Allahabad High Court
Purnmasi Yadav vs Narbedeshwar Tripathi And Others on 27 January, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(2)AWC831, AIR 1998 ALLAHABAD 260, 1998 ALL. L. J. 1627, 1998 (32) ALL LR 611, 1998 (2) ALL WC 831, 1998 (4) RECCIVR 201, 1998 (1) ALL RENTCAS 301, 1998 (2) CIVILCOURTC 678
Author: S.K. Phaujdar
Bench: S.K. Phaujdar
JUDGMENT S.K. Phaujdar, J.
1. This appeal was preferred along with an application for condonation of delay. The parties were heard. The delay was for about nine days as it was in time upto 3.1.1994 and the appeal was presented on 12.1.1994. In view of this insignificant delay, the prayer under Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands allowed. The appeal was also heard on merits including a preliminary objection on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The appeal is directed against the first appellate judgment and decree dated 23.9.1993 recorded by the District Judge. Gorakhpur in Civil Appeal No. 49 of 1993, which was preferred by the present appellant. The aforesaid civil appeal was dismissed and the decree of rejection of the plaint by the court below was upheld.
3. It appears that the present appellant filed Suit No. 318 of 1993 before the Civil Judge. Gorakhpur, for a declaration and injunction against the present respondent Nos. 1 to 6 in respect of a particular piece of land. It was prayed therein that a declaration be made that the compromise decree in Suit No. 455 of 1993, was void and was not binding on the plaintiff. There was further prayer for injunction so that the execution of the said compromise decree be stayed. The learned Court below took up the prayer for injunction on 1.9.1993 and had considered the objections raised by the defendants in the suit and after a thorough discussion of the cases of the parties, Including a defence of the defendants concerning the rent notes, came to the conclusion that the consideration of the documents Indicated no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. He was further of the view that the suit was of such nature which, from a reading of the plaint, indicated that it was filed mala fide with a view to harass the other party. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court as in 1978 ACJ 22 to hold that the dictum applied fully to the facts of the case. The dictum of the Supreme Court, as quoted by the trial Judge, was as follows :
"If on a meaningful reading of the plaint it appears manifestly fictitious and merltless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, courts should exercise powers under Order VII. Rule 11, C.P.C. If the litigation is Inspired by vexatious motive, it should remember the provision of Section 35A, C.P.C."
The court below not only dismissed the prayer for injunction but also rejected the plaint under Order VII. Rule 11. C.P.C.
4. When the matter was taken up in appeal before the District Judge, he too found that the trial court had heard the parties, perused the affidavit and documentary evidence filed by the parties in respect of their respective claims and then had arrived at the conclusion that the plaint was filed by the plaintiff for vexatious motive and was altogether meaningless. The appellate court also went on to find if the plaintiff-appellant had any right on the land in dispute and he decided that the entry in clause 8 of the revenue records was fake and fictitious and without any title. The appellate court also recorded an order against the claim of the plaintiff-appellant on the basis of adverse possession and found that the plaintiff-appellant had no right title over the land in dispute and so no valuable right of him had been jeopardised by the decree in the suit under challenge. The appellate court then confirmed the rejection of the plaint under Order VII. Rule 11, C.P.C. 5. The power under Order VII, Rule 11 speaks of rejection of plaint under four circumstances, the first one being non-disclosure of cause of action, and the last one is on a bar of suit under any provision of law. The other two grounds on which a plaint could be rejected relate to valuation and non-payment of court-fees, which are not matters concerned with the present case. For an order under Order VII, Rule 11. C.P.C., it is the plaint and the plaint alone which is to be considered and if the plaint made out a case Indicating a cause of action, then the falsity of the claim would be a matter to be determined at the trial and if at all the suit was found to be vexatious or based on false assertion, the plaintiff would be liable for compensatory costs under Section 35A, C.P.C. The Judgment of the Supreme Court that was quoted by the trial Judge also spoke that a meaningful reading of the plaint was necessary before rejecting a plaint under Order VII. Rule 11.C.P.C.
6. At this juncture, it may be necessary to take up the preliminary objection. raised by the learned counsel for respondents. It was stated that by the order dated 1.9.1993 the injunction prayer was disallowed and the plaintiff had a right to file a miscellaneous appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure and against such an appeal, no second appeal would lie. It was further stated that the plaintiff had deliberately paid a deficient court-fee before the lower appellate court. This point of court-fee should have been raised before the court below, but the judgment of the first appellate court does not Indicate raising of any such objection. As regards the first part of the objection, it can only be observed that although the prayer for Injunction was rejected on 1.9.1993, by the same order, the plaint was also rejected and the rejection of the plaint amounted to a decree as per Section 2, C.P.C. and the Interim order or its refusal merged in this decree. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that only the judgment was filed and not the decree and so the civil appeal before the lower appellate court was not competent under Section 96. The definition of 'decree', as given in the Code of Civil Procedure, Indicates that rejection of a plaint is covered within the term 'decree' and as such, in my view, there should not have been any further formal recording of the decree to enable the appellant to make an appeal. Moreover, this point should have been raised before the first appellate court.
7. Coming to the plaint, it is found that in Para 18 the plaintiff indicated the cause of action with an averment that the cause of action first arose on 1.7.1993 when the two sets of defendants colluded to deny payment of rent of the suit property. It was stated that the suit property was wrongly described in the earlier suit to obtain a compromise decree. It appears further that the two courts below had taken into account materials beyond the plaint to declare the case of the plaintiff as frivolous and vexatious. This was beyond the scope of Order VII. Rule 11. C.P.C. The plaint alone was to be read for an order under that provision and non-disclosure of cause of action was certainly a point different from non-maintainability of a suit. The courts below did not find. In clear terms, that the plaint itself did not disclose any cause of action or it was haired under some provision of some law or other.
8. Under these circumstances, it must be stated that the appeal has sufficient force in it and it is necessary that the matter should go back to the court of first instance for a fresh decision on the facts. It would be open for the trial court to come to a conclusion, if any of the conditions under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. was present. If not the court would proceed with the trial and would conclude it at an early date.
9. In the result, the appeal stands allowed. The order of rejection of the plaint by the trial Judge and Its confirmation by the lower appellate court are set aside. The matter is remitted back to the trial Judge for consideration, as Indicated in the penultimate paragraph of this Judgment. There will be no order as to costs.