Gujarat High Court
Mayaben Arjunsinh Vasadia vs Arjunsinh Dhirajsinh Vasadia And Ors. on 18 June, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996)3GLR35
JUDGMENT D.G. Karia, J.
1. Rule
2. With the consent of the learned Advocates for the parties and the learned Addl. Government Pleader in charge of the matter and in facts of the case when the Criminal Appeals No. 20 and 21 of 1995 have been ordered to be stayed, both these matters are heard finally. Both the said matters arise from the following facts and circumstances and as such shall be disposed of by this common judgment.
3. The petitioner. Mayaben Arjunsinh Vasadia, is the original complainant who filed Criminal Case No. 2303 of 1986 against respondents No. 1 to 3 for the offences under Sections 420, 120B. 498A. 500, 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baroda. The petitioner-complainant was lawfully married to respondent No. 1 on April 25, 1985 according to the Hindu rites and rituals at Baroda. The respondent No. 1 had taken dowry from the petitioner and her father, as detailed in Para 4 of the complaint. It is alleged that the respondent No. 1, while working as a Typist in the District Panchayat Office at Chhota-Udepur, had tried to trap a girl named Meena alias Mumtaz Patel, who was working as a nurse in the District Panchayat's Health Department at the relevant time. It is alleged that the said Mumtaz Patel had married a Muslim man and there was a child, daughter, out of the said wedlock. The respondent No. 1 had executed an agreement of friendship ('Maitri Karar') with the said Meena alias Mumtaz Patel in the year 1969 and both of them resided as husband and wife. Out of the said relationship, Mumtaz Patel had given birth to one son named Harendrasinh. It is alleged that the respondent No. 1 stayed with said Mumtaz Patel at Panvad for about 13 years as husband and wife.
4. It is alleged that the respondent No. 1 had married again with one Saroj Vakhatsinh Chastia of Vankaner, Taluka Savli, District Baroda on 28-4-1977 and taken a substantial sum by way of dowry. It is alleged that the respondent No. 1, having concealed his previous marriages, also married with one Geeta Rajput of Baroda. The respondent No. 1 having dishonestly induced the petitioner to deliver a substantial sum and ornaments by way of dowry, committed cheating with the petitioner. The complainant also alleged that the respondent No. 1 having hatched a criminal conspiracy, induced the petitioner and her father of petitioner's marriage with him and demanded and accepted Rs. 26,000/- from the father of the petitioner to marry with the petitioner.
5. After the aforesaid marriage of the petitioner with respondent No. 1, the mother of respondent No. 1 died at Jabugam. The petitioner and the respondent No. 1 had, therefore, gone to the native place of the respondent No. I to perform necessary ceremony of his deceased mother at Jabugam. Veena Bharat Patel, the respondent No. 3, was called at Jabugam by the respondent No. 1 by writing a letter to her. Respondent No. 3, continued to stay with respondent No. 1 even after the post-death ceremonies of the deceased mother of the respondent No. 1 were concluded. The respondents No. 1 and 3 were found in compromising position and the petitioner caught them red-handed during the said period at village Jabugam. The petitioner objected to such relationship of respondent No. 1 with respondent No. 3 as a result of which the respondents No. 1 and 3 having been enraged, gave threats to the petitioner to kill her if she disclosed about the incident to anyone else. The respondent No. 1 disclosed that the said Veena Patel was his kept and if the petitioner wanted to stay with the respondent No. 1, she would not have to take any objection about Veena Patel's staying with respondent No. 1 and his relationship with her. It is alleged that the petitioner was mercilessly (sic.) tortured and threatened. The petitioner tolerated all such inhuman behaviour of the respondent No. 1 and hoping that by passage of some time, the respondent No. 1 would improve. The petitioner, when objected to the illicit relationship of respondent No. 1 with respondent No. 3, was mercilessly beaten and thrown out of the house. It is the case of the petitioner that she had taken a file containing documents of illegal marriages and illicit relations of the respondent No. 1 with several ladies and the agreements executed with regard thereto and even the nude photographs of many girls, including respondent No. 3. It is also alleged that the respondents No. 1 and 3 were blackmailing other girls and used to send them to hotels for illicit relationship with others. The petitioner, therefore, filed the aforesaid criminal complaint before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Baroda against the respondents No. 1 and 3 for the aforesaid offences under Sections 420, 120B, 494, 498A, 500 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code. The copy of the said complaint is at Annexure 'B' to the petition.
6. It is also alleged that the respondent No. 1 was convicted for the offence of theft under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code on January 19, 1979 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, at Vadodara. The respondent No. 1 was, however, given benefit of Probation of Offender's Act for the said offence of theft under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code.
7. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baroda, after registering the aforesaid complaint as Criminal Case No. 2303 of 1986, ordered to issue bailable warrants against the respondents. The accused persons were thereafter released on bail.
8. It is the case of the petitioner that the aforesaid facts and the contents of Criminal Case No. 2303 of 1986 appeared in the newspapers and it was widely published. The respondent No. 1, therefore, filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner herein for defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 114 of Code, in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Baroda. The criminal case, being Criminal Case No. 2337 of 1986 for the aforesaid offences was registered against the petitioner herein and the summonses were issued against the petitioner and her father. The respondent No. 3 also lodged a criminal case of defamation, being Criminal Complaint No. 2410 of 1986, against the petitioner and her father.
9. It is the case of the petitioner that during the course of recording the evidence of the aforesaid complaints, the respondent No. 1 admitted all the allegations and the offences committed by him, the details of which have been mentioned in Criminal Case No. 2303 of 1986. During the course of the cross-examination, it was also revealed that the respondent No. 1 had trapped and married as many as 20 girls and collected substantial sums of dowry from them. It is also alleged that the respondents No. 1 and 3 having taken naked and nude photographs of some of those 20 ladies, started blackmailing and compelled them to involve in illicit profession of prostitutes. In the proceedings of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 2337 of 1986, the petitioner submitted an application before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate contending, inter alia, that the respondent No. 1 had filed a false and concocted complaint and had also deposed falsely on oath by adducing false evidence. It is also alleged that by the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 intentionally gave false evidence in the judicial proceedings of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 2337 of 1986 andor fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceedings and thereby committed offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code The petitioner also submitted an application Exh. 101 under Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and claimed compensation for accusation against the petitioner without reasonable cause. Both these applications, being Exhs. 100 and 101, are at Annexures 'D' and 'E', respectively on the record.
10. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baroda, by his judgment and order dated May 27, 1994, dismissed the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 2337 of 1986 for the offence under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner and her father and acquitted the petitioner and her father. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has also ordered to issue show cause notice to the respondent No. 1 to show cause why he should not be directed to pay the compensation for filing the false complaint against the petitioner. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate further ordered to issue a show cause notice to respondent No. 1 to show cause why he should not be punished for the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code for giving false evidence on oath in the judicial proceedings.
11. The learned Magistrate, having heard the respondent No. 1 and the petitioner, passed the order as per Exh. 119 on May 15, 1995 and awarded Rs. 5,000/ - by way of compensatory costs to the petitioner and her father. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate also passed the order vide Exh. 120 and convicted the respondent No. 1 for the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code by following summary procedure under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and sentenced respondent No. 1 to undergo three months' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo 20 days' imprisonment.
12. The respondent No. 1, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of his conviction for the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, preferred Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1995 in the Sessions Court at Baroda on May 17, 1993. The respondent No. 1, in the aforesaid appeal, did not join the petitioner as one of the parties and merely filed appeal against the State of Gujarat. The petitioner, therefore, by her application Exh. 6 in Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1995 sought to be joined as one of the parties in the said appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Baroda, by his judgment and order dated May 18, 1995, rejected the said application of the petitioner for being joined as party in Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1995 holding, inter alia, that the proceedings under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not initiated by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate against the petitioner or her father and as such they were not necessary or proper parties in the appeal proceedings. By the application Exh. 5, the respondent No. 1 sought to be released on bail till decisions against his conviction for the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Baroda. by his order dated May 19, 1995, ordered to release the respondent No. 1 on bail on his furnishing the surety of Rs. 10,000/- and the personal bond of the like amount. By application Exh. 8 in the said appeal, the petitioner sought stay of the operation of the order rejecting her application Exh. 6 for being joined as party The learned Magistrate (sic. Additional Sessions Judge), by a speaking order, dated May 19, 1995, rejected the said application. The petitioner and her father also submitted application Exh. 9 to stay the proceedings of the appeal till necessary orders are obtained from higher Court against the orders passed below the aforesaid application of the petitioner. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also rejected the said application. By application Exh. 10, the petitioner prayed for stay of the order as she intended to prefer Revision Application in the High Court. The said Revision (sic.) Application was also rejected by the learned Magistrate (sic.) by his order dated May 19, 1995, passed below the said application Exh. 10. The petitioner, by the Special Criminal Application No. 1029 of 1995, challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid orders passed below Exhs. 5, 6, 9 and 10.
13. Special Criminal Application No. 1030 of 1995 filed by Mayaben Arjunsinh Vasadia and her father, is against the order passed below Exh. 6 in Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 1995 disallowing the petitioner to be joined as party in the said appeal proceedings. The respondent No. 3, Veena Bharat Patel, had filed said Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 1995 against her conviction for the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, in the Sessions Court. Thus, both these petitions involve the indentical facts and common question of law and as such were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
14. Mr. Jashwant Makwana, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, contended that the impugned orders disallowing the petitioner to be joined as party in the appeal proceedings are unwarranted and illegal, inasmuch as the petitioner is likely to be adversely affected by the orders passed in the said appeal proceedings. According to Mr. Makwana, the petitioner is, therefore, proper and necessary party and she should be given opportunity to be heard in the appeals, as in the event of the appeals being allowed and the order as to payment of compensation being reversed, the petitioner will suffer loss and will also be caused prejudice, if she is not heard in the proceedings of the appeals without she being party therein. In support of his submission, Mr. Makwana placed reliance on the case of Chandulal Harilal Lodiya v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 1993(1) GLR 596 : 1993(1) GLH 520. This Court, interpreting the provisions of Section 397, 401 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, held that merely because State does not challenge the order of bail passed by the trial Judge, it would not be a ground for the High Court not to entertain the application filed at the instance of the private party. The petitioner, in that case, was the original complainant who had preferred an application for cancellation of bail granted in favour of the accused. This Court held that there is no law which prohibits the High Court from entertaining the application for cancellation of bail filed by the private party when the State has not come before the Court against the impugned order of grant of bail passed by the trial Court. Mr. Makwana further submitted that in the original complaint lodged by the petitioner, the State was not a party as it was a private complaint against respondents No. 1 and 3. He, therefore, submitted that if the impugned order of disallowing the petitioner to be impleaded as party is sustained, the petitioner will be caused great prejudice and pending complaint of the petitioner filed against the respondents No. 1 and 3 the offences under Sees. 191, 192 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code is likely to be adversely affected. In submission of Mr. Makwana, no prejudice is likely to be caused to the respondents if the petitioner is heard in the proceedings by allowing her to be joined as party. He further submitted that the petitioner is only interested and affected party and therefore, in ends of justice, she should be permitted to be impleaded as party in the aforesaid pending appeals.
15. As against this. Mr. P.B. Majmudar, learned Advocate for the respondents No. 1 and 3, submitted that the offence of perjury is between the party and the Court and as such the petitioner being third party cannot be said to be interested. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has, therefore, rightly, in submission of Mr. Majmudar, dismissed the applications of the petitioner for being joined as party in the pending appeals. Mr. Majmudar, in support of his submission, relied on the provisions of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which relates to summary procedure for trial for giving false evidence. Mr. Majmudar, having referred to and relied upon several authorities to which a reference will be made hereinafter, contended that the applications of the petitioner are not maintainable in law. Mr. Majmudar has also placed reliance on Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in support of his submission that the petitioner cannot be allowed to participate in the proceedings of the appeals preferred by the respondents No. 1 and 3.
16. Unlike provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, there is no clear and express provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in respect of allowing any party to be added in the proceedings before the Court. Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. However, there is no such provision empowering the Court to add any person as party in the criminal proceedings, in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
17. The term "party" is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. When it is used with reference to a proceeding in a Court, its primary meaning is a litigant. It would, therefore, mean a person who has a part to play in the proceeding. In the absence of anything to the contrary in the context, the primary meaning of the word "party" should be adopted as the person who is interested in the proceedings or that he is likely to be affected one way or the other in the final outcome of the proceedings. In the facts of the present case, it is the petitioner who has lodged private complaints against the respondents No. 1 and 3 for the offences under Sections 420, 120B, 494, 498, 500, etc. of the Indian Penal Code. As a counterblast, the respondents No. 1 and 3 filed separate complaints for the offence of defamation under Section 500 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner Mayaben and her father. In the said proceedings, the action for giving false evidence on oath in the judicial proceedings was initiated at the instance of the petitioner. At the instance of the petitioner, an application for compensation under Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also submitted and eventually was granted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. The submission of Mr. Makwana is that in the absence of the petitioner being party in the proceedings, the learned Public Prosecutor may not be able to point out all and correct facts and evidence on record, for the reason that the State was not a party in the proceedings of the complaints before the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate.
18. It is obvious that in case the appeal against the conviction under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code is allowed without the petitioner being party therein, the ultimate order of awarding compensation of Rs. 500/- (sic. Rs. 5,000/-) to the petitioner under Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure who would also be consequently quashed and it is the petitioner would be caused prejudice and she will also suffer loss if she is not made party to the appeal proceedings. Simply because there is no explicit provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the request of the petitioner, in my opinion, should not have been turned down for being impleaded as party, particularly when the actions for the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code were in fact initiated at the instance of the petitioner. It is the petitioner who pointed out to the Court at first instance as to how and in what manner the respondent No. 1 has deliberately deposed falsely and tried to mislead the Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, it would be just and proper and in the ends of justice that the petitioner be allowed to be joined as party in both the appeals. The respondents No. 1 and 3 who are original appellants of Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1995 and 21 of 1995, are not likely to be caused any prejudice if the petitioner is allowed to be represented in the appeals.
19. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, in rejecting the applications of the petitioner for being joined as party, has observed in the impugned order as follows It is not clear wherther the appellant has been convicted under Section 193 of I.P.C. or under Section 344 of Cri. Pro. Code or for this both counts, the appellant has been held liable, for giving false evidence in Judicial proceedings of Criminal Case No. 2410 of 1986.
20. It appears that the learned Judge has misread or misconstrued the judgment and the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate against which the appeal is preferred by the respondents No. 1 and 3. It is clear from the said judgment that the respondents No. 1 and 3 have been convicted and sentenced for giving false evidence in the judicial proceedings. It is also clear from the said judgment that the procedure adopted for trial for giving false evidence is summary procedure as provided under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is, therefore, no question of any conviction under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The findings of the learned Judge that the petitioner is not a complainant or aggrieved or annoyed party to the proceedings of the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code for which the respondents No. 1 and 3 have been held to be liable are contrary to record, inasmuch as it is the petitioner who submitted application for initiating action against the respondents No. 1 and 3 for giving evidence on oath in judicial proceedings, as observed hereinabove. There is no question of withdrawing the proceedings initiated against the respondents No. 1 and 3 nor compounding the said offence by the petitioner. The findings, in this context, of the learned Judge, are, therefore, fallacious.
21. It is true that the proceedings for the purpose of punishment for giving false evidence arc to be initiated in accordance with the provisions of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under:
344. (1) If. at the time of delivery of any judgment or final order disposing of any judicial proceedings, a Court of Sessions or Magistrate of the first class expresses an opinion to the effect that any witness appearing in such proceeding had knowingly or wilfully given false evidence or had fabricated false evidence with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceeding, it or he may, if satisfied that it is necessary and expendient in the interest of justice that the witness should be tried summarily for giving or fabricating, as the case may be, false evidence, cognizance of the offence and may, after giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be punished for such offence, try such offender summarily and sentence him to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or to fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX The learned Judge, having emphasised on "a Court of Sessions or Magistrate of the first class expresses an opinion" held that the petitioner cannot be said to be proper or necessary party to the proceedings. The learned Judge has lost sight of the fact that the proceedings were initiated on the application of the petitioner. The learned Magistrate has to deal with and dispose of the complaint as per the summary procedure provided in Section 344 of the Code Criminal Procedure. By interpretation of the provisions of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it cannot be concluded that the persons who are the parties in the initial proceedings could be excluded from the further proceedings in appeal. In my opinion, Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be resorted to in arriving at a decision whether a particular person is a proper or necessary party in the criminal proceedings or not. Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely provides the procedure, being summary procedure, for trial for giving false evidence.
22. The words "parties to the proceedings" occurring in Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be construed restrictedly. When an objector lays claim to the subject-matter of the proceeding he or she is a party to the proceeding for the purpose of Section 193 or Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code. He or she becomes a party to the proceeding as soon as he invokes the jurisdiction of the Court for some redress. In my opinion, therefore, no restricted meaning could be attached to the words "party to the proceedings" appearing in the section. It has to be understood in its normal sense. It cannot be said that in the appeal proceedings, the State could only be party to the proceedings. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner who was the accused in the complaint of the respondents No. 1 and 3 for defamation, was very much party before the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and normally in the proceedings arising out of the said complaint, the respondents No. 1 and 3 ought to have joined the petitioner as party. If the respondents No. 1 and 3 deliberately or designedly excluded to implead the petitioner as party, there is no reason why the application of the petitioner for being joined as party in the appeals should not be considered favourably.
23. Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is with regard to appearance by Public Prosecutors, providing as under:
301. (1) The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may appear and plead without any written authority before any Court in which that case is under inquiry, trial or appeal.
(2) If in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may, with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case.
Relying upon the aforesaid provisions of Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Majmudar submitted that it is only the Public Prosecutor who could be in charge of the appeal. However, there is nothing in Section 301 which prohibits appearance by any party, particularly one who was the party in the proceedings before the trial Court could be excluded or omitted in the appeal proceedings. In my opinion, there is nothing in Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prohibit the permission to the petitioner to be impleaded as party in the proceedings.
24. In case of Shantilal Mohanlal Shah v. Chandrakant Ambalal Thakkar and Anr. reported in 1987(2) GLR 784, the Division Bench of this Court comprising A.P. Ravani and M B. Shah, JJ. (as they were then), held that the cognizance of the case has been taken by the learned Magistrate only when the Police submitted the report after making investigation pursuant to the order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code. Once it is shown that the learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance on the basis of the complaint filed by the applicant, it can never be said that the case is instituted on the complaint filed by the applicant. This Court, therefore, held that the provisions of Section 385(1 )(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Code would not be of any help to the applicant inasmuch as with facts of the case it cannot be said that the case was instituted on the complaint filed by the applicant. Considering the ratio laid down in the judgment, 1 am of the view that the decision will not be applicable to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the petitioner is accused person of the complaints filed by respondents No. 1 and 3. It was a private complaint. There is, therefore, no question of the cognizance having been taken by the learned Magistrate on basis of the police report.
25. Mr. Majmudar relied upon the case of Varyabhai Jesangdas Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr. reported in 1986 GLH 154 and submitted that the right of Advocate instructed by a private person, such right is limited to assisting Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor. It is held by this Court in the said judgment that a very limited right seems to have been given to an Advocate instructed by a private person and that is to assist the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor. The language of Section 301(2) cannot be stressed to mean something which it prohibits by implication. The words 'shall act' occurring in Section 301(2) of Cri. P.C. would not include to plead or to examine or cross-examine the witnesses and it would also be clear from the very language of the section that even for advancing written arguments permission of the Court would be needed. In the facts of the case, to my mind, the provisions of Section 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding right of appearance by Public Prosecutors cannot be made applicable to the case and the judgment relied upon by Mr. Majmudar would not be of any help to the respondents, inasmuch as there is no question of examining or cross-examining any witness in the appeal proceedings. Since the petitioner was party as accused in the original proceedings and at her instance the proceedings of punishment under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code were initiated, the petitioner is proper and necessary party in the appeal proceedings.
26. A reliance was also sought to be placed on the case of Naranbhai Sadabhai Parmar and Ors. v. Barot Nandlal Khodidas and Anr. reported in 1983(1) GLR 522 wherein it is held that after committal to the Court of Sessions only Public Prosecutor in charge of the case has right to participate, private complainant or his Advocate has no right to participate. They can sit and assist the Public Prosecutor. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision relied upon on behalf of the respondents will not be of any assistance, inasmuch as the facts of that case are irrelevant to that of the present one as there is no question of the case being committed to the Court of Sessions. The proceedings wherein the petitioner was party at the initial stage have been taken to the Appellate Court against the conviction for the offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code of respondents No. 1 and 3.
27. In the case of Saniokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain and Anr. , the Supreme Court dealt with Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code regarding false charge of offence, etc. Having gone through the judgment, the same is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.
28. Mr. Majmudar lastly relied on the case decided by Calcutta High Court reported in 1988 Cri. LI. 278, wherein it is laid down, lawyer engaged by a private person has no right of audience in a case which is in charge of a Public Prosecutor and that he can only submit written statement with the permission of the Court. The provisions of Sections 2(4), 225, 234 and 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been dealt with in this judgment. Therefore, the said ruling cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.
29. In the above premises, both the present petitions succeed. The impugned orders passed below Exh. 6 in Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1995 and 21 of 1995 disallowing the petitioner and her father to appear as parties and represent the case is quashed and set aside. The application Exh. 6 in Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1995 and 21 of 1995 pending before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Vadodara stands granted. As regards the relief in context of the orders passed below applications Exhs. 5, 8, 9 and 10 in Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1995 and 21 of 1995, Mr. Makwana, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has not pressed the same and as such no order is passed with regard thereto.
Rule is accordingly made absolute in each of the Special Criminal Applications. Stay stands vacated.