Allahabad High Court
V.S. Krishnan And Anr. vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 25 May, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000CRILJ4498
JUDGMENT R.K. Dash, J.
1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for issuance of writ of certiorari to quash the first information report in case Crime No. 839 of 1999 under Sections 420/467/468/471/504, I.P.C. registered at Police Station Sector 20, Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar. A further prayer has been made directing the police not to arrest the petitioners in the aforesaid case.
2. The factual aspect of the case emerging from the averments made in the writ petition as also the copy of the first information report annexed therewith is that petitioner Nos. 1 and 2, related as husband and wife are the Directors of Maha Vishnu Financial Services Limited, Chennai (for short the "Company"). Dr. Purshottam Lal, respondent No. 4, while working in Apollo Hospital, Chennai had advanced loan of rupees fifty lacs to the financial company and subsequently a further sum of fifty lacs from his deposits in the Canara Bank. Villivakkam Branch, Chennai. Thus, the total loan availed of the company amounted to one crore. It is alleged by the petitioners that S. Xavier, the Director of the company who was actively involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company, indiscriminately advanced money to the tune of several lacs to his friends and others knowing fully well that they would not be in a position to repay the same. In due course, the company sustained huge financial loss on account of which it was unable to discharge its financial liabilities to respondent No. 4. During the year 1996-97, the company repaid a sum of Rs. 28.5 lacs, to respondent No. 4 by means of demand drafts and in respect of the rest unpaid amount, the petitioners issued postdated cheques which on presentation were dishonoured. The respondent No. 4, therefore, filed two complaint cases before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Lateron he also filed as many as ten such cases against them and other Directors of the company in the Courts of Ghaziabad and Gautam Budh Nagar under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420, I.P.C. In all the complaint cases, it is alleged, the allegations are the same and similar in nature, inasmuch as thecheques issued to respondent No. 4 on different dates were dishonoured. The Court in all these cases having taken cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act have issued summons for their appearance. The sole intention of filing large number of cases by the respondent No. 4 was to get the petitioners arrested and put them behind the prison bars and as they on their appearance were released on bail by the Chennai Court, he in connivance with the local police of Noida lodged the impugned first information report making the self-same allegations with certain improvements which are manifestly false and concocted with a view to pressurise them to satisfy his demand of exorbitant interest which was never agreed to between the parlies. The lodging of the said report being mala fide and with oblique motive, contend the petitioners, the Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should quash the said first information report at the threshold.
3. Mr. A.D. Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued with skill and adroitness that on the facts and circumstances, it is a fit case where the Court should in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution, should come to the help of the petitioners in order to save them from police harassment. Elaborating the submissions, Mr. Giri has urged that the cheques issued to Dr. Purshottam Lal, respondent No. 4 having been returned dishonoured by the Bank on presentation, complaints have been filed and cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been taken and the petitioners have been summoned by the Court. On the same set of facts with some alteration and addition which ex facie are absurd and untrue, first information report has been lodged by the respondent No. 4 on receipt of which the police has registered a case under Sections 420/467/468/471, I.P.C. and this has been done with oblique motive to get them arrested and put behind bars in order to coerce them to accede to his demand. In the circumstances, urges Mr. Giri, if the police is allowed to undertake investigation, it will amount to abuse of process of law and, therefore, justice demands that the first information report and the consequent investigation taken up by the police should be quashed. In support of his submission he has relied on a recent decision of Supreme Court in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., I (2000) SLT 499=1 (2000) BC 273=1 (2000) CCR 138 (SC)=2000(2) SCC 630.
4. Besides the above, Mr. Giri has raised certain questions of quite considerable importance which have attracted our attention for adjudication in the present case. According to him, the remedy to seek for anticipatory bail in the State of U.P. is not available to an accused in view of the U.P. Amendment Act of 1976 (Act No. XVI of 76) and being emboldened thereby, the police are harassing the people by arresting and lodging them in the lock-up notwithstanding the nature and gravity of the offence with which they are allegedly involved. True it is, the power of investigation of a cognizable crime vests with the police and there is no fetters in the exercise of their such power, but very often they misuse their 'vardi' and plunder the civil liberties of the people, inasmuch as they arrest and keep them in 'hawalat' for days together and adopt third degree methods to coerce them to confess the guilt. Right to 'personal liberty' as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution being aprecious right,,the police should not be permitted to interfere with the same in the garb of exercising statutory power of investigation and the Court as bastion of the freedom and rights of the people should exercise power of supervision over investigation and lay down guidelines with regard to exercise power of arrest by the police.
5. Per contra, Mr. K.P. Shukla and Mr. Amarjeet Singh, learned Additional Government Advocates appearing for the State of U.P. have contended with vehemence that a reading of the first information report prima facie makes out an offence of forgery and cheating and. therefore, the first information report and the investigation taken on the basis thereof cannot be quashed. They have further urged that the powers of the Courts as well as the investigating agency are well demarcated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and any impingement into the power of the police in the matter of investigation by the Court is impermissible in law. In that view of the matter, it would not be within the province of the Court to supervise or monitor the investigation. As regards the question of arrest, contend the Counsel, arrest being a part of investigation it is for the police to decide as to whether in the fact situation of a case it is necessary to arrest the accused or not and no guidelines can be laid down by the Court.
6. In view of the submissions made at the bar, the questions that arise for consideration are formulated as under:
Questions :
1. Whether the allegations made in the complaint and the first information report are same and similar warranting interference of the Court in exercise of powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the first information report?
2. Whether this Court in exercise of power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere in the matter of investigation of a cognizable offence by the police?
3. Whether exercise of power under Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the 'Code') by the police to arrest a person accused of cognizable offence in a case registered under Section 154 is unfettered or it is dependent on "necessity of arrest" ?
4. Whether this Court can interfere and stay the arrest of the accused pending investigation?Question No. 1
7. We have gone through the copies of the complaint petitions at Annexures 2 and 4 and the impugned first information report at Annexure 7 in an attempt to find whether the allegations made therein are same and similar and, if so, whether the concerned Police Officer was well within his jurisdiction to register a case on the basis of the said first information report. In the complaints (Annexures 2 and 4) as well as in the first information report (Annexure 7) petitioners along with some others are arrayed as accused persons. The allegations set out in brief in the complaint is that the petitioners owed huge amount to the respondent No. 4 and in order to repay a part of it, issued certain post-dated cheques which on presentation for encashment were dishonoured. Since it was an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the respondent No. 4 moved the Court by filing complaints. In the first information report, the averments made in the complaints are reiterated as preface to the subsequent event which gave rise to the filing of report to the police. It is alleged that the petitioners issued some post-dated cheques to respondent No..4 and took return of the documents of M/s. Krishna Agro Chemicals which they had deposited with him. However, in order to create belief in their activities and to repose trust on them, they while taking back the documents deposited some other documents of another company as a security for the remaining unpaid loan. These documents, it is alleged, are forged which the respondent No. 4 on inquiry could come to know only after filing of the complaints. So he lodged the impugned first information report at police station Sector 20, Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar on receipt of which the police registered a case under Sections 420/467/ 468/471, I.P.C. In the premises, the only question which requires probe by the police is whether the documents deposited by the petitioners with respondent No. 4 are genuine or forged. It is premature at this stage to say that prosecution allegation is quite absurd and concocted subsequent to the filing of the complaints. The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in G. Sagar Suri (supra), on which the petitioner placed reliance is quite distinguishable and thus has no application to the case in hand. In the said reported case, the complainant before lodging the first information report for the offence under Sections 406/420, I.P.C. had filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against Ganga Automobiles, its Managing Director, and others. In the first information report, omnibus statement was made against the main accused that with dishonest intention and misrepresentations, he got loan. Nothing was said as to what were those misrepresentations and how the complainant was duped. Besides, it was not explained as to why offences under Sections 406/ 420, I.P.C. were not added in the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and why resort was had to filing of a separate first information report. On such fact situation, Their Lordships held that the continuance of criminal proceedings registered under Sections 406/420, I.P.C. is an abuse of the process of law. The fact of the present case is, however, altogether different. Thus, taking an overall view of the facts and circumstances of the case as set out in the impugned first information report at Annexure-7, we are of the opinion that the commission of a cognizable offence is prima facie made out which requires thorough investigation by the police. We are therefore, not inclined to quash the said first information report at the threshold.
Question No. 28. Crime detection and investigation are the primary steps for adjudication of a crime and unless there is proper and effective investigation, the ultimate decision by the adjudicatory authority may go wrong. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom has given unfettered power to the police to investigate into a cognizable offence within the parameters of law. Primary duty of a Police Officer holding investigation is to unearth the crime and bring the person involved in the offence to book. Besides in heinous cases where public sentiment has been hurt, he keeps vigil over the situation in order to avoid breach of the peace. Undeniably investigation is a strenuous job and, therefore, free liberty has been given to the police to perform such duty in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Judiciary as a matter of course should not interfere in the process of investigation and to arrogate to itself the power of investigation which law does not so provide. The duty of the Courts is to adjudicate and not to investigate. The powers and functions of the police and the Court are well defined and well demarcated. Any encroachment upon the function of the police in the matter of investigation by the Court will bring them disrepute. Criminal justice system will be an effective instrument in shaping the society provided the police perform their duty independently, impartially and with utmost promptness. It is not desirable to suspect their honesty and trustworthiness. They should be allowed to act freely in the matter of investigation so long as they do not overstep their power conferred by law. Court's function begins after the investigation ends resulting in filing of charge-sheet or final report and not before that. The question with regard to Court's power to intervene in the matter of investigation came to be considered by the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18, where the Court laid down the following dictum:
"Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of inquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as Their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to be given direction in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case, as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then....."
9. The aforesaid views of the Privy Council was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. J.A.C. Saldanna and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 326.
Their Lordships while dealing with the question of Court's jurisdiction to interfere with statutory duty of the police observed:
"25 There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the Investigating Officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in Section 173(8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and, if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is thus a well defined and demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate."
10. The question now arises: Is the High Court denuded of power to exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the activities of the police in the matter of investigation when it finds that either there is no motion or slow motion in the investigation or the power of investigation is exercised mala fide?
11. In OUE country, the criminal justice system moves in a snail speed. Though Section 173 of the Code provides that every investigation of a cognizable offence shall be completed without unnecessary delay, experience shows that the said provision is observed in breach. Needless to say, inordinate and unexplainable delay in the investigation seriously affects the personal liberty of the accused who are incarcerated in jail. Likewise delayed investigation followed by the trial which also takes long time causes incalculable damage to the victim of crime. Delay in both stages results unmerited acquittals of the persons involved in heinous offences and ultimately the victim of crimes becomes the worst sufferer. It is said, because of delay the ratio of acquittal is about 90%. Therefore, unless sincere attempt is made by all concerned and associated with justice delivery system to give justice within a reasonable time people will lose faith in the whole system and may take law into their own hands.
12. The investigating agency is under the control of the executive and has not been made independent as judiciary is. For various reasons, investigation in serious crimes either does not move at all or moves very slowly and that too in a wrong direction. Very often it is complained, the police making investigation of such crimes are at the beck and call of the influential and affluent persons arrayed as accused, thereby an impression is created in the mind of general public that the forum to bring the offenders to justice is only intended to the ordinary citizens and the white collared criminals are above law. As has been well said in Jennision v. Becker, 1972(1) All. E.R. 1006:
"Law should not sit limbly, while those who defy it go free, those seek its protection lose hope".
In the premises, when the Court is approached through a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution complaining no motion, slow motion or wrong motion of the investigation, the Court in our considered opinion will be well within its jurisdiction to issue necessary writ/directions to the Investigating Officer to proceed with the investigation expeditiously and in accordance with law and complete the same within a reasonable time. Reference in this context may be made to the case of State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal, 1985(1) SCC 317, where it is held that when the requirements of law are not being complied with and investigation is not being conducted properly or with due haste and promptitude, the Court can issue necessary and proper directions to the investigating agency.
13. Everyday, writ petitions are filed in large number at the instance of the accused persons to quash the first information report and consequent investigation mainly alleging mala fide and bias against the Investigating Officer. The investigation is a slatutory function of the Police Officer. With his expertise and skill, he proceeds with the investigation to find whether the accused was involved in the offence or not. Day-to-day steps taken by him in the investigation is supervised by his higher officer. If there is anything wrong in the investigation, necessary directions can be issued by his authorities to correct it. Therefore, whenever mala fide or bias is imputed either by the accused or the victim, the same should be brought to the notice of the higher authorities at the earliest point of time. To impute motive, mala fide or bias is easy, but difficult to prove. Unless specific and definite allegations are made and established from the facts and circumstances to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court would be loath to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction and interfere with the process of investigation. This view of ours finds support from a decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Anr. v. P.P. Sharma and Anr., AIR 1991 SC 1260, where the Court observed thus :
"The allegation of mala fide and bias more often made easily, than proved. Investigation is a delicate painstaking and dexterous process. Ethical conduct is absolutely essential for investigative professionalism. Ethics can be defined as the practical normative study of the rightness and wrongness of human conduct. The Police Investigator faces the most frequent and immediate ethical pressure. Despite many a stress associated with the enforcement and investigation functions, the investigator must adopt a professional and uncompromising altitude. Rather than succumbing to unethical logic and engaging in unprofessional means to justify a seemingly desirable and the investigator should realise that no conviction is worth sacrificing one's personal and professional integrity. The allegation of mala fide causes deep incursion on the psychic attitude to uncover the crime and on the effectivity of the investigation. The threat of mala fide would deter an honest and efficient Investigating Officer to probe an in depth investigation into the crime. The result would be that the crime remains undetected and injury is irremediable to the society. Criminal becomes emboldened and people lose faith in the efficacy of law dnd order. Therefore, before countenancing such allegations of mala fides or bias it is salutary and onerous duty and responsibility of the Court, not only to insist upon making specific and definite allegations of personal animosity against the Investigating Officer at the start of the investigation but also must insist to establish and prove them from the facts and circumstances to the satisfaction of the Court. "
14. Similar view was also taken in an earlier decision in the case of S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors., 1970(1) SCC 653. In the said case, the petitioner S.N. Sharma who was an Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) was arrayed as an accused. The allegation in the first information report was that it was at his instigation certain goondas attacked one Bipen Kumar Tiwari. While the investigation was in progress, he approached the Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and filed petition under Section 159 of the 1898 Code for preliminary inquiry by the Court itself and further to issue necessary direction to the police to stop investigation. The Magistrate after hearing the parties passed an order directing the police to stop investigation and decided to hold inquiry. The said order came to be challenged in this Court and ultimately it was quashed. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner moved the Supreme Court. A contention was raised on his behalf that since a Judicial Officer deals with the cases brought up by the police and frequently gives decisions which the police dislike, the police may engineer afalse report of a cognizable offence against the Judicial Officer in order to harass him. Taking note of such submission, the Court observed :
"It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal power."
15. From a conspectus of the different provisions of the Code and keeping in mind the dictums of the Supreme Court referred to above, the irresistible conclusion is that the power of investigation of a cognisable offence is exclusively in the domain of the police and so long as the same is exercised in strict compliance of law, the Court would not be justified to interfere with the same in exercise of extraordinary writjurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution. However, if the Court is convinced from the materials that there is no motion or slow motion in the investigation or that he investigation is not free and fair, inasmuch as the Police Officer being influenced either by the accused or otherwise has been trying to hush up the case which may ultimately affect the cause of justice, the Court would be competent to issue him necessary direction to proceed with the investigation in order to bring the offender to book, Similarly, where allegation of mala fide and bias is made against the Police Officer by the accused that attempt has been to rope him in the crime and the same is established and proved from the facts and circumstances, the Court in order to protect the accused from harassment can issue necessary direction restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers.
Question Nos. 3 and 416. These questions being most sensitive and fragile, we have scrupulously examined the relevant provisions of the Code as also the law with regard to the right to "personal liberty' enshrined in the Constitution in order to arrive at a right conclusion. Article 21 of the Constitution says:
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
The next relevant provision is Article 22(2) of the Constitution which provides that--
"Even person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twentyfour hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to Court of the Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a Magistrate."
A glimpse on both the Articles would show that 'personal liberty' of a citizen cannot be interfered with/without following the procedure established by law and if there is any such interference because of his involvement in a crime, he should be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours and it is the Magistrate who can authorise detention beyond the said period. Section 41 of the Code enjoins a Police Officer with power to arrest any person without warrant from the Magistrate in the circumstances enumerated therein. Clause (a) of the said section which is relevant for the purposes provides that any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or acredible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned, any police may arrest him without warrant from the Magistrate. A reading of the said provision in conjunction with Section 157 of the Code would clearly indicate that the power of arrest of the police is circumscribed and not unlimited. The police cannot arrest any citizen because they have power to do so. Power of arrest is no doubt discretionary, but the same should not be exercised capriciously. What law requires is that in course of investigation if materials are discernible about participation of the accused in the crime and there is need to arrest him, then Only the police would be legally justified in effecting his arrest: True it is, arrest is a step in furtherance of investigation, but that does not mean that arrest of the accused in each and every case is a must for the police. Exercise of such power depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the police that the facts and circumstances of the case necessitate arrest of the accused. In this context it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 1994 SC 1349, where the Court has laid down a note of caution in the matter of exercise of power of arrest by the police in the following terms:
".....No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so. Arrest and detention at police lockup of a person can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of aperson. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person".
17. A person accused of commission of a cognizable offence cannot ask the Court to restrain the police from arresting him. If materials are forthcoming after some investigation showing his involvement and in the opinion of the Police Officer, there is need to effect arrest, no faul can be found with him in so doing. The Court sitting within four walls cannot visualise the situation which necessitated the Police Officer to arrest the accused. In the course of hearing, a submission was made at the Bar that in view of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Kumar (supra) that except in heinous offences, arrest must be avoided, there is implied prohibition on the police to exercise the power of arrest in respect of other non-bailable offences. We are unable to accept such contention. The aforesaid decision was rendered in a different fact situation. The petitioner, an Advocate, was called by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, to his office in connection with inquiry in some cases. On his appearance, he was taken to Mussoorie and detained in the police station. His brother along with other relatives went to the said police station and found the police to have taken him to some undisclosed destination. Under these circumstances, the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed before the Apex Court. Pursuant to the notice issued by the Court, Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad appeared and denied accusation of illegal detention and sated that the help of the petitioner was sought to detect some crimes. The question, therefore, was whether the petitioner was really detained by the police and if so what was the reason for detention. While dealing with the said question, Their Lordships made a passing observation that except in heinous offences, arrest must be avoided.
On a reading of the said decision what appears to us that no argument was advanced nor attention of the Court was drawn with regard to the necessity of arrest of a person involved in the offence which has impact on the society. In our opinion, besides the nature and gravity of the crime and seriousness of the offence, its social impact is also a circumstance to the decision about the need of arrest. For example, an incident, occurred in a village where some villagers belonging to higher caste wrongfully restrained some women to take water from a public well terming them as 'untouchables', stripped them off and threw away their earthen pots. On a report being logded, a case under Sections 147, 341 and 354, I.P.C. and Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was registered. Because of such incident, there was tense situation in the village and acrimony reached its zenith. At any moment, the situation might have gone out of control leading to some more serious crimes. Though offences under Section 147, 343 and 354, I.P.C. are bailable and offence under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act being non-bailable prescribes imprisonment for five years, yet the police in the facts and circumstances would be justified to effect arrest of the offenders involved in the incident.
18. The need of arrest may be viewed from another angle. Modern criminal jurisprudence recognises that no one is born criminal. A good many crimes are the product of socio-economic milieu. Therefore, emphasis has been given to reform and rehabilitate an offender and to bring him to the fold of civilised and orderly society instead of resorting to retributive justice. Keeping that in view, Probation of Offenders Act has been enacted in order to give a chance to the offender to reform himself. Similar provision has been made in Section 360 of the Code to release the accused in certain offences on probation for good conduct for a particular period. If Court declines to extend the said beneficial provision, it is obligatory for the Court, in view of Section 361 to record special reasons for not so doing. Therefore, when the Legislature intended not to send an offender after conviction in certain offences to prison but to release him on probation as a reformative measure, there is no reason why the police should arrest the offender in trivial offences having no serious consequence. Many instances have come to our notice that in respect of an incident of assault for which a case should have been registered under Sections 324, 325, I.P.C., the police having registered a case under Section 307, I.P.C. throng upon the offenders and arrest them as if they are hardened criminals. In such type of cases or the cases of trivial nature, if the persons involved approach this Court alleging that they apprehend arrest by the police, then the Court cannot remain as a silent spectator and permit the police to arrest them in the garb of exercising their statutory power. In such situations, the Court can issue necessary direction to the police not to arrest them till report is filed on completion of investigation.
19. Regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, we are not inclined to quash the impugned first information report as prayed for by the petitioners. However, keeping in mind the nature of accusation, it is provided that the Investigating Officer in case Crime No. 839 of 1999 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, I.P.C registered at police station Sector 20, Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar may proceed with the investigation and take to its logical end, but the arrest of the petitioners shall not be effected till submission of the report under Section 173 of the Code, provided they co-operate with investigation and make themselves available for interrogation as and when required by the Investigating Officer.
In the light of the observations made above, the writ petitions is disposed of.
S.R. Singh, J.
I have had the privilege and advantage of reading the draft judgment prepared by esteemed brother Hon. R.K. Dash, J. I respectfully express my concurrence with the views expressed and conclusions recorded by him on all the four questions formulated by him in his judgment. With respect to questions 2, 3 and 4, however, I would like to buttress his conclusions in my own way. Since these three questions are inter-linked, it would be convenient to consider them together in order to avoid repetition.
20. Registration, investigation and adjudication of a crime are terms -of distinct connotations. Section 154(1} of the Code which provides for registration of a cognizable offence reads thus:
"154. Information in cognizable cases....(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his directions, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form also the State Government may prescribe in this behalf."
21. Section 154(1) of the Code thus regulates the manner of recording the F.I.R. relating to a cognizable offence, The term "cognizable offence" has been defined in Section 2(c) of the Code. In substance, it means, an offence for which a Police Officer may, in accordance with law, arrest without warrant. It would appear from Section 154(1) of the Code that at the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of information disclosing cognizable offence, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an inquiry as to whether the information given by the informant is genuine and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. The word "information" used in Section 154(1) of the Code is not qualified by words like "reasonable" and/or "credible." In other words, whether or not the information regarding commission of cognizable offence is "reasonable" and/or "credible," the Police Officer incharge of the police station is bound to register the case. To put it differently, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the information is not a condition precedent for the registration of a case State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604. On the other hand, the officer incharge of the police station is obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has "reason to suspect" the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate subject to Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 157(1).
22. Investigation includes every step taken under the Code for the collection of evidence by a Police Officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. Section 156 of the Code which provides for investigation of a cognizable offence and Section 157 which regulates the procedure for investigation being relevant are quoted below:
"156. Police Officer's power to investigate cognizable case.--(1) Any officer-in-charge of a police station may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a Police Officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.
157. Procedure of Investigation.--(1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer-in-charge of a police station has reason to suspect, the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the Case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender:
Provided that--
(a) when information as the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer-in-charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot.
(b) If it appears to the officer-in-charge of a police station that there is not sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.
(2) In each of the cases mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), the officer-in-charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section, and, in the case mentioned in Clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any. in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated."
23. It would be evident from Clause (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 157 of the Code that the Police Officer incharge of a police station need not enter on an investigation of the case if it appears to him that there is not sufficient ground for entering on investigation. In such eventuality, however, the Police Officer incharge of the police station is under an obligation cast upon him under Sub-section (2) of Section 157 to forward to the Magistrate his reasons for not proceeding with the investigation. In addition to his report to the Magistrate, he is also required to notify to the informant in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government. Sub-section (2) in a way serves as a check on any arbitrary decision by the Police Officer not to enter on investigation. The registration of a case ipso facto does not warrant setting in motion the investigation of a case registered under Section 154(1) of the Code. The police officer has certain amount of discretion in the matter but the same is not 'unfettered.' Rather it is conditioned by 'reason to suspect commission of an offence' which the police officer has power to investigate under Section 156 of the Code. In Swapan Kumar Guha v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1982 SC 949, it has been observed thus:
"There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and, indeed, unlimited discretion in the sphere can come a rutheless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offence must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is grounded."
24. Insofar as the personal judgment of the police officer to enter on an investigation is concerned, the question whether or not the officer concerned has "reason to suspect," in the circumstances of a given case, cannot be viewed from 'legal microscope' in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal J. Porwal, AIR 1987 SC 316, it has been held:
"Whether or not the officer concerned had entertained reasonable belief under the circumstances is not a matter which can be placed under legal microscope, with an over indulgent eye which sees no evil anywhere within the range of its eyesight. The circumstances have to be viewed from the experienced eye of the officer who is well equipped to interpret the suspicious circumstances and to form a reasonable belief in the light of the said circumstances."
25. In State of Hatyana v. Bhajan Lal, the SupremeCourt has explained the term "reason of suspect" as under:
".......Therefore, the expression "reason to suspect the commission of an offence" would mean the sagacity of rationally inferring the commission of acognizable offence based on the specific articulate facts mentioned in the first information report as well in the Annexures, if any enclosed and any attending circumstances which may not amount to proof. In other words, the meaning of the expression "reason to suspect" has to be governed and dictated by the facts and circumstances of each case and at that stage the question of adequate proof of facts alleged in the first information report does not arise ......."
And after noticing its earlier decision on the point, the Supreme Court concluded as under;
"The sum and substance of the above deliberation results to a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions failing under Chapter XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned...... But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercised his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the Court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution. It needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable up to fathomable cosmos. Any recognition of such power will be tantamount to recognition of 'Divine Power' which no authority on earth can enjoy."
26. Occasion when this Court should step in aid of investigation has been aptly described in Jennison v. Becker, (supra), in two lines referred to and quoted in the judgment of brother Dash, J , and I fully agree with him that in the event of "no motion, slow motion or wrong motion of investigation", the Court will be justified in coming to the rescue of the aggrieved and in issuing appropriate writ, order or direction to the investigating agency.
27. This brings us to the question relating to the power of the police to arrest and the scope of judicial interference in the matter. Sections 41(a) and 157 of Code if construed in the light of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the power to arrest a person accused of a cognizable offence is not unfettered and registration of a cognizable case ipso facto does not necessitate arrest for arrest being a step towards investigation, the question of arrest would not arise until the police officer has 'reason to suspect' commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate under Section 156, Cri. P.C. and finds sufficient ground for entering on investigation. In De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition by J.M. Evans the principles has been stated thus:
"The police officer who has a common law or statutory power to arrest on reasonable suspicion, and the public official who has power to cancel a licence when he has reasonable grounds to believe the licensee to be unfit to hold a licence, must be prepared to justify in Court the reasonableness of their beliefs; they cannot defeat an attack upon the grounds on which they have exercised their discretion merely by proving that they honestly thought that their beliefs had been reasonable"-- Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 206, 228-229.
And further:
"The criterion of reasonableness is not subjective, but objective in the sense that it is subject to formulation and application by a Court of law. This is not to say that the Courts will readily interfere with the exercise of discretion if, from the nature of subject-matter or the surrounding circumstances (e.g. the necessity for taking swift action for the preservation of public order), it would be difficult for any one but the repository of the power to form an opinion as to the occasion for its exercise, or if it would be unfair to penalise the authority for a possible error of judgment in a doubtful case."
28. Though there is no express statutory fetters on the power of police to arrest a person concerned of cognizable offence, Section 41(a) of the Code which confers powers on a Police Officer to arrest a person without warrant is couched in a language which suggest that if the exercise of power to arrest a person is challenged, the Police Officer must be ready to justify in Court the "reasonableness of the complaint" of "reasonableness of the suspicion" or "credibility of information" that the person arrested is concerned in a cognizable offence. In Cedeno v. O' Brien, (1996) 47 W.L.R. 192, a case arising in Trinidad, the Court emphatically refuted a suggestion that power vested in an immigration officer to detain a person whom he had "reason to suspect" of being a prohibited immigrant, imported a purely subjective test of reasonableness. Section 41 which is a substantive provision conferring power on the police to arrest a person without warrant, in a way, impliedly prescribes 'reasonableness' of the complaint or 'suspicion '7' credibllity' of information that the person is concerned in any cognizable offence, as the basis of exercise of power to arrest without warrant.
29. Concededly, arrest of a person accused of a cognizable offence was a must under the old Code prior to its amendment by Criminal Procedure (Amendment), Act, 1923 whereby the expression "and, if necessary, to take measures" occurring in Section 157(1) was substituted for the words "and to take such measures as may be necessary." Section 157(1) of the old Code as it stood amended by Act XVIII of 1923 has been retained in the new Code. Purport of the expression "if necessary, to take measures" for discovery and arrest of the offender is that the measures for discovery and arrest may be taken on if it is necessary so to do for there may be cases when the offender may appear before the Police Officer or he may surrender before a Magistrate. The words "if necessary" qualify the words "to take measures" and are not meant to qualify "discovery and arrest of the offender". The words "if necessary" used in Section 157(1) are not intended to put any fetter on power of the police to arrest a person accused of a cognizable offence so as to make the arrest dependent on the 'necessity' thereof. If the offender fails to voluntarily surrender himself either before a Magistrate or before the police, the latter will have no option but to take measures for his arrest so as to bring him to book. There are two in-built fetters under the Code on the power of the police to arrest. One, visualise by Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 157( 1) which puts a fetter on the power of investigation by providing that where it appears to the Police Officer that there are "no sufficient grounds for entering on an investigation," the Police Officer need not enter on the investigation. The second fetter is contained in Section 41(a) itself. Section 41(a) of the Code empowers any Police Officer to arrest without warrant a person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, of a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned,"
30. The Code, it seems, has left it to the "experienced eye of the officer who is well equipped to interpret the suspicious circumstances and to form a reasonable belief in the light of the said circumstances."
31. Investigation of crime including arrest of accused being exclusively in the field of the executive, the Court will be loath to interfere with the discretion vested in the Police Officer and will rather act with restraint and circumspection when approached at the threshold of investigation in that the arrest of an accused may lead to discovery of valuable materials. Lord Denning, in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 1968(1) All. E.R. 763, has observed thus :
"Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law, there are many fields in which they have a discretion with which the law will not interfere. For instance, it is for the Commissioner of Police or the Chief Constable as the case may be, to decide in any particular case whether inquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest should be made or a prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide on the disposition of his force and the concentration of his resources on any particular crime or area. No Court can or should give him direction on such a matter."
32. The third report of the National Police Commission has, however, suggested the following guidelines for exercise of power of arrest conferred on Police Officers :
".........An arrest during the investigation of a cognizable case may be considered justified in one or other of the following circumstances :
(i) The case involves a grave offence like murder, dacoity, robbery, rape etc., and it is necessary to arrest the accused and bring his movements under restraint to infuse confidence among the terror-stricken victim.
(ii) The accused is likely to abscond and evade the processes of law.
(iii) The accused is given to violent behaviour and is likely to commit further offences unless his movements are brought under restraint.
(iv) The accused is a habitual offender and unless kept in custody he is likely to commit similar offences again."
33. In view of the above discussion, the Court veers around the view that though the Code expressly does not put any fetter on the power of the police to arrest a person accu-sed of a cognizable offence apart from inbuilt fetters and implied restrictions on the exercise of power of investigation and arrest as indicated hereinabove, the Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of Haryana, (supra), has for the first time adopted the principles of necessity suggested in the Royal Commission Report on Criminal Procedure as a restriction on the exercise of power of arrest and held as under:
"......No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power tp do so. Arrest and detention in police lockup of a person can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complainant and a reasonable belief both as to the person's complicity and even so to the need to effect arrest. "
34. It is now well settled that the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 226 of the Constitution can quash a F.I.R. in a cognizable offence where a case of interference is made out within the parameters of legal principles of interference pending investigation of a cognizable offence laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) and in many other cases and consequently where a case of quashing the F.I.R. is made out, the Court can also stay the arrest of the accused as a relief ancillary to the main relief to quashing of F.I.R. and investigation of the case. In Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, (supra), the Privy Council had an occasion to examine the question of Court's power of interference vis-a-vis the statutory power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence. The Privy Council held as under:
".........so it is of utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of inquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as Their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Cri. P.C. to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus."
35. In State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha (supra), the Supreme Court held as under:
"There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book".
36. In S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwaris, (supra), the Supreme Court has held as under:
"It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the Police Officer from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code."
37. In Prabhu Dayal Deorath v. District Magistrate, Kamrup, AIR 1974 SC 183. the Supreme Court while emphasising the preservation of personal liberty has observed as under:
"We say, and we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution the only guarantee of the personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law."
38. The principle of law well-settled is that an ostensibly unfettered grant of discretionary power does not necessarily stultify judicial review particularly in view of ever expanding horizon of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. However, it is equally well-settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, albeit plenary, should not be invoked in derogation of the powers of the police under the Code so as to preempt the exercise of discretion of the concerned police officer under Section 157 read with Section 41, of the Code, we are of the considered view that normally the Courts should not interfere with the process of investigation much less with the power of the police to arrest a person accused of a cognizable offence except in rarest of rare cases and on proof of fact that the police would not act 'reasonably' and 'honestly' and would rather act mala in se or in bad faith. No interim order staying investigation and arrest should be granted during the stage of criminal investigation except in a case where 'manifest injustice' cries for the order of the Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries, AIR 1979 SC 1889, or where some 'grossly iniquitous act' is going to be perpetrated and any delay would result in the 'fait accompli of a monstrosity' in Samarias Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Samuel and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 61, or except where, on facts pleaded and proved, the Court is satisfied that the Police Officer will not be fair and reasonable in exercise of his power of arrest under the Code. Barring these situations and the like, the High Court should refrain itself from intervening in the matter at the pre-arrest stage and rather leave it to the experienced judgment of the concerned Police Officer as to whether or not arrest, in the fact situation of a given case, is needed keeping in view the gravity of the offence; likelihood of any adverse impact on law and order; safety of the accused himself; likelihood of the accused absconding and evading the process of law; criminal antecedent, if any, of the accused; need to prevent repetition of the crimes; need to secure or preserve evidence relating to the offence or to obtain such evidence from the suspect by questioning him, etc., etc.
39. In the result, I am in respectful agreement with brother R.K. Dash, J., The petition stands disposed of finally in terms of the directions contained in his judgment.