Allahabad High Court
Guddu Singh vs District Magistrate And Ors. on 8 January, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003CRILJ2296
Author: Vishnu Sahai
Bench: Vishnu Sahai, R.C. Pandey
JUDGMENT Vishnu Sahai, J.
1. Through this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner detenu Guddu Singh has impugned the order dated 3-8-2002, passed by the first respondent Mr. V. K. Varshney, District Magistrate Kheri detaining him under Section 3(3) of the National Security Act. (actually it should have been Section 3(2) of the National Security Act).
The detention order along with the grounds of detention, which are also dated 3-8-2002 was served on the petitioner-detenu on 3-8-2002 itself and their true copies have been annexed as Annexure Nos. 1 and 2 respectively to the writ petition.
2. The prejudicial activities of the petitioner detenu impelling the first respondent to issue the impugned detention order against him are contained in Annexure No. 2. A perusal of Annexure No. 2 would show that the impugned order is founded on a solitary CR No. 168 of 2002 under Sections 147/148/149/302/307/452/379/504 IPC and 3(2)(V) of ST/ST Act of P. S. Maigalganj, district Kheri, which was registered on the basis of a complaint dated 25-7-2002 lodged by Rajendra Prasad Raidas at the said Police Station.
Since in our view, this writ petition deserves to succeed, on the averments contained in Paragraph 26 of the petition and ground 29 (h) thereof, we are not adverting to the prejudicial activities of the petitioner-detenu pertaining to said C.R.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
The pleading in Paragraph 26 of the petition and ground 29 (h) thereof is that on account of non-communication by the detaining authority about time period in which the petitioner could make a representation to the detaining authority the detention order is rendered violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
4. Mr. Amrendra Singh learned counsel for the petitioner-detenu invited our attention to the grounds of detention and pointed out that therein the petitioner has only been given an option to make a representation to the detaining authority (the language in the grounds of detention is "YADI AAP CHAHEIN TO MUJHE BHEE APANA ABYAVEDAN DE SAKATE HAIN). He also urged that the right of detenu to make a representation to the detaining authority is only available to the detenu till the detention order is approved by the State Government and pointed, out that in the grounds of detention it has not been mentioned that detenu could avail of such right till approval of detention order by the State Government.
5. The averments contained in Paragraph 26 of the petition and ground 29 (h) thereof have been replied to in Paragraph 17 of the return of Mr. V.K. Varnshey (detaining authority). The said paragraph reads thus :
"That in reply to the contents of Paragraph 24 to 29 of the writ petition, it is stated that the detention of the petitioner is on the basis of valid detention order, the writ petition has no force, deserves to be dismissed."
6. Mr. S.K. Singh, learned counsel for the Respondents 1, 2 and 3 invited our attention to Paragraph 3 of the return of Mr. C. P. Singh, Deputy Secretary, Home and Confidential Department, U.P. Civil Secretariat, Lucknow and contended that since in the said paragraph it has been mentioned that petitioner has made representation to the detaining authority on 23-8-2002, the circumstance that in the grounds of detention he was only given an option to make representation to the detaining authority would not enure to his advantage. He contended that for the same reason the fact that in the grounds of detention the detenu was not conveyed that his right to make representation to the detaining authority was only available to him till approval of detention order by the State Government would not enure to the benefit of the detenu.
7. We have considered the rival submissions and averments made in the rival affidavits. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Santosh Shankar Acharya reported in 2000 Cri LJ 3939 : AIR 2000 SC 2504, while dealing with a preventive detention order under Section 3 (2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drugs Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as MPDA Act) Has in Paragraph 6 has laid down that till the detention order is approved by the State Government, the detenu has a right to make representation to the detaining authority and non-communication of the said right would constitute an infraction of the valuable constitutional right guaranteed to the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and would make the order of detention invalid.
In our view, since the provisions contained in Sections 3, 8 and 14 of the National Security Act are analogous to those contained in Section 3, 8 and 14 of the MPDA Act the ratio laid down in Santosh Shankar Acharya, 2000 Cri LJ 3939 (supra) would be wholly applicable to the facts of the present case.
8. It is true that petitioner did make representation to the detaining authority on 23-8-2002 but that was after approval of the detention order (as is manifest from Paragraph 4 of the return of Mr. C.P. Singh, the detention order was approved by State Government on 9-8-2002).
9. Article 22(5) of the Constitution reads thus:
"22(5) : When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order".
A perusal of the said Article would show that detenu has two distinct fundamental rights namely;
(a) of being communicated by the detaining authority as soon as may be the grounds of detention; and
(b) of being afforded by the detaining authority the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order.
It is well-settled that violation of either of the said fundamental rights would vitiate the detention of the detenu.
10. Since in the instant case, the right of the detenu to make a representation to the detaining authority was available to him till the detention order was approved by the State Government and in the grounds of detention he was not communicated by the detaining authority this time limit, the fundamental right of detenu of being communicated the grounds of detention is violated. A partial communication of the grounds of detention of the type, which is here, would amount to non-communication of the grounds of detention.
11. In our view from the circumstance that the detenu made a representation to the detaining authority on 23-8-2002, it cannot be inferred that he was aware that his right to make a representation to the detaining authority was available to him till approval of the detention order by the State Government, which as we have seen earlier was made on 9-8-2002. It may be that detenu was labouring under the belief that said right to make a representation was available to him till last day of the life of the impugned detention order. It is well-settled that in a preventive detention matter the benefit of any omission/vagueness/doubt would enure to the advantage of the detenu.
12. Since it was the bounden duty of the detaining authority to have apprised the detenu that his right to make representation to him was only available to him (the detenu) till the detention order was approved by the State Government and the detenu was not informed this, the first facet of the detenu's fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, namely, of being communicated the grounds of detention would stand infracted, rendering the detention order illegal and bad in law.
13. For the aforesaid reasons we allow this writ petition; quash and set aside the impugned detention order; and direct that the petitioner detenu Guddu Singh be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case.