Delhi District Court
Chetna Verma vs Devender Damle on 23 March, 2015
IN THE COURT OF BHARAT CHUGH,
METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE (NI ACT)-1, CENTRAL:
ROOM NO.275, TIS HAZARI COURT COMPLEX, DELHI
Chetna Verma
VERSUS
Devender Damle
JUDGMENT
Part A - The lis at a glance A. Serial No. of the Case CC No. 2799/10 B. Date of Alleged Commission of the 28.09.2010 offence C. Name of the Complainant Chetna Verma w/o Sh. Rajiv Verma r/o H/No. 21/79, IInd Floor, Old Rajender Nagar, Delhi -
110060 D. Name of Accused person & his Devender Damle, Proprietor of M/s S.V.Damle parentage & residence Consulting Engineers, r/o C/70, First Floor, Inderpuri, Delhi E. Offence complained of Dishonor of cheque - culpable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
F. Plea of the accused and his Pleaded not Guilty. Denied having taken examination (if any) received any amount from the complainant.
Claimed that the cheques in question were given as security and as the accused had stood surety for the complainant, who had procured loans from other people on the basis of his blank cheques. The accused contended that the complainant and her family were in dire financial straits and had lost credibility in the market. In order to help them procure some loan, cheques in question were given to satisfy potential creditors as to their financial prowess. He, therefore denied any legal liability under the cheques.
G. Final Order Convicted.
H. Judgment reserved on 11.03.2015
I. Judgment pronounced on 23.03.2015.
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 1 of 34
Part B - A brief statement of reasons for the decision (As mandated u/s 355(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.)
1. Pithily put, this is a classic case of an alleged friendly loan, where the 'friendly' relations went sour, but the 'loan' remained, constraining the parties to come to the present court in this hotly contested matter. Let us now, without further ado, delve straight into complainant's case.
Complainant's case 1.1 The complainant claims that she and the accused are known to each other for more than 9 years. The complainant claims to have become acquainted with the accused through her husband Mr.Rajiv Verma, whose friendly relations with the accused go as back as 22 years on the date of filing of the complaint. They've been extremely cordial and it is claimed that the parties have had business relations in the past as well.
1.2 Then the plot thickens, as the complainant claims that in the month of July, 2006, the accused was going through a tough time financially and he approached the complainant to bail him out of that financial distress. To make his request more palatable, the accused came up with a lucrative business proposal to the complainant, and convinced her to finance a project which would yield handsome profits to her. To that end, he sought a loan of Rs. 14 lakhs from her, which the complainant and her husband, in view of the extremely cordial relations, agreed to provide. The rate of interest, was stipulated to be 3 % per month. It is the complainant's case that the accused was quite regular in the payment of the interest amount every month. The complainant being satisfied and assured of the bona Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 2 of 34 fides of the accused, gave in, to another request of the accused in August, 2007 and advanced him another Rs. 14,00,000/-, which she mustered by selling off all her jewelry.
1.3 The complainant contends that it was towards, the security and to liquidate the said liabilities of the loan of Rs. 28 lakhs, the accused issued three cheques bearing 549169, 549166 & 551750, all drawn on Bank of Maharashtra, Karol Bagh, Delhi, to the complainant, duly signed by him, with the authority for her to fill in the other details on the cheque and withdraw from his bank whenever she needs the money or in case the accused fails to pay the stipulated interest every month.
1.4 The accused paid the interest on the outstanding loan regularly till about November, 2007, thereafter he started defaulting on his payments and avoiding the complainant, which made her anxious as to the security of her investment. Finally in July, 2008 the complainant asked the accused to repay the entire loan. To allay her apprehensions, the accused executed a written document undertaking to repay the loan amount by 31.3.2010, failing which the complainant would be at liberty to present the cheques in the account of the accused.
1.5 The accused did not repay the loan within the stipulated time, constraining the complainant to present the cheques in question (more particularly described in Para 1.3 above), which much to the dismay of the complainant, returned dishonored on presentation on account of 'insufficient funds', following which, she made a demand of the money by way of a legal notice dated 28.09.2010, which also when fell on deaf ears, led to the filing of the present complaint.
Cognizance was taken on the complaint and accused Devender Damle was Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 3 of 34 summoned to face trial for an offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1898 [hereinafter the 'NI Act'].
The Defence.
2. The accused entered appearance and pleaded not guilty. To get a better insight into his defence as disclosed in his statement u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C & while deposing as DW1, and to narrow down the controversy to the core issue, let us sift it, in terms of the 'admitted' and the 'controverted' :-
Admitted • Admitted knowing the complainant, as a family friend, she being the wife of his friend Mr.Rajeev Verma.
• Also admitted that the cheques in question were drawn on his bank account and bore his signatures.
• Admitted having received the legal notice from the complainant.
Controverted • Denied filling-in of the particulars (name of the payee/amount/date) on the cheque. (denied everything except signatures).
• Denied business relations/ large scale monetary transactions with the complainant or family.
• Denied that the cheques were issued in discharge of any legal liability. Denied having taken any loan from the complainant. He claimed that the cheques were issued as security for a loan procured by the complainant in Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 4 of 34 his name. (Statement recorded on 11.07.2011) • While deposing as DW1, the accused contended that the cheques in question were issued somewhere between January to April 2010, as the complainant and her family were in grave financial difficulties, so much so, that they could not even manage their regular household expenses. He further contended that the complainant and family had lost all financial credibility in the market. Since there was no one to extend financial help to them, the accused states, that he had issued the cheques to enable them to procure loans by showing his blank cheques as surety and to show their financial prowess to their potential creditors. The accused further claims that the complainants did borrow money in cash and returned the same to the creditors, while relying upon his security cheques. The accused emphatically contends that the complainant did not have the financial competence to give him any loan, being under financial problems herself. The accused has further argued that no undertaking was filed by the complainant, although the same was specified in their complaint.
This, in sum and substance, is the factual exposé.
The Law
3. The factual position being thus, Now let us quickly run through the legal benchmark which is to be satisfied in order to constitute an offence under S. 138 N.I. Act :-
(i) Person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account;Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 5 of 34
(ii) The cheque should have been issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability;
(iii)That cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier;
(iv)That cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;
(v) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 30 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
(vi) The drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.
Being cumulative, it goes without saying that it is only when all the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied that the person who had drawn the cheque can be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act.
The legal benchmark being thus. Let us apply it to the facts of the case.
4. The service of legal notice having been admitted. Let us turn to the core question in this case, i.e whether the cheque in question can be said to have been issued in discharge of a legal liability or not ?
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 6 of 345. For that, let us again briefly recapitulate that the accused has admitted having drawn the cheque on a bank account maintained in his name and having signed the same. Now once these foundational facts are admitted and a factual basis is established, by virtue of Section 118(a) and Section 139 of the NI Act a presumption of the cheque having been issued in discharge of a legally sustainable liability and drawn for good consideration, arises.
Section 118 of the N.I Act provides "Presumptions as to negotiable instruments:
Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: (a) of consideration
- that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;"
Section 139 of the N.I Act further provides as follows:
"Presumption in favour of holder - It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability"
Hence it is clear that, as per the scheme of the N.I Act, on proof of foundational facts - a presumption arises as to the cheque having been issued in discharge of a legal liability, and the burden of proof lies upon the accused to rebut the said presumption. This clearly is an instance of the rule of 'reverse onus' in action, where it is incumbent on the accused to lead what can be called 'negative evidence'. Evidence of a character not to prove a fact affirmatively, but to lead evidence to show non existence of liability. Keeping in view, that this is a departure from the cardinal rule of 'presumption of innocence' in favour of the accused, and also keeping in mind that negative evidence is not easy to be led by its very nature. It is now fairly well settled that the accused can displace this presumption on a scale of preponderance of Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 7 of 34 probabilities and the lack of consideration or a legally enforceable debt need not be proved to the hilt or beyond all reasonable doubts. The accused can either prove that the liability did not exist or make the non existence of liability so probable that a reasonable person ought under the circumstances of the case - act on the supposition that it does not exist. Simply put, the accused has to make out a fairly plausible hypothesis. This the accused can do either by leading own evidence in his defence or even by punching holes within the case of the complainant in the testing ordeal of cross examination.
While adjudging whether in a case the presumption of consideration has been rebutted, it becomes important to underscore that a mere denial of liability or vague defence of blank cheque as security, cannot be taken at the mere ipse dixit of the accused. The accused has to come forth with a convincing defence that appeals to the judicial conscience. Needless to state that, if on a bare denial of liability, the presumption is taken to be rebutted, that would defeat the legislative intention of having a presumption in the first place. The presumption that a person would not normally hand over a signed cheque to another unless the same is for a liability has to be respected and given its full play. Only in a case where the accused comes up with a convincing defence to liability, that the presumption can be stated to have been rebutted, lest the statutory intent as adumbrated above would be the direct casualty.
In that light let us proceed to examine the defence of the accused and answer whether the same is a plausible one. In this we would, at all occasions, juxtapose the conduct of the accused with that of the hypothetical reasonable man and ordinary canons of human conduct and see how he fares.
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 8 of 346. In my opinion, the accused has not succeeded in rebutting the presumption of legal liability even on the scale of preponderance of probabilities. The defence of the accused, cannot be termed to be a plausible defence. The accused has contended that the cheques in question were issued to the complainant in the first quarter of 2010 for her and her family,to enable them to obtain a loan, by showing his cheques as surety/security for the loan amount that she would take from her creditors. The accused's defence therefore, is that he gave the blank signed cheques to the complainant for her to show these cheques to her creditors to convince them that their money is in safe hands and would be repaid.
This defence is unworthy of credence for more reasons than one, as would be demonstrated in the following paras :-
6.1 The accused, while deposing as DW1, has claimed that the chequeswere employed by the complainant to show the same to her creditors, and to secure loan for herself in cash and the said loan was also returned by the complainant to her creditors. Now, even assuming the defence of the accused to be correct for an instant, what refrained the accused from seeking his cheques back once the complainant, as per his own admission had taken the cash from her creditors and given it back to them. It does not stand to reason, as to why the accused would not seek back his cheques once the purpose was fulfilled. Whilst under cross examination on 20.05.2014, DW1 has candidly admitted :-
"I have never made any complaint to any department with regard to return of cheques from the complainant and had never asked the complainant to return the cheques...Again said, I used to ask the return of cheques from the Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 9 of 34 complainant"
..
"I have never lodged any police complaint or to any department with regard to the cheques in question"
Any reasonable man of even elementary prudence, leave alone an educated structural civil engineer like the accused, would have sought his cheques back and raised a protestation on non return. The plea of the accused that he had faith on the complainant and her family and for that reason did not seek the cheques back is patently falsified in view of the fact that the accused has not denied that the cheques in question were presented not once but twice. The accused ought to have been woken out of his deep slumber, on the first presentation and dishonor itself, and the complainant's intention ought to have been made clear to him. The alibi of 'faith' therefore fails to help the accused. It is important to note that even after the first dishonor, the accused did not take any steps to make any complaints against the complainant or even stop payment on the cheque. Even after having received the legal notice the accused remained mum. Nothing rankles the human heart like injustice. The silence of the accused in these circumstances is totally unnatural conduct, which raises an inference of culpability.
6.2 The accused, while under cross examination as DW1, deposed that he had met the creditors of the complainant, through whom the complainant obtained loans, by demonstrating her financial prowess through the blank signed cheques of the accused. It is important to note that during the cross examination of the complainant on 17.10.2012, a suggestion was put to her, which she denied, to the effect that :-
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 10 of 34"It is wrong to suggest that I had lost my credibility in the eyes of Sanjay Sharma and B.R.Ahuja. It is wrong to suggest that I had requested the accused to stand as a security for me and my family before Mr.Sanjay Sharma and Mr.B.R.Ahuja...."
It is therefore manifest that the accused claims to have stood guarantor/security/surety for the complainant enabling her to obtain credit from the said Mr.Sanjay Sharma and Mr.B.R.Ahuja. This suggestion having been denied by the complainant, it was for the accused to bear the onus to examine these people in his defence to establish his defence. Their testimony, only, could have thrown light on the defence on the accused. They were the most material witnesses for the accused. No attempt has been made by the accused to examine them, no reason has been assigned for their non examination either. This warrants an adverse inference against the accused, an inference of suppression of best evidence. It is logical now to presume that if the said witnesses had entered the witness box, they would have deposed adversely to the accused. Section 114 illustration (g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits the court to presume "that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it".
It is apt to note that the importance of examination of these witnesses in evidence was also emphasized by the Ld.Predecessor of this court even vide order dated 24.02.2014, however they have not been examined even thereafter by the accused till date.
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 11 of 346.3 The mainstay of the defence of the accused has been that his cheques were taken to be shown to creditors by the complainant as security for her repaying their debts. In order to be true, this pre-supposes accused to be in a very sound financial condition and enjoying good creditworthiness and reputation in the society/market. In this regard, the accused has brought on record no material to substantiate this. The accused in his cross examination on 20.05.2014, admitted that he had not filed his bank statement on record. He further admitted that he had not filed his income tax returns in the court. Having taken the defence of being a man of great credit and means in the society, it was incumbent on the accused to probablise the same, which he could have done by filing his IT Returns, Bank statements, Statement of Accounts of his business etc. but he has not filed any statement of accounts.
Apart from total lack of material by him to show his financial prowess, what renders his financial position in grave doubt, is that the accused, whilst under cross examination, admitted that one of his cheques given to NDPL had got bounced. As regards the amount and date of the said cheque, he evaded the question by saying :-
"I do not recollect if the cheque amount was Rs. 9,500 and it was the year 2010".
It is quite hard to believe that the accused must have forgotten the amount on the cheque. He having admitted dishonor of the cheque, renders his financial capability in the year 2010, highly suspect. Conversely, this probablises the case of the complainant that the accused being in financial difficulties had sought financial help from the complainant, which was extended. What further shrouds the defence of the accused in grave doubt is that cheques in question got dishonored against the accused not once but Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 12 of 34 twice and both times on account of insufficient funds. It is hard to believe that a person who does not have sufficient credit in his account would stand surety for the complainant to obtain loans of large amounts. When the accused himself was struggling, it defies logic how could he have stood surety for the complainant.
6.4. As against this, the complainant when being questioned as to her financial capability, gave details of the source of funds by saying that she had took some amount from her mother in law and also chest reserves at home to muster up the first loan and as regards the second loan she had managed the money through sale of her jewellary. This is clearly borne out from her cross examination and she has remained steadfast to that stand. When questioned on the question of IT returns, the complainant, in her cross examination on 17.10.2012, had the following to say :-
"At the request of the counsel for the accused, the witness has produced the photocopies of the Income Tax returns for the Assessment year 2005-2006 till the assessment year 2011-2012 alongwith audited balance sheets, which are marked 'X' (Colly). I have reflected the amounts given to Mr.Devender Damle in my Income Tax Returns. The amount of Rs.28 lacs was paid in cash, therefore the same amount has not been reflected in my bank account".
6.4.1 The photocopies of income tax returns for the AY - 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008,2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011, 2011-2012were promptly filed by the complainant as Mark 'X'(Colly)to corroborate her stand, these returns prima facie manifested the grant of loan to the accused. The IT returns for the AY-2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011 & 2011-2012, manifested that the loan granted to the accused was disclosed in the balance sheets supporting the IT returns and loan of Rs. 28,00,000/- to the accused Mr.Devender Damle has been shown in the returns. As regards Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 13 of 34 returns of the Assessment Year 2007-2008, a loan to of Rs. 14,00,000/- is shown to have been advanced to the accused. It would be apposite to remember that this corroborates the story of the complainant to the effect that the total loan of Rs. 28,00,000/- was given to the accused in two installments, firstly in July, 2006 and then in August, 2007. The Balance Sheet annexed to Assessment year 2007-2008 reflects loan of Rs. 6,35,000/- taken by the complainant from her mother, which could have been employed to give the loan to the accused in addition to chest reserves, cash in hand. As regards the first loan,in the returns of AY-2006-2007,The complainant is shown to have Rs. 6,50,000/- in home chest and Rs. 1,68,906/- as cash in hand. This probablises the financial capability of the complainant to have granted the loans. The giving of second loan of Rs. 14,00,000/- was demonstrated by the proceeds from the sale of jewellary.
6.4.2 After the above returns were filed in evidence, the accused filed an application for summoning of income tax returns of the complainant from the IT department and other documents. The said application was dismissed by the Ld. Predecessor of this court, on the premise that it was for the accused to bring evidence in support of his case and not to instruct the complainant to conduct her evidence in a particular manner, her being the dominus litus of her own case. The accused was given liberty to establish his own defence. The accused had approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for quashing of the said order, wherein the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 07.03.2014, had directed the present court to make an endeavor to obtain authenticated Income Tax Returns of the complainant and proceed with the matter.
6.4.3 In compliance thereof, the record was sought from the IT department on 15.03.2014, wherein the IT department filed authenticated IT returns of the Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 14 of 34 complainant for the AY 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 and with respect to the rest of the returns i.e for the AY 2006-2007, 2007-2008, 2008-2009, it was submitted that they were unavailable in their systems. Inspite of repeated directions the record remained untraceable. Strict note was taken of the matter and on 27.11.2014 the IT department was directed to produce the record on the next date of hearing and in default file written explanation as to steps taken for tracing of the record and also to furnish explanation as to why the same was not traceable and also to fix specific responsibility of those concerned and the matter was listed for 03.02.2015. On that date IT department maintained that despite their best efforts the concerned record could not be found as traced. The reason assigned for non production was that voluminous record had been stored in gunny bags while shifting of office from C.R.Building to Civic Centre in the year 2013, and the entire old record including returns/documents had perhaps got mixed up in the gunny bags which were moved to another building. These documents sent to the store were stated to be running into lacs and the impossibility of locating certain returns in the same was emphasized by the department. Report from the Jt.Commissioner of Income Tax concerned was taken on record as Ex. DW1/R-1. Statement of one Mr.K.K.Mitra, ITO Ward, 50(3) New Delhi was recorded to this effect. The Commission of Income Tax(11) was directed to initiate an enquiry into the matter and fix responsibility on the concerned officials for this sheer negligence and loss of vital evidence and file a status report by 29.04.2015.
As regards the merits of the case, On joint concurrence of the parties, the matter was proceeded with as per material available on record, as the matter was stalled in this stale-mate situation for a considerable time.
6.4.4 Ld.Counsel for the Accused has argued with great vehemence that Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 15 of 34 adverse inference need to be drawn against the complainant for having not procured the rest of the IT returns. To my mind, this is an argument thoroughly misconceived, no case for adverse inference is made out in view of the fact that it is the IT department who has been unable to find out the authenticated IT returns. The complainant could at best have filed the copies of returns available with her, which she has filed. If the department has, due to sheer negligence or otherwise, lost the copies, the necessary action under the law shall follow against him, but the complainant cannot be made to pay for the lackadaisical approach or loss of records by the department.
Section 114(illustration g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which deals with adverse inference, categorically reads :
"the court may presume - (g) that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it".
A bare reading of the provision reveals that the adverse inference is to be drawn where a party being in the position to bring some evidence on record, withholds it. This is not one such case, the authenticated IT returns are in the possession of the IT department. The complainant has adduced in evidence the copies available with her and that is the best she could have done. No adverse inference against her, therefore is liable to be drawn. It deserves mention that the IT department has never claimed that returns had never been filed by the complainant during those years, or that they have taken any action against the complainant ever. Therefore in view of this it would not be fair and just to draw any adverse inference against the complainant for loss of some of the record.
Having said that, equities of the case can be well balanced by eschewing those Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 16 of 34 returns, which have not been authenticated by the IT department from consideration.
Let us now turn to the authenticated copies of returns filed by the departments. The department has filed the duly authenticated copy of computation of taxable income filed by the complainant for the AY 2008-2009. The same clearly shows the sale of jewellary of about Rs. 15,00,000/- by the complainant, which she claims to have utilized to advance the second loan of Rs. 14,00,000/- to the accused. In the balance sheet the loan advanced by the complainant to the accused to the tune of Rs. 28,00,000/- is also clearly shown. Now this computation pertains to the year 2008-2009 i.e even before handing over of the cheques in question, which have been admitted by the accused to have been issued in the first quarter of 2010 and much before the filing of the present case. The disclosures being antecedent in point of time to the cheques and naturally the present case, there is no reason therefore to disbelieve the same. It would amount to stretching the imagination too much, to assume that the complainant might have planned the use of cheque and filing of the case and to fabricate evidence to that end disclosed the loan in her computation in the year 2008-2009. This goes against the grain of ordinary human conduct and amounts to giving wings to flights of fancy too much. It is important to note that the IT department has not been able to produce the authenticate IT returns of certain years from their records. The IT department had pleaded that the record is not traceable and not that the complainant did not file any IT returns during those years. It is not the case where the department had served any notices during those years to the complainant for non filing of her IT returns. The loss of her IT returns by the department has to be seen in this light.
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 17 of 34Even de hors the other returns, this computation by itself, greatly probablises the version of the complainant. The complainant had deposed having taken a part of money from her Mother in law for the purpose of it being given to the accused and part of it from chest reserves at home. For the subsequent loan of Rs. 14,00,000/- she has claimed having mustered that amount by sale of her jewellary, this amount is duly reflected in the authenticated computation of income for AY-2008-2009. It is pertinent to note that the complainant during the course of her case had filed affidavits by the purchasers of her jewellary confirming the factum of sale. Now these documents, since they have not been formally led in evidence ought to be eschwed from consideration. Having said that, it was still open to the accused to examine the persons mentioned in the affidavits in support of his case and in his defence evidence, whose full details are spelt out in the affidavits, to disprove the sale of jewellary by the complainant.
All in all for the foregoing reasons the financial capability of the complainant is clearly discernible. It deserves mention that as against this, the accused has not filed even an iota of evidence to substantiate the fact that he was in a good financial condition so as to be able to stand surety for the complainant. In a situation like this where the court has to go by preponderance of probabilities, the case superior in weight or the more probable case has to be preferred, in this, the complainant's case is clearly more superior and the accused's defence unworthy of belief.
6.5 Ld.Counsel for the Accused has argued that that a written undertaking mentioned by the complainant in her evidence has not been filed on record and in that regard an adverse inference ought to be drawn against her. This, argument is devoid of merit, since the complainant has consistently Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 18 of 34 maintained that the original of this undertaking is filed before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a civil suit for recovery by the complainant against the accused. In such circumstances, it need not be gainsaid, that the original document can be at only place at one time. The non filing of the document in original in this case cannot merit an adverse inference as the same was not possible. The law does not require a party to do the impossible. That document, in any event, has not been exhibited or relied upon by the complainant in evidence, therefore the same is not being read in evidence. Even de hors that document, as demonstrated above, there is sufficient ammo in the case of the complainant and sufficient deficiencies and infirmities in the defence of the accused.
7. Ld.Counsel for the Accused has strenuously argued that the complainant being a Money Lender, is debarred from recovering her loan, in absence of a money lending license.
This argument leaves me cold, and fails to persuade for more reasons than one.
Firstly, the complainant has nowhere stated that she is a money lender, she has claimed herself to be a housewife having been duped of the money by the scheming accused. She claims to have been beguiled into parting with money at the assurance of the accused of some profits/returns. There is nothing on record to suggest that she has been giving loans to other people on interest earlier. In any event, in order for the complainant to be a money lender, it needs to be proved that she is engaged in the business of grant of loans to several people in a commercial manner. No evidence has been brought on record to demonstrate that she is a money lender. The allegation therefore has Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 19 of 34 remained unsubstantiated.
Secondly, even assuming the complainant to be a money lender for an instant, the same would not render the present complaint non-maintainable. In this regard, a recent decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court is apposite to be referred to.
In Kajal v. Marwah (Crl. A. 870/2003 - Date of Decision : 27.03.2014), the court, under similar facts, held :-
"In my view, even if the appellant/complainant was engaged in lending money, that would not debar her from filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, if a cheque issued to her towards repayment of the loan advanced by her is dishonoured by the bank for want of funds and the drawer of the cheques fails to make payment within the prescribed time, after receipt of legal notice from the lender. Section 3 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders' Act, 1938, which applies to Delhi, to the extent it is relevant provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit by a money lender for the recovery of a loan shall, after the commencement of the Act, be dismissed unless the money lender at the time of institution of the suit is registered and holds a valid license or holds a certificate from the Commissioner granted under Section 11 of the Act, specifying the loan in respect of which the suit is instituted or if he is not already a registered or licensed money lender, he satisfies the court that he has applied for such registration or license but the application is pending. The aforesaid provision does not debar a money lender from instituting a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which is a remedy enforceable before a criminal court, and totally independent of a civil suit. The criminal liability is incurred only in case a cheque is issued in discharge of a debt or other liability, the said cheque is dishonoured for want of funds and the borrower fails to make payment of the amount of the cheque even after receipt of a notice from the lender."
It is, therefore, apparent therefore that the embargo is with respect to filing of Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 20 of 34 suit for recovery of money or simply the recovery of that money. This fails to have a bearing on the present case, since what is at hand is a complaint case u/s 138 of the NI Act, which is not a recovery proceeding, but are proceedings to punish a person who after issuing a cheque fails to honour the same and also commits a default in paying the said amount on receipt of the notice.
Hence the argument of amount being irrecoverable and therefore not a legally enforceable debt, is misconceived in the facts of the case and in view of the legal position as enunciated above.
8. Ld.Counsel for the Accused has also argued that the alleged loan not having been disclosed in the Income Tax Returns, cannot be termed to be legally enforceable liability in view of the bar of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act.
This argument, is thoroughly misconceived, for more reasons than one:-
Firstly, It has not been proved on record that the loan in question was not mentioned in the IT Returns by the complainant of the relevant year. The same is in the realm of 'not proved' state, and not proved or disproved. The story of how the income tax returns were not available for certain years when the loan is stated to be granted, has been well enunciated above. The loan was disclosed in all the income tax returns filed by the complainant, however since they have not been authenticated are not looked into. Having said that, the loan was disclosed in the computation of income for the AY 2008-2009 by the complainant, which has been authenticated by the IT department. In addition to this the sale of jewelery and other money in the hand of the complainant is borne out of the returns authenticated by the IT department.Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 21 of 34
This has not been rebutted by the accused. This disclosure pertaining to a time, before the taking of cheqeue in question and much before the filing of the present lis, cannot be said to be stage managed. Therefore the factum of non disclosure by the accused remains a bald argument and contrary to record.
I hasten to add, that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the loan was not disclosed in the IT returns, the same would be inconsequential. It is now fairly settled that the mandate of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, extends only to the taker or receiver of the loan and not the giver. Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, reads as under :-
Section 269SS: Section 269SS provides that any loan or deposit shall not be taken or accepted from any other person otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft if,
(a) the amount of such loan or deposit or the aggregate amount of such loan and deposit ; or (b) on the date of taking or accepting such loan or deposit, any loan or deposit taken or accepted earlier by such person from the depositor is remaining unpaid and the amount or the aggregate amount remaining unpaid ; or
(c) the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (a) together with the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (b), is twenty thousand rupees or more.."
Thus, it is clear that no person can accept any loan or deposit of Rs 20000 or more otherwise than by way of an account payee cheque or an account payee draft.
Consequences of contravention of Section 269SS have been provided in Section 271D of Income Tax Act 1961, which provides, that if a loan or deposit is accepted in contravention of the provisions of section 269SS then a penalty equivalent to the amount of such loan or deposit may be levied by the Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 22 of 34 Joint commissioner.
Hence even on a bare reading of these provisions it is manifest that the bar pertains to the receiving or taking of loan and not giving the same.
In this regard reliance on Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54, is also misplaced. Reliance on the judgment is placed to buttress the submission that a non disclosure of loan in IT returns is sufficient to rebut the presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act as in that case the court acquitted the accused on account of non disclosure of the loan in income tax returns. I am afraid, the said decision does not hold ground anymore. The judgment on this aspect stands impliedly overruled by the three judge bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC.
This aspect is very succinctly highlighted by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the relatively recent decision of Krishna P.Morajkar v. Joe Ferraro, 2013 SCC Online Bom 862, which reads as follows :-
"..
18. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the observations of the Supreme Court in para 14 of the judgment in Rangappa (supra) show that the Supreme Court had not in any way cast any doubt on the correctness of the decision in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra), as it was based on specific facts and circumstances therein. Therefore, he submitted that observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) about non- compliance of provisions of Section 269SS and the implications of Section 271D of the Income Tax Act would still stand as good law. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that even these observations would stand impliedly over- ruled. He pointed out that what was held in Krishna Janard- han Bhat (supra) was that advance taken by way of loan of more than Rs. 20,000/- was only to be made by way of an ac- count payee cheque. He submitted that in Rangappa (supra) the Supreme Court was specifically considering the case of an advance of Rs. 45,000/- made in cash and yet the Supreme Court had upheld the conviction recorded. Thus Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 23 of 34 even those observations based on the provisions of Section 269SS and 271D of the Income Tax Act made in Krishna Ja- nardhan Bhat (supra) would stand impliedly overruled. I am entirely in agreement with the learned Counsel for the appellant because the Supreme court in Rangappa (supra) had specifically noted the judgment in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra). The Supreme Court had obviously noted the observations in para 26 in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) that advance of more than Rs. 20,000/- was to be made only by way of an account payee cheque, and yet the Supreme Court accepted case of a complainant who claimed to have made an advance of Rs. 45,000/- in cash and proceeded to uphold the conviction, even though the case rested on the fact that cash advance of a sum more than Rs. 20,000/- was made. Thus, on this aspect also Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) stood impliedly overruled by Ranga- paa (supra), and the judgment is to be held rendered on the facts of that case, not laying down any law. Therefore, judg- ments which follow Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) can be safely ignored.
19. There is another aspect of the matter. The learned Coun- sel for the respondent pointed out that inKrishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) attention of the Supreme Court was possibly not drawn to the actual wording of Section 269SS of the In- come Tax Act. He submitted that Section 269SS of the In- come Tax Act, in fact, does not cast any burden upon a per- son making advance in cash to record it in his returns and does not prevent any such cash advance from being made. It may be useful to quote provisions of Section 269SS and 271D of the Income Tax Act as under:
Section 269SS: No person shall, after the 30th day of June, 1984, take or accept from any other person (hereafter in this section referred to as the depositor), any loan or deposit other- wise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft if,-
(a) the amount of such loan or deposit or the aggregate amount of such loan and deposit; or
(b) on the date of taking or accepting such loan or deposit, any loan or deposit taken or accepted earlier by such person from the depositor is remaining unpaid (whether repayment has fall-
en due or not), the amount or the aggregate amount remaining unpaid; or
(c) the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (a) together with the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (b), is twenty thousand rupees or more:
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 24 of 34Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any loan or deposit taken or accepted from, or any loan or de- posit taken or accepted by-
(a) Government;
(b) any banking company, post office savings bank or co-opera- tive bank;
(c) any corporation established by a Central, State or Provincial Act;
(d) any Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
(e) such other institution, association or body or class of institu-
tions, associations or bodies which the Central Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, notify in this behalf in the Official Gazette:
[Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not ap- ply to any loan or deposit where the person from whom the loan or deposit is taken or accepted and the person by whom the loan or deposit is taken or accepted are both having agricultural in- come and neither of them had any income chargeable to tax un- der this Act.] Section 271D - (1) If a person takes or accepts any loan or de- posit in contravention of the provisions of section 269SS, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit so taken or accepted. (2) any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be im-
posed by the joint Commissioner.
(emphasis supplied).
A plain reading of Section 269SS shows that no person can accept any loan or deposit of a sum of Rs. 20,000/- or more otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account pay- ee bank draft. It does not say that a person cannot advance more than Rs. 20,000/- in cash to another person. It is clear that the restriction on cash advances was in fact on the tak- er and not the person who makes the advance. The penalty for taking such advance or deposit in contravention of pro- visions of Section 269SS was to be suffered by one who takes the advance. Therefore, it was obviously impermissible to invoke these provisions for preventing a person from recov- ering the advance which he has made..."
This renders it clear that Krishna Janardhan (supra) fails to advance the case of the accused. I need not dilate on this much, since in the instant case, the Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 25 of 34 mention of these loans and financial capability is clearly discernible from the authenticated IT returns of the complainant, as available on record.
What further fortifies this conclusion is the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Mukesh Gupta v. P.K.Bajaj (CS(OS) No. 1615/2003, DOD : 20.11.2006,wherein the court, in a civil suit for recovery, quite categorically held, that even assuming a non disclosure in tax returns, merely that, would not render the contract of loan void and loan irrecoverable. Relevant excerpts from the decision are as follows :-
"36. On issue No.2 framed vide order dated 2.2.2006, suffice would it be to note that as held in the report published as 2002 (8) SCC 31, Nutan Kumar &Ors. vs. IInd Additional District Judge &Ors., unless a statute specifically provides that a contract contrary to the provision of the statue would be void, the contract would remain binding between the parties and can be enforced between the parties themselves. Consequences, if any other in law, would follow.
37. Learned counsel for the defendants could not show any statutory provision under the Income Tax Act 1961 or any other law which stipulates that a loan transaction not recorded in the Income Tax Return or a loan transaction which is in violation of Section 69-A, 69-B or Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act would be void.
38. I accordingly hold that the suit is not barred under Sections 69-A, 69-B or Sections 269SS of the Income Tax Act..."
9. As what can be termed as a last ditch effort, Learned Counsel for the accused has argued, with great vehemence, that the cheque in question was given in blank, which was subsequently filled in by the complainant. He states that this subsequent filling on of the cheque by the complainant invalidates the instrument as it constitutes material alteration.
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 26 of 34In my opinion, this contention is thoroughly misconceived. It is no longer res integra that no law requires that whole body of the cheque should be filled by the drawer himself. If the signatures on the cheque are admitted, the same is sufficient. The legal permissibility of the much hackneyed 'defence of blank cheques' has been rendered virtually immaterial after several pronouncements to that effect (See Ravi Chopra vs State AndAnr. 2008(2) JCC (NI) 169, Vijender Singh v. M/s Eicher Motors Limited &Anr. Crl.M.C. 1454/2011 decided on 05.05.2011, TarunGautam vs State Crl M C No.529/2012 decided on 13.02.2012 and Manoj Sharma vs Anil Aggarwal CRL.M.C. 1325/2012 decided on 20.04.2012). The relevant excerpts from a judgment by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Ravi Chopra vs State And Anr, may be referred to, in this regards :-
"
..
15. What appears to be clear from the above definitions that an essential feature of a cheque is that it has to be signed by the maker. This signing of the cheque need not be by hand alone. After the amendment to Section 6 in 2002, the NI Act acknowledges that there can be an electronic cheque which can be "generated, written and signed in a secure system." Nevertheless, the signing of the cheque is indeed an essential feature. But what about the other material particulars? Can the word "cheque" occurring in Section 138 NI Act include a blank cheque which is signed by the drawer but the material particulars of which are left unfilled at the time it was handed over to the payee? While on the one hand Section 138 NI Act which contemplates a 'no fault liability' has to be strictly construed as regard the basic ingredients which have to be shown to exist, it requires examination of the other provisions of the NI Act in order to ascertain if a cheque that was signed but left blank can, if the material particulars are subsequently filled up and presented for payment, still attract the same liability.
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 27 of 34...
...
18. Section 20 NI Act talks of "inchoate stamped in-
struments" and states that if a person signs and deliv- ers a paper stamped in accordance with the law and "either wholly blank or have written thereon an incom- plete negotiable instrument" such person thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof "to make or complete as the case may be upon it, a negotiable in-
strument for any amount specified therein and not ex- ceeding the amount covered by the stamp." Section 49 permits the holder of a negotiable instrument endorsed in blank to fill up the said instrument "by writing upon the endorsement, a direction to pay any other person as endorsee and to complete the endorsement into a blank cheque, it makes it clear that by doing that the holder does not thereby incurred the responsibility of an endorser." Likewise Section 86 states that where the holder acquiesces in a qualified acceptance, or one limited to part of the sum mentioned in the bill, or which substitutes a different place or time for pay- ment, or which, where the drawees are not partners, is not signed by all the drawees, all previous parties whose consent has not been obtained to such accep-
tance would stand discharged as against the holder and those claiming under him, unless on notice given by the holder they assent to such acceptance. Section 125 NI Act permits the holder of an uncrossed cheque to cross it and that would not render the cheque invalid for the purposes of presentation for payment. These provisions indicate that under the scheme of the NI Act an incomplete cheque which is subsequently filled up as to the name, date and amount is not rendered void only because it was so done after the cheque was signed and delivered to the holder in due course.
19. The above provisions have to be read together with Section 118 NI Act which sets out various presump-
tions as to negotiable instruments. The presumption is of consideration, as to date, as to time of acceptance, as to transfer, as to endorsement, as to stamp. The only exception to this is provided in proviso to Section 118 which reads as under:
Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 28 of 34 from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful con- sideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him .
20. A collective reading of the above provisions shows that even under the scheme of the NI Act it is possible for the drawer of a cheque to give a blank cheque signed by him to the payee and consent either implied- ly or expressly to the said cheque being filled up at a subsequent point in time and presented for payment by the drawee. There is no provision in the NI Act which either defines the difference in the handwriting or the ink pertaining to the material particulars filled up in comparison with the signature thereon as constituting a 'material alteration' for the purposes of Section 87 NI Act. What however is essential is that the cheque must have been signed by the drawer. If the signature is al- tered or does not tally with the normal signature of the maker, that would be a material alteration. Therefore as long as the cheque has been signed by the drawer, the fact that the ink in which the name and figures are written or the date is filled up is different from the ink of the signature is not a material alteration for the pur- poses of Section 87 NI Act.
It is therefore, apparent that a combined reading of Section 20 and Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as aforesaid, amply reveals that merely filling in the particulars on a blank signed cheque would not amount to material alteration, and a person giving blank cheque can be attributed with the intention of having given implied consent to the payee to fill in that cheque. In the circumstances of the case, the cheque cannot be said to have been materially altered merely because the complainant has filled in the particulars, especially, when the complainant has categorically deposed to having done the same at the instructions of the accused. In this case the complainant could have argued, like most, that these cheques were given duly filled in, however the complainant has made a clean breast of things and has fairly conceded having filled in the said cheques herself albeit under the Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 29 of 34 authority and consent of the accused. The accused could not adduce any evidence or elicit anything in the cross examination of the complainant to detract from such implied authority given to the complainant. Therefore this defence, does not advance the case of the accused in any manner.
10.Ld.Counsel for the Accused has also argued that the cheque was a security cheque and the complainant has admitted it to be a security cheque in her complaint when she states in para 5 that "That towards the security and to liquidate the said liabilities of the loan of Rs. 28 lakhs, the accused issue three cheques....".
Ld.Counsel for the Accused has argued with great eloquence at his command that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.S Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala, AIR 2006 (6) SCC 39, a case u/s 138 of the N.I.Act does not lie in case of a security cheque.
In my considered opinion,while there is no dispute as the preposition of law laid down in M.S.Narayana Menon (supra) to the effect that a cheque issued as security cannot be the basis of a prosecution u/s 138 of the NI Act being not issued for a legally enforceable debt, however in this case the cheques cannot be said to have been issued as security, for reasons I shall discuss below. The mention of the word 'security' in the pleadings of the complainant, seems clearly to be a case of inartistic drafting. It is important to note that in the said para the cheques are stated to have been issued "as security and to liquidate the liabilities of the loan...".Now in this regard, it is clear that, the cheques could have been issued, either as security or to liquidate the liabilities and it can't be both at the same time. The pleadings being inaccurate, a forensic approach is required to unearth the real nature of this transaction and for that Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 30 of 34 the time frame would be crucial to be seen. The accused (whilst under examination as DW1) has admittedly given the cheques to the complainant in the first quarter of 2010, whereas the loans have been disbursed in 2006 and 2007. This is clearly a case of cheques having been given for a debt in praesenti or in other words an existing legal liability. What needs to be kept in mind that is that term 'security' is often used, mostly abused, but rarely understood. However that need not be, because the concept has been demystified already by authoritative judicial pronouncements. For what constitutes security, let us turn for guidance to a decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in M/s Collage Culture &Ors v. Apparel Export Promotion Council &Anr. 2007 SCC, wherein it was held :-
"20. A post datedcheque may be issued under 2 circumstances. Under circumstance one, it may be issued for a debt in presenti but payable in future. Under second circumstance it may be issued for a debt which may become payable in future upon the occurrence of a contingent event.
21. The difference in the two kinds of post-dated cheques would be that the cheque issued under first circumstance would be for a debt due, only payment being postponed. The latter cheque would be by way of a security.
22. The word 'due' means 'outstanding at the relevant date'. The debt has to be in existence as a crystallized demand akin to a liquidated damages and not a demand which may or may not come into existence; coming into existence being contingent upon the happening of an event."
In view of the above, the cheques which have been issued when the debt was already due and outstanding, the same cannot be said to have been issued by way of security.
I am further fortified in this line of reasoning by the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Sampelly Satanarayana Rao v. M/s. Indian Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 31 of 34 Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd. (2014 SCC OnLine Del 2932), wherein the expostulation of law relating to security cheques as expounded in Collage Culture (supra) was followed and the court held :-
"10. In the present case when the post-dated cheques were issued, the loan had been sanctioned and hence the same fall in the first category that is they were cheque issued for a debt in present but payable in future. Hence, I find no reason to quash the complaints. However, these observations are only prima facie in nature and it will be open for the party to prove to the contrary during trial."
In the present case also, it is an admitted position that as on the date of the issuance of the cheques the loan had already been disbursed and infact the complainant had also demanded the repayment of the said loan from the accused, when the cheques came to be issued. Therefore, whichever way one looks at it, the cheques cannot be said to have been issued as security. I reiterate once again, that the court has to examine the facts of the case and apply the correct law, de hors any error in the pleadings.
11.Accused's reliance on Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, AIR 2009 SC 1518, is also misplaced. While there is no disputing the general legal preposition laid down in the case, to the effect that the presumption of liability u/s 118 and 139 of the NI Act can be rebutted from the overall probabilities of the case of the complainant himself. To this extent there is no dispute and homage to this principle has been paid in Para 5 of this judgment, where the parameters of rebuttal have been discussed. However on factual basis both the cases are different. In the instant case the presumption has not been rebutted by the accused either by his own evidence, cross examination of the complainant or even the case of the complainant. Complainant's case is much more plausible and superior in weight to the case of the accused. The defence of the accused looks moonshine and inherently unbelievable for a variety of Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 32 of 34 reasons, which have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
Even on a bare reading, Kumar Exports (supra), is distinguishable on facts. The factual background was that a cheque was issued by the accused signed in blank as advance for goods to be supplied in future which never came to be supplied and the same was proved on evidence of the case. In this factual context the court held that the presumption of liability stood rebutted and recorded an acquittal. Now the present case is completely distinguishable on facts. Here we have a case where the cheques have been shown to have been issued after the disbursal of loan and after demand and therefore for a debt in praesenti. The factum of giving of loan has also been established. Therefore this decision has no application to the facts of the case. It needs to be outlined that no precedent is a statute or a Euclid's theorem. Every case is to be read secundum subjectum materiami.e in the specific light of its own facts.
12. Summing up the cogitation above and in the ultimate analysis :-
a) The conduct of the accused in not seeking return of his cheques, before or after the first dishonor;
b) Not having filed any complaint against misuse of cheques by the complaint;
c) Not having stopped payments on the cheque at any point of time, even after the first dishonor;
d) The non reply to the legal notice admitted to have been received;
e) The non examination of so called creditors of the complainant, with whom accused claims to have stood surety, in evidence, which leads to adverse inference of suppression of best evidence.
f) The total lack of material showing accused's financial capability to have stood surety for the complainant, and conversely the complainant's Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 33 of 34 comfortable financial position having been shown satisfactorily, the complainant having accounted for the money stated to have been advanced to the accused and the authenticated IT returns corroborating the same.
g) The cheques having been demonstrated to have been issued not as security but for an outstanding due.
All these factors seen cumulatively, render the defence of the accused unworthy of credence. The defence of the accused does not seem like a plausible and reasonable defence. It is manifest that the accused has not been able to either prove the lack of legal liability or even make the non existence of the liability probable enough for a reasonable person to believe the same. The presumption u/s 118 & 139 of the NI Act, having gone unrebutted and the complainant having satisfied the essential requirements of Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The accused Devender Damle stands convicted of offence u/s 138 of the N.I.Act.
Let the convict now be heard on the quantum of sentence.
Let a copy of these judgment be provided to the convict free of cost.
A copy of this judgment be placed on the official website of the District Court.
Announced in the open court today on 23.03.2015 (Bharat Chugh) MM (NI Act)-01, Central District, Delhi 23.03.2015.
* Judgment contains 34 signed pages.
Chetna Verma v. Devender Damle Page 34 of 34