Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Indian Council Of Agricultural ... vs Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyd ... on 22 January, 2021
Bench: C.Praveen Kumar, B Krishna Mohan
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HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
Writ Petition No. 3930 of 2013
And
Writ Petition No. 8203 of 2013
COMMON ORDER:(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice C. Praveen Kumar) These Writ Petitions are disposed of through BlueJeans video conferencing App.
1) Since, both these Writ Petitions are filed challenging the Order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, dated 27.04.2012, in O.A. No. 673 of 2011, the same are disposed of by this Common Order.
2) The facts, which lead to filing of these Writ Petitions, are as under:-
(i) One G. Hemasundera Rao ['Applicant'] in O.A. was working as a Tractor Driver in Central Tobacco Research Institute ['CTRI'], Rajahmundry, during the year 2003 to 2008. Initially, he was transferred from Rajahmundry to Veda Sundur in Tamil Nadu in February 2008 and in the month of July 2008 was transferred back to Kandukuru in Prakasam District.
While he was working at Kandukuru, memos came to be issued stating that his performance in handling 2 the tractor was not good and that he was driving the tractor slowly, taking more time than required in ploughing, thereby affecting the field operations.
(ii) While things stood thus, a complaint, dated 11.01.2008, was received by the CTRI, alleging that the Applicant was repeatedly harassing one Ms.T.Swetha, thereby causing hurt to her modesty. It has been further stated that the Applicant was stalking her; indecently proposed her and made an attempt to lure her to come to his house. Basing on these allegations, the Director of the Institute conducted preliminary investigation.
(iii) After obtaining the written statement of Ms.T.Swetha, dated 18.01.2008 and 22.01.2008, memorandums, dated 11.09.2008, 16.10.2008 and 23.09.2009, were issued to the Applicant calling for his explanation. However, the Applicant submitted a reply to the memorandums on 05.10.2009. The Applicant was placed under suspicion in the month of October 2009. A charge memo, dated 09.03.2010, came to be issued by the Disciplinary Authority, under Rule 14 containing three [03] Articles of Charge including the charge of hurting the modesty of Ms. T. Swetha. 3
(iv) The Applicant submitted his written statement denying the contents of the charge-memo and further stated that the written statement of the complainant Ms.T.Swetha is found to be forged.
(v) Not being satisfied with the explanation given, the Director, CTRI, appointed one Dr. Smt. Suman Kalyanai, as an Inquiry Officer to hold an inquiry in respect of the Charges. After giving due opportunity to the Applicant, the inquiry was conducted as per Rules and all the three [03] Charges were held proved, vide Report, dated 31.07.2010. Later on, the Applicant submitted a detailed representation, dated 21.08.2010, to the Director, CTRI, in respect of the aforesaid report, wherein, he sought for imposing lesser penalty. Taking into consideration the finding of the Inquiry Officer and after considering the representation, the authorities imposed penalty of removal from service.
(vi) Challenging the same, the Applicant filed an Appeal, dated 28.09.2010, before the Appellate Authority, who rejected the same vide Order, dated 19.04.2011, confirming the penalty of removal from service. 4
(vii) Aggrieved by the same, the Applicant preferred O.A. No. 673 of 2011 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. Vide its Order, dated 27.04.2012, the Tribunal while upholding the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and also the Appellate Authority, however, remitted the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority for awarding lesser punishment. The Tribunal further held that the period between the date of removal and reinstatement, after imposing lesser punishment, shall be treated as dies-non. Challenging the same, the Department filed W.P. No.3930 of 2013; while the Applicant filed W.P. No.8203 of 2013.
3) Heard Smt. C. Vani Reddy, the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners in W.P. No. 3930 of 2013 and Sri.Tuhin Kumar, the learned Counsel for the Applicant, in W.P. No.8203 of 2013.
4) Smt. C. Vani Reddy, the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners would contend that, the Order of the Tribunal is illegal, arbitrary and incorrect. Having regard to the nature of allegations made against the Applicant, the order of the Tribunal directing the authorities to impose lesser punishment and to treat the period from the date of removal and reinstatement, after imposing lesser punishment, as dies- 5 non is totally contrary to law. In other words, the learned Counsel would contend that, while remanding the matter back, the Tribunal virtually ordered reinstatement of the Applicant, which could not have been done. She further pleads that, no reasons are given as to why the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the Charges proved against the Applicant.
5) On the other hand, Sri. Tuhin Kumar, the learned Counsel for the Applicant would contend that, the entire proceedings before the Disciplinary Authority stands vitiated, as the Complainant Ms. T. Swetha, at whose instance the Charges came to be framed, was not examined, thereby denying the Applicant to cross-examine the Complainant. He further pleads that, when the punishment imposed being grave i.e., removal from service, non-examination of the Complainant and not giving an opportunity to cross-examine the Complainant would be in violation of principles of natural justice. In other words, he would contend that, the procedure followed while holding the Applicant guilty of the Charges, more particularly, the 1st Charge, is not fair and violative of basic principles of law.
6) The point that arises for consideration is, whether the Order of the Tribunal warrants interference? 6
7) In order to appreciate the same, it would be useful to refer to the Articles of Charge framed against the Applicant, which are as under:
'Article-I Sri. G. Hemasundara Rao, Technician, T-2 (Driver) while working at CTRI, Rajahmundry had repetitively hurt the modesty of Ms. T. Swetha, B.Tech (Final Year) while she was doing Project Work at CTRI, Rajahmundry during the year 2008.
Sri. Hemasundara Rao was stalking the girl, proposed her indecently and lured her to come to his house. Such acts on the part of Shri Hemasundara Rao amounts to harassment of a woman at work place which is misconduct under Rule 3-C read with Rule 3(1)(i) and with Rule 3(i)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-II Sri. G. Hemasundara Rao, while working as Technician, T-2 (Driver), while working at CTRI Research Station, Kandukur, did not maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. He acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant. He habitually neglected the duty entrusted to him. His negligence caused serious consequences to the research activities of the Station. Such acts amount to misconduct under Rule 3(1)(i) read with Rule 3(1)(ii), Rule 3(1)(iii), Rule 3(25)(g) and Rule 3(25)(10) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-III Sri. G. Hemasundara Rao, while working as Technician, T-2 (Driver), while working at CTRI Research Station, Kandukur, made false accusations against his superiors. He has attempted to induce his superior 7 officers to withdraw four Memoranda by attributing caste-coloured remarks to the Head, CTRI Research Station, Kandukur. He also threatened the Head, CTRI Research Station, Kandukur that if the Memoranda are not withdrawn, he would take-up the matter with other authorities.
Such acts on the part of Shri Hemasundra Rao amounts to misconduct under Rule3(1)(iii) read with Rule 3(25)(1), Rule 3(25)(7) and Rule 3(25)8) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964".
8) A reading of the above Articles of Charge would show that, 1st Charge relates to repeated hurt caused to the modesty of Ms.T. Swetha, B. Tech (Final Year) student, while she was doing a project work at CTRI, Rajahmundry in 2008.
The Applicant was stalking the girl, proposed her indecently and lured her to come to his house.
9) The 2nd Charge relates to maintaining integrity and devotion to duty by the Applicant. It was alleged that, he acted in a manner unbecoming of a government servant and was negligent in his duty.
10) The 3rd Charge relates to the Applicant making false allegations against his superiors. He is said to have attempted to induce his superior officers to withdraw four memorandums by attributing caste-coloured remarks to the Head, CTRI Research Station, Kandukur.
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11) It is to be noted here that the power of judicial review in matters of this nature, is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion reached by the authority is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. Dealing with the same, the Apex Court in The State Of Karnataka v. N.Gangaraj1, referred to the following cases, which are as under:
"8. In State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao2, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under:
"7. ...The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence...."1
Civil Appeal No. 8071 of 2014, dt. 14.02.2020. 2 AIR 1963 SC 1723 9
9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors.,3 again, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under:
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority 3 (1995) 6 SCC 749 10 held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel4, this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.,5 this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under:
"16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High 4 (1964) 4 SCR 781 5 (2000) 1 SCC 416 11 Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above.
But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya6, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly 6 (2011) 4 SCC 584 12 held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India - 1995 (6) SCC 749, Union of India vs. G. Gunayuthan - 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank of India vs. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC 762, High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil - 2001 (1) SCC416)."
12) In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran7 the Apex Court held that, 'High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in disciplinary proceedings'. The Court further held as under, the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings:-
"13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
i. re-appreciate the evidence;
ii. interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; iii. go into the adequacy of the evidence; iv. go into the reliability of the evidence;7
(2015) 2 SCC 610 13 v. interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
vi. correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
vii. go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
13) In Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari8 the Apex Court held:-
"That if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct"
14) From a reading of the judgments referred to above, it is very much clear that, the High Court cannot go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience; secondly, if the disciplinary authority records a finding which is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. The Courts have also held that, if the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of 8 2017 2 SCC 308 14 adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be a ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
15) As regards the contention that Ms. T. Swetha, was not examined, the Tribunal held that, there was a preliminary enquiry by the Committee in which her statement was recorded and the representation of the Applicant, dated 13.09.2010, to the Disciplinary Authority, was only to reduce the punishment/take a lenient view over the report of the Inquiry Officer. Therefore, non-examination of the victim girl, having regard to the totality of the circumstances, would not vitiate the inquiry.
16) Insofar as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the Tribunal while holding the Applicant guilty of the three Charges, held as under:
"... After going through the material placed before us, we are of the considered view that the punishment given by the Disciplinary Authority as confirmed by the Appellate Authority is shockingly disproportionate to the Charges held proved against the Applicant. We feel that the Applicant, who is only 45 years old and has a family to maintain, deserves another chance to correct himself and improve his performance."
17) From the findings arrived at by the Tribunal, it appears that, Charge Nos. 2 and 3 were not serious enough to warrant punishment of removal from services, but, however, 15 punishment of removal of service vis-à-vis Charge No. 1 was shockingly disproportionate to the charge.
18) It also appears that the circumstances which weighed with the Authority, were that the Applicant was 45 years old and deserves another chance to correct himself and improve his performance. Further, the Tribunal virtually ordered reinstatement of the Applicant while directing the authorities to award lesser punishment and treat the interregnum as dies-non. We are afraid that the Tribunal ought not to have gone to the extent of mentioning the terms of punishment, namely, reinstatement and treatment of the said period as dies-non, while remanding the matter for imposing lesser punishment.
19) Be that as it may, the primary question that falls for consideration is, whether the Disciplinary Authority was right in holding that the Applicant admitted his guilt and whether his removal from services without examining the Complainant and not giving him an opportunity to cross-examine the Complainant is correct?
20) The fact that Charge No. 1 came to be framed mainly on a report given by the Complainant Ms.T.Swetha, who was doing project work at CTRI, Rajahmundry is not in dispute. It is not doubt true that a written statement of the Complainant 16 was taken at the time of preliminary investigation but it is also well established that preliminary investigation is being conducted only to find-out as to whether the allegations made are correct and whether it warrants further inquiry.
21) The Report of the Inquiry Officer, dated 31.07.2010, wherein, it was held that, all the three [03] Charges are proved, refers to examination of five [05] witnesses and marking of about eight [08] documents, but, for reasons best known, Ms. T. Swetha, was not examined. No explanation is forthcoming as to why she was not examined, though, the basis of the 1st Charge, was the complaint given by her.
22) The argument advanced before the Inquiry Officer was that the victim girl, who appeared before the preliminary Inquiry, identified the Applicant and also substantiated the allegations made by her in the complaint is false. But, however, the same was rejected on the ground that the infirmities and contradictions in the statements of the Applicant and his lies emerging during the inquiry does not give scope for the inquiry officer to consider his innocence of the charges and the facts and records of the prosecution establish the truth. Similar such plea was taken before the Appellate Authority, but the same was rejected. The Tribunal also held that failure on the part of the prosecution to examine the material witnesses does not vitiate proceedings, 17 when in his written statement, the Applicant admitted his guilt.
23) But, it is to be noted that the Applicant nowhere admitted his guilt but only sought for reduction in punishment after submission of the inquiry report. It is to be noted that the Tribunal came to such a conclusion basing on a letter, dated 13.09.2010, addressed by the Applicant to the Disciplinary Authority, which was long after the inquiry report and before the decision of the Appellate Authority.
24) As seen from the record, when a copy of the Enquiry Officer's report was supplied to the Applicant, vide letter, dated 06.08.2010, the Applicant submitted a detailed representation, dated 21.08.2010, requesting the authorities to drop the Charges, but, however, a show-cause notice was issued, on 20.08.2010, proposing to impose penalty of removal from service, for which, the Applicant submitted a representation, dated 13.09.2010, to Disciplinary Authority, for taking a lenient view. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed an Order on 18.09.2010, awarding punishment of removal. The letter, dated 13.09.2010, obviously, was in reply to the show-cause notice issued, after finding him guilty and before the punishment is imposed. After taking into consideration the letter, dated 13.09.2010, the Order of removal from service came to be passed on 18 18.09.2010. Therefore, the contents of this letter, cannot be treated to mean that he has admitted his guilt. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the Applicant has admitted his guilt may not be correct.
Non-Examination of the Complainant.
25) The Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others9 categorically held as under:
"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence."
26) Similarly, in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Another10, the Apex Court held as under:
"41. In the aforesaid backdrop, we have to consider the most relevant issue involved in this case. Admittedly, the Enquiry Officer, the High Court on Administrative side as well on Judicial side, had placed very heavy reliance on the statement made by Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, Mr. G.G. Jani, complainant and that of Shri P.K. Pancholi, Advocate, in the preliminary 9 (2009) 2 SCC 570 10 (2013) 4 SCC 301 19 inquiry before the Vigilance Officer. Therefore, the question does arise as to whether it was permissible for either of them to take into consideration their statements recorded in the preliminary inquiry, which had been held behind the back of the appellant, and for which she had no opportunity to cross-
examine either of them.
42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amlendu Ghosh v. District Traffic Superintendent, North-Eastern Railway, Katiyar11, held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held.
45. In view of above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross- examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.
46. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,12 this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of earlier judgments held that cross- examination is an integral part of the principles of natural justice, and a statement recorded behind back of a person wherein the delinquent had no opportunity to cross- examine such persons, the same cannot be relied upon."
27) In view of the Judgments referred to above, it is very clear that the statement recorded in the preliminary enquiry, which are behind the back of the Applicant, and for which he 11 AIR 1960 SC 992 12 AIR 2013 SC 58 20 had no opportunity to cross-examine them, cannot be used in regular inquiry, as the delinquent/applicant was not associated with it and had no opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such preliminary enquiry. The Court went on to hold that using such evidence would be violative of principles of natural justice; squarely falling within the parameters laid down by the Apex Court, for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
28) Admittedly, in the instant case, the complainant was not examined during the enquiry and no opportunity was given to the Applicant to cross-examine the complainant. The statement of the complainant recorded during the preliminary enquiry was made the basis for the first charge. Having regard to the judgments referred to above, the Order impugned in the Writ Petitions is set-aside and the matter is remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority to start the proceedings by examining the Complainant and give an opportunity to the Applicant to cross-examine the Complainant and thereafter, proceed in accordance with law.
29) It is made clear that any observations made in this Order are only for deciding the issue involved and the same shall not influence either the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority while dealing with the mater on remand. 21
30) With the above directions, Writ Petition No. 3930 of 2013 and Writ Petition No. 8203 of 2013 are disposed off. No order as to costs.
31) Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
______________________________ JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR ________________________________ JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN Date: 22.01.2021.
SM...
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HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR AND HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN Writ Petition No. 3930 of 2013 And Writ Petition No. 8203 of 2013 (per the Hon'ble Sri Justice C. Praveen Kumar) Date: 22.01.2021 SM..