Allahabad High Court
Ganesh Shankar Misra vs State Of U.P. And Others on 1 September, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999(2)AWC1073
JUDGMENT R.H. Zaidi, J.
1. In these cases common questions of law and fact are involved and counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavits have also been exchanged and filed by the parties. Therefore, as desired by the learned counsel for the parties'as well as looking to the importance of the subject-matter in dispute, these petitions were heard finally at this stage and are being disposed of by means of this common judgment.
2. By means of Writ Petition No. 3506 (S/S) of 1998, petitioner prays for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 4.8.98 passed by Basic Shiksha Adhikan, Unnao, appointing authority/ disciplinary authority, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from the post of Assistant Teacher, in the Primary School Laharkhera, Gramin Kshetra-Sarosi, district Unnao, established and run by U. P. Basic Shiksha Parishad, Allahabad (for short 'the School').
3. Relevant facts of the case as unfolded in the writ petition are that the petitioner was holding the post of Assistant Teacher in the School under the administrative control of Director of Education [Basic) U. P.. Lucknow. It was on 31.5.98 that President of U. P. Shikshak Sangh. Convenor of U. P. Primary Karmchari-Shikshak Sanyukt Morcha, notified a programme of agitation to the State Government on account of non-Implementation of revised pay scale and for removal of anomalies in the pay scales. On the call given by the said President, teachers took part in agitation and they went on strike with effect from 1.7.1998. During continuance of said strike, a notification dated 25.7,98 was issued by the State Government declaring the services under Basic Shiksha Parishad, as essential services and the strikes were banned for a period of six months, in exercise of powers under U. P. Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1966. Thereafter, a memorandum is also stated to have been Issued on 1,8.1998 directing the striking teachers to resume their duties by forenoon of 1.8.1998. It is stated that in daily newspaper 'Rashtriya Sahara', a charge-sheet dated 2.8.1998 was published, about which petitioner came to know on 6.8.1998. It has been stated that the aforesaid charge-sheet was never served upon the petitioner. No opportunity of hearing was afforded to him. No information regarding appointment of enquiry officer or initiation of enquiry was at all given, the enquiry, if any, allegedly conducted by the said Inquiry Officer was farce and concocted. Enquiry report was never supplied to the petitioner, nor any show cause notice was given to him but he was dismissed from service in violation of principles of natural justice, the relevant service Rules and Article 311 of the Constitution of India vide impugned order dated 4.8.1998, in wholly arbitrary manner.
4. On behalf of the respondents, a short counter-affidavit, has been filed, in which it has been stated that the petitioner, who was Adhyaksh of U. P. Shikshak Sangh, District Unnao published a notice, copy of which is contained as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter-affidavit, calling upon teachers of all Primary Schools not to sign the attendance register from 1.7.1998 to 7th July, 1998 and thereafter put locks on the doors of the Schools with effect from 8.7.1998 and to participate in the strike. On 25.7.98, a notification declaring the services under U. P. Basic Shlksha Parishad, as essential services, was issued by the State Government and strikes by the teachers of Primary Schools was declared illegal and was banned for six months. It is stated that on 28.7.1998, notice to hold Dharna was published by the petitioner and other striking teachers in support of their demands for implementation of revised pay scales and removal of anomalies. It was on 29.7.98 that notice/memorandum was issued by the Director of Education (Basic) U. P., Lucknow to the striking teachers asking them to resume their work by forenoon of 1.8.1998, but they failed to resume their duties. Consequently, on 1.8.1998 Smt. Savita Singh, Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikari was appointed as Inquiry Officer who on the same date issued a charge-sheet to the petitioner. Charge sheet was not served upon the petitioner and is stated to have been pasted on his house on the same date as he was alleged to be absent from his house. Charge-sheet is also alleged to have been published in newspaper on 2.8.1998. Inquiry Officer has submitted her report on 3.8.1998 and on the basis of the said inquiry report, (which though directed to be served upon the petitioner, was not served), the petitioner was dismissed from service on 4.8.1998. Reliance was placed upon Rule 5 of U. P. Basic Shikaha Education Staff Rules. 1973 and it was stated that the impugned order was appealable under the said rule. Petitioner has failed to avail of the statutory alternative remedy, of filing an appeal, writ petition was liable to be thrown on the ground of availability of equally efficacious and convenient alternative remedy.
5. Petitioner also filed supplementary affidavit, wherein it was stated that the strike was called off on 6.8.98, and petitioner and other teachers have Joined their duties. It has also been stated that the petitioner shall take extra classes to make good the losses of studies of students, if any occurred, on account of strike.
6. On behalf of the petitioner, rejoinder-affidavit was also filed, in which facts stated in the counter-affidavit were controverted and the facts stated in the writ petition were reiterated and affirme'd. It has been asserted that the petitioner was dismissed from service without affording him an opportunity of hearing and to defend, as neither the charge-sheet was served upon him, nor he was afforded opportunity to file his explanation to defend himself No inquiry, as required under the law, was at all conducted and the procedure prescribed for awarding major penalties was at all not followed and the impugned order of dismissal was passed in violation of principles of natural Justice.
7. In the other Writ Petition No 3544 (S/S) of 1998. facts are similar, except that against the petitioners, orders of dismissal were passed on printed proformas dated 5.8.1998 contained in Annexures-1 to 10 to the writ petition. It has been stated that the petitioners were not afforded opportunity of hearing or to explain their cases at any stage. Show cause notice is alleged to have been published on 3.8.1998. Petitioners were called upon to submit their explanations on that very day, i.e., 3.8.1998. and the impugned orders of dismissal were passed on 5.8.98 against the petitioners without following the procedure prescribed under the law and in violation of principles of natural justice.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners vehemently urged that the petitioners have been dismissed from service without following the procedure prescribed under law. and in violation of principles of natural Justice, it was urged that neither any charge-sheet was given to them, nor they were afforded opportunity to file their explanation and to defend themselves nor they were permitted to participate in the enquiry alleged to have been conducted against them, nor any enquiry was ever conducted by the Enquiry Officer, nor inquiry report was supplied to them, nor they were afforded opportunity to file their explanation against the recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer for dismissing them from service. Impugned orders of dismissal were, therefore, non-est and were liable to be quashed. It was also urged that the respondents were liable to be directed to reinstate the petitioners with all consequential benefits including the payment of their salary for the period salary has not been paid to them.
9. On the other hand Mr. S. C. Misra, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents vehemently urged that the present petitions were directed against the orders of dismissal. Said orders were appealable under Rule 5 of the U. P. Basic Shlksha Education Staff Rules, 1973. Petitioners having not availed of statutory alternative remedy and having filed the present petitions straight away, the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of equally efficacious statutory alternative remedy. Learned counsel also submitted that in case appeal is filed by the petitioners, same shall be dealt with and decided taking lenient view in the matter by the appellate authority. It- was urged that the procedure prescribed for awarding penalty was fully followed in asmuch as, charge-sheet was prepared and the same was supplied to the petitioners ; but as same could not be served personally, it was affixed on their residential houses and was also published in the newspapers. Petitioners having failed to file their explanations within the time prescribed by the competent authority, orders of dismissal were passed against them, in accordance with law, and that no case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was at all made out.
10. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record of the case.
11. Learned counsel for the parties have, in support of their submissions, referred to and relied upon the several decision of Apex Court as well as of this Court, which I will deal with later on. Before dealing with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it may be noted that at one stage of the arguments. learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent submitted that in case petitioners file undertakings in writing not to go on strike in future and to perform their duties in accordance with law, lenient view may be taken in this case.
12. On the suggestions made by learned counsel for the contesting respondents, petitioners were asked to file their undertakings.
13. In the undertaking filed in Writ Petition No. 3506 (S/S) of 1998, it has been stated that the petitioners, henceforth, shall not take part in any illegal strike. Learned counsel for the petitioners has termed and described the aforesaid undertaking as unconditional, as since the strike by the teachers after notification dated 25.7.98 has become illegal, therefore, the petitioner henceforth shall not take part in any Illegal strike. In other Writ Petition No. 3544 (S/S) of 1998, petitioners have submitted totally unconditional undertakings. It has been stated that the petitioners, henceforth, will not take part in any strike and will complete courses by taking extra classes of all students.
14. So far as preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents. regarding maintainability of the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is concerned, same is based on Rule 5, of U. P. Basic Shiksha Education Staff Rules. 1973, which is reproduced below :
5. Appeal.--(1) An appeal shall lie from an order passed by the appointing authority in respect of the posts mentioned in column 1 or the schedule appended to these rules, imposing upon any officer, teacher or other employee of the Board and of the penalties mentioned below, to the appellate authority mentioned in column 3 of the schedule ;
(a) reduction to a lower post or time scale to a lower stage in a time scale.
(b) removal from service of the board which does not disqualify for future employment ;
(c) dismissal from the service of the Board, which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment.
15. From the abovenoted rule. It is evident that against the orders of dismissal, statutory alternative remedy is provided before the appellate authority, i.e.. State Government. Therefore, ordinarily before approaching this Court and filing petitions, it was necessary for the petitioners to exhaust alternative remedy. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that In the present case. It was not necessary to exhaust alternative remedy before approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as, impugned orders of dismissal were passed in violation of principles of natural Justice, they were, therefore, non est and that in case the order is passed in violation of principles of natural justice, it is not necessary to exhaust alternative remedy by filing an appeal and thereafter to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for quashing the said orders. Learned counsel for the petitioners. in support of their submissions, have referred to and placed reliance upon the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court In Stale of U. P. v. Mohammad Noah. AIR 1958 SC 86 ; Mafat Lal Naran Das Barot v. J. D. Rathod Divisional Controller State Transport Mehsana and another, AIR 1966 SC 1364 ; A K Karatpak and others v. Union of India and others, 1969 (2) SCC 262 ; Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1985 SC 1147 ; Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India. 1987 SCC (Supp) 518 ; Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur, U. P. and others, 1987 SCC (4) 525 ; Avtar Singh v. State of U. P. and another, 1989 (2) UPLBEC 561 ; Natthi Mal Ram Sahai Mat, Edward Corporation College Association, Khurja, Bulandshahr and others, v. Vice-Chancellor, Meerut University and others, 1981 ALJ 445 ; Baidya Nath Rai v. Registrar, Kanpur University and others, 1991 AWC 154 ; Gorakh Nath Yadava v. District Magistrate, Corakhpur and another, AIR 1992 All 340 and Latta Prasad v. State of U. P. and others, 1998 (16) LCD 358 ; Ram Narain Tiwari, v. U.P.S.R.T.C. and others, 1994 SCC 300 (DB) ; Satya Prakash Pandey v. Town Area Committee. 1994 (1) LCD 262.
16. In all the aforesaid decisions, it has consistently been held by the Apex Court and this Court that if the orders are passed affecting the civil rights of any person, without affording him opportunity of hearing, to defend himself or to show-cause and explain his case, the orders are non est. It has been ruled that if the principles of natural justice are violated, the orders passed or action taken are non-est and unenforceable in law and in that event, it is not necessary to the person aggrieved to approach the appellate authority for ventilation of his grievances. This Court, in such cases, is fully competent to entertain the petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and to grant appropriate relief to the petitioners/
17. On the other hand, Mr. S. C. Misra, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents has referred to and relied upon the following decisions of Apex Court and this Court in support of his arguments that the present petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy :
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1955 SC 661 : Union of India, v. T. K. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882 ; N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. S. Raja Nainar and others. AIR 1959 SC 422 ; C. A. Abraham v. Income Tax Officer, Kottayam and another, AIR 1961 SC 609 ; Cita Devi Aggarwal v. Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal and others, 1970 ITR 496 (SC) : Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and another v. State of Orissa and another, AIR 1983 SC 603 ; S. Jagadeesan v. Ayya Nadar Janaki Ammal College and another, 1984 (1) SCC 158 ; Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U. P. Co-operative Union, Lucknow and others, 1991 (2) UPLBEC 898.
18. The aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents are on the general proposition of law that in case of availability of statutory alternative remedy, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable. Not a single decision has been cited, of the Apex Court or this Court or of any other High Court, holding that even in cases of violation of principles of natural justice, it is necessary to exhaust alternative remedy before approaching this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
19. It is well-settled in law that rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may, in exceptional cases, issue a discretionary writ, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. In the exceptional circumstances under which this Court can issue discretionary writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exhaustively enumerated, since it is a matter of discretion of the Court which is to be exercised according to the facts and circumstances of each case. Normally and generally this Court may grant relief even though statutory remedies have not been exhausted : where there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the Officer or authority or tribunal to take the action impugned for example where the proceedings have been taken under a law which is ultra vires, or upon an erroneous interpretation of the statute, or where the imposition is without authority of law or ultra vires, or where impugned order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice, or where the fundamental rights have been infringed by the Impugned order, or where it is beyond the competence of the statutory authority to grant relief on the grounds urged in the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India etc.
20. In the present case, petitioners and other teachers went on strike on 1.7.98. It was on 25.7.98 that notification was issued by the State Government, whereby strikes were banned for a period of six months under U. P. Essential Services (Maintenance) Act. 1966. On 1.8.98 memorandum/circular was issued by the State Government whereby petitioners and other teachers were called upon to resume their duties by the forenoon of 1.8.98. Admittedly, petitioners had no knowledge or notice of appointment of Enquiry Officer. The charge-sheet alleged to have been issued by the Enquiry Officer, was admittedly not served upon the petitioners or any one of them. Same is stated to have either been affixed on the door of the residential house of the petitioner (in Writ Petition No. 3506 of 1998) and to have been published in newspaper on 2.8.1998 about which petitioners came to know on 6.8.98. In the meanwhile. petitioners were dismissed from service on 4.8.98 (in Writ Petition No. 3544 of 1998 on 5.8.1998. In the counter-affidavit only it has been stated that one Smt. Savita Singh, Assistant Basic Shlksha Adhikari, Unnao was appointed as Enquiry Officer on 1.8.1998. On the same date, the charge-sheet is stated to have been issued to the petitioners. Same was pasted on the doors of the petitioners on 1.8.98. It has also been stated to have been published on 2.8.1998. On 3.8.1998 the Enquiry Officer is stated to have submitted the report and the petitioners are stated to have been dismissed from service on 4.8.1998 (In Writ Petition No. 3506 of 1998). In Writ Petition No. 3544 of 1998, it has been stated that a show-cause notice was published on 3.8.1998. on the same date, i.e., on 3.8.98. Petitioners were required to file their explanation, if any other explanations were not filed. On 5.8.1998, petitioners were dismissed from service.
21. Rules 55 and 55A of the Fundamental Rules provide procedure for taking disciplinary action against Government employees, which are fully applicable in the present case. Said rules are quoted below :
"55. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850 no order (other than an order passed on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a Court martial) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or time scale or to a lower stage In a time scale but excludes the reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post) shall be passed on a person who is a member of a Civil Service, or holds a civil post under the State unless he has been Informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required. within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. It he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the Inquiring Officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witness to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the ground thereof. The officer conducting the inquiry may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be Imposed on the charged Government servant.
(2) Where the punishing authority itself inquires Into any charge or appoints an Inquiring Office for holding an inquiry into such charge, the punishing authority, if It considers it necessary to do so. may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as 'Presenting Officer', to present on its behalf the case in support of the charge.
(3) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf, but not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer appointed by the punishing authority is a legal practitioner or the punishing authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits.
(4) This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, be waived, where there is difficulty in observing exactly the requirements of the rule and those requirements can in the opinion of the Inquiring Officer be waived without injustice to person charged.
(5) This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of either a temporary Government servant or of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation. In such cases, a simple notice of termination, which in the case of a temporary Government servant must conform to the conditions of his service, will be sufficient.
55A. After the Inquiry against a Government servant has been completed and after the punishing authority has arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the Government servant charged shall, if the penalty proposed is dismissal, removal or reduction In rank, be supplied with a copy of the proceedings prepared under Rule 55 together with the recommendations. If any, in regard to punishment, made by the officer conducting the inquiry and be given a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit, by a particular date, which affords him reasonable time, such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty, provided that such representation shall be based on the evidence adduced during the enquiry :
Provided that, if for sufficient reasons, the punishing authority disagrees with any part or whole of the report of the inquiring officer abovementioned. the point or points of such disagreement, together with a brief statement of the grounds thereof, shall also be communicated to the Government servant charged.'
22. After Induction of 42nd Amendment in Article 311 of the Constitution of India, clause (2) of the said Article was deleted and Rule 55A of Fundamental Rules was also repealed. The effect of deletion of Article 311(2) came to be considered before the Apex Court in Ramzan Khan's case AIR 1991 SC 471. wherein it was ruled as under :
"15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent In the matter of making his representation. Even though the second state of the Inquiry in Art. 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural Justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42nd Amendment. We. therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations. If any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The Forty-Second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position."
23. The said controversy was again considered by the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECILS case. AIR 1994 SC 1074. After considering various decisions including the decision in Ramzan Khan's case. It was ruled as under :
"28. ..... All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the Enquiry Officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges.
29. Hence it has to be held that when the Enquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of Enquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the Enquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice."
24. Thus, after the decision of Ramzan Khan's case, the status quo as existed prior to 42nd Amendment in Article 311 in the Constitution of India, was partly restored back. The effect was that the Government servants, after the decision in Ramzan Khan's case, were entitled to full opportunity of hearing, during the course of enquiry and after submission of the enquiry report, by Enquiry Officer before it is obligatory upon the appointing authority to supply enquiry report to the delinquent Government servant, to show cause against the proposed punishment before awarding the punishment. Thus, Rule 65A of the C.C.A. Rules, referred to above, was also practically re-enforced.
25. It may also be noted that. along with the supplementary affidavit dated 1.9.1998. Government Order No. 13/92 Ka-1-93. Lucknow, dated 10.2.1993. which was issued after the decision in Ramzan Khan's case to give effect to the decision in Ramzan Khan's case, has been filed. In which time schedule for conducting the disciplinary proceedings against Government servants, for awarding minor and major penalties to them, has been prescribed. In the said Government Order, it has been provided that in quite old matters, disciplinary action should not be taken- For awarding even the minor punishment, the procedure has been prescribed, details of which are not relevant for the purpose of present case. For awarding major 'punishment, it has been provided that charge-sheet should be prepared and supplied to the delinquent Government servant within two weeks of the decision to Initiate disciplinary proceedings. Suspension order, should be passed simultaneously or after supply of the charge-sheet against the delinquent Government servant. The delinquent servant should be given atleast one month's time or maximum two months for filing his explanation, all papers relevant in the case, should be supplied to the delinquent Government servant, if for any reason it is not convenient, he should be permitted inspection of the record within two weeks. Enquiry Officer, thereafter, should conduct and complete the proceedings. The Enquiry Officer should not be appointed by name, but by designation. It has further been provided that if the enquiry is not being conducted by the appointing authority. Itself, the enquiry report should be submitted within two weeks. If the Enquiry Officer proposes penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, copy of report should.be supplied to the delinquent employee, calling upon him to submit his explanation, within two weeks. After considering the report, other materials and the explanation of the delinquent-employee. order of punishment. If necessary, could be passed by the punishing authority. It has been provided that aforesaid time schedule should be observed strictly, falling which the faulting officer should be dealt with and punished.
26. In the present case, it took hardly four or five days time to initiate disciplinary proceedings and to conclude the same by passing order of dismissal from service against the petitioners. Petitioners were not supplied charge-sheet, they were not given opportunity to file their explanation, no enquiry was In their knowledge or notice, held, at all by the Enquiry Officer, report submitted by the Enquiry Officer was not given to them, no show-cause notice was admittedly Issued or served upon the petitioners against the proposed punishment and their services were terminated wholly arbitrarily and Illegally. The disciplinary proceedings were rushed through in violation of the provisions of Article 311, the Government Order dated 10.2.93 and the, provisions of Rules 55 and 55A of the C.C.A. rules and in utter breach of principles of natural justice, as well as in violation the decisions of Apex Court and this Court, referred to above. The impugned orders, therefore, are wholly illegal, and non est in law. Thus, in my opinion. It was not necessary for the petitioners to approach appellate authority before filing the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, to the contrary, therefore, cannot be accepted. Writ petitions filed by the petitioners, are legally maintainable and were rightly entertained by this Court.
27. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that Rules 55 and 55A of the C.C.A. Rules, provided procedure for taking disciplinary action against delinquent Government servant. The said rules are fully applicable in the present case. The decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in Ramzon Khan's case and Managing Director, ECIL (supra), were also binding upon the respondents. The respondents were also bound of their own notification dated 10.3.1993. The respondents have failed to follow the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, Rules and Regulations and have arbitrarily passed the impugned orders against the petitioners, which are non-est, and unenforceable In law and are liable to be quashed.
28. The next question to be considered by this Court is as to whether the petitioners are entitled to their salaries for the period they remained on strike and failed to discharge their duties. Under the Indian laws, strikes by the Government servants and other employees and persons are not completely prohibited ; but the same may be banned by the State Government in exercise of its powers under U. P. Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1966. In the present case, petitioners and other teachers went on strike after giving notice to the competent authority. Strikes by the teachers and consequent closure of educational Institutions in India, in the present conditions when the illiteracy is rampant and the State has failed to achieve aims and objects enshrined in the Constitution of India, and to follow the mandate contained in Article 39(a) and (f), as well as Article 45, strikes are to be deprecated and should be banned not only of teachers but also of doctors, lawyers, students and other Government servants as they are no solution of any problem. Total ban on strikes by appropriate enactment would be in the Interest of entire nation. in the present case, notification banning the strike by the petitioners and other teachers was issued by the State Government on 25.7.98 declaring services under Basic Shiksha Parishad, as essential services under U. P. Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1966. Therefore, till said date, strike by the petitioners and other teachers cannot be said to be illegal. Petitioners will be entitled to their salaries for the period of strike till 25.7.98, but not for the period after the said date, till they resumed thetr duties. Before. I part with this case, it may be provided that the petitioners will abide by their undertakings and any breach of the said undertakings will render them liable for prosecution for contempt of this Court.
29. In view of the aforesaid discussions, these petitions succeed and are allowed. Impugned orders dated 4.8.98. (contained in Annexure-1 in Writ Petition No. 3508 (S/S) of 1998) and 5.8.98 (contained In Annexures-1 to 10 In writ petition No. 3544 (S/S) of 1998), are hereby quashed. Petitioners have already joined their duties. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioners to continue to hold their posts, to perform their duties and to pay them arrears of salaries, if any, and to continue to pay the salaries as and when the same fall due.
30. No order as to costs.