Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Susmita Chatterjee & Anr vs Medical Council Of India & Ors on 20 July, 2018
Author: Arindam Sinha
Bench: Arindam Sinha
1
20.07.2018
(18)
ddas WP 11426 (W) of 2018
Susmita Chatterjee & Anr.
Vs.
Medical Council of India & Ors.
Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, ld. sr. adv.
Mr. Biswarup Bhattacharya
Mr. Dipayan Kundu
Mr. Pratik Majumder
... ... For the petitioners
Mr. Debaki Nandan Maiti
Mr. Supratik Roy
... ...For the WBUHS
Mr. Sougata Bhattacharya
... ...For the MCI
Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee, ld. sr adv.
Mr. Uday Sankar Chatterjee
Mr. Suman Sankar Chatterjee
... ...For the respondent no. 3
Mr. Biswarup Bhattacharya, learned advocate appears on behalf of petitioner and relies on two Supreme Court reports. First is a compilation of inter locutory orders in Fraz Naseem & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2016) 13 SCC 521]. He draws attention to order dated 3rd November, 2014 separately reported as (2016) 13 SCC 553, part of which is continuing paragraph 139. The paragraph is reproduced below :-
"139. This being the position, the applicant is entitled in law to apply for migration to Bangalore Medical Council & Research Institute, Bangalore and, accordingly, we permit her and the other students to apply within a period of two weeks hence. The 2 applications shall be considered accordingly as per Medical Council of India Regulations as interpreted by us. It should be treated as an extension of period by this Court for the purpose of migration. This Court hopes and trusts that the respondent State shall take an attitude of sympathy and empathy and not a negative attitude or an attitude of obstinacy. No authority of the State Government even remotely thinks to overreach the orders of this Court and religiously follows the command. The decision shall be taken within four weeks from the date of receipt of the applications. The State of Karnataka shall file a report before this Court within four weeks hence."
He then relies on Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & Anr. reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156, to paragraph 89. He relies on a passage in that paragraph which is reproduced below :-
"89... ... ...The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a 3 prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infra-structural organizations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.... ... .."
He draws attention to amended regulation 6(1) in Medical Council of India Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997. The amended regulation on migration is extracted below :-
"6(1) Migration of students from one medical college to another medical college may be granted on any genuine ground subject to the availability of vacancy in the college where migration is sought and fulfilling the other requirements laid down in the Regulations. Migration would be restricted to 5% of the sanctioned intake of the college during the year. No migration will be permitted on any ground from one medical college to another located within the same city."
He then files supplementary affidavit upon leave granted with copies to appearing respondents served in Court. He seeks adjournment since his client is using this affidavit for respondents to consider the same.
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Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned senior advocate appears on behalf of respondent no. 3. He submits, his client has no difficulty in issuing 'no objection' to petitioner regarding her desire to migrate but, she will have to make good indemnity she executed when she took admission. He submits further, there is no question of unreasonable bargain since fee structure of his client, being a private college, is settled by Fee Fixation Committee headed by a retired High Court Judge. Mr. Sougata Bhattacharya, learned advocate appears on behalf of Medical Council of India and relies on regulations 6(3) and (4) to submit, in addition to regulation 6(2) already relied upon and recorded in order dated 16th July, 2018, there is embargo upon a 2nd year 4th semester medical student such as petitioner on seeking migration. He relies on regulation 6(5) for submission that at this stage if petitioner migrates, she will not be able to achieve minimum attendance in transferee college.
This Court does not find any embargo on seeking migration by regulation 6(3) and (4) as applicable to petitioner at her stage in course study. Regulation 6(3) is a qualifying regulation. It enables a medical student to apply for migration. The embargo is on applying for migration only if applicant student has commenced clinical course of study. On behalf of petitioner it is submitted clinical course study for her has not commenced.
5List on 27th July, 2018 marked at 12:30 p.m. (Arindam Sinha, J.)