Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Mazda Travels vs Government Of India, Department Of ... on 11 March, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(2)ALD525, 1999(2)ALT350
ORDER
1. Rule nisi, Mrs. D.S.R. Krishna, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for Central Government took notice for the 1st respondent. Mr. C. V. Rajeev Reddy, learned Standing Counsel took notice for the 2nd respondent. The writ petition is finally heard with the consent of learned Counsel for both sides.
2. The petitioner has, essentially, in this writ petition, sought to enforce contractual obligations arising out of an agreement for hiring cars owned by the petitioner. Initially the agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent for supply of three Ambassador Cars for a period of one year. At that time, the agreement provided that if the petitioner's services were found to be satisfactory, the period of contract might be extended for a further period of two years, totally for a period of three years. It should be noted at this stage itself that this is a power reserved for the 2nd respondent to extend the contract. It is stated that after the expiry of the first term of one year of contract, the contract was extended for a further period of one year and that period would come to an end by 31-3-1999. When the matter stood thus, at that stage, the respondent No.2 issued tender notification on 14-2-1999 calling for tenders from the eligible persons for supply of vehicles on hire basis. At this stage, the present writ petition is filed seeking declaration that the action of the 2nd respondent in calling for tenders on 14-2-1999 is illegal, arbitrary and without considering the representations of the petitioner dated 30-3-1998 and 20-7-1998.
3. I have heard Sri A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, learned senior Counsel for a considerable time for admission of the writ petition. Learned senior Counsel is not in a position to trace any existing binding agreement between the parties under which the petitioner can possibly seek a right that the contract should be extended for a further period of one year. As pointed out supra, the respondents refused to exercise the power, rather liberty, reserved to them under initial agreement to extend the contract for a further period of one year. Be that as it may, admittedly the petitioner's contract is not extended beyond 31-3-1999. The contract in question is a pure commercial contract, and it is not a statutory contract. Courts have repeatedly held that the non-statutory contract cannot be permitted to be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the aggrieved parties should resort to civil Court remedies or arbitral remedies. To cite a few authorities are the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Bareilly Development Authority, , The Divisional Forest Officer v. Biswanath Tea Co. Ltd, , M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496, and several other pronouncements to follow those decisions. The petitioner has failed to point out any existing legal right vested in him to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to extend the existing contract for a period of one more year.
4. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.