Karnataka High Court
The Workmen Of Karnataka Government ... vs The Presiding Officer Principal ... on 11 February, 1999
Equivalent citations: ILR1999KAR3298, 1999(3)KARLJ421
Author: V. Gopala Gowda
Bench: V. Gopala Gowda
ORDER
1. The workmen of K.G.I.D. Employees Union have presented this petition challenging the validity and legality of the award passed by the 1st respondent-Tribunal in Industrial Dispute No. 32 of 1994, dated 26th September, 1997, urging various legal contentions.
2. The various legal contentions urged in this petition need not be adverted to in this order as the Tribunal has rejected the reference on two main grounds, namely, the points of dispute referred by the State Government to it for its adjudication conflict with the demand made by the Union, therefore, the demand of the workmen is beyond the scope of the reference, hence the reference has to be treated as bad. The 2nd ground on which the reference is rejected by the 1st respondent-Tribunal is that the claim of the Union with regard to the payment of Bonus from 1980 and its demand is dated 8-9-1992 as could be noticed from the factual report submitted by the Conciliation Officer to the State Government for exercise of its power to make a reference. Therefore, the demand is for the period from 1980 which was raised in the year 1992 after a lapse of 12 years for which there is no explanation was offered by the Union for allowing the long lapse of delay. Therefore on that ground also reference was rejected by the Tribunal.
3. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Union, Mr. L. Leelakrishnan, submits placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Management of M/s, Express Newspapers (Private) Limited, Madras v The Workers and Others, he has placed reliance at paragraph 19, in support of the case of the petitioner. He has further placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court, following the judgment of the Apex Court referred to above. In the case of Workmen of M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Limited v Management of M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Limited and Another, at paragraph 11, law has been succinctly laid down, which supports the case of the Union. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that in view of the law laid down in the aforesaid cases, the ground for rejection of the reference by the Tribunal is wholly unsus-
tainable in law, hence the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ certiorari.
4. The learned Counsel has further elaborated his submission contending that the second ground of delay in raising the dispute on which the reference is rejected by the Tribunal also is unsustainable in law, in view of the law declared by the Apex Court which is M/s. Avon Services Production Agencies (Private) Limited v Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Others, holding that the delay in raising the dispute by the workmen is no ground either for the Government either to refuse to make a reference or reject the reference. The Division Bench of this Court placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court has interpreted the various provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Central Offices and Another v Govinda Setty and Another, has held the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 has no application to the provisions of the Act. Either the Government or the Labour Court can refuse to exercise its power either to make a reference or to reject the reference by the Labour Court/Tribunal after making a reference for adjudication of the Industrial dispute as per the points referred to it on the ground that there is a delay in raising the dispute. Further, this Court has taken the view that delay by itself is no ground to reject the claim of the workmen for the reason, that the industrial dispute between the parties would exist till it is adjudicated on merits either by the Labour Court or the Tribunal.
5. The learned Additional Government Advocate, Mr. Mehaboob Ali Khan, appearing on behalf of the respondents would sought to justify the award passed by the 1st respondent-Tribunal contending that the points of dispute referred to the Tribunal by the Government is very vague. The demand made by the petitioner's Union with regard to the payment of Bonus as claimed by it in its claim statement both before the Conciliation Officer as well as before the Tribunal conflicts with each other. Therefore, the Industrial Tribunal having regard to the facts of the case and the evidence placed on record has rightly come to the conclusion and recorded a finding of fact that the claim is conflicting with the demand and points of dispute referred to it, hence the rejection of reference on this ground is justified. Elaborating his submission, he would further submit that the dispute was a stale which was raised by the petitioner's Union, which is a relevant aspect of the case, has been taken note of by the Tribunal and it has exercised its power under the provisions of the Act and rightly rejected the reference. Therefore, this Court should not find fault with the reasons assigned by it in rejecting the reference.
6. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and this Court has perused the award, and I have considered the legal submissions of both the learned Counsel appearing on bebalf of the parties and I have examined the correctness of the findings and reasons recorded by Tribunal in rejecting the reference by passing the award. The original points of dispute and the Corrigendum referred to it are extracted as here under:
7. The legal submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Management of M/s. Express Newspapers case, supra, is well-founded, hence the same must be accepted, the relevant paragraph 19 of the judgment wherein it has laid down the law as hereunder:
"(19) Then in regard to Issue No. 2, the argument is that this issue has, in fact, been determined by the Government and nothing is left to the Tribunal to consider or decide. It may be conceded that the wording of the issue is not artistic and unfortunate. As it is worded, it no doubt, prima facie gives an impression that the enquiry on this issue has to proceed on the assumption that the conduct of the appellant amounts to a lockout, and this argument is somewhat strengthened by the ill-advised and unfortunate order passed by the State Government under Section 10(3). It is hardly necessary to emphasise that since the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in dealing with industrial dispute referred to it under Section 10 is limited by Section 10(4) to the points specifically mentioned in the reference and matters incidental there, the appropriate Government should frame the relevant orders of reference carefully and the questions which are intended to be tried by the Industrial Tribunal should be so worded as to leave no scope for ambiguity or controversy. An order of reference hastily drawn or drawn in a casual manner often gives rise to unnecessary disputes and thereby prolongs the life of industrial adjudication which must always be avoided. Even so, when the question of this kind is raised before the Courts, the Courts must attempt to construe the reference not too technically or in a pedantic manner, but fairly and reasonably. Thus construed, even the inelegant phraseology in framing the issue cannot conceal the fact that in dealing with the issue, the main point which the Tribunal will have to consider is whether the strike of the respondents on April 27, 1959, was justified and whether the action of the appellant which followed the said strike is either a lockout or amounts to a closure. The respondents will contend that it is a lockout which is in the nature of an act of a reprisal on the part of the appellant, whereas the appellant will contend that it is not a lockout but a closure genuine and bona fide. Thus, having regard to the content of the dispute covered by Issue No. 2, it would not be right to suggest that the reference precludes the Tribunal from entertaining the appellant's plea that what it did on the 29th April is in fact not a lockout but a closure. The fact that the relevant action of the appellant is called a lockout does not mean that the Tribunal must hold it to be a lockout. In this connection, it may be recalled that in several cases where industrial disputes are referred for industrial adjudication in respect of certain persons named as workmen, the employers raise the contention that the specified persons are not their workmen and it has never been suggested that merely because the said persons are described as workmen in the reference, the employer is precluded from disputing their status or that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try such an incidental dispute. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Sastri is right in contending the Issue No. 2 has been so worded as to exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with the question as to whether the appellant's impugned action amounts to a closure or not".
8. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the Tribunal should not have construed the order of reference too technically or in a pedantic manner. But it should have construed the points of dispute with reference to the pleadings and material evidence on record fairly and reasonably. The Tribunal construing the points of dispute on the basis of the phraseology in framing the issue cannot conceal the fact in dealing with the issue. The Tribunal ought to have considered as to whether the demand made by the workmen was with regard to the payment of bonus for the relevant period. It was the statutory duty cast upon the Tribunal to find out the exact dispute between the parties with reference to the pleadings and evidence on record and it should have answered the reference. Even if the points of dispute are very vague and suffers from ambiguity, it is the statutory duty of the Tribunal to find out the exact dispute between the parties and adjudicate the same. Therefore, the reasons assigned at paragraphs 17 and 18 of the impugned award by the Tribunal in rejecting the reference are bad in law, hence the award passed by it is wholly unsustainable in law.
9. Further submission of the learned Counsel for the Union placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court and the Division Bench judgment of this Court referred to above with regard to the delay in raising the industrial dispute which was referred to it for its adjudication, the Tribunal should have borne in mind the law laid down in this regard that delay by itself is no ground to reject the reference. The Labour Court should have considered the law laid down in this regard and should not have considered the provisions of the Limitation Act as the same have no application to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. That would amounts to re-writing the statute by the Tribunal which is not permissible in law. The Industrial Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration all the relevant facts having regard to the fact that the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court that the industrial dispute between the parties would exist until it is adjudicated on merits either by the Labour Court or the Tribunal.
10. In this view of the matter, the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate cannot be accepted as the same is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court. The Tribunal while rejecting the reference on the grounds referred to above, it has not discharged its statutory duty adverting to the pleadings and the evidence on record. Therefore, it is a proper and fit ease for this Court to remit back the matter to the Tribunal for its fresh consideration on merits of the case. For the reasons stated above, this petition must succeed. Accordingly, I pass the following:
ORDER The writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. The matter is remitted back to the 1st respondent-Tribunal with a direction to re-examine the case on merits and pass an appropriate award in accordance with law within three months from the date of receipt of this order.