Delhi High Court
Sandeep Chandra vs Vice-Admiral Subhash C. Chopra (Rtd.) & ... on 28 August, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1999IAD(DELHI)73, 76(1998)DLT776, 1998(47)DRJ308
Author: N.G. Nandi
Bench: N.G. Nandi
ORDER Devinder Gupta, J.
1. The facts in brief are that in a petition preferred by the petitioner [C.M. (Main) No. 406/93] on 28.10.1993, notice was directed to be issued to the respondents therein. It is alleged that the said notice was taken and tendered to the respondents on 29.10.1993 at about 5.30 p.m. Respondent No. 1 after reading the notice not only abused the petitioner and the process server, but also hurled abuses against the Court. Offensive, abusive and derogatory language was used by respondent No. 1 and he refused to receive the notice. For this alleged act on the part of the respondent, the petitioner on 1.11.1993 filed this petition praying for initiating proceedings against the respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act and to punish them in accordance with law for the alleged contempt, alleged to have been committed by them.
2. The petition instituted on 1.11.1993, came up before the Court on 2.11.1993 and was adjourned from time to time till 10.8.1994, where the following order was passed:
"The petitioner has sought initiation of contempt proceedings against the respondents alleging that when notices were sent by this Court to the respondents in CM(M) 406/93 and CM 2043/93, derogatory remarks were made by the respondents while refusing to accept the notices and such derogatory remarks have been reproduced by the process server in his report. I have seen the original notices appended in Part-B of CM (M) 406/93. Prima facie, the report of the process server is not in accordance with law. Even the name of the process sevver is not appearing on the record. There is no proper affidavit of process server. Before proceeding further, let the petitioner file particulars of the process server who is stated to have tendered the notices to the respondent. This should be down within one week.
List 23rd August, 1994."
3. The petitioner without any effective proceedings continued to be adjourned till 22.2.1995. Needless to add that till that date neither any notice to show cause was directed to be issued to be respondents, nor the Court took cognizance of contempt, alleged to have been committed by the respondents. On that date, the following order was passed by learned Single Judge:
"Even if the allegations contained in this civil contempt petition are true, it will not constitute civil contempt. It may constitute criminal contempt. I am not inclined to take further action on this civil contempt petition. It is open to the petitioner to convert this civil contempt petition into a criminal contempt petition. At this stage learned Counsel for the petitioner prays that this civil contempt petition may be treated as a criminal contempt petition. The prayer is granted. The Registry is directed to number this civil contempt petition as a criminal contempt petition and list it before the appropriate Bench on 6th March, 1995.
4. Pursuant to the above order, the petition as posted on 6.3.1995 before Division Bench as a Criminal Contempt Petition on which date, for the first time, notice was directed to be issued to the respondents to show cause as to why Contempt of Court proceedings be not initiated against them. The notice was made returnable for 5.4.1995. The order reads:
" Notice to the respondents to show cause as to why Contempt of Court proceedings be not initiated against them returnable on 5th April, 1995."
5. In response to the show cause notice, respondent No. 1 while denying the alleged incident and narrating the background of the suit filed by the petitioner against the club and proceedings therein stated that on 29.10.1993 after 5.45 p.m. soon after he had finished meeting the representatives of Delhi Gymkhana Club Staff Welfare Association, a person in civil attire was brought to him, who asked him to sign a paper and take notice of some documents filed by the petitioner in the High Court. On going through the papers, it was noticed by him that the text thereof was similar to the papers which the petitioner had filed before the Civil Judge, Delhi in the suit and, therefore, he was bit surprised and perplexed that how two similar cases could be filed in two different Courts by the same person. As such, respondent No.1 states that he asked his Secretary, who was also then present in the Committee room to get in touch with the Lawyer, who advised him to accept the papers. The person who had brought the notice had been requested to wait till he had consulted the lawyer. During the short period, when respondent No.1 contacted the Lawyer, the man had quietly disappeared with the papers. Thus, respondent No.1 has denied having declined to accept the notice or having uttered the alleged offensive language. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have also denied having used the alleged offensive language.
6. On 14.2.1997 noticing the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the initiation of contempt proceedings is barred by Section 20 of the Act, the following order was passed:
"Mr. Bhandare has raised a preliminary objection that the initiation of these contempt proceedings is barred by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. We would like Mr. Bhandare to examine whether the matter has been considered by any Court including the Supreme Court with reference to Articles 215 and 129 of the Constitution of India.
Re-notify on 26.3.1997."
7. In the above background we heard learned Counsel for the parties on the question of limitation. In view of the bar in Section 20 of the Con-tempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No.70 of 1979), proceedings for contempt can still be initiated after expiry of period of one year from the date on which the alleged contempt has been committed.
8. The date of commission of the alleged contempt, according to the petitioner is 29.10.1993. Though the petition was instituted on 1.11.1993, no effective orders were passed thereon except on two dates, namely, on 22.2.1995 and 6.3.1995. On 22.2.1995, learned Single Judge simply observed that even if the allegations contained in the petition are taken as true, it will not constitute civil contempt. It may, however, constitute criminal contempt. At that stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner prayed that the petition be treated as a criminal contempt petition. The prayer was allowed and the petition was directed to be posted before a Division Bench. On 6.3.1995, as noticed above, for the first time show cause notice was directed to be issued as to why Contempt of Court proceedings of be not initiated. Admittedly, within a period of one year from the date of the alleged commission of contempt, no proceedings for contempt were initiated by the Court. Learned Counsel for the parties, on the question arising before us placed reliance upon a number of decisions.
9. It was contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that High Court being the Court of Record is possessed of inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of itself and there is no restriction on its power. Such power cannot be circumscribed or curtailed by any of the statutory provisions like Section 20 of the Act. In other words, according to him, the power to punish for contempt, being inherent in a Court of record, no act of Parliament can take away that inherent jurisdiction and thus the period of limitation would not come in the way and this Court will be within its right to punish the respondents, who have committed gross contempt by uttering offensive language.
10. Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand, vehemently contended that the bar contained in Section 20 of the Act is an absolute one. It bars initiation of any proceedings for contempt after expiry of the period of one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. This bar is applicable not only for initiation of contempt at the instance of any person, but also against suo motu initiation of proceedings by the High Court.
11. There cannot be any dispute that the power which this Court enjoys to punish for contempt is a part of its inherent jurisdiction and is essential to enable the Courts to administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent interference in due administration of justice. On this established position learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the four decisions, namely, The Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. Vs. Ramniwas Poddar & Ors., ; D.D.A. Vs. Tejwant Singh & Anr., 1995 RLR 165 (SC); Dr. D.C. Saxena Vs. Hon'ble The Chief Justice of India, 63 (1996) DLT 492 (SC); and Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India & Anr., . The settled position as regards inherent power of High Court to punish for contempt was re-asserted by the Apex Court in Supreme Court Bar Association's (supra) observing:
"The expression `Court of Record' has not been defined in the Constitution of India. Article 129, however, declares the Supreme Court to be a Court of Record while Article 215 declares a High Court also to be a Court of Record. A Court of Record is a Court, the records of which are admitted to be of evidentiary value and are not to be questioned when produced before any Court. The power that Courts of Record enjoy to punish for contempt is a part of their inherent jurisdiction and is essential to enable the Courts to administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent interference in the due administration of justice."
12. The question before us is not the one on the exercise of power, but is of the period of limitation within which proceedings may be initiated. In Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, , while examining the provisions of the Act, it was observed that the scheme adopted by the Legislature in the Act is that the Court may initiate proceedings for contempt suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General or on a reference made by a subordinate Court. It is only when the Court initiates a proceeding for contempt suo motu, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and takes the first step in exercise of it. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus-a-quo for the period of limitation provided under Section 20 of the Act is the date when proceedings for contempt is initiated by the Court. In para-7 of the report, the Court held:
"Section 20 prescribes a period of limitation by saying that no Court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It will be seen from these provisions that the scheme adopted by the Legislature is that the Court may initiated a proceeding for contempt suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General or on a reference made by a subordinate Court. Where the Court initiates a proceeding for contempt suo motu, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and takes the first step in exercise of it. But what happens when a motion is made by the Advocate-General or any other person with the consent is writing of the Advocate-General or a reference is made by a subordinate Court. Does the Court enter upon the jurisdiction to punish for contempt and act in exercise of it when it considers such motion or reference for the purpose of deciding whether it should initiate a proceeding for contempt? We do not think so. The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference, to decide, in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for the contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceedings for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a terminus-a-quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court."
13. In Gulab Singh Vs. Ramji Dass, , petition for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act was dismissed because of the bar under Section 20 of the Act. It was held that there is no provision under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which in any manner stops the running of time of one year contemplated by Section 20 of the Act. The petitioner in that case had brought to the notice of the Court the alleged acts of the contempt within a period of one month. The Court did not pass any orders before the expiry of period of one year. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner should not be allowed to suffer for the mistake of the Court. He had done what was necessary for him and there-after the entire matter was between the Court and the respondent. The proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act were not initiated because the Court thought that no action for contempt should be taken during pendency of a writ petition. It was contended therein that during the period during which the writ petition remained pending, should not be counted, while computing the period of one year. Such a contention was negated by the Court.
14. In N. Venkataramanappa Vs. D.K. Naikar & Anr., , following the ratio of the decision of Allahabad High Court in Gulab Singh's case (supra), it was held that the language of Section 20 of the Act makes it clear that after expiry of period of one year, no Court can initiate any proceedings for contempt, either suo motu or otherwise.
15. A Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Dineshbhai A. Parikh Vs. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad & Ors., , relying upon the decisions in Baradakanta Mishra's case (supra) and concurring with the view expressed by Allahabad High Court in Gulab Singh's case (supra) and Karnataka High Court in N. Venkataramanappa's case (supra), held:
"No contempt proceedings can be initiated by a Court after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the alleged commission of contempt. Action under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 can be taken if the Court has applied its mind and initiated proceedings by passing some order within a period of one year from the date of the alleged act of contempt. If an application for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is filed within a period of one year from the date of the alleged commission of contempt, but the Court has passed no order thereon before the expiry of one year from the said date, such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the Court is barred because the Court did not apply its mind to the complaint or information within a period of one year. It is this application of mind by the Court which amounts to initiation of proceedings within the meaning of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971."
16. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which creates a bar in a Court for initiation of any proceeding for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after expiry of a period of one year reads:
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt-No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of on year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
Article 215 of the Constitution reads:
"215. High Courts to be Courts on record-Every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself."
17. In Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra), the question which had come up for consideration was whether the Supreme Court can, while dealing with the contempt proceedings, exercise power under Article 129 of the Constitution or under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution or under Article 142 of the Constitution to debar a practicing Lawyer from carrying on his profession as a Lawyer for any period whatsoever. It was held that the Supreme Court being the Court of record enjoys power to punish for contempt as a part of its inherent jurisdiction, but the power in respect of investigation or punishment of any contempt including contempt of itself is expressly made subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by the Parliament by Article 142(2) of the Constitution of India. However, the power to punish for contempt being inherent in a Court of Record, it follows that no act of Parliament can take away that inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Record to punish for contempt and the Parliament's power of legislation on the subject cannot, therefore, be so exercised as to stultify the status and dignity of the Supreme Court and/or of the High Courts though such a legislation may serve as a guide for determination on the nature of punishment, which the Court may impose in the case of established contempt. On the nature and type of punishment, which a Court of Record can impose, the Supreme Court held that the same has now specifically been incorporated in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, in so far as the High Courts are concerned and, therefore, to the extent the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 identifies the nature or type of punishment, which can be awarded in the case of established contempt, which does not impinge upon the inherent powers of the High Court under Article 215. The Court further held that a case of Contempt of Court is not stricto sensor a cause or a matter between the parties interse. It is a matter between the Court and the contemner. It is not, strictly speaking, tried as an adversial litigation. The party which brings the contemptuous conduct of the contemner to the notice of the Court, whether a private person or the subordinate Court, is only an informant and does not have the status of a litigant in the Contempt of Court cases. On the nature of jurisdiction of contempt, the Court held:
"The Contempt of Court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution, whenever an act adversely effects the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely effects the Majesty of Law or dignity of the Courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of Law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining the `jury, the judge and the hangman' and it is so because the Court is not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the general interest of the community it is imperative that the Authority of Courts should not be imperiled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It is a matter between the Court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law and the dignity of the Courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice."
18. In the light of what has been observed aforementioned, it will be seen that there is no limit to the exercise of power of the Court of Record to punish for its contempt, either suo motu or on a reference from subordinate Court or on the application of a party. The question of limitation was left open in the case.
19. The only limit on the period within which the proceedings for contempt may be initiated, is provided in Section 20 of the Act. The proceedings can be initiated only when the Court applies its mind. In Baradakanta Mishra's case (supra), the Apex Court held that it is only when the Court initiates a proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. This exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings and not before. The terminus-a-quo for the period of limitation is the date of initiation of proceedings for contempt by the Court. As such, in the case of a party, when it brings the contemptuous conduct of the contemner to the notice of the Court, mind can be said to have been applied by the Court only on the date when it decides to take action and issues any notice to the contemner that why action be not taken or proceedings be not initiated for contempt and not merely on the date of institution of the proceedings. The power to punish under the Constitution being in addition to and not in derogation of the inherent powers, there cannot be any bar on such power, but the period of limitation having specifically been incorporated in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, in so far as the High Court is concerned, when it may assume jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the same will have to be adhered to. Bar of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act will apply in the case when show cause notice is issued under the Contempt of Courts Act for initiation of proceedings for contempt.
20. In the instant case, the Court had not decided within a period of one year to initiate any proceedings. Because of this, we are of the view that the petition on that ground is liable to be dismissed. Otherwise also we do not consider it to be a fit case for initiating any proceedings, in exercise of our powers under Article 215 of the Constitution. The petition is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.