Bombay High Court
Union Of India Thr. Ministry Of Home ... vs Kanwar Vilas Nath And Anr. on 18 April, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:19417
25 SA 197-2021(f).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO. 197 OF 2021
Union of India,
Through Ministry of Home Affairs,
Rehabilitation Division,
Old Address: North Block, ND FFR Division,
Jaisalmar House, Mansing Road, New Delhi
New Address: Rehabilitation Wing, FFR Division,
NDCC Bldg. No.2,
Jaising Road No.1, New Delhi - 01 ... Appellant.
Versus
1. Kanwar Vilas Nath
2. Kanwar Virajan Nath
Both of Mumbai
Indian Inhabitants, R/at 21, Advent, J.
Bhosale Marg, Mumbai 400021
3. Syndicate Bank,
A Banking Corporation,
Constituted under the Banking Companies
(Acquisition & Transfer of Undertaking) Act,
1970, which is carrying on business at
Mumbai Zonal Office at Maker Towers,
Cuffe Parade, Mumbai 400 005.
... Respondents.
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Mr. Pranil Sonawane a/w. Ms. Janhavi Jadhav, Mr. Krishna Shukla for the
Appellant.
Mr. Darius Khambata, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Naval Agarwal, with Mr.
Sameer Tapia, Ms. Siddhi Doshi and Mr. Rohan Marathe i/by ALMT Legal
for Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
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Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Date : April 18, 2026
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25 SA 197-2021(f).doc
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. The present Second Appeal is at the instance of the original Respondents challenging the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court by which the suit came to be decreed partly and the Plaintiff was held entitled to redemption of mortgage as per the schedule of Indenture of Deed of Modification and additional securities dated 8th September, 1972. For sake of brevity, the parties are referred by their status before the Trial Court.
2. Special Civil Suit No. 9 of 2000 was instituted by the Plaintiff seeking redemption of the mortgage, for rendition of accounts, and for discharge of the mortgage debt under the mortgage deed. It was pleaded that the subject properties were acquired by Late Raj Nath on 21st April, 1960 from the President of India through the Department of Rehabilitation and evacuee property. On 21 st April, 1960, late Raj Nath executed a mortgage deed in favour of the Government stating that in consideration of the agreement dated 14th August, 1957, which was the agreement for sale, and in consideration of Rs.48,11,000/- owed by Late Raj Nath to the Government of India as set out in the mortgage deed, he would pay the said sum in the manner set out therein along with interest sa_mandawgad 2 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc with liberty to Raj Nath to pay the sum at an earlier date. It was pleaded that to secure the repayment of loan of Rs.48,11,000/- to the Government of India, Raj Nath mortgaged the suit properties, and the same were conveyed, transferred to and vested in the Government of India subject to right to redemption set out therein.
3. By supplementary indenture of modification and additional security dated 8th September, 1972 executed between Late Raj Nath and the Government of India, time was given to pay the sum of Rs 53,07,705/, the first of which was to be paid on or before 20 th October, 1972 and the last to be paid on 20th October, 1976. There was default in payment of the first installment and on 20 th June, 1975, and 7th February, 1981 the Government issued notices demanding payment of entire amount payable under the Indenture of mortgage and additional security dated 8th September, 1972. On 24th September, 1981, the Government took possession of the suit properties.
4. The Government appointed Syndicate Bank as agent to sell the mortgaged properties and public notice came to be issued which described the Government as a mortgagee and as being in possession and Late Raj Nath as mortgagor. By notice dated 9 th March, 2001 and by a prior letter on 6th September, 1989 addressed to the proprietary firm by Late Raj Nath, the Government through sa_mandawgad 3 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc the attorney invited the attention of late Raj Nath to the mortgage deed calling upon him to pay the principal amount along with interest failing which the mortgaged property would be sold. In the year 2006, the Special Civil Suit No 99 of 2006 came to be filed seeking redemption of mortgage and possession.
5. The suit came to be resisted by the Defendant No.1 contending that the Plaintiff is not entitled to redemption of mortgage. It was contended that the Plaintiffs have not paid the outstanding dues as per the conditions set out in the agreement- cum-mortgage deed and the indenture of modification and they have lost their right to institute any suit of such nature. It was further contended that despite repeated notices served upon the late Raj Nath calling upon him to pay the principal amount along with interest in accordance with the provisions of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, "T.P. Act"), the Plaintiffs have failed to pay the said amount and that the possession of the properties have been taken over by the Defendant, who is now auctioning the suit properties. It was further contended that the right of redemption subsisted till the possession of the property was taken over.
6. The Trial Court framed the necessary issues including the sa_mandawgad 4 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc issue as to whether the suit is within limitation and whether the Defendants prove that the Plaintiffs have lost their right to institute this suit. The issues came to be answered in favour of the Plaintiffs and the suit came to be partly decreed vide judgment dated 30th April, 2012.
7. As against the judgment of the Trial Court, the Defendant No.1 filed Regular Civil Appeal No.9 of 2016. The First Appellate Court framed the necessary points for determination and noted that there is no reference made in the deed that the deed of mortgage is governed by the Government Grants Act and that the deed of mortgage was executed separately. The Appellate Court considered the pleadings in the written statement admitting the case of mortgage and declined to accept the contention of Defendant No.1 that there was no mortgage. On the aspect of limitation, it was held that the right to redeem first accrued on the date of last installment i.e. 20th October, 1976 and the suit is within limitation as provided by Article 61 of Limitation Act.
8. Mr. Sonawane, Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant would contend that the document executed on 21st April, 1960 was not a mortgage deed in view of Section 2 of the Government Grants sa_mandawgad 5 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc Act, 1895 (for short, "Act of 1895"). He submits that under the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 1895, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 do not apply to any grants or other transfer of lands made by on behalf of the Government. He submits that in view thereof, the document in question cannot be construed as mortgage deed under Section 58 of the T.P. Act. He has taken this Court in detail through the findings of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court to contend that the Courts after having accepted that the land was transferred under the Act of 1895 could thereafter not hold that there existed mortgagor-mortgagee relationship between the parties and that the mortgage could be redeemed.
9. He would further submit that in the present case, the suit was filed in the year 2006 wherein under the document of 21 st April, 1960 and the indenture of modification dated 8th September, 1972 read with the supplement to the indenture of mortgage dated 21 st April, 1960, the first installment was required to be paid on or before 20th October, 1976. He submits that the Courts while construing the period of limitation under Article 61 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, "Limitation Act") has taken into consideration the last date of repayment which was on 20 th sa_mandawgad 6 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc October, 1976, whereas according to him, limitation would commence from the date of first default. He submits that the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court has failed to notice that even if the pleadings referred to the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship in view of Section 2 of the Act of 1895, the provisions of T.P. Act does not apply and there is no estoppel against law.
10. Per contra, Mr. Khambata, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Defendant No.1 would submit that the deed of conveyance was executed on 21st April, 1960 which was a transfer for the purpose of the Act of 1895. He submits that deed of mortgage which is also of 21st April, 1960 was a separate and independent transaction which permitted redemption on its own terms. He submits that the document expressly provides that the T.P. Act applies including the power of sale without the intervention of the Court under Section 69 of the T.P. Act. He would further point out the written statement as well as the various notices issued on behalf of the Defendant No.1 admitting that the document in question was a mortgage deed and calling upon the Plaintiffs to make the payment of mortgage money. He submits that the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court has taken note of these admissions in the pleadings which constitute judicial admission and the Defendant sa_mandawgad 7 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc No.1 cannot resile from the said admission.
11. He submits that even if it is accepted that the mortgage deed is executed under the Act of 1895, the mortgage deed itself provides for redemption of the mortgage. He would further submit that even admitting that the mortgage deed was executed under the Act of 1895, the terms of the mortgage deed would prevail over other statute or law in view of the statement of object and reasons of the Act of 1895. He submits that Section 2 and 3 of the Act of 1895 have to be read along with the statement of object and reasons to understand the object of Section 2 of the Act of 1895. He submits that Section 2 does not exclude the application of the T.P. Act in its entirety, and only in the event of any inconsistency between the grant or any condition imposed in the grant and the T.P. Act, it is the condition which is imposed in the grant which would prevail.
12. Insofar as the limitation is concerned, he submits that under the provisions of Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, the right to redeem a mortgage is 30 years from the date when the right to redeem accrues. He submits that it is a settled position of law that right to redeem first accrues on the date on which the last installment falls due and in this case is 20 th October, 1976. He would sa_mandawgad 8 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc further submit that in the alternative, a fresh period of limitation would commence from the date of acknowledgment of a mortgage by virtue of Section 18 of the Limitation Act and would point out to the notices issued calling upon the Plaintiffs to make the payment of the mortgage money. He submits that the contention raised in the written statement that the transaction in question was availed of by Raj Nath with the Government of India with a condition of repurchase is contrary to the documents and evidence on record. He would submit that as the questions sought to be raised in the present case, even if they are questions of law, are squarely covered by the judicial pronouncement, the Second Appeal cannot be said to raise any substantial question of law. In support, he relies upon the following decisions.
(i) The State of U.P. vs. Zahoor Ahmad and Anr.1
(ii) Collector of Bombay vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri and Ors.2
(iii) Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (decesed) by Lrs.3
(iv) Lasa Din vs. Mt. Gulab Kunwar and Ors.4
(v) Bibijan and Others vs. Murlidhar and Ors.5 1 (1973) 2 SCC 547 2 1955 SCC OnLine SC 49 3 (2001) 3 SCC 179 4 A.I.R.1932 Privy Council 207 5 (1995) 1 SCC 187 sa_mandawgad 9 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc
13. In rejoinder, it is submitted that when the possession has been taken over on 24th September, 1981, the right to redeem has been lost.
14. I have considered the submissions and perused the record.
15. Second Appeal has been preferred against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court against the Plaintiff on the issues of limitation and the right of redemption.
Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to deal with the contention of Mr. Sonawane that as the land was transferred under the Government Grants Act, 1895 the provisions of T.P. Act are excluded and the document executed on 21st April, 1960 is not a deed of mortgage. Section 2 of the Act of 1895 excludes the provisions of the T.P. Act to the government grants. It would be appropriate to note the Statement of Object and Reasons of the Act of 1895, which reads as under:
"Statement of Objects and Reasons. - The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, sections 10-12 invalidate with certain exceptions all conditions for the forfeiture of the transferred property on alienation by the transferee and all limitations over consequent upon any such alienation or any insolvency of or attempted alienation by him. The Crown is not specifically mentioned in the Act, and it may be assumed that it was not designed to impose fetters of sa_mandawgad 10 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc this description upon the discretion of the Crown, especially as to the creation of inalienable jahgirs in grants made for public services; but it has been thought better to set the question at rest by express legislation. Upon a late occasion the Government of India were advised that it is not competent for the Crown to create an inalienable and impartible estate in the land comprised in any Crown grant, unless such land has heretofore descended by custom as an impartible Raj. The second sub-section of the Bill is intended to obviate this inconvenience by providing that all Crown grants are to be construed according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law which might otherwise affect their operation."
16. It is therefore clear from the Statement of Object and Reasons of the Act of 1895 that the legislation was crucial for affirming the Government's right to impose conditions on land transfer and for the same to override the statutory provisions which would affect such right, as the statement of object and reasons makes a specific reference to the provisions of the T.P. Act which invalidates all conditions of forfeiture in transfers of property. It is in the light of the statement of object and reasons that the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 1895 is required to be construed and when are so construed, evidences that there is no sa_mandawgad 11 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc fetters on the power of the Government to execute the mortgage deed even in respect of the land granted under the Act of 1895. In case of The State of U.P. Vs Zahoor Ahmad and Anr (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held in paragraph 15 and 16 as under:
"15. In the present case the High Court correctly found on the facts that the respondent after the determination of the lease held over. Even if the Government Grants Act applied Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act was not rendered inapplicable. The effect of Section 2 of the Government Grants Act is that in the construction of an instrument governed by the Government Grants Act the court shall construe such grant irrespective of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It does not mean that all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are inapplicable. To illustrate, in the case of a grant under the Government Grants Act, Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act will not apply because Section 14 which provides what is known as the rule against perpetuity will not apply by reason of the provisions in the Government Grants Act. The grant shall be construed to take effect as if the Transfer of Property Act does not apply.
16. Section 3 of the Government Grants Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of the land be. The meaning of Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act is that the scope of that Act is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only. The Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations, or restrictions in its grants, and the rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be sa_mandawgad 12 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc regulated according to the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory or common law."
17. In Collector of Bombay vs Nusserwanji (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that Section 3 of Act of 1895 saves provisions/ restrictions/conditions in the agreement which would be bad or inconsistent with T.P. Act.
18. It would also be pertinent to note that the statement of object and reasons provides that government grants are to be construed according to their tenor, and in the present case, the mortgage deed executed on 21st April, 1960 itself recognises the right of the Plaintiffs to redeem the mortgage as under:
"PROVIDED ALWAYS AND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED that if the mortgagor shall pursuant to the covenant in that behalf herein before contained pay to the Government the said principal sum and interest for the same at the rate and in the manner hereinbefore mentioned and also all other moneys (if any) by these presents or by law payable by the mortgagor to the Government (hereinafter referred to as the "The Mortgage Debt") then in such case the Government shall at any time thereafter upon the request and at the cost of the mortgagor reconvey and re- assign the said mills, the said vacant plots, the said three plots, the said factories and the said plant (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the mortgaged premises") hereby sa_mandawgad 13 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc granted and assigned or expressed so as to be unto and to the use of the mortgagor or as he shall direct freed and discharged from the security hereby created."
19. The terms of the mortgage deed itself permits redemption and even accepting that the mortgage deed was executed under the Act of 1895, the grant is required to be construed according to its tenor. The terms of the grant under Act of 1895 would override any statutory inconsistency and in the present case, the grant makes applicable the provisions of Transfer of Property Act including the power to sell under Section 69 of T.P. Act to the transfer in favour of Raj Nath.
20. The argument raised that the document is not deed of mortgage is also unacceptable in light of the admissions of the Defendant No.1 not only in the pleadings but also in the correspondence exchanged between the parties that the deed is deed of mortgage. The mortgage deed speaks of creation of English Mortgage of the subject properties for the sum owed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant No.1. The Defendant No.1 has repeatedly admitted the jural relationship of Mortgagor-Mortgagee in the written statement, in the legal notices, in the public auction notice and made categorical references to the provisions of T.P. Act sa_mandawgad 14 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc to bolster its defence. The admissions in the written statement constitute judicial admissions and the Defendant No.1 is estopped from claiming otherwise. [See Nagindas Ramdas Vs Dalpatram Iccharam (1974) 1 SCC 242].
21. Coming to the issue of limitation, the Trial Court has held that the term of the mortgage fixed in the modification deed expired on 20th October, 1976 and hence, the suit is within time. The Indenture of Modification and additional security was executed on 8 th September, 1972 providing for the payment of first installment on 20th October, 1972 and the last installment on 20 th October, 1976. The suit has been filed in the year 2006. Article 61 (a) of the Limitation Act provides that a suit by a mortgage to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged is thirty years from the accrual of right to redeem or to recover possession arises. Section 60 of T.P. Act governing the right of mortgagor to redeem provides that at any time after the principal money has become due. The mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage money to require the mortgage to deliver the mortgage deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property. There is nothing in the mortgage deed which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 60 of T.P. Act.
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The right to redeem would accrue for purpose of limitation upon the expiry of full term of the mortgage.
22. The issue as to whether the period of limitation would begin to run from the expiry of the time set out in the contract notwithstanding any earlier default by the mortgagor and exercise of option by the mortgagee has been considered by the Privy Council in the decision of Lasa Din vs. Gulab Kunwar, Musammat and Ors. (supra), has held as under:
".... If on the default of the mortgagor - in other words, by the breach of his contract - the mortgage money becomes immediately "due," it is clear that the intention of the parties is defeated, and that what was agreed to by them as an option in the mortgagees is, in effect, converted into an option in the mortgagor. For if the latter, after the deed has been duly executed and registered, finds that he can make a better bargain elsewhere, he has only to break his contract by refusing to pay the interest, and "eo instanti," as Lord Blanesburgh says, he is entitled to redeem. If the principal money is "due," and the stipulated term has gone out of the contract, it follows, in their Lordships' opinion, that the mortgagor can claim to repay it, as was recognised by Wazir Hasan J, in his judgment in the Chief Court. Their Lordships think that this is an impossible result. They are not prepared to hold that the mortgagor could in this way take advantage of his own default: they do not think that upon such default sa_mandawgad 16 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc he would have the right to redeem, and in their opinion the mortgage money does not "become due" within the meaning of Art. 132 of the Limitation Act until both the mortgagor's right to redeem and the mortgagee's right to enforce his security have accrued. This would, of course, also be the position if the mortgagee exercised the option reserved to him."
23. Mr. Khambata is right in submitting that it cannot be that the right to redeem would arise upon a default being committed, as it would amount to taking advantage of one's own default in making the payment. The trigger point for the commencement of period of limitation is the last date of the payment which was on 20 th October, 1976. The suit having been filed within 30 years from the date is within limitation.
24. Apart from this, the notices which have been pointed by Mr. Khambata addressed by the Defendant No.1 to the Plaintiffs as late as 9th March, 2001 called for the Plaintiffs to make the payment of the mortgage money. This constitutes an acknowledgment that the mortgage could still be redeemed by the payment of the amounts due. In light of the demands for mortgage money, it cannot be said that the right to redeem the mortgage was lost when possession was taken over by the Government on 24 th sa_mandawgad 17 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc September, 1981. The mortgage deed gives the right to the Government to require the mortgagor to discharge his liability in full by written notice in event of default committed by the mortgagor. The issuance of notices to the Plaintiff acknowledges the subsisting right of the Plaintiff to redeem the mortgage.
25. The Trial Court has rightly taken into consideration the issue of limitation in accordance with the statutory provisions and upon interpretation of the documents which shows the subsistence of the jural relationship. Each document constituted an acknowledgment within the Limitation Act and the Trial Court has rightly held that the dispute is not barred by limitation.
26. In the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 12 and 14 as under:
"12. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the Legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance"
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as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta Vs. T. Ram Ditta, AIR 1928 PC 172, the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co., Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju, ILR 1952 Mad 264:-
"When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law."
and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:-
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The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.
14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for sa_mandawgad 20 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis."
27. It is further held that the pure findings of facts cannot be challenged before the High Court in Second Appeal, and it is only when the question of law which is based is not covered by judicial pronouncement that it can be said that a substantial question of law arises. In the present case, the decisions relied upon by Mr. Khambata on the aspect of limitation clearly covered the issue of limitation for redemption of mortgage. The Trial Court has rightly taken into consideration the admission in the written statement as well as the notices to hold that the document of 1960 was in fact the mortgage and has been so admitted by the Defendant no.1 in various documents.
28. As far as the subsistence of right to redeem the mortgage is concerned, in paragraphs 56 of the judgment of the Trial Court, the Trial Court has noted the admission of the Defendant No.1's witness that the mortgage is in existence and has also taken into consideration the notices issued by the Government clearly asserting the subsisting mortgage and the purported exercise of rights under the mortgage. The Trial Court and the First Appellate sa_mandawgad 21 of 22 25 SA 197-2021(f).doc Court on the basis of the statutory provisions and the evidence on record has rightly held that the Plaintiffs have proved that the transactions are in the nature of mortgage which are subsisting and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to redemption of mortgage and recovery of possession by payment the mortgage debt.
29. In light of above discussions, no substantial question of law arises in the present case. Second Appeal stands dismissed.
30. In view of the dismissal of the Appeal, pending Civil/Interim Application, if any, does not survive for consideration and same stands dismissed.
[Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]
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Signed by: Sanjay A. Mandawgad
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 23/04/2026 20:47:13