Patna High Court
Arun Khanna vs State Of Bihar And Anr. on 27 January, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994(2)BLJR961
JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J.
1. This application has been filed for quashing the order taking cognizance for offences under Section 498-A/406/34, Indian Penal Code and the entire proceeding.
2. Cognizance has been taken on the complaint of Nita Khanna. opposite party No. 2. According to her, after marriage with the petitioner on 12-3-1990 solemnized at Amritsar, she was ill-treated by the accused persons, the husband and in-laws, because her father could not satisfy the demand of dowry. At times she was assaulted. As a result of cruelty, torture and harassment meted out to her, she was forced to leave her matrimonial home and live with her parents at Dhanbad. On 12-8-1991 a son was also born but accused persons did not even care to come over and see him. It is said that at the time of marriage, gold ornaments weighing 40 tolas and Rs. 50,000 in cash as well as many personal and house effects were given by her parents for her benefit and use which were entrusted to the accused persons. The complainant was not allowed to bring them back.
3. The validity of the order is challenged on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is said that entire occurrence allegedly having taken place at Amritsar, the Dhanbad Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and take cognizance. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the source of jurisdiction of the Dhanbad Court is sought to be found is Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('the Code', in short) but the said provisions is not applicable. Counsel contended that in order to attract the provisions of Section 179, the consequence of the act should not only be the integral part of the offence but that the act and the consequence must together constitute the offence. Where the act by itself constitutes an offence or, in other words, where the offence is complete by reason of the act itself irrespective of the consequence that ensued, Section 179 has no application. Counsel in support of his contention placed reliance on M. A. Alexander and Anr. v. Claim Alexander , and Gonga Jaiswal v. Chhotelal Jain .
4. Counsel for the complainant-opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that at this stage the Court has to go by the allegations alone. In the absence of evidence which is yet to come it cannot be said as to where the entrustment of property had taken place constituting the offence of criminal broach of trust under Section 406, I.P.C. Counsel stated that so far as the other offence under Section 498-A is concerned, it is not necessary to go into the question of consequence. Counsel made reference to various paragraphs of the complaint petition. He contended that so far as this Court is concerned the point is concluded by the decision in the case of Sardar Harpal Singh v. Balbinder Pal Kaur reported in 1991 Eastern India Criminal Cases 756.
5. Section 179 of the Code reads as follows:
Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.-When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.
The section is in the nature of exception to the general rule that every offence shall be enquired into and tried by the Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. It provides that an act is an offence by reason of consequence which has ensued therefrom, the offence may be enquired into or tried by Court within whose local jurisdiction the act was committed or the consequence has ensued. There can be no doubt that the act and its consequence must be so interlinked that the consequence is the direct result of the Act. Where the wife is forced to leave her husband/in-laws' house there can be no doubt that her leaving the house is the direct result or consequence of conduct and, therefore, an integral part.
6. At this stage it would be appropriate to refer to the complaint the relevant portions of which are as follows:
7. That, on and from 15-9-1990 all the accused persons used to treat the complainant with cruelty and the accused persons used to torture the complainant by not affording her food, clothes and other essential amenities and they also used to beat the complainant off and on mercilessly.
8. That, the complainant was subjected to physical and mental harassment at the hands of the accused persons with a view to coercing her to meet unlawful demands of the accused persons or to leave her matrimonial house for which the complainant used to send letters to her parents regarding the mal-treatment attributed by the accused persons to her.
14. That, lastly when the cruelty attributed by the accused persons became peak and went up to the neck and when the complainant apprehended that she would be killed by the accused persons as all the accused were making plan to administer poison in the food of the complainant to eliminate her and further when the accused persons failed in their bid to compel the complainant to commit suicide then on 26-2-1993 the complainant along with her newly born child were driven out from the matrimonial house by all the accused persons and all her Stridhan were kept and the complainant was not allowed to take it back and without any baggage she along, with her son reached at Dhanbad in the morning of 28-2-1993 and narrated about all tragedy to her parents and relatives.
16. That, different types of tortures and ill-treatment were meted out to the complainant at Amritsar as a consequence of which she had to leave her matrimonial home and shifted to her father's house at Dhanbad she could not have left her matrimonial house if she would not have been subjected to ill-treatment and tortures at the hands of the accused persons and its consequence had ensued at Dhanbad where the complainant is residing with her child at present at her father's house within the jurisdiction of this learned court and in this view of the matter this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try such nature of offence as provided under Section 179 and Section 182(2) of the Cr. P.C.
7. Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code provides for punishment to husband for relative of husband of a woman subjected to cruelty. Explanation appended to the section defines 'cruelty' to mean:
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman ; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
A bare perusal of the provision would indicate that if a person is found guilty of any wilful conduct which is of such nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide of to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman or guilty of an act of harassment relating to demand for any property etc. he can be punished for the offence under Section 498-A. Reading of the complaint leaves no room for doubt that the allegations made therein do prima facie, constitute the ingredients of the said offence. The only question is regarding territorial jurisdiction or the place of enquiry or trial.
8. In the instant case, the complainant has alleged that by reason of the conduct of the accused persons, she was forced to leave her matrimonial home If the act of cruelty had not been committed and there was no danger to her life and health, there perhaps would have been no occasion for her to leave the house. She has also alleged that as a consequence of the acts of the accused persons she is suffering mental agony at Dhanbad. In other words the wrong or the offence is still continuing. In my opinion, the term 'cruelty' in Section 438-A has to be given an extended meaning. If the woman continues to suffer the mental agony or torture as a result of the acts done to her by the husband or his relatives forcing her to leave the matrimonial home, it must be said that the cruelty is continuing. While construing the question of jurisdiction with respect to offence under Section 498-A one should not forget the social background and the object for which the said offence has been created. This new penal provision is intended to provide benefit and relief to the females who constitute the weaker section of the society, the destitutes who have been turned out of the husband's home. If they are to be compelled to file the complaint only at the place where the act was committed, that is, at the place where the husband/in-laws reside, she may not be able to prosecute the complaint properly which will not serve the desired object. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sardar Harpal Singh (supra), relied upon by Mr. M. M. Benerjee on behalf of the opposite party, has taken the same view and I find myself in respectful agreement with the same.
9. The decisions relied upon by Mr. P. S. Dayal, in the facts of the case, have no application. In those cases, the question of application of Section 179 of the Code came up for consideration in the context of the offences of bigamy and cheating under Sections 494 and 420, I.P.C., respectively. The offence under Section 498-A lies in a different compass and calls for different consideration.
10. I would, thus, hold that the Dhandbad Court has jurisdiction to try the petitioner and other accused and, accordingly, dismiss this application.