Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Panyam Prasad Rao, vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 4 December, 2019
Author: M.Satyanarayana Murthy
Bench: M.Satyanarayana Murthy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
WRIT PETITION Nos.19007 and 19035 OF 2019
COMMON ORDER:
These two writ petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India claiming identical relief questioning the G.O.RT.No.1109, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 (W.P.No.19007 of 2019) calling for applications for constitution of non-hereditary trust board to Sri Penusila Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy vari Devasthanam, Penchalakonakshetram, Rapuru Mandal, SPSR Nellore District and G.O.Rt.No.1110 Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 (W.P.No.19035 of 2019), whereby the existing trust is superseded while calling for applications from public for being appointed as trustees of the Board of the temple Sri Mahanandeeswara Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Mahanandi, Kurnool District and declare those G.Os. as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, consequently, direct the respondents not to constitute non-hereditary trust board till completion of the tenure of the petitioners as non-hereditary trustees.
Since the relief claimed in both the petitions is identical, I find that it is appropriate to decide both the writ petitions by common order.
Respondent No.1 issued notification in G.O.RT.No.150 Revenue (Endowment-II) Department dated 28.01.2019 calling for application for constitution of non-hereditary trust board to Sri Penusila Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Penchalakonakshetram, Rapuru Mandal, SPSR Nellore District. In response to the said notification, the petitioners and others have applied for being appointed as non-hereditary trustees of MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 2 respondent No.2 temple. The petitioners were appointed as non- hereditary trustees after following the rules and thorough verification. Respondent No.1 issued G.O.Rt.No.349 Revenue (Endowments.II) Department dated 27.02.2019 constituting trust board by appointing the petitioners and 3 others as trust board members. Thereafter, oath was administered on 01.03.2019 as per notification.
Similarly, the writ petitioner in W.P.No.19035 of 2019 and 10 others were appointed as members of the trust board to Sri Mahanandeeswara Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Mahanandi, Kurnool District vide G.O.Rt.No.915, Revenue (Endowments.II) Department dated 02.07.2018 for a period of two years from the date of taking of oath of office and secrecy and the members of the trust board administered oath on 11.07.2018.
The said two trust boards are functioning within their limits and the petitioners are discharging their duties effectively as members of the trust board for benefit of the temple and public. While the matter stood thus, respondent No.1 in W.P.No.19007 of 2019 issued G.O.RT.No.1109, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 for constitution of new trust board to the respondent No.2 - temple superseding the existing trust board invoking Section 135 of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short "Act 30 of 1987") as amended by Act No.31 of 2019.
Similarly, in W.P.No.19035 of 2019, Government issued G.O.RT.No.1110, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 superseding the existing trust board of Sri Mahanandeeswara Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Mahanandi, Kurnool District with immediate effect.
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The said G.O.RT.Nos.1109 and 1110, Revenue
(Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 are challenged in the writ petitions on the ground that the amendment cannot be given retrospective effect, such amendment can be given effect only to the trust board to be constituted by the Government, but superseding the existing trust board by exercising power under Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987, which takes away the right accrued under the existing law prior to amendment is nothing but arbitrary exercise of power by the State.
It is specifically contended that the notification issued by the Government is contrary to the spirit of constitution of trust board and such stringent action superseding the existing trust board is taken due to political vengeance.
It is the specific case of the petitioners in both the petitions that the right is conferred on the petitioners to continue in the office as members of the trust board till completion of their tenure. Therefore, issuance of fresh notification without prior notice to the petitioners is nothing but violation of principles of natural justice.
It is also contended that giving equal opportunity to S.Cs, S.Ts, B.Cs in terms of the notification is not in the public interest, but it is only a ruse to supersede the existing trust board. Therefore, G.O.RT.Nos.1109 and 1110, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 are illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of A.P.Act 30 of 1987 and violative of principles of natural justice, besides violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
During hearing, Sri D.V.Sasidhar, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.19007 of 2019 and Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.19035 of MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 4 2019 made identical submissions, more particularly reiterating the grounds urged in the Writ Petition No.19007 of 2019. The main contention raised during arguments is that amended provisions cannot be given retrospective effect and in the absence of any clause giving retrospective effect, the supersession of existing trust board by exercising power under Section 135 of the Act 31 of 2019 is a serious illegality and it is contrary to the very spirit of the A.P.Act 30 of 1987 and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Providing reservation of 50% to S.Cs, S.Ts and B.Cs is only to provide social representation in Pubic charitable and endowments institutions and it cannot be construed as a public purpose. Hence, superseding or annulling the present trust boards removing the members of the Trust Board will affect the rights of the petitioners seriously and such supersession is nothing but an arbitrary exercise of power, consequently hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, requested to set aside the G.O.RT.Nos.1109 and 1110, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019.
Sri S.Sriram, learned Advocate General, mainly contended that the question of applicability of provisions of amended Act either prospective or retrospective is not relevant for deciding the present controversy since the Government provided social representation in the trust boards of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments and amended the A.P.Act 30 of 1987 with avowed object of providing social representation in Public Charitable, Religious and Endowments institutions.
Section 135 of the amended Act conferred power on the Government to supersede the existing trust boards in the public interest, therefore, step taken by the State in issuing MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 5 G.O.RT.Nos.1109 and 1110, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 is only in the public interest and to achieve the Constitutional goal of providing social representation in Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments and not tainted with any malafide or political vengeance.
Learned Advocate General further contended that appointment as member of the trust board or Chairman of the trust board will not confer any statutory legal right to continue in the office as members of the trust board and it is only at the pleasure of the Government. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to claim any vested right having appointed as members of the trust board. Therefore, question of taking way any right that accrued to the petitioners does not arise in the present facts of the case. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in "Ishwar Nagar Co-op. Housing Building Society v. Parma Nand Sharma1", and another Division Bench Judgment of High court of Judicature at Hyderabad in W.P.No.11512 of 2015 and batch dated 18.06.2015, where a similar objection was raised before the Division Bench when the Boards of Agricultural Market Committees were superseded by amending the provisions of A.P. (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966, but the Division Bench did not accept the contention of the petitioners therein, who are similarly placed, concluded that appointment as member of the Agricultural Market Committee does not confer any legal or statutory right and upheld the amendment to the provisions of the Act. Based on the principles laid down in the said two judgments, learned Advocate General requested to dismiss these petitions. 1 AIR 2011 SC 548 MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 6 It is an undisputed fact that the petitioners in both the petitions were appointed as members of the trust board (referred supra) under two different G.Os, the tenure of the members of the trust board is two years from the date of taking oath of office and secrecy. The tenure of the petitioners as members of the trust board is not yet completed. On account of amendment to various provisions of A.P.Act 30 of 1987 by G.O.Ms.No.378 Revenue (Endowments.I) Department dated 22.08.2019, the existing trust boards are superseded. Certain amendments were made to existing Act 30 of 1987 by Act 31 of 2019 notified in G.O.Ms.No.378 dated 22.08.2019. As per amended provisions, proviso is added to sub- section (2) of Section 17, so also Section 135 of Principal Act 30 of 1987. These two amendments are vital for superseding the existing trust boards by issuing G.Os. impugned in the writ petitions.
Prior to amendment, Trust board can be dissolved in the circumstances enumerated under Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987. Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987 is as follows:
Prior to amendment Post amendment
"135.Dissolution of the Board of "135.Dissolution of the Board of
Trustees:- Where at any time it Trustees:- Where at any time it
appears to the Government that appears to the Government that
any Board of Trustees has failed any Board of Trustees has failed
to perform its functions or has to perform its functions or has
exceeded or abused any of the exceeded or abused any of the
powers conferred upon it by or powers conferred upon it by or
under this Act resulting in under this Act resulting in
material loss or loss of prestige to material loss or loss of prestige to
the institution or endowment, the institution or endowment,
the Government may the Government may
communicate the particulars communicate the particulars
thereof to the Board of Trustees thereof to the Board of Trustees
and if the Board of Trustees fails and if the Board of Trustees fails
to remedy such defect, excess, or to remedy such defect, excess, or
abuse or to give a satisfactory abuse or to give a satisfactory
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explanation therefor within such explanation therefor within such
time as the Government may fix time as the Government may fix
in this behalf, the Government in this behalf, the Government
may dissolve the Board of may dissolve the Board of
Trustees." Trustees."
Proviso is added to Section 135
of the Act 30 of 1987 by Act 31 of 2019
by G.O.Ms.No.378 Revenue
(Endowments-I) Department dated
22.08.2019, is as follows:
"provided that the Board
may be superseded by the
Government for the reason to
be recorded in writing in
public interest."
Section 17 of the Act 30 of 1987 is as follows:
Prior to amendment Post amendment
"17. Procedure for making "17. Procedure for making
appointments of trustees and appointments of trustees and
their term: their term:
(1) In making the (1) In making the
appointment of trustees under appointment of trustees under
section 15, the Government, the section 15, the Government, the
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Deputy
Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner or the Assistant
Commissioner, as the case may Commissioner, as the case may
be, shall have due regard to the be, shall have due regard to the
religious denomination or any religious denomination or any
such section thereof to which the such section thereof to which the
institution belongs or the institution belongs or the
endowment is made and the endowment is made and the
wishes of the founder: wishes of the founder:
Provided that the founder or Provided that the founder or
one of the members of the family one of the members of the family
of the founder, if qualified as of the founder, if qualified as
prescribed shall be appointed as prescribed shall be appointed as
one of the Trustees. one of the Trustees.
(2) Every trustee appointed (2) Every trustee appointed
under Section 15 shall hold office under Section 15 shall hold office
for a term of (two years) from the for a term of (two years) from the
date of taking oath of office and date of taking oath of office and
secrecy." secrecy."
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(Provided that every trustee (Provided that every trustee
who completed a term of office of who completed a term of office of
one year at the commencement one year at the commencement
of the Andhra Pradesh of the Andhra Pradesh
Charitable and Hindu Religious Charitable and Hindu Religious
Institutions and Endowments Institutions and Endowments
(Amendment) Act, 2000, shall (Amendment) Act, 2000, shall
ceased to hold office forthwith ceased to hold office forthwith
and every Trustee whose term of and every Trustee whose term of
office exists after such office exists after such
commencement shall continue to commencement shall continue to
hold office for a period of two hold office for a period of two
years from the date of taking years from the date of taking
oath of office and secrecy.") oath of office and secrecy.")
In sub-section (2), for proviso,
the following shall be substituted, in
Section 17 of the Act 30 of 1987 by Act
31 of 2019 by G.O.Ms.No.378 Revenue
(Endowments-I) Department dated
22.08.2019, which is as follows:
"Provided that the
Government may for good and
sufficient reason in public
interest remove a Trustee from
office before the expiry of the
two year term."
In view of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act 30 of 1987, power is conferred on the Government to supersede the trust board for good and sufficient reason in public interest, remove the trustees from the office before the expiry of the two year term, whereas Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987 permits the Government to supersede the trust board for the reasons to be recorded in writing in public interest.
The proviso to Section 17 is irrelevant since it is not a case of removal of a member from any trust board. The proviso to Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987 is relevant provision and applicable to MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 9 the present facts of the case since the trust boards are superseded by exercising power under proviso to Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987. Mandatory requirement as per proviso added to Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987 by Act 31 of 2019 is "recording of reasons in public interest". What is pubic interest is again a question to be decided taking into consideration of various factors.
The word "public Interest" is not defined anywhere in any enactment. The general meaning of the word "public interest" can be taken into consideration to decide the requirement to exercise power under proviso to Section 135 of Act 31 of 2019.
In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest' is defined thus:
"Public Interest: a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public interest"
is defined as follows :
"Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by national government...."
The definition of "public interest" is identical in both Strouds Judicial Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition). In fact, definition of "Public Interest" as per Strouds Judicial Dictionary was accepted by the Apex Court in many matters including "Janata Dal vs H.S. Chowdhary2". Therefore, applying 2 AIR 1993 SC 892 MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 10 the same meaning, the action of the respondents in superseding the existing trust boardS can be said to be in the public interest.
Certain constitutional directives provides for administration of justice viz., access to justice for the socially, economically and/or politically disadvantaged or other disabled or weaker sections of the community. Women and children are given a special place of protection. The following principles emanate from the constitutional directives.
(a) Securing social, economic and political justice to all people;
(b) Securing the functioning of all the institutions of national life towards the above objective;
(c) Ensuring that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
Thus, public interest can be understood and treated as a citizens' participation irrespective of caste, creed and sex to achieve the constitutional goals. Therefore, in the way forward to achieve constitutional goal, the State took a drastic step creating reservations in trust boards of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments by amending the Act suitably by Act 31 of 2019 and to achieve the object of the Act and constitutional mandate, the State superseded the Trust boards of Sri Penusila Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Penchalakonakshetram, Rapuru Mandal, SPSR Nellore District and Sri Mahanandeeswara Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Mahanandi, Kurnool District and such supersession of trust boards can be said to be in the public interest i.e. to provide social representation to MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 11 certain categories i.e. S.Cs., S.Ts., B.Cs and women in the trust boards. Therefore, action taken by the State cannot be described as an arbitrary Act, violative of any of the provisions of the Act 30 of 1987 as amended by Act 31 of 2019 or fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India.
An identical question came up before the Apex Court in "Ishwar Nagar Co-op. Housing Building Society v. Parma Nand Sharma" (referred supra), wherein Rule 25 (1) (c) of Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 1973 came up for consideration, which authorizes the competent authority to expel a member from the society and the main challenge was that such provision cannot be given retrospective effect and contrary to the bye-laws. In the said Judgment, the Apex Court framed four (4) points for consideration. Question No.2 is as follows:
"2. Whether bye laws of the society can debar the respondent-1 on acquisition of a separate residential/dwelling house in Delhi?"
Rule 25 says that Notwithstanding anything contained in the rules or the bye-laws of the co-operative society, if a member becomes, or has already become, subject to any disqualification specified in Sub-rule (1), he shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member from the date when the disqualifications were incurred.
In view of the rule, a member who acquired the property shall be debarred from membership and the same is challenged based on its retrospective operation as amended. But the Court after considering several judgments concluded that the most concrete cases wherein laws are made retrospective are those in which the date of commencement is earlier than enactment, or which validate some invalid law, otherwise, every statute affects rights which would have been in existence but for the statute and MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 12 a statute does not become a retrospective one because a part of the requisition for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. Applying the above principle to the facts of the case in the said judgment, the Apex Court arrived at an inescapable conclusion that Rule 25(2) is not retrospective. All that Rule 25(2) does is that it operates in future, though the basis for taking action is the factum acquiring a plot in the past. Thus when by virtue of Rule 25(2), a member is deemed to have ceased to be a member of the society, the cessation operates from April 2, 1973, when the rules came into force.
Turning to the present facts of the case, the petitioners did not question the constitutional validity or vires of the amended Act 31 of 2019. Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.19035 of 2019, contended that the Act is silent as to its operation either retrospective or prospective and the amended provisions cannot be applied to the existing trust boards invoking proviso to Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987 as amended by Act 31 of 2019. But this contention cannot be accepted, even assuming that the amended Act got prospective effect, the power is conferred on the State to supersede the existing trust boards by recording reasons in the public interest. Therefore, application of the provision, either prospective or retrospective, is irrelevant when such power is conferred on the State to supersede the existing trust boards. Therefore, this Court need not dwell upon to decide the application of amended provision either prospective or retrospective.
Though, learned counsel for the petitioners in both the petitions contended that the G.O.RT.Nos.1109 and 1110, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 are issued in MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 13 arbitrary exercise of power, but there is nothing to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power was exercised arbitrarly without any authority, when the Statute confers such power, it cannot be construed to be an arbitrary exercise of power.
G.O.RT.No.1109 Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 disclosed specific reason for superseding the trust board, which is as follows:
"Towards achieving the objectives of the Act and to expedite the action to reconstitute the Trust Board, it is proposed to supersede the existing Trust Board Sri Penusila Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Pechalakonakshetram, Rapuru (M.), S.P.S.R. Nellore District in order to implement the amended Legislation made by the Government of AP and to reconstitute the Trust Board afresh for substantial representation to various sections of the society and to women in public interest at large."
G.O.RT.No.1110 Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 disclosed specific reason for superseding the trust board, which is as follows:
"Towards achieving the objectives of the Act and to expedite the action to reconstitute the Trust Board, it is proposed to supersede the existing Trust Board Sri Mahanandeeswara Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Mahanandi, Kurnool District in order to implement the amended Legislation made by the Government of AP and to reconstitute the Trust Board afresh for substantial representation to various sections of the society and to women in public interest at large."
Thus, it is clear from the contents of the said G.Os, that to provide reservations in the Trust Boards as a measure of social representation in Public Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments provided by Act 31 of 2019, the State exercised power under Section 135 of the Act as amended by Act 31 of 2019. Such exercise of power cannot be said to be arbitrary.
MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 14 One of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no opportunity and no notice was issued prior to superseding the existing trust boards. No doubt, no notice was issued before passing G.O.RT.Nos.1109 and 1110 Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019, but the Act is silent as to procedure to be followed for superseding the existing trust boards and on the other hand, proviso to Section 135 of the amended Act 31 of 2019 clearly stipulates recording of reasons in writing in public interest to supersede the trust board at any time. Therefore, when the Statute did not specify as to issuance of notice to the members of the existing trust board, the Court cannot compel the State to issue notice before passing such order though it harshly affects the members of the trust board.
Learned Advocate General supported the G.Os issued by the State while contending that appointment as a member of the trust board is not a vested right on anyone and trust boards are being changed from time to time based on situation prevailing in the State. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any vested right and when the petitioners have no vested right, the question of issue of notice does not arise and placed reliance on "Avjinder Singh Sibia v. S. Prakash Singh Badal3", in the said judgment, the Court held as follows:
"14. It appears that the petitioner was only a nominated member of the Market Committee, Raikot (Ludhiana), whereas in the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Ram Dial and others AIR 1965 SC 1518 the appellants, who had been removed by a notification, were elected members of the municipality, and they had been removed on the ground of a resolution passed by outgoing members of the committee belonging to a different political party, who had lost their seats to the appellants in elections. Moreover, the provisions of Section 14(e) of the Punjab 3 AIR 2008 P & H 67 MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 15 Municipalities Act No. 3 of 1911 had given unfettered discretion to the Government to remove elected representatives/ members of municipal committees without any notice to them, and/or without a right of hearing which, on the contrary, was envisaged under Section 16, a parallel provision, of the same Act which also provided for removal of a member of municipal committee in public interest. As regards the Amendment Act No. 5 of 2007 impugned herein which has superseded all the market committees with nominated members in the State, it does not seem to carry an element of mala fide, inasmuch as, it has been passed to supersede all such committees in the State and not any individual market committee. Further, provisions of Section 35 of the Act, which have been heavily relied upon by learned senior counsel for the petitioner, are to apply in individual cases, on the ground of incompetency. An order passed in exercise of powers under Section 35 would essentially be stigmatic in nature and, therefore, before passing any such order, it may require granting an opportunity of hearing to the aggrieved person. The Act in question has been passed by the legislature by exercising powers within its legislative competence and in no manner, it casts any stigma like the one in-built in the grounds under Section 35 of the Act. Moreover, we are also not inclined to accept the submission of learned senior counsel that the doctrine of pleasure would not apply if the statute provides for specific term of the office. This submission was also urged before Hon'ble the Apex Court which could not find favour vide the judgment (Om Narain Aggarwal and Ors v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur and Ors.) [1993]2SCR34. The arguments raised on behalf of the appellants are contained in para 9 of the judgment as under (Para 8 of AIR):
9. Learned Counsel for the private respondents submitted that once the power of nominating the women members is exercised by the State Government, such nominated members cannot be removed prior to the completion of the term of the Board unless they are removed on the grounds contained under Section 40 of the Act. It was also contended that the State Government cannot be allowed to remove a nominated member at its pleasure without assigning any reason and without affording any opportunity to show cause. Once a women member is nominated she gets a vested right to hold the office of a member of the Board and the State Government cannot be given an uncanalised, uncontrolled and arbitrary power to remove such member. It is contended that such arbitrary and naked power without any guidelines would be contrary to the well established principle of democracy and public policy. It would hamper the local bodies to act independently without any hindrance from the side of the Government.
15. The Hon'ble Court in para 13 of the judgment held that the nominated members of the Board fall in a different class and MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 16 cannot claim equality with the elected members. The Hon'ble Court has also held that even the highest functionaries in the Government, like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney General and the Advocate General, discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to become demoralised or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remained in the office.
This observation of the Hon'ble Court was given in answer to an additional argument raised in the case that in such cases, there would be a constant fear of removal at will of the State Government and is bound to demoralise the nominated members in discharge of their duties as members of the Board. The Hon'ble Court has also held that the right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body depends and arises under the statute. If such appointments have been made initially by nomination on political consideration, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution, in case the Legislature authorises the State Government to terminate such appointments at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of the persons to be affected by the act of such body. It also appears from the ratio of the judgment that as the provision challenged therein did not put any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members, their removal without affording an opportunity did not offend any provision of the Constitution. Though in an earlier judgment (State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid) ((1954)IILLJ678SC) while dealing with the doctrine of pleasure, the Hon'ble Court has held that to the extent of deviation from the doctrine of pleasure, a civil suit would be maintainable but in the Judgment of 1993 (supra), no such liberty appears to have been granted. Moreover, looking to the nature of appointment as being nominated, it would not be open to assail the amendment on the ground of livelihood and even if a party takes the plea of doctrine of livelihood, this being a question of private interest would have to yield to public interest. In the instant case, the Legislature in its wisdom has passed the impugned amendment superseding all' the market committees with nominated members and has left it to the administrative exercise of discretion of the Government under Section 35 of the Act, and rightly so,, because in that case, it would cast stigma on the members of the committee and under such circumstances, even though they are nominated, they would be entitled to a personal hearing. Though there is no specific mention about the doctrine of pleasure in the Act to be applicable in this case, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, as the petitioner was nominated to the Board and it was not a selection or election, the doctrine of pleasure may be read into the Act and would certainly apply, thus, principle of MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 17 natural justice as regards giving of hearing before removal from office in the absence of any stigma would not be attracted. Irrespective of doctrine of pleasure, as argued by learned senior counsel, the impugned Act No. 5 of 2007 whereby all the nominated market committees in the State have been superseded is also justified on the ground that nomination to an office which if made under a Statute can be taken away by suitable amendments in that statute as a nomination does not create a fundamental right or a common law right in favour of a nominated member to continue in the office."
In view of law declared in "Avjinder Singh Sibia v. S.Prakash Singh Badal" (referred supra), no notice prior to supersession is necessary and failure to issue prior notice does not amount to violation of principles of natural justice.
In "M/s Rattan Lal and Co. v. The Assessing Authority, Patiala4", a question came up for consideration about the supersession by amending the Act. In the said judgment, the Apex Court held that "the Act enables the operation of existing laws to the new States until superseded, amended or altered by the appropriate legislature in the new States." While following the same, the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in W.P.No.11512 of 2015 and batch the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad observed that the Act is a law in the new States and subject to constitutional fetters or limits, the legislatures are competent to address the requirements of legislation and amend the present law to its present needs. To observe otherwise, it would certainly lead to anomalous situation in implementation of the existing laws by the new States. Therefore, on consideration of the Act, Act 6 of 2014 and scheme of constitution in distribution of subjects between State and Union, the Division Bench is of the view that no 4 AIR 1970 SC 1742 MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 18 constitutional provision is violated through enactment of Amendment Act 5 of 2015 by the Telangana State Legislature and concluded that The Amending Act being retrospective in operation by itself is not a ground to accept challenge to the Amendment Act. Therefore, the challenge on the ground of Amendment Act being retrospective must fail and is accordingly rejected.
The other contention before the Division Bench was that on the basis of motives or discrimination in the term of office held by committees and special committees is merely referred to and rejected in limini. The legislative action under our Constitution is subject only to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution. The enactment of competent legislature cannot be tested on the grounds available against an executive order. The challenge on the ground of motives or discrimination is factually and legally untenable and is accordingly rejected. It is further observed that it is an admitted fact that the petitioners were nominated to the committee in accordance with unamended Section 5 of the Act. The nomination to post or a committee as held by the A p e x Court in "Om Narain Aggarwal and Ors v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur" and "Avjinder Singh Sibia v. S. Prakash Singh Badal" (referred supra) have a few trappings and uncertainties. Merely because at the time of nomination a three year tenure was provided in the Statute, the same cannot be treated as a vested right under the Statute. The fact that before nomination an effort of short listing or selecting eligible applicants does not make any difference to the term of office of the Committee. It is one thing to reduce the term of office of an elected body and another to reduce the term of office of a nominated body. The State Legislature, as already noted, made a MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 19 further few changes to the principal Act to keep these sections in line with Section 5 of the Act. The exigencies of administration and vicissitudes with the change of political power are considered in great detail in the decisions referred to above and in agreement with the ratio/reasoning in the cases referred to above on the State Legislature's power to determine the term of office to nominated posts.
The facts of the above case are almost identical to the present facts of the case, but the difference is State enactment. When identical question was decided by the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in W.P.No.11512 of 2015 and batch, it is binding on the Single Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Applying the principle laid down in the above judgments, I am afraid to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners while accepting the contention of the learned Advocate General for the State upholding the act of the State in supersession of the trust boards for the temples of Sri Penusila Lakshmi Narasimha Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Penchalakonakshetram, Rapuru Mandal, SPSR Nellore District (vide: G.O.RT.No.1109, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019) and Sri Mahanandeeswara Swamy Vari Devasthanam, Mahanandi, Kurnool District (vide: G.O.RT.No.1110, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019).
Since the petitioners were nominated as members of the trust board and not by any election, such nominated posts cannot be equated with the elected posts in the general elections. Thus, the petitioners were nominated by the Government in power by then, when the party in power is changed; there may be uncertainties in some aspects. Moreover, in view of circumstances, MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 20 enumerated in Section 135 of the Act 30 of 1987, members of the trust boards can be removed, but in view of the amended Act 31 of 2019, power is conferred on the Government to supersede by recording reasons in the public interest. To achieve constitutional goal of providing social representation in Public Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions, which is totally in the interest of public, Act 30 of 1987 was amended by Act 31 of 2019 and superseded the present trust boards only to provide representation to certain class of persons as per the amended Act, such supersession of trust board by the Government cannot be said to be an arbitrary Act and on the other hand, it is inconsonance with the constitutional obligation of the State.
Though the petitioners raised contention that the act of the State superseding trust boards is violative of Article 14 and provisions of Act 30 of 1987, they miserably failed to substantiate this contention. On the other hand, learned Advocate General is able to justify the act of the State in superseding the trust boards is only to provide social representation in the trust board and to achieve the constitutional obligation of the State, recording the same reason the trust boards are superseded.
The preamble of the Constitution provides equal status and opportunity to all. Though constitutional provisions provide equality of opportunity in matter of public employment, the State for different reasons provided reservations in Public Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments by way of social representation. Since the validity of the Act 31 of 2019 is not challenged before this Court, this Court need not touch the constitutional validity of the amended provisions of the Act 31 of 2019. As long as the amended Act 31 of 2019 is not challenged, it MSM,J WPs_19007 and 19035_2019 21 is difficult to accept the contentions of the petitioners.
On an overall consideration of entire material available and the law declared by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad inW.P.No.11512 of 2015 and batch (referred supra), I find no illegality in G.O.RT.Nos.1109 and 1110, Revenue (Endowments-II) Department dated 06.11.2019 issued by the State. Consequently, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.
_________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY 04.12.2019 Ksp