, the applicant in L.G.C. No. 219 of 1995 as P.W.5, the applicant in L.G.C. No. 220 of 1995 as P.W.6. Annapu Reddy Eswsar Reddy, who is said to have executed the sale deeds dated 25.3.1968 and 21.5.1968 with regard to the application schedule lands in all the L.G.Cs., in favour of P.Ws. 3,4,6 and in favour of predecessors in title of P.Ws. 1,2 and 5, was examined as P.W.7. Exs. A.1 to A.17 are marked on behalf of the applicants.On behalf of the respondents, who are the petitioners herein, Gaddam Mohan Reddy, the first respondent in the L.G.C., and one Mr. Ranga Reddy s/o Venkata Reddy are examined as R.Ws. 1 and 2 and 25 documents are marked as Exs. B.1 to B.25.On behalf of the Special Court, Mr. Laxma Reddy s/o Buchi Reddy, Inspector of Survey, S.L.R., R.R. District and Mr. Syed Liaqatuddin, M.R.O. Uppal were examined as C.Ws. l and 2 and through them, Exs. C.1 to C.36 are marked. Further, with the consent of the parties and without prejudice to their contentions, Exs. B.26 to B.31 were marked.
6. The Special Court, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence and the decree passed in O.S. No. 218 of 1991 dated 13.8.1993, marked as Ex.A.2, on the file of the Court of Prl. District Munsif, East and North, R.R. Distirct, and also taking into account the fact that Mr. Gaddam Lakshma Reddy, father of 1st petitioner and Mr.Gaddam Ram Reddy father of petitioners 2 to 5 herein, are the attestors to the sale deeds dated 25.3.1958 and 21.5.1968, recorded the finding that the petitioners herein are the land grabbers within the meaning of that term under Section 2(d) read with Section 2(e) of the Act, and allowed the L.G.Cs by judgment and decree dated 24.12.1997, impugned in these writ petitions and directed the petitioners herein to deliver possession of the application schedule lands to the applicants in the L.G.Cs. However, the prayers for mesne profits and prosecution of the petitioners for commission of offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are denied. Hence, these writ petitions by the aggrieved respondents in the L.G.Cs.
7. We have heard Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri K.Vinod Kumar Deshpande for the respondents. The contentions of Sri V.Venkataramana, in brief, are as follows: (a) The Special Court has failed to record any finding as to whether Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy had title to the land in S.No. 54 and that no material was placed to prove title of Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy. The Special Court while dealing with the questions of title, should have considered as to whether the vendor of the applicants had title and if so how he acquired title. In the absence of a finding regarding the source of title, the Special Court has committed a serious error in recording a finding that the applicants are the owners of the application schedule lands; (b) P.W.7, Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy, has deposed that he is not the owner of the land in S.No. 54 and he has not executed sale deeds relied on. The Special Court has committed serious error in allowing the applicants to declare P.W.7 as hostile and allowing cross-examination of P.W.7. The finding recorded by the Special Court that by reason of the fact that the sale deeds are attested by the forefathers of the writ petitioners, the petitioners are estopped from questioning the title of the applicants, is perverse. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail1 referred to by the Special Court has no application to the facts of the case. It is well settled principle of law that title has to be proved by documents and source of title. Attestation of a sale deed cannot decide as to whether the sale deed has actually transferred the title and clear title has passed on to the purchaser. Thus, the findings recorded by the Special Court are contrary to the settled principles of law and hence the order of the Special Court is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record; (c) the finding of the Special Court that exparte decree in the injunction suit would operate not only against the defendants, but also against all persons claiming through them, is yet another perverse finding arrived at by the Special Court. It is settled law that decree in an injunction suit is a decree in personum and it will bind only the parties to the suit. The scope of a decree in an injunction suit does not enable conclusions on question of title. The finding of the Special Court that the decree in the injunction suit acts as res judicata is contrary to all settled principles of law, and thus the order of the Special Court is liable to be set aside; (d) the Special Court should have seen that C.Ws. 1 and 2 have clearly deposed that the revenue records disclose that the family of the petitioners was regarded as possessors commencing from Vasool Baqui Register of 1931 and other subsequent pahanees. The Special Court has erred in rejecting the evidence on record which clearly establishes that the family of the petitioners has been in possession of the land in S.No. 54. Section 6 of the A.P. Record of Rights in Land Act, 1971, provides for a presumption of correctness of the entries in the revenue records and hence the Special Court should have presumed that the petitioners are in possession and their ancestors were in possession ever since 1931. In that view of the matter, it cannot be held that petitioners are land grabbers within the meaning of the Act.The provisions of the Act do not apply to every case of disputed title. Normal and regular remedy of civil suit is not ousted by the provisions of the Act. Unless the respondent before the Special Court satisfies the definition under Section 2(d) and 2(e) of the Act, the provisions of the Act do not apply, and that without deciding the jurisdictional facts, the Special Court went on deciding the controversy and thus the impugned order of the Special Court is unsustainable in law.The other reasons and conclusions arrived at by the Special Court are contrary to the material on record and perverse;(e) the Special Court has seriously erred in law in deciding the title of the application schedule lands in the manner it has decided and that the documents and circumstances on the basis of which the Special Court has placed reliance are not relevant and germane to decide the title question and (f) the applicants did not discharge the initial burden placed on them under Section 10 of the Act.
8. Sri Vinod Kumar Deshpande, on the other hand, contended that the decree in O.S. No. 218 of 1991 dated 13.8.1993 passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, East and North, Ranga Reddy District, marked as Ex.A.2, and also the fact that Mr. Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Mr. Gaddam Ram Reddy, father of respondent No.1 and respondents 2 to 5 in the L.G.C., respectively, have attested the sale deeds would clingingly establish that the applicants in the L.G.Cs., are the lawful owners of the application schedule lands and that they had been in actual possession and enjoyment of the same till the year 1994 when the application schedule lands were grabbed by the petitioners herein. Mr. Vinod Kumar Deshpande would also highlight that this Court, while reviewing the order of the Special Court, cannot assume the role of an appellate Court and reappreciate the evidence on record. The learned counsel also contended that this Court cannot go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of which the Special Court recorded the findings.
9. As rightly contended by Sri Vinod Kumar Deshpande, this Court while reviewing the impugned Judgment of the Special Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot assume the role of an appellate Court and reappreciate the evidence on record. It is well settled law that in its writ jurisdiction, the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution will not decide the disputed questions of fact. The area to decide the disputed questions of fact is in the jurisdiction of the trial Courts or fact-finding Tribunals which are competent to determine such questions on taking appropriate evidence. On priori the writ courts do not embark upon the trial of disputed questions of fact. Further, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not appellate in nature howsoever wide, but is only supervisory in nature. Certiorari can issue only in cases where the orders or awards of the quasi-judicial authorities suffer from jurisdictional defects or are vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record or violate the rules of natural justice. It is not that every wrong decision of an inferior Tribunal is reviewable on Certiorari by the writ court. In other words, writ courts cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal or Court by reappreciating the evidence for itself, which would be outside its jurisdiction unless such findings are supported by no evidence or are otherwise perverse. The writ court is not competent to review the evidence adduced before the inferior Tribunal or Court and its duty is solely to see whether the conclusions reached by the inferior Tribunal or Court are supported by some evidence. Further, the question of sufficiency or adequacy of evidence on the basis of which the findings were recorded will not be open before the writ court.
10. The Special Court, on detailed consideration of oral and documentary evidence recorded the finding that the petitioners herein are the land grabbers within the meaning of that term under Section 2(d) of the Act and accordingly granted part of the relief sought by the applicants in the LGCs. Therefore, the only question that falls for our consideration and decision is whether the factual findings recorded by the Special Court are based on some substantive legal evidence or not. As pointed out supra, this Court cannot go into the question of sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence. Of course, it is true as contended by Mr. V.Venkataramana, that if a finding recorded by the inferior Tribunal or Court is not based on evidence, such flaw ill be a legal flaw in the order and, therefore, it is permissible for the writ court to step in and correct the inferior Tribunal or Court, as the case may be. After carefully reading the order of the Special Court and hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, it is seen that mainly two factors weighed with the Special Court in concluding that the petitioners herein are the land grabbers. They are: the fact that Mr. Lakshma Reddy and Mr. Rama Reddy, the father of respondent No.1 and father of respondents 2 to 5 in the L.G.Cs., respectively are the attestors of the sale deeds in favour of the applicants or their predecessors in title and, therefore, the ratio of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahboob Sahab's case (1 supra) applies and in that view of the matter, Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy is estopped from disclaiming the application schedule lands, and (ii) the decree for permanent injunction obtained in O.S. No. 218 of 1991 on the file of the Prl. District Munsif, East and North, Ranga Reddy District dated 13.8.1993 by Mr. Narasimha, the husband of the first applicant and father of applicants 2 to 4 in L.G.C. No. 214 of 1995.The question is whether the above two factors and grounds which have gone into the decision-making by the Special Court are germane and relevant to the decision-making or they are totally irrelevant to the decision-making.The petitioners herein claim their title to the application schedule properties through Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy. It is satisfactorily proved that Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy were the attestors of the sale deeds executed in favour of the applicants and their predecessors in title. If this is the proved factual position, we do not find any error on the part of the Special Court in applying the ratio of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahboob Sahab's case (1 supra). In that case, one Syed Ismail and another by name Ibrahim, who were sons of Maqdoom, Panchamale filed O.S.No. 28 of 1965 impleading their parents and appellant/ purchaser, for possession of the suit lands and for mesne profits from the appellant. The averments made in support thereof are that their father had executed a gift deed bequeathing 15 acres 38 guntas out of 31 acres 36 guntas in S.No. 781 of Aland village, jointly in their favour and their mother Smt. Chandi, the third defendant, who in turn, orally gifted her share to Syed Ismail in April, 1958 at the time of his marriage. Being minors, their father-second defendant, while cultivating the lands on their behalf, had colluded with the Patwari and executed sale deed Ex.D.1, in favour of the appellant. On their becoming aware of the same, they filed the suit contending that their father had no right, title and interest therein to alienate the lands and, therefore, the sales effected by him in favour of the appellant were invalid, inoperative and do not bind them. The appellant pleaded that Maqdoom had entered into an agreement of sale under Ex.D.22 on April 12, 1961 to sell 12 acres of land for valuable consideration and had executed the sale deed, Ex.D.1 dated May 12, 1961, to discharge antecedent debts. Similarly, an agreement of sale of 4 acres of land for Rs.2500/- was executed and the appellant had obtained permission from the Assistant Commissioner on August 14, 1964 for sale thereof. When he and Smt. Chandi refused to execute the sale deed, he filed O.S.No. 4/1 of 1966 for specific performance which was decreed on contest and the sale deed Ex.D.3 was executed and registered by the Court. Their parents had not given any gifts which were set up only to defraud the appellant. It was brought out at the trial that O.S.No. 3/1/1951 filed by one Ismail on the foot of a possessory mortgage, the executability of another decree obtained by another creditor, was impugned wherein by judgment and decree dated September 24, 1951, the Court held that Maqdoom had jointly gifted the lands to the respondents and their mother by a registered gift deed. In the background of those facts, the Apex Court held that where the sale of land was by father and son attested the sale deed and since no objection was raised by the son though the sale was against son's interest, the son is estopped by his conduct from challenging the sale subsequently.In para (7), the Apex Court was pleased to observe as follows:
"Her 1/3rd undivided share was not subject matter of O.S.No. 3/1/1951.The Additional Civil Judge, therefore, was right in his findings that the gifts have not been proved. They were not complete.Admittedly, the father continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the lands as owner as evidenced by the revenue records until it was mutated in the name of the appellants to the extent of 16 acres purchased by him as per the aforesaid sale deeds Ex.D.1 and Ex.D.3. Ibrahim has attested Ex.D.1 when his father conveyed the lands as an owner. Though the sale was against his interest, he had not objected to the sale.He, thereby, is estopped by conduct and record to assail Ex.D.1 sale or to claim any interest in the lands."
11. In this case also, M/s. Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy, did not raise any objection to the sale of the application schedule properties in favour of the applicants and their predecessors in title and, in fact, they attested six sale deeds executed by Mr. Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy. Of the six sale deeds, five sale deeds are dated 25.3.1968 whereas the other sale deed is dated 21.5.1968.It is highly incredible that M/s Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy, without the knowledge of the contents of the sale deeds attested them on 25.3.1958 and 21.6.1969. The circumstances clearly establish that M/s Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy had attested the sale deeds with full knowledge of the contents of the sale deeds. Since the petitioners are claiming their title to the application schedule properties through M/s Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy, the ratio of the above Judgment of the Supreme Court applies.
12. Further, in terms of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, Mr. Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy, cannot be permitted to disclaim the property. It needs to be noticed that even in the evidence, P.W.7, has not denied the execution of the sale deeds in favour of the applicants and their predecessors in title. Since he has admitted the execution of the sale deeds, the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act are attracted. In terms of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, when the terms of any transaction have been reduced to the form of a document, they must be proved by production of the document itself; the reason being that a term of extrinsic evidence would be equivalent to a term to substitute any other contract by introduction of terms which are not to be found in the document. The rule embodied in Section 92 is a logical sequence of the rule in Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act and may properly be said to be a part of it. Therefore, the petitioners herein are estopped by conduct and record to assail the sale deeds executed by Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy in favour of the applicants and their predecessors in title in the L.G.Cs., on 25.3.1958 and 21.5.1968. The Special Court in applying the ratio of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahboob Sahab's case (1 supra) has not committed any error. Secondly, the decree passed by the civil Court in O.S.No. 218 of 1991 dated 13.8.1993, Ex.A.2, was allowed to become final and, therefore, it would not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to say that despite the decree of injunction, they continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the application schedule lands. Such a plea cannot be permitted to be raised in law by the petitioners. The said decree was passed against respondents 1 to 3 in the L.G.Cs., and, therefore, they are bound by the same. Ex.A2 decree also holds good to dismiss the claim of the petitioners that they perfected their title to the application schedule lands by adverse possession. The petitioners cannot be permitted to take the plea that despite the binding decree in O.S. No. 218 of 1991 dated 13.8.1993, they continued to be in possession of the application schedule lands both in terms of law and equity as well as to maintain the sanctity and inviolability attached to the orders and decrees passed by competent Courts of Law. Further, in all the sale deeds, there is a specific recital that the applicants had been put in possession of the plots sold to them. This recital in the sale deeds coupled with the Civil Court decree for permanent injunction clearly establishes that the applicants had come into possession of their respective plots as per the sale deeds executed in their favour by Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy.It is the specific case of the applicants in the LGCs that the petitioners herein had grabbed the application schedule lands in the year 1994.There is absolutely no evidence to show that after the execution of the sale deeds and despite the Civil Court decree, Ex.A.2 dated 13.8.1993 in O.S.No. 218 of 1991 on the file of the Prl. District Munsif, East and North, Ranga Reddy District, the petitioners came into possession of the application schedule lands by any legal means.Therefore, the finding recorded by the Special Court that the petitioners are the land grabbers within the meaning of that term under Section 2(d) read with Section 2(e) of the Act cannot be said to be perverse or is based on no evidence.
13. The contention of Sri V.Venkataramana that the applicants did not discharge the initial onus under Section 10 of the Act to prove their title to the application schedule lands is not acceptable to us. The applicants by producing the sale deeds dated 25.3.1968 and 21.5.1968 executed by Annapu Reddy Eswar Reddy and attested by M/s Gaddam Lakshma Reddy and Gaddam Ram Reddy and also producing the Civil Court decree in O.S. No. 218 of 1991 dated 13.8.1993 on the file of the Prl. District Munsif, East and North, Ranga Reddy District, discharged the initial burden under Section 10 of the Act. On the other hand, the petitioners herein utterly failed to discharge the burden shifted to them after the discharge of initial burden by the applicants.
14. It is true that the observation of the Special Court that "Ex.A.2 not only binds respondents 1 to 3, but also all the persons who are claiming through respondent 1 to 3", literally speaking, is not correct statement of law, because, it is well settled law that injunction decree is a decree in personum and not in rem.Therefore, it would bind only the defendants in the suit. But the above observation of the Special Court should be understood in the right perspective and in the context in which it is made. Since respondents 7 and 8 in L.G.C. Nos. 217 and 218 of 1995 claimed their title through respondent 1 to 5, the plea of the respondents 7 and 8 that despite the decree Ex.A.2 dated 13.8.1993, they had been in possession of the application schedule lands, is not acceptable. The Special Court, therefore, loosely stated that Ex.A.2 not only binds respondents 1 to 3 but also all the persons who are claiming through respondents 1 to 3.
15. The other contention of Sri V.Venkataramana that the revenue records and the pahanees produced by the petitioners in support of their case were rejected by the Special Court for no good reason is also not well-founded. The Special Court, as could be seen from the order, has referred to and considered all the documents produced by the petitioners. The presumption of the correctness of the entries in the revenue records and pahanis to be drawn under Section 6 of A.P. Record of Rights in Land Act, 1971, is a rebuttable presumption and that presumption can be rebutted by rebuttal evidence. In the instant case, the presumption that can be drawn under Section 6 of the A.P. Record of Rights in Land Act, 1971, with regard to the Revenue Records and pahanis produced by the petitioners is satisfactorily rebutted by the applicants in the LGCs by producing substantive legal evidence such as sale deeds and civil Court decree.
16. There is also no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that jurisdictional facts whether the petitioners are land grabbers and their action tantamounted to land grabbing within the meaning of those terms under Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Act are not decided by the Special Court is also not well-founded. The evidence led before the Special Court to which reference is made by the Special Court clearly goes to show that the petitioners are 'land grabbers' being guilty of 'land grabbing' within the meaning of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Act.
17. In conclusion, we do not find any merit in the writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.