Madras High Court
Radha Devi vs Mahendra Prasad Dalmia on 9 July, 2008
Equivalent citations: AIR 2008 (NOC) 2899 (MAD.), 2009 (1) AJHAR (NOC) 49 (MAD.)
Author: M.Chockalingam
Bench: M.Chockalingam, R.Subbiah
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 9-7-2008 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.CHOCKALINGAM AND THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUBBIAH O.S.A.No.192 of 2004 and CMP No.13839 of 2004 1.Radha Devi 2.Deepak Ddalmia .. Appellants vs 1.Mahendra Prasad Dalmia 2.Triveni Dalmia 3.Sitaram Dalmia 4.Vijay Kumar Dalmia .. Respondents Original side appeal preferred under Order 36 Rule 1 of O.S. Rules and Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the judgment and decree in C.S.No.1264 of 1990 dated 15.9.2003. For Appellants : Mr.K.M.Sukadev For Respondents : Mr.P.B.Balaji for RR1 to 3 No appearance for R4 JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.CHOCKALINGAM, J.) Challenge is made to a judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing a suit in C.S.No.1264 of 1990.
2.The appellants as plaintiffs have laid the action with the following allegations:
(a) The defendants 1 to 3 are the sons of Humlal Dalmia. The first plaintiff is the wife of the third defendant, while the second plaintiff is the adopted son of the third defendant and the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff and the third defendant married in 1946, and they did not have any child. They adopted the second plaintiff as per the Hindu vedic rites, and it was also registered in accordance with law and by a deed of adoption dated 14.5.1973. The second plaintiff is none other than the grandson of the second defendant through his daughter Sumitra Gupta. The second plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 along with the third defendant constituted a joint Hindu Undivided Family, and it has a property situate at No.1, Janakiraman Street, West Mambalam, Madras, besides other movable properties worth Rs.75 lakhs. The third defendant though was a coparcener along with the 2nd plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2, got infatuated towards one lady by name Bhagyam and released all his rights under an oral family arrangement. He has been living with the said Bhagyam from 1979. He has no manner of right over the said property by conduct and arrangement. The second plaintiff being the legally adopted son of the third defendant and the first plaintiff, is entitled to succeed as a coparcener to the joint family properties and is entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit properties. The business of M/s.Dalmia Private Ltd. is also a joint family business, and the plaintiffs are entitled to accounting in the said business and also entitled to 1/3rd share in the said business. The first plaintiff being the wife of the third defendant, is not entitled to a share in the property, but however, she is entitled to maintenance and consequently a charge over the joint family property for her maintenance.
(b) In the year 1983, the defendants made an unsuccessful attempt to sell the suit property. At that time, the plaintiffs made an advertisement in The Hindu on 19.1.1983, to the effect that the 2nd plaintiff is entitled to 1/3rd share in the ancestral property, thus cautioning the public the real position. In the middle of 1990, a further attempt was made by the defendants to sell the property. A notice was issued by the plaintiffs on 17.9.1990, calling upon the defendants to divide the property and hand over 1/3rd share to the 2nd plaintiff. But, the defendants have not cared to do the same. The plaintiffs are in possession of the property, and they are also living in the said premises for over a number of years. Hence, the suit.
3.The suit was resisted by the defendants 3, 5 and 6 by filing separate written statement. They alleged that there is absolutely no cause of action for the plaintiffs to come before this Court with a relief of partition when the husband of the first plaintiff and the father of the second plaintiff, namely the third defendant herein, is alive; that the father of the defendants 1 to 3 is Chunnilal Dalmia and not Humlal Dalmia; that these defendants are entitled to the suit property which was purchased by their father; that the third defendant left the matrimonial home because of ill-treatment meted out to him by the first plaintiff, and started living separately from 1979; that it is denied that the third defendant released all his rights under an oral family arrangement; that there was no such arrangement at all; that so long as the third defendant is alive, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief; that the said Bhagyam is an employee of the third defendant; that the third defendant was running a business under the name and style M/s.Himalaya Industries; that if at all the first plaintiff is entitled to maintenance, it can be only against the third defendant and not against other defendants or their properties; that these defendants never attempted to sell the suit property as alleged by the plaintiffs; and that the suit itself is liable to be dismissed since the third defendant is alive.
4.On the above pleadings, four issues were framed. The parties went on trial. On the side of the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff was examined as P.W.1, and Exs.P1 to P6 were marked. On the side of the defendants, the third defendant was examined as D.W.1, and Exs.D1 to D3 were marked. On considering the evidence both oral and documentary, the learned trial Judge took the view that the plaintiffs are not entitled either for partition or for maintenance and dismissed the suit in entirety. Hence, this appeal at the instance of the plaintiffs.
5.Advancing the arguments on behalf of the appellants, the learned Counsel in short would submit that admittedly, the first plaintiff is the wife of the third defendant and the second plaintiff is their adopted son; that in order to prove the fact that there was an oral family arrangement whereby the third defendant relinquished all his interest in the property and he left the family, the first plaintiff wife has been examined; that though the third defendant was examined as D.W.1, his evidence if carefully scrutinised, would indicate that he left the family and was living apart for a longtime; that he would further add that he was actually under the care and maintenance of one Bhagyam with whom, according to the plaintiffs, he was living all along the period; and that this fact has actually been proved; but, the lower Court has not taken into consideration that aspect of the matter.
6.Added further the learned Counsel that in the instant case, the second plaintiff has become a coparcener from the date of adoption applying the Hindu Law that the adopted son gets the equal rights as that of a son born and also the right by birth; that if it is to be construed as if born, then he automatically became a coparcener along with two others; that apart from that, since the third defendant has gone somewhere leaving his right, he became a coparcener along with the defendants 1 and 2, and thus, he became entitled to 1/3rd share; that even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs is to the effect that there was a relinquishment of the share of the third defendant, that would not take away the entire rights of the second plaintiff since he was a coparcener along with the other defendants 1 and 2, and thus, he was actually entitled to 1/6th while the third defendant is entitled to 1/3.
7.The learned Counsel would further add that in the instant case, the trial Court has taken an erroneous view that the property was a self acquired property of the third defendant, but it was not so; and that the trial Court has also held that so long as there is no evidence to show the arrangement or relinquishment of his rights, there is no question of claiming any right by the second plaintiff that would arise, but it is not correct.
8.Relying on paragraph 265 of Mr.N.R.Raghavachariar's Hindu Law, Volume I page 282, the learned Counsel would add that it is an admitted position that the property originally belonged to the grandfather of the second plaintiff and it has come to the hands of the third defendant by way of a settlement in 1958, and thus, it has come to their hands; that it is an admitted position that the father of the defendants 1 to 3 died in 1972; that the second plaintiff was adopted in the year 1973; that under the circumstances, he becomes a coparcener along with the other defendants 1 and 2; and that he is also entitled to have the right.
9.The learned Counsel would further submit that it is to be considered as right by birth; that once it is an admitted position that it is the property of the grandfather of the second plaintiff and it has come to the hands of the defendants 1 to 3, he has got to be considered as a coparcener along with the defendants 1 and 2, and to that extent he is entitled to, and partition has got to be ordered.
10.Added further the learned Counsel that in the case on hand, it is an admitted position that the first plaintiff was deserted by the third defendant, and he is living apart; that he would say that he was maintaining her; but, it was not so; that under the circumstances, maintenance was also asked for; but, the lower Court has rejected the claim which is not proper, and hence, it has got to be ordered.
11.Contrary to the above contentions, the learned Counsel for the respondents would submit that admittedly, the property belonged to the maternal grandfather of the third defendant who actually settled the same on his daughter; that thereafter, the property came to the hands of the mother of the defendants 1 to 3 who has executed a deed in 1958 in favour of the father of the defendants 1 to 3, and thus, it came to the hands of the defendants 1 to 3; that it is an admitted position that the father of the defendants 1 to 3 died in the year 1972; that the adoption has also taken place in the year 1973; that it is not in controversy that the second plaintiff is the adopted son; but, the character of the property is the main issue to be decided in this case; that the property which came to be hands of the defendants 1 to 3, has got to be considered as self-acquired property; that it did not have the character of a coparcenary property; that so long as it is considered as self-acquired property, the third defendant has got 1/3rd share; and that apart from that, so long as he is alive, there is no question of claiming any right by the second plaintiff or anybody for the matter that would arise.
12.The learned Counsel would further add that the claim of the plaintiffs that there was a relinquishment made by the third defendant in respect of his share in the property in favour of the plaintiffs and that too, by way of an oral family arrangement cannot be countenanced; that firstly, the oral arrangement cannot be accepted in law; that secondly, there is no material available as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, and under the circumstances, that has been rightly negatived by the trial Court.
13.The learned Counsel would further submit that the contention now put forth by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the second plaintiff is entitled to 1/6th share cannot also be countenanced; that he would claim that he is a coparcener; but, the character of the property as could be seen is not at all a coparcenary property; that the claim has been made not conscious of the fact that they cannot claim it as a coparcenary property; that they want to put forth a case as if the property was relinquished by the third defendant in favour of the plaintiffs and thereafter, the plaintiffs made the claim; and that so long as it could not be characterised as a coparcenary property, the second plaintiff cannot make any claim at all.
14.In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied on two decisions one reported in AIR 1963 MADRAS 255 (ARUNACHALATHAMMAL V. RAMACHANDRAN PILLAI AND OTHERS) and the other reported in 1964(2) SCR 172 (LAKKIREDDI CHINNA VENKATA REDDI V. LAKKIREDDI LAKSHMAMA).
15.Added further the learned Counsel that the trial Court has rightly pointed out that if at all the first plaintiff has to make her claim for maintenance, she must approach the Family Court after the commencement of the Family Courts Act, and hence, the appeal has got to be dismissed.
16.The Court looked into all the materials available and paid its anxious consideration on the same.
17.The plaintiffs are the appellants. They laid a claim for partition as far as the second plaintiff is concerned, in the property mentioned in the Schedule annexed to the plaint, stating that the first plaintiff is the wife of the third defendant; that the second plaintiff was adopted in the year 1973 by both of them; that they were living together; that the third respondent developing an illicit intimacy with one Bhagyam, left the family; that at that time, there was a family arrangement by which the third defendant released all his rights; that apart from that, the second plaintiff is entitled to succeed to the property as a coparcener, and hence, he is entitled to 1/3rd share in the property; and that as far as the first plaintiff is concerned, she is entitled for maintenance in the hands of the third defendant. The suit was actually resisted by the defendants stating that the property is self-acquired property of the third defendant; that so long as he is alive, no claim could be laid either by the second plaintiff or by anybody for the matter; that as far as the maintenance is concerned, the oral family arrangement set up was nothing but a falsehood; that it would not stand in the eye of law; that in such circumstances, the second plaintiff cannot make any claim; and that if at all to make a claim, she can make her claim before the Family Court. Now, at this juncture, the point for determination is whether the property in respect of which division is sought for, is coparcenary property as contended by the appellants, or self-acquired property as contended by the defendants 1 to 3.
18.It is not in controversy that the property originally belonged to the maternal grandfather of the third defendant, and he also settled the property on his daughter Mani Bai who is actually the mother of the defendants 1 to 3. The property was actually settled by Mani Bai in favour of her husband, the father of the defendants 1 to 3, in the year 1958, and thus, the property came to the hands of the father of the defendants 1 to 3. The father also died in the year 1972, and thereafter, the property came to the hands of the defendants 1 to 3. It is also not in controversy that the the second plaintiff was taken in adoption by the first plaintiff and also the third defendant in the year 1973. Thus, applying the position of law, he has got the right in the family property namely right by birth. In the instant case, he claims to be a coparcener which also cannot be disputed. Though he was subsequently adopted, he can claim the right as if he was born in the family and also on the basis of right by birth. But here, the controversy is as to the character of the property. After considering the materials available, this Court is of the considered opinion that the property cannot be characterised as coparcenary property, but it is only self-acquired property. Hindu Law views the property of a Hindu as coparcenary property, joint family property and also self acquired property. In the instant case, it would be fit and proper to look into the judicial pronouncement in this regard.
19.The learned Counsel for the respondents relied on the decision of this Court reported in AIR 1963 MADRAS 255 (ARUNACHALATHAMMAL V. RAMACHANDRAN PILLAI AND OTHERS). In that case, the First Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the question whether Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, have come into operation in respect of the property of a male Hindu.
"(28)But these principles cannot and do not apply in the interpretation of S. 6 of the present Act. This is a Code which lays down a comprehensive rule of succession based on principles of justice and also on the basis of natural love and affection of the deceased. Section 8 deals with the property of a male Hindu who dies. The term "property" though not defined under the Act, is a word of wide import including prima facie every kind of property over which he has a right of disposal. Section 8, it will be seen, does not use the words like separate or self acquired property. Even in regard to joint family property, Sec.30 confers a power on a member to dispose of his interest by means of a will.
Section 6 states:
"When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act :
Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara Coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship.
Explanation I: For the purpose of the section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.
Explanation II: Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein".
(29)In our opinion, S. 6 can be regarded only as an exception to the general rule of succession prescribed by S. 8. Even to that exception there is a proviso which enables succession to the interest of the deceased member of a joint family in favour of his wife's daughter etc. (30)The cardinal rule of interpretation is that words in an Act are prima facie used in their correct sense and not in any loose form. The term "interests in joint family property" has a definite significance in law, namely, that the person concerned is undivided. Prima facie these words in S. 6 have to be understood in that sense. It is true that where a legislature uses in any enactment a legal term which has received a judicial interpretation, it must be assumed that such term, unless a contrary intention appears, has been used in any subsequent enactment in the sense in which it has been judicially interpreted: Vide Jay v. Johnstonex, 1893-I-Q. B. 25 at 28. This rule cannot obviously apply to a case where the words used in a distinctive sense in a previous statute, should be attributed the same meaning in any subsequent statute, whose object and terms indicate that the legislature did not intend to use the words in the restricted sense attributed to it by courts with reference to special legislation. Judged in the light of the context and the limited extent to which the statute preserves the rule of survivorship, it must be taken that S. 8 is intended to apply to all kinds of separate property possessed by a Hindu, whether it be self acquired or not obtained on partition from his family when he has no sons himself. S. 6 being in the nature of an exception, should be strictly construed and will only apply to a case where a member thereof dies undivided and without leaving any female heirs mentioned in class I. We are therefore of opinion that S. 6 will not apply to property held by a person as a sole surviving coparcener or to a separate property obtained at a partition in the family, when that person has left no undivided sons of his own."
20.A very reading of the above would clearly reveal that Sec.6 of the Hindu Succession Act is only an exception to Sec.8 of the Act. If a line is drawn, it could be well seen that the property that is acquired by a Hindu, can, at no stretch of imagination, be characterized as coparcenary property, and the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court as above continues to be in the field even this day. Thus, applying the principles laid down therein, it would be quite clear that the property what is found in the plaint, originally belonged to the father of the defendants 1 to 3 which actually came to their hands, and thus, the property has got the character of self-acquired property. The same can, at no stretch of imagination, be considered as coparcenary property.
21.The learned Counsel for the appellants relied on paragraph 265 of N.R.Raghavachariar's Hindu Law at page 282 regarding right by birth. A very reading of the same would clearly reveal that every coparcener gets an interest by birth in the coparcenary property. There is no quarrel as to the legal submission put forth by the learned Counsel for the appellants as found in the Hindu law, and by the learned Counsel for he respondents as found in the above position of law. It is not in controversy that every coparcener gets right by birth in the coparcenary property. But, the question in the case on hand is whether the property in question is coparcenary property or not. Applying the position of law as stated supra, it is not a coparcenary property, but a self-acquired property of the individuals namely the defendants 1 to 3, which came to their hands from their father.
22.Apart from the above, it is to be pointed out that if a claim has got to be made in the coparcenary property, either the share in the property should be thrown to the common hotchpot by one of the coparceners, or there must be a thorough relinquishment. In this regard, a case came to the hands of the Supreme Court reported in 1964 (2) SCR 172 (LAKKIREDDI CHINNA VENKATA REDDI V. LAKKIREDDI LAKSHMAMA) wherein the Supreme Court held thus:
"Law relating to blending of separate property with joint family property is well settled. Property separate or self-acquired of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein : but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilised out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation. It is true that Butchi Tirupati who was one of the devisees under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy was a member of the joint family consisting of himself, his five brothers and his father Bala Konda. It is also true that there is no clear evidence as to how the property was dealt with, nor, as to the appropriation of the income thereof. But there is no evidence on the record to show that by any conscious act or exercise of volition Butchi Tirupati surrendered his interest in the property devised in his favour under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy so as to blend it with the joint family property. In the absence of any such evidence, the High Court was, in our judgment, right in holding that Lakshmama was entitled to a fourth share in the property devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy."
23.Merely because a person happens to be a coparcener, he cannot lay his claim in all the properties which belonged to the family, and that too, in the case of a separate property of his father and also when he is alive. Now, at this juncture, there is no evidence to show that the property which belonged to the third defendant, was thrown to the common hotchpot, and further, the relinquishment as put forth by the plaintiffs, was also not proved. It remains to be stated that the specific case of the plaintiffs when they filed the suit, was that there was a relinquishment of the share of the third defendant in favour of the plaintiffs; that there was a family arrangement in that regard; and that he went away from the family. Thus, it would be quite clear that when they filed the suit, they were conscious of the fact that the second plaintiff could lay a claim as a coparcener along with the defendants 1 and 2; and so they specifically pleaded that by way of family arrangement, the share of the third defendant was given to the plaintiffs. Now, at this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that they were unable to prove the said fact. It can be well stated that in the instant case, neither the abandonment nor the family arrangement as pleaded by them was proved. Thus, the 1/3rd of the property which has got to be characterized as self-qcquired property, remained in the hands of the third defendant, and he is also alive. Under the circumstances, no claim could be made by the second plaintiff calling him as a coparcener. The trial Judge was perfectly correct in rejecting the claim.
24.As far as the maintenance is concerned, from the commencement of the Family Courts Act, any claim for maintenance has got to be laid before the said Court. The learned trial Judge has not made any comment; but, on the contrary, it has been pointed out by the learned trial Judge that it is true that the third defendant has got a right to maintain his wife, but not done so, and at the same time, the claim could not be made before this Court; but, it should be made before the Family Court.
25.For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the view that there is nothing to interfere in the judgment of the trial Judge. Accordingly, this original side appeal fails, and the same is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge and leaving the parties to bear their costs. Consequently, connected CMP is also dismissed.
(M.C.,J.) (R.P.S.,J.) 9-7-2008 Index; yes Internet: yes nsv/ M.CHOCKALINGAM, J.
AND R.SUBBIAH, J.
nsv/ OSA No.192 of 2004 DT: 9-7-2008