Allahabad High Court
Jai Prakash vs State Of U.P. And 3 Ors. on 8 May, 2026
Author: Saral Srivastava
Bench: Saral Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Reserved On: 08.01.2026
Delivered On: 08.05.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - A No. - 36497 of 2016
Jai Prakash
..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 3 Ors.
..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
Amit Saxena, Amit Saxena (senior Adv.), Atipriya Gautam, Vinod Kumar Mishra
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
C.S.C.
Court No. - 40
HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
HON'BLE SUDHANSHU CHAUHAN, J.
(Delivered by Honble Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.)
1. Heard Shri Vinod Kumar Mishra and Shri Devesh Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Rajeshwar Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel-II for the State-respondents.
2. The present writ petition has been filed being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 21.03.2016 passed by the learned State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow in Claim Petition No. 561 of 2014 by means of which the claim petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order of dismissal from service has been dismissed.
3. The facts involved in the present controversy are that the petitioner was appointed as Constable on 27.08.2006 in the Provincial Arms Constabulary (PAC) on 26.05.2011. An FIR was lodged against the petitioner under Sections 376, 313, 493, 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, by one X alleging that the petitioner had married the complainant in a temple and had established physical relations with her and had got her aborted while she was in a family way with the assurance of marrying the complainant.
4. Subsequently the petitioner was arrested and was placed under suspension on 25.06.2011 on account of pendency of criminal case. Thereafter departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and on 17.09.2012 a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner wherein the only charge against the petitioner is that the petitioner had established physical relations with X on the assurance of marrying her and the incidents related thereto. The inquiry officer had submitted inquiry report on 06.07.2013 wherein the charge against the petitioner was held to be proved and a recommendation was made that the petitioner be dismissed from service.
5. In pursuance to the inquiry report a show cause notice dated 05.07.2013 was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner had submitted his reply thereto on 29.07.2013. Ultimately vide the order dated 22.08.2013 the petitioner was dismissed from service. Thereafter the appeal and the revision filed by the petitioner were also dismissed on 19.10.2013 and 16.12.2013 respectively.
6. The petitioner being aggrieved by the punishment order as well as the appellate order and the revisional order had challenged the same before the learned Tribunal by filing Claim Petition No. 561 of 2014, essentially on the ground that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted in due accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules, the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal proceedings arising out of the same charges could not have continued against the petitioner and the petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings and lastly the departmental inquiry was vitiated in view of the fact that the inquiry officer could not have recommended the punishment to be imposed upon the petitioner. However, the learned Tribunal by means of judgment and order dated 21.03.2016 had dismissed the claim petition while rejecting the grounds of challenge raised by the petitioner.
7. It is the contention of the petitioner that the impugned judgment and order dated 21.03.2016 has been passed without considering the grounds raised by the petitioner as the disciplinary inquiry was not completed in due accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Rank (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the the Rules, 1991) and the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing and the order dated 22.08.2013 is cryptic and non-speaking. Further the petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings initiated against him and in these circumstances the contrary findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings were unjust and unfair and lastly it has been contended that the inquiry itself was vitiated as it was not open for the inquiry officer to recommend the punishment to be imposed upon the petitioner.
8. On the contrary it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing during the course of inquiry and the petitioner out of his own sweet will refused the cross examine the witnesses produced during the inquiry despite being afforded opportunity and as such now it was not open for the petitioner to allege that the inquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed. Further acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceedings was not an honourable acquittal but acquittal was on technical grounds as the witnesses had turned hostile and as such the disciplinary proceedings could have continued against the petitioner. Lastly under the Appendix I of the Rule 14 (1) of the Rules, 1991, the inquiry officer may also separately from the proceedings make his own recommendation regarding punishment to be imposed on the charged police officer. Hence, it was contended that the inquiry officer was duly competent to recommend the punishment to be imposed upon the petitioner as the same was provided for under the Rules, 1991.
9. As far as the ground raised by the petitioner of the inquiry not having been conducted according to the Rules. 1991 is concerned, the records reveal that the statement of X, the father of X and the Manager of the concerned hotel visited by the petitioner were recorded during the course of inquiry, however, the petitioner despite being granted opportunity to cross examine the three witnesses had failed to do so. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was denied an opportunity of hearing and the inquiry was not conducted as per the rules.
10. In fact the learned tribunal in its judgment and order dated 21.03.2016 in this regard has held as under:
9-हम लोगों ने प्रस्तुत प्रकरण में विभागीय जाँच जो प्रदर्श-9 के रूप में पत्रावली पर दाखिल की गयी है का गहनता पूर्वक अवलोकन किया। विभागीय जाँच के दौरान पीड़िता ... का दिनांक 29-1-12 को मुख्य परीक्षण किया गया जिसमें उक्त पीड़िता ने आरोपित घटना का पूर्ण समर्थन करते हुए साक्ष्य दिया, उक्त साक्षी से याची को प्रति परीक्षण करने का पूरा अवसर जाँच अधिकारी द्वारा दिया गया परन्तु याची ने उससे कोई पूछताछ व जिरह नहीं किया। दूसरे साक्षी के रूप में उसी दिन ... जो पीड़िता के पिता है ने भी आरोपित घटना का समर्थन किया है। इस साक्षी से भी याची ने पर्याप्त अवसर देने के बावजूद कोई प्रत्ति परीक्षण नहीं किया। एक अन्य साक्षी विरेन्द्र खत्री प्रबन्धक गिरजाईन होटल परीक्षित हुए है, उन्होने स्पष्ट रूप से कहा है कि उन तीनों तिथियों को पति पत्नी के रूप में याची जय प्रकाश व ... उनके होटल में ठहरे थे जैसा कि उनके रजिस्टर में अंकित है। उक्त साक्षी से भी याची को प्रति परीक्षण करने का अवसर दिया गया परन्तु उसने कोई प्रति परीक्षण नहीं किया। एक अन्य साक्षी के रूप में श्री चन्द्र प्रकाश दुबे परीक्षित हुए जिन्होंने अपने साक्ष्य में प्रारम्भिक जाँच को सिद्ध किया है और यह भी कहा है कि प्रथम दृष्टया याची के विरुद्ध 376 का अपराध बनता था। याची द्वारा एक प्रार्थना पत्र जाँच अधिकारी को इस आशय से दिया गया जिसमें उसने श्री पुतानी सिंह, श्री राज किशोर चौरसिया, श्री रजल, श्री सुरेश सिंह व राजेश अग्निहोत्री व बबलू यादव से प्रति परीक्षण करने हेतु प्रार्थनापत्र जाँच अधिकारी दिया। उक्त प्रार्थनापत्र जाँच अधिकारी को दिनांक 17-6-13 को प्राप्त हुआ। उक्त प्रार्थनापत्र में यह नहीं अंकित किया गया है वह किस साक्षी से क्या प्रमाणित कराना चाहा है। जांच अधिकारी ने याची के विरुद्ध पर्याप्त साक्ष्य होने व आरोपित को सभी परीक्षित साक्षियों से जिरह करने की पूर्ण स्वतंत्रता प्रदान की गयी है, उसको देखते हुए उनके द्वारा पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध साक्ष्यों का मूल्यांकन करते हुए अपना निष्कर्ष दिया गया है। जाँच अधिकारी ने माननीय उच्च न्यायालय द्वारा पारित दोनों निर्णयों याचिका 59737/12 व 47733/13 योजित की जिसे माननीय उच्च न्यायालय द्वारा सुनवाई के उपरान्त दिनांक 9-1-13 व 1-2-13 के आदेश द्वारा निरस्त कर दी गयी का उद्धरण देते हुए अपना निष्कर्ष निकाला है जिसमें याची के विरूद्ध महिला . को शादी का आश्वासन देकर उससे शारीरिक सम्बन्ध बनाने व घोर अनुशासनहीनता उदण्डता, स्वेच्छाचारिता के कदाचार का दोषी पाते हुए उसको सेवा से पदच्युत्त किये जाने के दण्ड की संस्तुति की है।
On perusal of the records, we agree with the findings so arrived at by the learned Tribunal.
11. As far as the punishment order dated 22.08. 2013 being cryptic and non-speaking is concerned, we find that the disciplinary authority has considered each of the pleas raised by the petitioner in his reply dated 29.07.2013 to the show cause notice dated 15.07.2013 and after applying his mind, the disciplinary authority had taken a decision to dismiss the petitioner from service. Hence, it cannot be said that the punishment order dated 22.08.2013 is cryptic and non-speaking.
12. Further the contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner had been acquitted in criminal proceedings and as such he could not be awarded punishment in a the disciplinary inquiry arising out of the same charge We have perused the judgment and order dated 26.03.2015 passed by the learned criminal court thereby acquitting the petitioner and we find that the complaint X and her father had turned hostile. Further the learned criminal court while acquitting the petitioner has held चूंकि अभियोजन पक्ष द्वारा परीक्षित कराये गये सभी साक्षी पक्षद्रोही घोषित हुए है अतः डाक्टर व उपनिरीक्षक की गवाही का कोई लाभ अभियोजन पक्ष को नहीं मिलेगा।
Hence, it is evident that there is no honourable acquittal of the petitioner but petitioner in the criminal proceedings has been acquitted solely on the ground that the witnesses had turned hostile.
13. In the case of GM Tank v. State of Gujarat and others 2006 (5) SCC 446, relied upon by the petitioner the Apex Court had held that the dismissal of an employee was not sustainable on account of honourable acquittal of the employee in criminal proceedings. The Apex Court in that case amongst others had held as under
30.In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand.
(emphasis added)
14. Hence, it is evident that the witnesses were examined in the said case and the learned court had arrived at a conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the incumbent beyond reasonable doubt and had went on to acquit the incumbent on the ground that the charge has not been proved. Hence, it was not a case of acquittal on technical grounds. Thus, the facts of the aforesaid case were clearly different from that of the present case, where X and her father had turned hostile during the criminal trial.
15. Further in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and another v. S. Samuthinath, 2013 (1) SCC 598, wherein a member of police personnel was himself caught in an act of eve teasing leading to initiation of criminal and disciplinary proceedings, culminating in dismissal from service and acquittal in criminal proceedings. The Apex Court had held as under:-
23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non-examination of two key witnesses before the criminal court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning over PWs 1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the prosecution had not examined Head Constable Adiyodi (No. 1368) and Peter (No. 1079) of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the /scene of occurrence along with PWs 1 and 2, husband and wife, to Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal court has also opined that the signature of PW 1 (complainant husband) is found in Ext. P-1 complaint. Further, the doctor, PW 8 has also clearly stated before the enquiry officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood g and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined.
26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it falls to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and a preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.
27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules.
28. In view of the abovementioned circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings as against the respondent, in its limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
16. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case we are of the view that the controversy involved in the present writ petition is squarely covered under the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of S.Samuthinath (supra). Moreover no provision in the Rules, 1991 was pointed out before us to demonstrate that an acquittal in criminal proceedings would have led to automatic reinstatement of the petitioner.
17. Besides we are also of the view that the standard of proof required in any criminal trial vis a vis a disciplinary inquiry are very different as during the disciplinary inquiry the guilt of delinquent employee is established on the principle of preponderance of probabilities, whereas, in a criminal trial the burden lay upon the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, the acquittal of an employee during the criminal trial would not lead to his exoneration in disciplinary proceedings, in each such case. Thus, we are of the view that as the acquittal of the petitioner was on technical grounds in the criminal case, the punishment of dismissal from service could have been imposed upon the petitioner.
18. As regards the last ground raised by the petitioner that the inquiry officer had recommended the punishment in the inquiry report, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Uttaranchal & Others v. Kharak Singh (2008) 8 SCC 236, wherein it was held as under:
"18. Another infirmity in the report of the enquiry officer is that he concluded the enquiry holding that all the charges have been proved and he recommended for dismissal of the delinquent from service. The last paragraph of his report dated 16-11-1985 reads as under:
"During the course of above inquiry, such facts have come into light from which it is proved that the employee who has doubtful character and does not obey the order, does not have the right to continue in the government service and it is recommended to dismiss him from the service with immediate effect"
Though there is no specific bar in offering views by the enquiry officer, in the case on hand, the enquiry officer exceeded his limit by saying that the officer has no right to continue in the government service and he has to be dismissed from service with immediate effect.
19. As pointed out above, awarding appropriate punishment is the exclusive jurisdiction of the punishing/disciplinary authority and it depends upon the nature and gravity of the proved charge/charges and other attended circumstances. It is clear from the materials, the officer, who inspected and noted the shortfall of trees, himself conducted the enquiry, arrived at a conclusion holding the charges proved and also strongly recommended severe punishment of dismissal from service. The entire action and the course adopted by the enquiry officer cannot be accepted and is contrary to the well-known principles enunciated by this Court."
19. In this regard, before adverting to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Kharak Singh (supra), we deem it fit to first examine the relevant provisions of the Appendix I of Rules 14 (1) of Rules, 1991 which reads as under:
"APPENDIX-I"
Procedure Relating to the Conduct of Departmental Proceedings against Police Officer [See Rule 14(1)] Upon institution of a formal enquiry such Police Officer against whom the inquiry has been instituted shall be informed in writing of the grounds on which was proposed to take action and shall be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be used in the form of a definite charge or charges as in Form 1 appended to these Rules which shall be communicated to the charged Police Officer and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Police Officer, of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in, in a written statement of his defence and to state, whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the Inquiry Officer so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be recorded as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The charge Police Officer shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish :
Provided that the Inquiry Officer may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the finding and the ground thereof. The Inquiry Officer may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Police Officer.
20. In respect of the subject matter of the controversy, we have also considered the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P & Ors. v. Harendra Kumar, (2004) 13 SCC 117, which was a case arising out of the Rules, 1991 and relevant part thereof reads as under:-
"1. When certain misconduct came to the notice of the competent authority, a preliminary enquiry was ordered to ascertain as to whether there was any need to initiate disciplinary proceeding or not. After preliminary enquiry and in the light of the preliminary enquiry report, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent on the charge that while he was on duty he has consumed liquor and abused another constable when he was on duty. Thereafter, a regular enquiry was held and on the basis of the material placed in the enquiry, the enquiry officer having recorded a finding that the charge levelled against the respondent was proved, made the following recommendations:
"Task Force Battalion is armed with sophisticated weapons and a minor diversion or negligence can prove fatal. Therefore it is dangerous if an employee is on duty while in inebriated state.
Being in an intoxicated state while reporting on duty and showing indiscipline is not something appreciated or desired in Task Force or PAC, a disciplinary force. Therefore it is recommended that this constable Harendra Kumar 56306 may be dismissed from service under the provision of Rule 14(1) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991."
2....
3. The Tribunal after considering the rival contentions on their relative merits held that there was no prejudice caused to the respondent in the enquiry, the punishment imposed on the respondent was not disproportionate to the charge held proved. However, the Tribunal found fault with the order of dismissal on the ground that the disciplinary authority did not apply its mind and merely passed the order on the basis of the recommendations made by the enquiry officer. In that view, the Tribunal felt that the order of dismissal was vitiated and accordingly allowed the application and set aside the order of dismissal, however, gave liberty to the appellants to pass fresh order of punishment in accordance with law after giving full opportunity of hearing, if so desired. The appellants aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, approached the High Court by filing a writ petition challenging its correctness and validity. The High Court unfortunately dismissed the writ petition without even broadly noticing the contentions and/or the questions of law raised before it. The order passed by the High Court in the writ petition reads thus:
"Heard counsel for the petitioner.
Learned Standing Counsel could not assail the finding recorded by the Tribunal. The writ petition is dismissed."
Hence this appeal.
4.....
5.....
6. We must notice that the respondent did not challenge the findings of the Tribunal, it was only the appellants who questioned the validity and correctness of the order of the Tribunal. The only contention that survives for our consideration is: whether the disciplinary authority did not apply its mind in considering the case of the respondent while passing the order of dismissal. We think it is appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the order of dismissal which reads:
"That while you were posted as constable a report was received by me about your having had consumed liquor and abused Constable Driver Omparkash Pall while you were on terrorist duty in Kasimpur Garhi PS Afzalgarh, District Bijnor and hence indiscipline. I had thereon ordered a preliminary inquiry on 15-3-1994 and the same was conducted by one Shri Girish Chandra Dhyani, Dal Nayak.
Shri Girish Chandra Dhyani had submitted a report in this context on 2-4-1994 wherein you were found guilty in the above incident and departmental action against you was recommended under Rule 14(1) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. As I found myself agreeing with the above report, the departmental action against you was decided to be taken by Shri Ram Bodh, Assistant Commandant on 9-5-1994.
The departmental proceedings against you were held by Shri Ram Bodh under the provision of Rule 14(1) of the above rules while rendering you reasonable opportunity to defend yourself. In his report submitted on 27-7-1994 he recommended your dismissal from service as the charges were fully established.
After receiving the above conclusions I closely studied the entire case and I found myself in consent with the inference dated 27-7-1994 of Shri Ram Bodh, Assistant Commandant, 47th Battalion, PAC. I issued a show-cause notice to you on 8-8-1994 wherein it was clearly mentioned that you were required to submit your reply within 8 days of show-cause notice's receipt otherwise it shall be presumed that you have nothing to offer in defence and it was also clarified that in case your reply is received within the prescribed time then the final decision will be taken only after considering your explanation sympathetically. After you returned from leave you did not file any explanation till date. When your statement was being recorded you were specifically asked as to if you have to say anything in reply to the show-cause notice but you had refused to."
7. It is clear from the portion of the order extracted above that there has been proper application of mind by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has also stated in the order that after receiving the conclusions from the enquiry officer he closely studied the entire case and found himself in agreement with the report of the enquiry officer. It is clear from the same order that a show-cause notice was given to the respondent to make any written submission by ways of explanation.
8. Having regard to the nature of the charge i.e. that the respondent had consumed liquor on duty, that too on a duty in relation to terrorist activities and had abused another constable driver, proved by the evidence which is not challenged, we fail to understand what more consideration was required by the disciplinary authority. This apart, as we have already stated above, bare reading of the entire order of dismissal clearly shows that there has been proper application of mind. The disciplinary authority agreeing with the enquiry officer need not write a detailed judgment. In this view, the Tribunal committed a serious error in holding that there has been non-application of mind in passing the order of dismissal. The Tribunal having found that no prejudice was caused to the respondent in enquiry proceedings and punishment imposed was not disproportionate, we not at all justified in setting aside the order of dismissal. It is unfortunate that the High Court, as stated above, did not look into the matter at all in exercising the power of judicial review and had simply passed a non-speaking order. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances, we do not find any good ground to sustain the impugned order affirming the order of the Tribunal."
(Emphasis added)
21. Consequently when the facts of the instant case are tested on the touchstone of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Harendra Kumar (supra) what this Court finds is that the inquiry officer was perfectly empowered to recommend punishment while submitting the inquiry report. Merely because instead of recommending punishment separately, the same became a part of the of the inquiry report would not vitiate the inquiry in as much as no prejudice is caused or pleaded to be caused to the petitioner.
22. It is further pointed out that, as far as the case of Kharak Singh (supra) is concerned, the same did not relate to proceedings arising out of the Rules, 1991. As already noted above, the Apex Court had held that though there is no specific bar in offering views by the inquiry officer, in the case at hand the inquiry officer had exceeded his limits by observing that the officer had no right to continue in government service and he has to be dismissed from service with immediate effect. Thus, the law laid down in the said case was in the context of the facts, circumstances, and service rules applicable therein. However, in the case of Harendra Kumar (supra), the proceedings had arisen out of the Rules, 1991, Hence, the reliance placed on the case of Kharak Singh (supra) by learned counsel for the petitioner would be of no assistance to the petitioner.
23. Further learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgemnt of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Haneef Khan v. State of U.P. and others through Principal Secretary (Home), 2017 Lawsuit (All) 3525 wherein this Court has held as under:-
[13] This aspect has already considered in State of Uttranchal and others Vs. Kharak Singh, 2008 8 SCC 236 and Court has held, if in inquiry report, punishment is also recommended by Inquiry Officer, it is a grave illegality for the reason that appropriate punishment is the exclusive jurisdiction of punishing or disciplinary authority and Inquiry Officers only job is to enquire, whether charge levelled against the delinquent employee is proved or not.
[14] In the present case rules permit Inquiry Officer to make its own recommendation regarding punishment but separately and not as part of inquiry report. In the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case, impugned punishment order as well as judgment passed by Tribunal cannot sustain
24. Besides the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Special Appeal No. 443 of 2024 (Bhanu Pratap singh Yadav v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 02.05.2024, however, the perusal of the said judgment reveals that it has been passed while relying upon the judgments in the case of Kharak Singh (Supra) and Mohd. Haneef Khan (supra).
25. However, we find that the judgments of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Haneef Khand and Bhanu Pratap Singh Yadav have been passed without taking into consideration the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harendra Kumar (supra). We are also of the view that the law laid down in the case of Harendra Kumar (supra) would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as proceedings in the said case arose out of the Rules, 1991, which was not so in the case of Kharak Singh (supra), hence, we do not agree with the view of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Haneef Khan (supra) and that of Bhanu Pratap Singh Yadav (supra).
26. Our view is further fortified by the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Masood Asghar Versus Uttar Pradesh State Public Service Tribunal, Indira Bhawan, Lucknow and others, 2018(5) ADJ 179 (DB) (LB) though relied upon by the petitioner, wherein it was observed that the inquiry officer making a recommendation of punishment, is merely an irregularity and that the same would not vitiate the inquiry. The only requirement is that the delinquent employee must have notice of the proposed punishment, it was held as under :-
"9. A Division Bench of this Court at Allahabad in Yash Pal Singh's case supra has treated the recommendation of the Inquiry Officer, on the point of punishment, as an irregularity and has relegated the matter to the disciplinary authority to reconsider the award of punishment, applying his own mind to the facts of the case. The aforesaid facts are not disputed by the Standing Counsel."
27. Similarly another Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ-A No. 18527 of 2021 (State of U.P. vs Raj Kumar Singh) decided on 15.3.2023, wherein the incumbent was a constable and was dismissed from service on account of unauthorized absence and the learned Tribunal had set aside the punishment order amongst others on the ground that the inquiry officer committed an illegality in proposing the punishment, while allowing the writ petition it has held as under :-
2. Appendix-1 of Rules, 1991, therefore, specifically provides that Inquiry Officer may recommend proposed punishment after concluding the departmental proceedings. Proviso to this Appendix provides that the Inquiry Officer may also separately from this proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police officer.
33...
34. In view thereof, we are of the opinion that the learned Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment on the respondent. At the most, Tribunal could have remitted the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order. The Tribunal was not within its jurisdiction and competence to set aside the punishment sitting in appeal without returning a finding that the disciplinary enquiry stood vitiated for breach of statutory provisions of the Rules, 1991, or that the punishment was not commensurate to the guilt, or perverse.
28. Further a learned Single Judge of this Court, in the case of Mahadev Prasad Sharma v. State of U.P. 2014, SCC Online Allahabad 16172 had held as under:-
24. Thus from a perusal of the provisions of Appendix (1) it would be clear that the enquiry officer has been empowered to make his own recommendation regarding punishment to be imposed on the charged Police Officer.
25. In the present case merely because the Inquiry Officer has not recorded his opinion as to the punishment required to be imposed against the petitioner on a separate sheet, in my opinion, would not vitiate the enquiry proceedings or the order of the disciplinary authority who has imposed the punishment after a detailed discussion of the entire facts and merits of the case of the petitioner and therefore, it cannot be said that the order of the disciplinary authority is without application of mind
29. In the present case, we find that the disciplinary authority after issuance of the show cause notice dated 05.07.2013 has duly considered the reply submitted by the petitioner on 29.07.2013 while passing the punishment order dated 22.08.2013. Thus, it is evident that the disciplinary authority had applied his independent mind, prior to imposing the punishment of dismissal and it cannot be said that the punishment was awarded to the petitioner on the basis of the recommendations made by the inquiry officer.
30. Thus, we are of the view that the inquiry officer was duly competent to recommend the punishment to be imposed upon the petitioner under the Rules, 1991 and the inquiry could not have been said to be vitiated on this ground. Moreso, the disciplinary authority had passed the punishment order after due application of mind.
31. Hence, in view of the above, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.
32. No order as to costs.
(Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.) (Saral Srivastava,J.) May 8, 2026 Nadeem