Bombay High Court
Evaristo Estenaslaoc Rodrigues And ... vs Vaman Anant Parab Mahambrey And Ors. on 18 October, 1985
Equivalent citations: 1986(3)BOMCR560
JUDGMENT G.F. Couto, J.
1. This writ petition gives rise to an interesting question of law, namely whether a landlord can get vacant possession of the premises let out by him for commercial purposes on the ground of its bona fide requirement for his residence.
2. The petitioners are the owners of a house property situated at Patte Ribandar. The said property belonged to the parents of the first, second, fourth, fifth and seventh petitioners and one Custodia, Rodrigues who is another brother of the petitioners. The said Rodrigues filed a civil suit for division of the said property in the Court of the Civil Judge, (Senior Division) Panaji and the said house property was divided in the said suit. A portion of the said house laying to the South was allotted to the said Rodrigues and the remaining portion was allotted to the petitioners. By a lease agreement dated 4th January, 1957, a part of the said building was let out by the petitioners and Custodia Rodrigues to the first respondent for the purpose of carrying on commercial activity, particularly, to run a grocery shop. The said lease agreement was renewed on or about 11th February, 1966 and it was mentioned, at the time, that the period of lease was for six years beginning from 5th January, 1966. Thereafter, there was no renewal, but respondent No. 1 continued to occupy the rented premises as a statutory tenant. Then in the month of July, 1977, the petitioners and Custodio Rodrigues gave an Advocate's notice to the first respondent asking him the evict the rented premises on the ground that not only he was in arrears of rent for a period of 21/2 years but also that the said premises were required by the petitioners and Custodia Rodrigues for their bona fide personal occupation and for bona fide use as additional accommodation. Then, respondent No. 1 moved an application under section 18 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") before the Rent Controller, Goa North Division, Panaji, Respondent No. 1 was permitted to deposit the arrears of the rent by the Rent Controller and he has continued to deposit the monthly rent in the proceedings. The petitioners are residing in a part of the said house continues to the rented premises, and the part occupied by them consists of one room serving as a hall, two other rooms which are utilised as bedrooms and a kitchen-cum-dining room. One aunt of the petitioners is residing with them, the total of number of persons occupying the said portion being ten persons. The said portion of the house is not as such sufficient for the residential needs of the petitioners and therefore, on account of paucity of accommodation, petitioner No. 2 is residing with his in-laws in a different place at Ribandar. He desires to come back to the house belonging to him and his brothers. The rented premises are sufficiently large and if added to the portion occupied by petitioners, will give enough accommodation to satisfy the matters needs. The petitioners, therefore, filed a civil suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Panaji, for eviction of the first respondent from the rented premises on the ground of personal occupation. Resisting this suit, the first respondent raised the question that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction since it was the Court of the Rent Controller which could exercise under the Act the power of eviction. A preliminary issue was framed and by his judgement and order dated 13-1-1983, the learned Civil Judge, Panaji, dismissed the suit. After this judgment of dismissal of the suit, the petitioners filed a rent eviction application before the Rent Controller, Goa North Division, Panaji, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, seeking eviction of the first respondent from the rented premises on the ground of bona fide requirement thereof for personal occupation under section 23 of the Act. The first respondent resisted this application, mainly, on the ground that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that the application filed by the petitioners was not maintainable either under section 23(3) of the Act or under any other provision. By his judgement and order dated 19th November, 1983, the Additional Rent Controller, who was dealing with the matter held that the eviction application filed by the petitioners was maintainable and that the petitioners' case was covered by section 23 of the Act. The first respondent, however, being aggrieved preferred an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal which was later on treated as a revision. This revision application was ultimately decided by the Administrative Tribunal by its judgment and order dated 15th January, 1985. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and, accordings, quashed and set aside the judgement and order passed by the Additional Rent Controller on 19th November, 1983. It is against this judgment and order that the present writ petition is directed.
3. The petitioners assail the said judgment mainly on the ground that the Tribunal has wrongly construed the provision of section 23 of the Act in as much as it imported in sub-section (3) thereof the definition of building given in section 2(e). In fact Mr. Surendra Desai, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners invited my attention to the observations made by the Tribunal in para 5 of the impugned judgment and submitted that the reasoning of the Tribunal is patently wrong, for as can be seen from section 2 of the Act, the definitions given therein are to be considered only when the context in which the expression or the word defined in section 2 occurs does not require otherwise. Now, according to the learned Counsel, Clause (e) of section 2 defines "building" as meaning any building or part of a building, which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose and includes the garden, ground and out-houses, if any, appertaining to such building use in such building or part of the building as well as any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of the building. Manifestly, this definition cannot be read in section 23 of the Act which deals with the right of the landlord to obtain possession. In the context of section 23, the learned Counsel further contended, the word "building" has to be necessarily construed in a manner different from the definition given in section 2(3). He specifically brought to my attention that sub-section (3) provides that a landlord who is occupying only a part of a residential building, may, notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his own use or for the use of any member of his family. In the present case, the building is a house which is structurally a residential building. A part of that building was let out to first respondent for commercial purposes but, nonetheless, the building as such continues to be a residential building. In such case, what is material is the real structure of the building for deciding whether or not the provision of sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act applied. To read in the said provision of law, the argument proceeded, the definition of building given in Clause (e) of section 2 of the Act would be improper, for that will do violence to its language and substance. In this connection, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Punjab and Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Madras High Courts in Sampran Kaur v. Sant Singh, ; Sujan Singh v. Shobha Nath, , Jagitkumar v. Jagdeeshchandra, ; Dakshinamoorthy v. Thulja Bai, and of the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz v. Menghani, .
4. Mr. S.K. Kakodkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, however jointed issue with Mr. Desai and urged that there was no reason whatsoever for this Court to interfere with the impugned judgment in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. He contended that, first of all, the petitioners had not pleaded that the portion of the building occupied by the first respondent is a residential building and that they require the said portion for their occupation. This was absolutely necessary in order to get the reliefs sought. Therefore, in the absence of such pleadings before the Rent Controller, he had no jurisdiction at all to deal with the matter Reliance was placed in support of these submissions on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagindas v. Dalpatram, and of the Delhi High Court in N.D. Khanna v. Hindustan Industrial Corpn., . Secondly the impugned order is not absurd and there is nothing wrong with it. On the contrary, the construction given by the Administrative Tribunal to the provision of section 23(2) of the Act is not only absolutely compatible with its wording, but also entirely correct. In such circumstances, the learned Counsel urged that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution should not be exercised as observed by the Supreme Court in Sayed Yakooh v. Radhakrishnan, as well as in Mohd.Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, . Apart from this aspect of the case, the learned Counsel contended that even on merits, the petitioners have no case at all. He submitted that the test to classify a building as residential or non-residential is that of the user and, in any event, interpretation of provision of law regarding rent matters should be in favour of the tenant. Then placing reliance on the decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Dakshinamoorthy v. Thulja Bai, , he submitted that the purpose for which a building was let out, and not its structural fitness, constitute the relevant test to classify whether or not the building is residential or non-residential.
5. In para 5 of the impugned judgment the Administrative Tribunal held the view that by virtue of the definition of building given in section 2(e) of the Act, there can be several buildings within the same structure in accordance with the purposes for which each part of the structure has been let out. Thus, if a part of a building was let out for residential purposes, other for commercial purposes and the third for any other purpose, there will be , under the Act, three buildings within the same structure, one being residential, other commercial and the third for the other purpose. The Tribunal further observed that section 22 of the Act provides for the grounds of eviction and except in Clause (e) thereof, speaks of building without making any distinction whether it is let out for residential, commercial or any other purpose, and therefore, the said section 22 would govern eviction cases of all types of buildings including the one let out for residential, commercial or other purposes. The Tribunal then proceeded to observe that section 23 contemplates an additional right given to the landlord under which he may seek possession of the rented premises in respect of residential and non-residential buildings and that in case of a non-residential building, the right to obtain possession is limited to those non-residential buildings which are used for the purpose of keeping vehicles or adapted for such use. This being so, the Tribunal held the view that the question of seeking possession of a building let our for commercial purpose would not arise either under section 23(1)(a) or under section 23(1)(b) of the Act since both the said clauses omit any reference to a building let out for commercial purpose. This view of the Tribunal would appear to be correct in the light of the definition of building given in section 2(e) of the Act and the circumstances that in sub-section (3) of section 23 a reference is made to a residential building. It was however, contended by Mr. Desai that this is not so, because the definition of building given in the said section 2(e) cannot be read in sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act, as such meaning does not fit in it and causes violence to its language. It would, therefore, advert to the aforesaid provisions of law,
6. Section 2(e) defines "building" as meaning :-
"any building or part of a building, which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes -
(i) the garden, ground and out-houses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of the building;
(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building, but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house."
Section 23 of the Act deals with the landlord's right to obtain possession. In sub-section (1), it lays down that a landlord may, subject to the provisions of section 24, apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the building (a) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family, or if the landlord who has more buildings that one in the city, town or village concerned is in occupation of one such building and he bona fide requires another building instead, for his own occupation, or (b) in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord requires it for his own or to the possession of which he is entitled in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under the Act or otherwise. Sub-section(2) provides that where the landlord of a residential building is a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution, it may, if the building is required for the purposes of the institution, apply to the Controller, subject to the provisions of section 24, for an order directing the tenant to put the institution in possession of the building. Then, sub-section (3) provides as under :-
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a residential building, may notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his own use or for the use of any member of his family."
It is thus indisputable and clear that section 23 of the Act provides additional grounds for eviction of a tenant by enabling the landlord to get possession of the let out building in cases where he bona fide requires it for his personal occupation. In sub-section (1)(a), it deals with residential buildings which are occupied and which are required for personal residential occupation of the landlord and in Clause (b), with the case of non-residential building which are being used exclusively for the purposes of keeping a vehicle or which are adapted for such use. Sub-section (2) deals with buildings belonging to religious, charitable, educational or other public institutions and finally, in sub-section (3) deals with a case where a part of a residential building is occupied by the landlord and the other part is let out to a tenant. Thus, it would appear that in the scheme of section 23 of the Act, the landlord can be put in possession of a building that has been let out only when such building is a residential building and he requires it for his personal occupation. In fact the only case envisaged in section 23 where the landlord can get possession of a non-residential building for his own personal occupation is the one which is contemplated in sub-section 1(b) i.e. of a building which is being used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle adopted for such use. Now, under section 2(e) of the Act, a building can be the whole structure or part of the structure which is or is intended to be let separately for use as residence or for commercial use of or any other purpose. It would also, therefore, appear that under the Act the purpose for which a building is let out is the test laid down in the law for determining the nature of a building and for classifying it as residential or non-residential. The word "separately" occurring in the definition of "building" in section 2(e) of the Act makes it indeed clear that if the building is let out for a composite purpose, say for residential and commercial purpose, then the dominant purpose will possibly define the nature of the building. But if a building is separately let out for a single purpose, whether residential or commercial or industrial, such building will become residential or non-residential in accordance with the particular purpose for which it was let out. In the circumstances, therefore, I find it rather difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Dessai that to read the definition of building given by section 2(e) in sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act will amount to cause violence to the wording and substance of this provision of law. It is true that Mr. Desai, placing reliance in Sampran Kaur's case (supra), submitted that the word "building" occurring in section 23(3) of the Act includes the integrated larger building as a whole rather than a part thereof demised to a particular tenant alone. Similarly, relying in Sujan Singh's case, he submitted that since the portion let out to the first respondent is only a small part of the whole building, the said portion does not become non-residential so as to dis-entitle the petitioners to seek the eviction of the said respondent for bona fide requirement thereof for their own use and occupation. Mr. Desai placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Firm Panjumal Daulatram v. Sakhi Gopal, , and further urged that, as observed by the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz's case, the purpose of the lease is not a decisive test to establish the character of the building.
7. In Sampran Kaur's case the Punjab and Haryana High Court, while dealing with section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949, and the definition of the building given in the said Act, observed that the word "building" in section 2 is not in terms absolute but is subject to contextual limitations, for the very opening part of the said section makes it explicit that the definition is to apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or the context. It was, therefore, held that the use of word "building" in section 13(3)(a)(iii) has to be viewed in its particular textual context and not with any inflexible absoluteness of the literal terms of Clause (a) of section 2 and as such, it is possible to construe the word "building" as use in section 13(3)(a)(iii) to include the integrated larger building as a whole, rather than the part thereof demised to a particular tenant alone. These observations, as I have already mentioned, were made in connection with the provisions of section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Section 2 of the said Act deals with definitions and is couched in terms which are similar to those of the Act. In fact, section 2 of the Act also opens with the following words :-
"In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.................................................................."
Thus, just like in the said Punjab Act, the definitions given in section 2 of the Act will not be operative if the context where the defined word occurs requires otherwise. I have, in the premises no quarrel with the above observations made in Sampran Kaur's case and, on the contrary, I fully agree with them. I am indeed of the view that if a word or expression defined in section 2 of the Act occurs in any provision thereof, ordinarily such word or expression will have the meaning as given in section 2, or in other words, the definition, in section 2 is to be read in that particular provisions; if, however, the meaning given in the definition is repugnant to the context of that particular provision of law, then, obviously, in view of the opening part of section 2 itself, the said word or expression is to be given a meaning which is consistent with that provision. But this does not help the petitioners, for as I have already observed, in the context of section 23(8) of the Act, the meaning of building given in section 2(e) is entirely consistent with the provision of section 23 and not at all repugnant to it. Thus the said authority of the Punjab and Haryana High Court does not advance the case of the petitioners and it is not possible, on the facts and circumstances of this case, to hold that the word "building" occurring in sub-section (3) of section 23 includes the integrated larger building.
8. I will now turn to Sujan Singh's case. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held in that case the view that where a very small portion of a residential building is let out for non-residential purposes, it does not mean that the particular portion has become non-residential so as to disentitle the landlord to seek ejectment of a tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for his own use and occupation. These observations, were also made while dealing with section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, following the ruling of the same High Court in Sampran Kaur's case and considering the particular definition of building given in that Act, which is entirely different from the definition of building in the Act. This definition makes in my view, all the difference, because under the Act if a part of a building is separately let out for one or other purpose, that part will become a separate building, residential or non-residential according to the purpose of letting. Therefore, Sujan Singh's case clearly distinguishable and does not help the petitioners.
9. A reference may be made also to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kanti Khare v. Kali Prasad, A.I.R. 1983 Allahabad 45. While dealing in that case with sections 12, 16 and 18 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a residential building is a building which is used for residential purpose, i.e. in which people reside or dwell, the word "residence" being equivalent to "residential" in contradiction to "business" and having reference to the use or mode of occupancy to which the property may be put. Therefore, the Division Bench observed, a building used as a place of abode and in which no business is carried on, is used for residential purpose. It further observed that in India, it is not unknown that a building is used both for residence as well as for commercial purpose and in such an event, the controversy required to be decided is as to what is the dominant purpose which would determine the nature of building. I am afraid that this authority also relied upon by Mr. Desai does not advance his case because the above observations were made in a particular context of the facts, namely, that the same building was occupied both for the purposes of residence and non-residential purposes. It was in those premises that the Allahabad High Court held the view that the test of the predominance of the user determines the nature of the building. In our case, however, in the light of the definition of building in section 2(e) of the Act, separate and distinct buildings can exist within the same larger structure if parts of the latter were or are separately let out for one or other purpose. Therefore, in such case, there will be different buildings unlike in the case before the Allahabad High Court, a circumstance that makes the said observations non-applicable to the case before me.
10. Mr. Desai also relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz v. Menghani and in Firm Panjumal Daulatram v Sakhi Gopal , In Busching Schmitz's case, their Lordship of the Supreme Court held that residential premises are not only those which are let out for residential purposes nor do they cover all kinds of structures where humans may manage to dwell. The use or purpose of letting, the Court observed, is no conclusive test. Whatever is suitable or adaptable for residential uses, even by making some changes can be designated 'residential premises' and therefore, once it is 'residential' in the liberal sense, section 14-A or the Delhi Rent Control Act stands attracted. It was further observed that if a beautiful bungalow were let out to a business, or to run a show-room or for a meditational or musical uses, it remains non-the less a residential accommodation. All these observations were made by the Supreme Court in the context of section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act which gives the right to recover immediate possession of premises by the Government and for the purpose of emphasising that otherwise eviction proceedings could be resisted on the ground that residential premises were let out for a residential-cum-commercial purposes and thus, the very purpose of section 14-A would be defeated. Similarly, in Sakhi Gopal's case, while dealing with section 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the Supreme Court observed that the residential portion of a building is a part thereof and is an accommodation by definition. The non-residential portion is also as a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. That was, however, a case where the lease agreement was composite i.e. for residential and non-residential purposes and it was in that context of facts that their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that in such a case, the landlord is entitled to an eviction of the non-residential portion if he makes out a bona fide residential requirement. In the circumstances, therefore, the observations of the Supreme Court in the above referred two authorities are clearly distinguishable and not attracted to the case before me. These observations were indeed made in reference to the particular facts of the cases before the Supreme Court which are substantially different from those before me.
11. The learned Counsel also sough support for his view in the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Dakshinamoorthy's case (Supra). The Full Bench has, in fact, held in the said case that for the purpose of determining whether a building is residential or non-residential, one has to bear in mind a few salient considerations, such as (1) where there is an instrument of tenancy specifically and explicitly declaring the purpose of the letting as residential, or non-residential no difficulty generally arises; (2) where there is no such instrument of tenancy, the question will have to be considered on the basis of direct evidence aliunde (sic) concerning the purpose of the letting, which may be adduced in a case (3) if no such evidence too is forth coming, the Court can only look at the evidence concerning the user of the premises by the tenant down acquired in by the landlord, (4) where there is evidence of such user, but there is no evidence of such acquiescence, the structural design, the antecedent user of the building by the landlord as known to the tenant and other surrounding circumstances, if any, will also have to enter into the determination of the question whether the building is or is not residential; and (5) difficulty may sometimes still remain, i.e. after applying the test above indicated, if the buildings is found let for both kinds of purposes, residential and non-residential, no distinction being made between one part as let for one purpose and the other for other purpose. In such a case, what has to be determined as a question of fact is what was the real, main and substantial purpose of the letting. These observations of the Madras High Court, however, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Kakodkar, instead of supporting the case of the petitioners run counter. First of all, it may be pointed out that it is common ground that the petitioners themselves let out to the first respondent the portion occupied by him for commercial purposes. Therefore, not only the purpose of letting was specifically stated to be non-commercial in the agreement of lease but also the occupation for such purpose had been acquiesced by the petitioners in the circumstances, applying the observations made by the Madras High Court, I have to hold that it is the purpose for which the building was let out as per the agreement that will define its nature. I may also mention that the Madras High Court, while reaching the aforesaid conclusions, had observed that what is at the inception a residential letting, and any conversion, after the letting, of a residential building into a non-residential may well take place within and only within the limits which the statue prescribes, and further that to hold that, if prior to a letting a building happens to have been of one character it must for ever keep that character irrespective of what the effect of the letting or of the acts of parties subsequent to the letting may be a difficult, if not possible, position. It is thus clear that the view taken by the Madras High Court is that the purpose of letting is the test that governs the classification of a building as residential or non-residential, a view that is obviously adverse to the petitioner's case.
12. It is therefore, undisputable that in the scheme of section 23 of the Act, a landlord can obtain possession of a let out building from his tenant if he bona fidely requires it for his own occupation only in cases where the rented premises are residential, with the sole exception of a building which is occupied for keeping a vehicle or adapted for such purpose. Thus, in the present case where within the same structure there are two building; one let out for commercial purpose and the other occupied for residential purpose, it is obvious that the petitioners are not entitled to get the first respondent evicted from the portion he is occupying as a tenant for commercial purposes.
13. Though not necessary, I will now deal with the contention of Mr.Kakodkar, according to which, in any event, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief on two grounds, namely, (i) that they have not pleaded that the first respondent is occupying a part of a residential building and (ii) that the order of the Administrative Tribunal is not absurd and, therefore, it is not open to this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In support of his first contention, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagindas's case (supra). He urged that since under sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act, the since qua non for enabling the landlord to take resource to the said provision is that he is occupying a part of a residential building and the remaining portion of the same building is being occupied by the tenant, such fact ought to have been pleaded and that much was not done. In Nagindas's case, the Supreme Court observed that at the existence of one of the statutory grounds is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the lower Court under the provisions of the respective Act and hence, the failure of the petitioners in making such averment acts as a bar for this Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
14. It was, however, contended by Mr. Desai that on going through the pleadings before the Rent Controller, it is clear that whatever is necessary for the purpose of taking resource to sub-section(3) of section 23 of the Act has been actually averted. In fact, it was said that the building in question is a house and that part of it had been let our for commercial purpose by the petitioners.
15. Exhibit P-3 is a copy of the application for eviction filed by the petitioners before the Rent Controller. On going through the said application I do not find any support to the submission made by Mr.. Dessai. In fact though in para 1 of the said application, it is said that the petitioners are landlords of a building situated at Ribandar and that there is a house in said property, nowhere it is stated that the whole building is merely a residential house. On the contrary, it is specifically averred in para 3 that part of the said building has been let out to the first respondent for the purpose of his carrying in the said place commercial activities. In the circumstances, therefore, it would be wrong to say that the petitioners have pleaded all the essential facts that entitle them get possession of the demised premises under sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Act. On this ground also, therefore, and in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Nagindas's case the petition could not have been allowed.
16. In so far as the second contention of Mr. Kakodkar is concerned I find myself entirely in agreement with him in as much as he submitted that the order of the Administrative Tribunal, far from being absurd, is on the contrary consistent with the relevant provisions of law. Mr. Kakodkar contented, and rightly that in such circumstances the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is not justified. I draw support for this view in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) where in the Supreme Court observed that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or Tribunals in cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction or in excess of it or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction and similarly where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court of Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be head to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. These observations of the Supreme Court have great relevance in the case before me, for, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Kakodakr, the Administrative Tribunal has not committed any error of fact or of law in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it. Thus, I am afraid that in the circumstances, it will not be proper for this Court to interfere with the judgment of the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. I may also point out that even if the decision of the Administrative Tribunal was erroneous that would not have been by itself sufficient to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. In fact, as observed by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus's case (supra) the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. The Supreme Court also observed that in exercising such supervisory powers the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal and least review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.
17. The result is, therefore, that this petition fails and is consequently dismissed with costs. The rule is accordingly discharged.
Petition dismissed.