Kerala High Court
Prameela Mohanan vs P.Devi on 12 February, 2015
Author: B. Kemal Pasha
Bench: B.Kemal Pasha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.KEMAL PASHA
WEDNESDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF MARCH 2017/24TH PHALGUNA, 1938
RSA.No. 729 of 2015 ()
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AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN AS 196/2013 of ADDITIONAL DISTRICT
COURT-1, KOZHIKODE DATED 12-02-2015
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN OS 939/2010 of III ADDITIONAL
SUBORDINATE JUDGE'S COURT, KOZHIKODE DATED 13-11-2013
APPELLANTS/APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS:
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1. PRAMEELA MOHANAN, AGED 46 YEARS,
W/O.LATE MOHANAN, SREENILAYAM, 25/5260,
KATCHERIKKUNNU, THEKKE NEELAYARIPARAMBA,
P.O.POKKUNNU, VALAYANAD AMSOM DESOM,
KOZHIKODE TALUK.
2. SARATH, AGED 23 YEARS,
S/O.LATE MOHANAN, SREENILAYAM, 25/5260,
KATCHERIKKUNNU, THEKKE NEELAYARIPARAMBA,
P.O.POKKUNNU, VALAYANAD AMSOM DESOM,
KOZHIKODE TALUK.
3. SURAJ, AGED 23 YEARS,
S/O.LATE MOHANAN, SREENILAYAM, 25/5260,
KATCHERIKKUNNU, THEKKE NEELAYARIPARAMBA,
P.O.POKKUNNU, VALAYANAD AMSOM DESOM,
KOZHIKODE TALUK.
BY ADVS.SRI.A.BALAGOPALAN
SRI.A.RAJAGOPALAN
SRI.M.N.MANMADAN
SRI.M.S.IMTHIYAZ AHAMMED
SRI.K.SANEESH KUMAR
SMT.P.SEENA
RSA.No. 729 of 2015 ()
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RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:
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P.DEVI, AGED 79 YEARS,
W/O.GOPINATH, SREENILAYAM, 25/5260,
KATCHERIKKUNNU, THEKKE NEELAYARIPARAMBA,
P.O.POKKUNNU, VALAYANAD AMSOM DESOM,
KOZHIKODE TALUK, PIN-675 237.
BY ADV. SRI.M.KRISHNAKUMAR
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 15-03-2017, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
DSV/-
[CR]
B. KEMAL PASHA, J
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R.S.A.No.729 of 2015
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Dated this the 15th day of March, 2017
J U D G M E N T
Whether a plea of want of free consent to the execution of a document amounts to denial of execution within the meaning of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act?
2. Challenging the concurrent findings entered by the III Additional Subordinate Judge's Court, Kozhikode in O.S.No.939 of 2010 followed by those of the First Additional District Court, Kozhikode in A.S.No.196 of 2013, the defendants in the suit have R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 2 : come up in Second Appeal.
3. The suit is one for the cancellation of Exhibit-A1 settlement deed, on the ground that it is hit by coercion, which has resulted in lack of free consent. A Consequential relief of recovery of possession has also been sought for. The plaintiff is the mother of late Mohanan. The defendants are his wife and children. Mohanan died on 30.06.2010.
4. According to the plaintiff, Mohanan was born to her in her relationship with Ramadasan. Subsequently, Ramadasan was not heard of, and later it was revealed that he had another wife and children. Thereafter, the plaintiff was married to one Gopinath, through whom, one daughter named Sreelatha and a son named Aneesh Kumar were born. According to the plaintiff, Mohanan was a prodigal son, and he used to entertain frequent quarrels with the members of the family as well as R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 3 : the neighbours and public. While he was a student, he had even kept the Headmaster of the School in a locked room, which resulted in his throwing out of the School. Subsequently, he went away and for quite some years, his whereabouts were not known.
5. Ultimately, the plaintiff came to know that he was working in the Indian Military, and subsequently, he abandoned that job also. Again, he was entertaining frequent quarrels with the plaintiff and other members of the family, and also the public. A series of criminal cases were registered against him. He used to threaten the plaintiff and her other children born in Gopinath, with death. He threatened the plaintiff by demanding for the execution of Exhibit-A1 settlement deed in respect of the plaint schedule property in his favour, whereby, the plaintiff, out of fear of life, happened to execute Exhibit-A1.
R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 4 :
6. According to the plaintiff, by exerting force, she was taken to the Document Writer's Office, where her signature was obtained in the document without making her aware of the contents of the document and thereafter, she was taken to the Sub Registrar's Office, where the said document was got registered. According to the plaintiff, the said document is an outcome of coercion and on that ground, the present suit was filed immediately after the death of Mohanan.
7. Defendants resisted the suit by contending that Exhibit-A1 document is, in fact, a sale deed even though its nomenclature is that of a settlement deed, since sizable consideration of an amount of `1,66,000/- was paid by Mohanan to the plaintiff to get the said document executed. The lack of free consent on account of coercion etc. was denied. It was also contended that the document had already R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 5 : come into effect and possession of the property was handed over to Mohanan immediately on the execution of Exhibit-A1.
8. On the side of the plaintiff, PW1 was examined and Exhibit-A1 to Exhibit-A46 were marked. On the side of the defendants, DW1 was examined and Exhibit-B1 to Exhibit-B11 were marked. The trial court found that the original of Exhibit-A1 was not produced by the defendants and further, they had not examined any of the attesting witnesses to prove the said document and mainly on that ground, disbelieved the contentions of the respondents. The trial court found that Exhibit-A1 was the result of coercion and consequently, it lacked free consent. On these grounds, the trial court decreed the suit in terms of the plaint. The trial court, on the aforesaid reasoning, held that Exhibit-A1 is not a genuine document and its R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 6 : execution was denied by the plaintiff.
9. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the defendants preferred A.S.No.196 of 2013 before the District Court, Kozhikode. The learned First Additional District Judge also concurred with the findings entered by the trial court and dismissed the appeal with costs, and hence this Second Appeal.
10. This Second Appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following questions of law:
"i. Is it the duty of the defendants to prove that Exhibit-A1 document was executed voluntarily in a case where plaintiff alleges execution of the said document under threat and coercion?
ii. Were the courts below were correct in holding that the plaintiff has denied execution of Exhibit-A1 document when admittedly her case is that the same was executed under threat and coercion?
iii. Is it the burden of the defendants to examine the attesting witness of Ext.A1 document to prove its execution when the R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 7 : plaintiff has not denied the execution of the said document?"
11. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent.
12. The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that this is not a case wherein the plaintiff has denied the execution of the original of Exhibit-A1; whereas, this is a case wherein, the execution was admitted and the plaintiff contended that there was no free consent from her part to execute the said document, since it was hit by coercion.
13. It has also been argued that when the execution has not been denied, and that the relief sought for was claimed by alleging lack of free consent, the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act has no application in the case and no R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 8 : duty is cast upon the defendants to prove the execution and attestation of the said document by examining at least one of the attesting witnesses. It has also been argued that there are no specific pleadings regarding the coercion allegedly exercised by Mohanan.
14. It has been further argued that no purpose would be served in the present case even if the original of Exhibit-A1 was produced and one of the attesting witnesses was examined, because of the fact that the plaintiff has no case that she has not affixed her signatures in the said document, and she has no case that there was no proper attestation for registration of the document.
15. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that when it has been pleaded that the execution is hit by coercion, and especially when the plaintiff has a case that she was R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 9 : not made known anything about the contents of the said document, it is as good as denial of execution within the meaning of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, and in such circumstances, the persons propounding such a document have to prove its execution and attestation by examining at least one attesting witness. It has been argued that there is absolutely nothing to interfere with the concurrent findings entered by both the courts below.
16. It has clearly come out that the second attester to Exhibit-A1 is none other than Sreelatha, who is the daughter of the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff in the plaint is that coercion was exercised on her as well as her daughter and they were taken by Mohanan to the Document Writer's Office, where the plaintiff was made to sign in a document and her daughter Sreelatha was made to sign as one of the R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 10 : attesters, and that they were taken to the Sub Registrar's Office also, for registration of the document.
17. At the same time, the plaintiff as PW1, in cross-examination, has stated that she was undergoing treatment in connection with Renal disease and she was incapable of going out without the aid of others and it was because of that, she called her daughter also to accompany her, and took her along with her as an aide. Again, she has specifically admitted that it was just as an aide to her, her daughter accompanied her.
18. It seems not only that Sreelatha was an attester to the document, but also that she was the identifying witness of the executrix at the time of registration. PW1 has clearly admitted that she has never made any complaint to the Sub Registrar. Further, in cross-examination, PW1 has clearly R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 11 : admitted that she derived title over 13= cents of property from her mother, out of which, 7= cents is in the title and possession of Mohanan. She has further admitted that Mohanan has taken loan from the Bank by furnishing the said property as security. She gifted the balance property to her daughter Sreelatha, out of which, 3 cents was given to Aneesh Kumar.
19. In cross-examination, she has further stated that Mohanan broke open her Almirah and took away her document in respect of the property, for creating Exhibit-A1. According to her, she was afraid of Mohanan and consequently, she did not prefer any complaint before the police or any other authorities. Even though the aforesaid versions were given by her in cross-examination, she had no such case in the plaint. In the plaint, she has pleaded that she was afraid of Mohanan, since he was a grave R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 12 : criminal.
20. It is true that the plaintiff has filed the suit only after the death of Mohanan. At the same time, her aforesaid versions in cross-examination are highly contradictory to the pleadings in the plaint. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, the facts constituting coercion have not been specifically and properly pleaded. It has not been pleaded as to the date on which such coercion was exercised. It has not been pleaded as to when and on which date the plaintiff along with her daughter were forcibly taken to the Document Writer's Office and to the Sub Registrar's Office. It has not been specifically pleaded as to the manner in which the so-called coercion was exercised.
21. On examining the other circumstances also, it seems that the plaintiff had executed the document by gifting 7= cents of property to R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 13 : Mohanan, who is her elder son. Out of 13 = cents of property, she gifted the balance 6 cents of property to her daughter out of which, 3 cents of property was gifted to her younger son. On the death of Mohanan, again she becomes entitled to < share over the plaint schedule property.
22. Even if the original of Exhibit-A1 was produced and proved and an attesting witness was examined, no purpose would be served in the present case. The plaintiff has no case that the signatures in the document were not affixed by her. The plaintiff has no case that the signatures of Sreelatha as an attester and as an identifying witness were not affixed by Sreelatha. She has no case that the document was not attested and registered. Therefore, even if the original of the document was produced and an attesting witness was examined, no purpose would have been served R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 14 : in the present case.
23. In the above context, it has to be examined whether there is denial of execution of the original of Exhibit-A1 in this case from the part of the plaintiff to invite the application of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act says:
"68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.---If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence:
[Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a Will, which has been registered in accordance with R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 15 : the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied.]"
24. From Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is evident that in order to invite the application of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, it presupposes the denial of execution, as far as a document like a gift deed. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, when the plaintiff has a case that she along with her daughter was forcibly taken for the execution and the registration of the document, and the document was got signed by her without revealing its contents, it is as good as the denial of execution.
25. The learned counsel for the respondent has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Kunwar Surendra Bahadur Singh and others v. R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 16 : Thakur Behari Singh and others [AIR 1939 Privy Council 177], wherein a deed of mortgage was considered. In the written statement, it was contended as follows:
"The contesting defendant does not admit the execution and completion of the document sued on, nor is receipt of any consideration of the same admitted."
In the trial, defendants did not dispute the execution of the deed; but, it was contended that the execution and due attestation of the mortgage bond so far as the mother of Lachman Singh was concerned, had not been proved. In that particular case, it was argued that the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act had no application, and it was not necessary for the plaintiffs at the trial to call an attesting witness, in as much as the mortgage deed had been registered and the execution thereof had not been specifically denied. The said contention was R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 17 : not accepted.
26. In respect of the point which is at present being considered herein, the decision in Kunwar Surendra Bahadur Singh (supra) has no application at all. In that particular case, it was specifically contended that "the defendant does not admit the execution and completion of the document". Therefore, it was a case wherein the execution was not admitted, which means that there is denial of execution. In such a case, as per the proviso to Section 68, the plaintiff was duty bound to prove the document through the examination of at least one attesting witness at the trial.
27. Regarding execution, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the decision in Velayudhan v. Velayudhan [2001 (1) KLT 392], wherein it was held:
"The execution of a deed or other R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 18 : instrument includes the performance of all acts which may be necessary to render it complete as a deed or an instrument importing the intended obligation of every act required to give the instrument validity, or to carry it into effect or to give it the forms required to render it valid. Thus, the signature is an acknowledgement that the person signing has agreed to the terms of the document. This can be achieved only if a person signs after the document is prepared and the terms are known to the person signing. In that view of the matter, mere putting of signature cannot said to be execution of the document."
28. Learned counsel for the appellant has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in (Firm) Shams Din and others v. Collector, Amritsar and another [AIR 1936 Lahore 449], wherein it was held:
R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 19 :
"Signature alone will not, in all cases, complete the execution of a document for the purpose of giving it legal validity, for instance, a will may not be legally executed until it is duly attested by witnesses; a hundi is not executed until it is delivered: see 19 Bom 635(1), but for the purpose of the Stamp Act, the clause makes all documents which are chargeable with duty, when executed, chargeable as soon as they are signed by the executant. Thus it has been held by a Full Bench of the Burma Chief Court, in 22 I C 75(2), that an instrument chargeable is not liable to duty until it is signed, although this fact does not necessarily imply that the unsigned document is incomplete for the purpose for which it was drawn up."
29. In the decision in Velayudhan (supra), heavy reliance was placed on Devidas v. Mamooji [20 NLR 7], wherein it was held in a case wherein the R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 20 : signature was admitted in a document and contended that the signature was affixed on a blank paper. In that particular case, it was held that even if the admission of signature is there, it will not create execution, since it was contended that the signature was affixed on a blank paper. It depends from case to case to note down in what all circumstances such signatures amount to execution or not.
30. In this particular case, what has been pleaded is that there was lack of free consent for the execution since it was hit by coercion. At the same time, from the evidence of PW1 in cross-examination, it can clearly be seen that the plaintiff took her daughter on her own will, and went to the document writer's office and thereafter, to the Sub Registrar's office. Even though the plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint that she along with her R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 21 : daughter was forcibly taken away by Mohanan for the execution and registration of the document, PW1 has clearly admitted that her daughter, who is one of the attestors as well as one of the identifying witnesses during registration, had willingly accompanied her as an aide on the request of the plaintiff. The said circumstance also has to be considered to find out what was intended was the denial of execution. When plea of lack of free consent within the meaning of Section 14 of the Indian Contract Act is being resorted to by an executant of a document, it pre-supposes the admission of execution. At the same time, when the executant shown in a document like gift deed or any person claiming under such executant contends that it was not the executant, who affixed his signature in the document or wherein impersonation was committed for the execution of such a document, no R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 22 : doubt, it is specific denial of execution. In such cases, such a document will be void in case it is found that the signature shown in the document is not the one affixed by the executant. Further, in such cases, the examination of an attestor in the case of a document coming within the scope of Section 68 is a mandatory formality on the part of the person propounding such a document.
31. Learned counsel for the respondent has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Laxmanan K. v. Thekkayil Padmini and others [2009 (1) KLT 29 (SC)], wherein a case in which a Will and a Gift deed were propounded by the contesting defendant claiming properties covered by it, was considered. In that case, it was through the written statement, the said Will and Gift were propounded. Through the evidence in the case, the execution was denied by the adverse party, the plaintiff. In such R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 23 : case, the Apex Court held that execution of the gift deed was also under challenge and the attesting witness to the said deed of gift was also not examined. In that particular case, the Will was also not proved and further, the Gift was also not proved. The identifying witness in one of the said documents gave evidence that he had not signed as an identifying witness in that document. Consequently, both the said documents were disbelieved.
32. On a careful consideration of the provisions contained under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, it can be seen that only when a specific denial of execution in respect of a document required by law is to be attested, the proviso to Section 68 has application. Here, in this particular case, the pleadings coupled with evidence show that there is no denial of execution; whereas, what has been contended is that such execution was bad in law on R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 24 : account of lack of free consent. Even the facts constituting coercion have also not been specifically pleaded. Both the courts below have found fault with the appellants in not producing the original of Ext.A1 and in not examining at least one of the attesting witnesses to prove such a document. In this particular case, the same is not at all required. Even if the original of Ext.A1 was produced, it would not have served any purpose when the signatures were admitted. Further, there is no case that there was lack of proper attestation. Even if an attesting witness was examined, the same also would not have served any purpose.
33. The denial from the part of the plaintiff regarding the validity of the document in this particular case cannot be treated as the denial of execution. In this particular case, the execution has been admitted and its validity is challenged on R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 25 : account of lack of free consent. A plea of lack of free consent on account of the presence of any of the vitiating elements contained in Section 14 of the Indian Contract Act cannot be treated as the denial of execution of such a document, within the meaning of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.
34. Regarding 'execution', the learned counsel for the appellant has invited the attention of this Court to Section 2(f) of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959. It states, "executed" and "execution" used with reference to instruments, mean "signed" and "signature". As per Section 2(j), "instrument" includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded; but does not include a bill of exchange, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 26 : transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt. Section 2(f) gives light to the proposition that the execution of a document of the instrument means the signature affixed in it.
35. From all the above, it can safely be concluded that both the courts below have gone wrong in giving importance to base their decision on the mere fact of non-production of the original of Ext.A1 as well as the want of examination of any of the attesting witnesses to the said document. When the plaintiff, after admitting the execution, is challenging the validity of the said document in the sense that the said document is not binding on her or the plaint schedule property, it is for the plaintiff to prove her case of such coercion. The plaintiff cannot hang on the deficiency from the part of the defendants. Even if the defendants are not contesting a suit like this, can it be said that the R.S.A.No.729 of 2015 : 27 : plaintiff has no duty to prove the case forwarded by the plaintiff? Even in such case, the plaintiff has to adduce independent evidence after specifically pleading all the facts relating to such coercion.
In the result, the Regular Second Appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are set aside. O.S. No.939/2010 of the III Additional Subordinate Judge's Court, Kozhikode is dismissed. In the nature of this appeal, the parties shall bear their respective costs. All pending interlocutory applications in this appeal are closed.
Sd/-
B. KEMAL PASHA JUDGE DSV/aks/16/3/17 // True Copy // PA to Judge