Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Dr I Srinivas Sri Naresh vs State on 10 January, 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos. 8490, 8781 AND 9025 OF 2023
COMMON ORDER:
1. The three Criminal Petitions are interconnected and pertain to the same crime, and the following common order disposes of three petitions.
2. Criminal Petition No.8490 of 2023 is filed by the petitioner/A.3; Criminal Petition No.8781 of 2023 is filed by the petitioner/A.2, and Criminal Petition No.9025 of 2023 is filed by the petitioner/A.1 by invoking the provisions of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) seeking pre-arrest bail in the event of their arrest in connection with Crime No.18 of 2023, registered at the C.I.D., Police Station, Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati, Mangalagiri.
3. The petitioners, stand accused in a case involving the offences punishable under Sections 166, 167, 409, 120(B) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (referred to as 'I.P.C.'), and Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (referred to as 'P.C. Act').
4. The case of the prosecution as projected in the report, dated 11.10.2023 as contained in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent-State, in three petitions, which are as follows:-
i. In a report dated 11.10.2023 from the Commissioner of Distilleries & Breweries and Managing Director of Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Limited (referred to as the 'Corporation'), the C.I.D. registered Crime No. 18 of 2023. The report revealed that in line with T.M.R., J 2 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch state policy decisions since 2015, the Corporation reviewed earnings and Revenue for the State from 2014 to 2019. This examination brought to light policy decisions that, contrary to the recommendations of the Government of A.P.'s constituted Committee, favoured specific distilleries through the issuance of Letters of Intent ('L.O.I.'). Notably, public servants permitted new brands post the General Election notification on 18.03.2019, lacking apparent public interest.
ii. Additionally, a concerning revelation was the collusion between suppliers and licensees, inflating demand for certain products without informing the Corporation. The absence of a mechanism for demand verification led to disproportionate orders for products from a few companies, indicating a deliberate effort to confer undue pecuniary gains to specific entities. Further scrutiny of decisions made between 2014 and 2019 identified instances where policy decisions resulted in revenue loss for the government and financial gains for licensees.
iii. The first allegation revolves around introducing statutory rules in G.O.Ms.No.391 dated 16.06.2012 in 2012 for imposing a privilege fee on A4 shop licensees. The prescribed privilege fee is 8% plus V.A.T. on the turnover of purchases by the mentioned shops, applicable only if their purchases surpass six times the annual license fee. ii. While finalizing the policy for A4 shops, the cabinet primarily considered the salient features of the excise policy forwarded on 17.06.2015. This included decisions on the methodology of allotting shops through drawing lots, operating 10% of shops by the Corporation, and establishing new eligibility criteria. On 22.06.2015, the amendment process for License Rules (G.O.Ms.No.391 dated 18.06.2012) was initiated, and on the same day, G.O.Ms.No.218 Revenue (Excise-II) was issued. Notably, this issuance occurred without discussing financial implications and disregarding the prescribed procedure. The proposal for amending statutory rules, submitted on 22.06.2015 by C.P.E., included draft rules for amendment, incorporating the deletion of Rule 16(9) of the License Rules, 2012. This deletion removed the existing privilege fee on shop licensees. G.O.Ms.No.218 dated 22.06.2015 was then issued, officially deleting Rule 16(9) of the License Rules from G.O.Ms.No.391 dated 18.06.2012. Notably, this deletion of the privilege fee contradicted the initial proposal, which T.M.R., J 3 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch suggested continuing the fee if purchases exceeded 10 times the annual license fee. Despite recommendations to increase the threshold for the fee, a rule removing the privilege fee altogether was notified, causing a substantial loss of Rs. 2984 Crores between 2012 and 2015. Significantly, the decision to delete the privilege fee did not undergo cabinet approval and was not included in the salient features of the excise policy presented to the cabinet, as evident from the records.
iv. It is evident that a distinct excise policy for Bars in 2015-2016 was proposed, and subsequent discussions, held on 23.11.2015, involved the then Hon'ble Chief Minister and the then Hon'ble Minister for Excise. The framework of the new Bar Policy for 2016 was established during these deliberations. The suggested amendments, which entailed the removal of the obligation of privilege fees for Bars as outlined in Rule 10(a), were presented for consideration to the then Hon'ble Chief Minister and Excise Minister. Notably, the approval for deleting the privilege fee was granted without adhering to procedural requirements, circumventing basic mandatory steps. Consequently, this decision, with significant financial implications amounting to approximately Rs. 1300 Crores, resulted in a substantial loss of Revenue for the State. Simultaneously, it conferred corresponding benefits to A4 shop owners, as explicitly evident. This marks a clear abuse of office by public servants, compromising the public interest through an unlawful process that circumvented and bypassed established procedures under Business Rules.
v. The second accusation pertains to M/s. S.P.Y. Agro Industries Limited, Nandhyal, is receiving preferential treatment as an extension of the Letter of Intent validity for establishing a manufacturing facility. Despite a High Court directive in P.I.L. No.102/2015 stating that S.P.Y. is obligated to pay the enhanced license fee amended in 2011, not as on the date of L.O.I. issuance, additional benefits were granted. S.P.Y. was allowed to pay the license fee in instalments, and interest on arrears in license fees was only enforced from 27.11.2015, contrary to the judgment's findings. Furthermore, the relaxation of interest payable for the period preceding 27.11.2015 was justified by citing Section 65 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968, in conjunction with Rule 3 of the 1982 Rules. However, these provisions do not align with the T.M.R., J 4 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch circumstances of the case. The financial repercussions of enforcing interest only from 27.11.2015, rather than from the earlier date of accrual dues, amounted to approximately 18%, resulting in a financial loss to the government and a corresponding pecuniary gain of Rs.15 Crores to S.P.Y. vi. The third accusation centres on the infringement of recommendations made by the Committee established under G.O.Rt.No.993, Revenue (Excise-II) Department, dated 12.11.2014. Despite the rules governing the Committee stipulating that the government is obligated to adhere to the Committee's recommendations, a decision was made to permit the establishment of distilleries beyond the Committee's recommended capacity. This decision, made without any further justification, whether factual or legal, represents a departure from established rules. The beneficiaries of this departure were private distilleries, specifically M/s. P.M.K. Distilleries, M/s. Visakha Distilleries, and three others.
vii. The fourth allegation highlights a lack of verification for actual demand, resulting in selective preferences for certain companies and orders placed for their products to the extent of 70% of the brands. The final allegation accuses the government of hastily approving brands after the notification of the General Elections in 2019, devoid of public interest and solely for the benefit of suppliers, causing an apparent loss to the state exchequer.
5. The case of the petitioner/A.3 in Crl.P.No.8490 of 2023 and the petitioner/A.2 in Crl.P.No.8781 of 2023 are the same, in brief, are that:
i. The registration of F.I.R.s concerning policy decisions made in 2015- 16 is seemingly motivated, with a clear intention to detain the petitioner until the 2024 elections. The accusations relate to decisions and recommendations made during official duty. Considering the prohibition on initiating any inquiry or investigation without approval under Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the alleged inquiry conducted on October 11, 2023, and the subsequent F.I.R. registration lack validity, the investigation should be halted.
ii. The initiation of this case on October 11, 2023, after an inexplicable delay of around eight years from the policy decisions under T.M.R., J 5 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch investigation, is in defiance of propriety, especially when the matter under Section 17-A is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The State's actions appear to disregard due process and raise concerns about the timing of the registration. iii. The petitioner's fear of arrest is rooted in the jurisdictional deficiencies in the F.I.R. registration. The hurried preliminary inquiry conducted in 18 days needs more specificity, and the lack of mention of any concrete instances supporting a charge of conspiracy is evident. Notably, the F.I.R. alleges favors to specific companies, M/s. S.P.Y. Agro Industries, yet the company itself is not named as an accused. The petitioner, having served as the former Chief Minister from 2014-2019, asserts that the F.I.R. may be a manifestation of 'regime revenge,' while highlighting the need for an investigation into the present excise policy.
iv. The legal stance established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognizes that a delay in filing an F.I.R. can be a valid basis for granting anticipatory bail. Notably, any concessions extended to S.P.Y. Agro were in line with a cabinet decision, and the petitioner did not make an individual decision. Holding the petitioner accountable for commercial decisions made by a corporation in 2015-16 is unwarranted, as the cabinet collectively endorsed all decisions. v. The petitioner lacks direct or indirect control over the relevant departments or individuals involved in the alleged offences, making it evident that releasing the petitioner on pre-arrest bail poses no risk of witness influence or evidence tampering. The sweeping nature of the allegations in the F.I.R., devoid of specific accusations against the petitioner, underscores that the enactment of Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. aimed to safeguard the personal liberty of individuals.
6. The case of the petitioner/A.1 in Crl.P.No.9025 of 2023 is also on the same footing as that of the petitioner/A.3 in Crl.P.No.8490 of 2023. The case of the petitioner/A.1 further state that:
i. The complainant has referred to only the draft performance report and has failed to disclose the subsequent event, i.e. after submission of the draft performance of audit report on functioning of Prohibition and Excise Department, the Audit Department had discussions with the officials of the Commissionarate/Government level and the Principal Accountant General (Audit), Vijayawada submitted a report to the T.M.R., J 6 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch comptroller and Auditor General, who in turn furnished the final report titled "Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Revenue Sector for the year 2019".
ii. Once the final report is submitted and in the said report, there is no mention of any irregularities as alleged in the complaint, and once the final report is submitted, it is deemed that the observations made in the draft report, which are only tentative, are considered to be addressed. The petitioner has taken charge as Commissioner for Prohibition and Excise on 12.01.2015. After due discussions, the government formulated the new excise policy by considering all the parameters. The petitioner, who was the then Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise and Managing Director of A.P. Beverages Corporation Limited, is advisory with inputs from the field level and has very limited or no role in policy matters with financial implications and all the policy and financial decisions are taken by the Government and sent to Commissionerate for implementation. The new Excise Policy for 2015-17 was approved in the Cabinet meeting on 17.06.2015. In view of the decisions taken in Cabinet, the proposals for new excise policy were forwarded from the office of the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise. The government issued G.O.Ms.No.218 dated 22.06.2015, presumably following all government business rules, including deletion of the privilege fee. The petitioner has no role in the issue of removal or decrease or increase of privilege fee. The then Special Chief Secretary (Revenue-Excise) and the concerned officials at the government level have to explain how the same was notified in G.O.Ms.No.218 dated 22.06.2015 when there was no proposal emanated from the office of the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise.
iii. The petitioner contends that approximately Rs.343 Crores of privilege fee in the Revenue is from Telangana and only Rs.23-25 Crores per annum from the State of A.P., which is very meagre. Regarding the Bar Policy, the petitioner was not in office then, and the government decided it in consultation with the petitioner's successor. iv. The petitioner contends that the petitioner rejected the proposal for a grant of DM-2 (M.G.O.) The licence was dated 27.06.2015, and afterwards, the petitioner was transferred from the post; the government considered and granted a licence dated 04.07.2016. The entire process and subsequent G.Os. were issued by the then Special Chief Secretary and successor, C.P.E. The petitioner has no role in the grant of licences to distilleries, as it is solely the prerogative of the Government. The Government constituted a Committee vide G.O.Rt.No.993 dated 12.11.2014, and the Committee met on T.M.R., J 7 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch 26.03.2015 and recommended four distilleries to the Government for expansion in the first phase. The recommendations of the Committee are not binding on the Government, nor is the Committee responsible for decisions taken at the government level, as the Government alone has the power to approve and issue G.O.s.
v. The petitioner worked only for nine months, and everything was consistent in procuring stocks and supplies to outlets. Brand preference is the sole prerogative of licensees/consumers, and usually, payment is made after the supply is completed. The petitioner was absent during that period, and the Successor C.P.E. has to reply appropriately.
vi. The petitioner further contends that all the events from 2014-2019 have been covered up to 01.03.2019 and 13.05.2019 after election notification 2019, wherein 25 brands were approved, which implies that all the accused come under the ambit of Section 17-A of the P.C. Act, as amended in 2018, and hence needs prior clearance from respective statutory authorities, as date of registration of F.I.R. is the criteria or initiation of process. The petitioner retired from service on 31.12.2021, and the present complaint is filed regarding the alleged irregularities of 2015.
7. A reply filed by A.1 in Crl.P.No.9025 of 2023 refutes the averments made in the counter and reiterates his earlier stand. The contentions raised in the reply to the counter will be considered in the order.
8. Written submissions were filed on behalf of either side. Heard Sri S. Nagamuthu and Sri Dammalapati Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel, representing the petitioner/A.3 in Crl.P.No.8490 of 2023; Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A.2 in Crl.P.No.8781 of 2023 and Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A.1 in Crl.P.No.9025 of 2023 and Sri S. Sriram, learned Advocate General, representing the Respondent-State in Crl.P.Nos.8490 & 8781 of 2023 and Smt. Y.L. Sivakalpana Reddy, learned Special Public T.M.R., J 8 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch Prosecutor for C.I.D., representing the Respondent-State in Crl.P.No.9025 of 2023. Both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petitions and the counters. Consequently, the contentions raised by learned counsel in three petitions need not be reproduced.
9. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision reported in Sushila Aggarwal and others vs. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) and another1, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"40. The law presumes an accused to be innocent till his guilt is proven. As a presumably innocent person, he is entitled to all the fundamental rights, including the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
10. In Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others vs State of Punjab2, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"31. In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the applicant's antecedents, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail, he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must be weighed with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at 1 (2020) 5 S.C.C. 1 2 (1980) 2 SCC 565 T.M.R., J 9 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and "the larger interests of the public or the State" are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.
56. The reason for the enactment of Section 438 in the Code was the parliamentary acceptance of the crucial underpinning of personal liberty in a free and democratic country. Parliament wished to foster respect for personal liberty and accord primacy to a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence, that everyone is presumed to be innocent till he or she is found guilty. Life and liberty are the cherished attributes of every individual. The urge for freedom is natural to each human being. Section 438 is a procedural provision concerned with the personal liberty of each individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence. As denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when not imposed by the legislature."
11. In Mahipal V. Rajesh3, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is necessary for the Court while considering a bail application, to assess whether, based on the evidentiary record, there existed a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed the crime. It is settled law that when granting bail, a detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the case's merits has not to be undertaken. That did not mean that whilst granting bail, some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.
12. A Court doesn't need to give elaborate reasons while granting bail, particularly when the case is at the initial stage, and the allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystallized as such. 3 (2020) 2 SCC 118 T.M.R., J 10 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch
13. It is settled law that while considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to a free, fair and complete investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused. It is the duty of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in the proper way to protect the personal liberty of the citizen. According to law, everyone charged with a penal offence has a right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The presumption of innocence is a human right. There cannot be a presumption of guilt to deprive a person of his liberty without an opportunity before the Court. The Court must thoroughly scrutinize the entire available record, particularly the allegations directly attributed to the accused, and assess whether these allegations are corroborated by other material and circumstances on record.
14. In light of the above settled legal principles, the rival contentions raised on behalf of both sides will be appreciated to decide the entitlement of the petitioner to get the relief of anticipatory bail.
15. To facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the rival contentions, it is essential to briefly highlight specific admitted or uncontested facts: The Statutory Rules regarding the imposition of privilege fee was introduced in the year 2012 vide Statutory Rules in G.O.Ms.No.391 dated 18.06.2012 for grant of licence for shops (A4 licence) as per Rule 69, the privilege fee shall be levied. The Sub-Rule nine (9) is as follows:
T.M.R., J 11 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch "The licensee shall be required to pay privilege fee at the rate of 8% plus applicable Value Added Tax (V.A.T.) thereon, on the sale price of IMFL and F.L. purchased from APBCL when the cumulative value of his/her purchases during the license year exceeds six (6) times of the annual license fee".
16. After that, vide G.O.Ms.no.357 dated 22.06.2013, the word "six" in rule 16(9) was amended to that of "seven". To evade such imposition, the licensees resorted to disguising sales accounting manipulations regarding the sale of stocks. While initiating the decision-making for the Excise Year 2015-17, initially, it was proposed that the threshold limit for imposition of privilege fee be enhanced to be applicable only if the purchases exceed ten times the annual licence fee so that there are incentives for compliance with the statutory rules.
17. The proposal submitted for the amendment of the Statutory Rules was moved on 22.06.2015, which included the deletion of Rule 16(9) of the Licence Rules, 2012, thereby removing the existing privilege fee on Shop Licencees and the consequent to the G.O.Ms.No.215 dated 22.06.2015. On the said proposal, the Statutory Rules in G.O.Ms.No.218 dated 22.06.2015 were issued duly deleting Rule 16(9) of the Licence Rules, comprised in G.O.Ms.No.391 dated 18.06.2012.
18. The then Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise addressed a letter dated 01.09.2015 to the Government proposing to dispense with the collection of privilege fees for 2B-Bar Licences. A representation of the A.P. Wine Dealers Association seeking parity with the A4 shop licence requested T.M.R., J 12 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch the exemption of the privilege fee for the 2B Bar licence. The respondent/state has produced the letter dated 01.09.2015 of the Commissioner of P&E, and a representation of the A.P. Wine Dealers Association has also been filed. While formulating the procedure for the Excise Year 2016 to be made effective from 01.01.2016, the proposal to delete the privilege fee even for Bars was initiated on 30.09.2015.
19. The learned Advocate General contends that G.O.Ms.Nos.216 and 217 notify the Excise Policy for the years 2015-2017, and note files concerning those G.Os. indicate that there was neither discussion nor reference in the salient features of the Excise Policy to the Cabinet about the withdrawal of the privilege fee for A4 shop licence. The salient features of the Excise Policy did not contain any whisper about the withdrawal of the privilege fee. As per the Note files, A.2 and A.3 acknowledge the same by putting their signatures in the files relating to G.Os. and both the G.Os. were issued accordingly. As seen from the G.O.Ms.No.216 dated 22.06.2015, it was issued by Sri Ajeya Kallam, Special Chief Secretary to Government. Similarly, G.O.Ms.No.217, dated 22.06.2015, was also issued by Sri Ajeya Kallam, Special Chief Secretary to Government.
20. During the hearing, it is not seriously disputed that G.O.Ms.No.216 is nothing but a declaration and Excise Policy disposal of liquor outlets between 2015-17, and it has nothing to do with the privilege fee. Similarly, T.M.R., J 13 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch G.O.Ms.No.217 is in respect of the location of liquor shops depending upon the population of that area.
21. The learned Advocate General contends that contrary to the initial proposal to continue the privilege fee if the purchases crossed ten times the annual licence fee, the Rule was notified to remove the privilege fee altogether. Therefore, a decision with huge financial implications amounting to around Rs.1300 Crores loss of Revenue to the State and corresponding benefit to the A4 shop owners, as is noticeable explicitly in turn, and it is a clear abuse of office by the Public Servants.
22. The State contends that it could be discernable that a separate Excise Policy for Bars for 2015-16 is mooted, and subsequent decisions are shown to have been held on 23.11.2015 with the then Hon'ble Chief Minister and then Hon'ble Excise Minister for Excise, the outline of the New Bar Policy for 2016 is shown to have been arrived. The financial implications arising from the proposal are not discussed, and the file is not circulated to the Finance Department under the Business Rules. The proposed amendments remove the obligations of privilege fee payable by Bars as contained in Rule 10(a) without any procedural adherence and by circumventing the basic mandatory requirements. The Bar Excise Policy for 2016 is a departure from the existing Rules, contemplating the removal of privilege fee payable by Bars on turnover is finalised by the then Chief Minister and the Excise T.M.R., J 14 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch Minister without reference to the Cabinet or the Council of Ministers by limiting the circulation of the file.
23. The respondent/State has submitted a copy of the letter dated 25.11.2015 addressed by Sri Mukesh Kumar Meena, I.A.S, Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, A.P. Hyderabad, to Special Chief Secretary to the Government (C.T., Excise and Stamp and Registration) Revenue Department, A.P. Secretariat, Hyderabad. In the letter, it is mentioned that, following discussions with the Hon'ble Chief Minister and Hon'ble Minister for Prohibition and Excise on 23.11.2015, necessary amendments to the A.P. Excise (Grant of Licence of Selling by Bar and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2005 are proposed, specifically regarding the deletion of privilege fee under Rule 10-A. The learned Advocate General asserts that the removal of the privilege fee on the 2B-Bar license was influenced by A.2 and A.3. Subsequently, G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 11.12.2015, was issued, eliminating Rule 10-A.
24. The State argues that the Government lost Rs.2984 Crores in revenue due to the decision to eliminate privilege fees between 2012 and 2015. According to the State, the standard procedure outlined in the Business Rules involves sending such proposals to the Finance Department for clearance under Rule 11(a)(ii) and 15(1) of the Business Rules, 2013, applicable at the relevant time. However, the material provided does not specify the responsible officers tasked with sending the proposal to the T.M.R., J 15 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch Finance Department for clearance and whether any action has been initiated against them also for not obtaining the financial clearance and, if not, the reasons for such inaction against them.
25. The counsel representing the petitioners (A.2 and A.3) argues that, according to the material provided by the respondent/State on 22.06.2015, a note was submitted detailing the key points of Cabinet decisions, with approval sought for four draft G.O.s. The Special Chief Secretary signed the file and issued the G.O.s the same day. Therefore, the responsibility for administering the G.O. lies with the Chief Secretary, the Principal Secretary, and Special Chief Secretaries, and not with the Minister (A.2) or the Chief Minister, as neither of them signed the G.O.
26. The counsel for the petitioners (A.1 to A.3) further argues that the then Chief Prohibition and Excise Officer (C.P.E.) proposed several amendments to the Bar Policy, including raising the application fee from Rs.5000/- to Rs.2,00,000/- and exempting privilege fees when sales exceeded 6/7 times the license value. The estimated loss due to waiving privilege fees from June 2014 to March 2015 is only Rs.11.32 crores. Other privilege fees in the document about income from CMRF are sports fees, special privilege fees when bottle prices are rounded off, and additional privilege fees when case values are rounded off. The Comptroller and Auditor General (C.A.G.) examined the waiver of privilege fees, and its findings are included in the C.A.G. report on Revenue for the period ending T.M.R., J 16 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch March 31, 2016. The petitioners (A.1 to A.3) assert that the imposition of privilege fees failed to achieve the desired objectives, as shop owners engaged in dummy sales, cross-movement of stock, and redistributed turnover to adjacent shops, with no demand for vacant notified stocks.
27. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year ending 2015-2016 is placed before the Court. Chapter VIII deals with the Follow-up Audit of the Audit Recommendations about the performance audit on the functioning of the Prohibition and Excise Department, in Para No.8.1.3.2, reads as follows:
"The Government replied (June 2016) that levy and collection of privilege fees was given up as the levy of privilege fees on the sales over and above the optimum level had dampened the spirit of the licensees to improve their sales. It acted as an impediment to the growth of IMFL sales as the increase in sales did not give any additional income to the licensee.
Information obtained from Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation Limited (APBCL) in respect of the sale of liquors eligible for levy of privilege fee showed that the sales had come down during the year 2014-15 as compared to the year 2013-14, which substantiated the cause for deletion of provision to levy privilege fee."
28. The response from the Government to the C.A.G. further supports the petitioners' (accused) claim that sales decreased during the year 2014-15 compared to 2013-14, justifying the removal of the provision to levy privilege fees. The petitioners argue that the Government, having submitted a reply to the Comptroller and Auditor General (C.A.G.) stating that the collection of privilege fees was given up due to its negative impact on licensees' sales, cannot logically claim revenue loss due to the deletion of T.M.R., J 17 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch privilege fees. The petitioner/A.1 asserts that the Commissioner, Prohibition and Excise, and the Managing Director of APBCL have a suggestive/advisory role with limited involvement in policy matters and financial decisions taken by the government. The government initiated, processed, and approved the deletion of privilege fees, and the then Chief Prohibition and Excise Officer (C.P.E.) had no significant role in it. The petitioner/A.1 maintains that he neither sent nor approved the proposal for an extension of the license period and the related suggestions, including the issue of privilege fees. The note file presented by the respondent also aligns with the petitioner/A.1's contention. The petitioner/A.1 emphasizes that the Commissioner, Prohibition and Excise, serves as an implementing authority, while the formulation of policy issues rests solely with the government in consultation with finance. The petitioner/A.1 denies responsibility for acts of omission and commission by the government.
29. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A.2 that after the new administrative dispensation, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.372 dated 22.08.2019 framing new excise policy, in supersession of the earlier amendments. The Government also framed this policy to exercise the power conferred under Section 72 of the A.P. Excise Act. It is not the case of the respondent/State that the present Government collected the privilege fee from the Bar Licence holders. When the respondent/State contends that the previous Government caused the T.M.R., J 18 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch revenue loss to the Government exchequer by deleting the privilege fee, it is not explained why the present Government has not collected the privilege fee from the Bar Licence holders.
30. The current Government introduced a new policy in 2019, cancelling shop licenses and allowing the Corporation to sell liquor directly. However, the bar license remains unchanged. If the withdrawal of the license fee for bar licenses had caused a loss to the Government, the present Government would have introduced the imposition of privilege fees. The fact that the current government has not imposed privilege fees supports the view that withdrawing privilege fees from bar licenses by the previous government was justifiable and not inappropriate.
31. In State of T.N. v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Assn4., the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"12. The respondent has placed reliance on BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India [BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333]. A Constitution Bench considered a challenge to the decision of the Union of India to disinvest and transfer 51% shares of Bharat Aluminium Company Limited. Rejecting the challenge, it was observed that the wisdom of economic policies is not subject to judicial review (S.C.C. pp. 381-82, paras 92-93) "92. In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow its own policy. Often, a change in Government may result in a shift in focus or change in economic policies. Any such change may adversely affect some vested interests. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the Court.4
(2021) 15 SCC 534 T.M.R., J 19 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch
93. Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless it can be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any statutory provision or the Constitution. In other words, it is not for the courts to consider the relative merits of different economic policies and consider whether a wiser or better one can be evolved. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts. Here, the policy was tested, and the motion was defeated in the Lok Sabha on 1-3-2001."
32. This Court views that as it is the prerogative of the elected government to follow its own policy unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or malafide, it is not supposed to make attributions against the policymakers.
33. As per Section 72(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, the amended Rule shall be laid on the table of both the Houses. Section 72(4) of the Act, which reads as follows:
"Sec.72(4) Every rule made under this Act, shall, immediately after it is made, be laid before each House of State Legislature if it is in session and if it is not in session, in the session immediately following for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions and if, before the expiration of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or in the annulment of the rule, the rule shall, from the date on which the modification or annulment is notified, have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled, as the case may be; so however that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule."
34. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners/A.1 & A.3 asserts that the respondent/State has not provided any material to the Court indicating whether any objections were raised by Assembly members, including the current Hon'ble Chief Minister, who was then the Opposition Leader of the T.M.R., J 20 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch House. Furthermore, there is a lack of information regarding whether the Committee on Subordinate Legislation, which holds the authority to scrutinize and report on the exercise of powers delegated by the Legislature, raised any objections. It is crucial to establish whether the prescribed procedure under Section 72(4) was followed.
35. The learned Advocate General argues that the claim that files related to the policy decision on withdrawing the privilege fee reached the highest office, i.e., the Governor of the State, lacks documentary support, and the ongoing investigation does not substantiate this. He emphasizes that policy decisions made in clear violation of the law with a shared intention to gain undue financial advantages are not exempt from criminal law implications, citing the Supreme Court's observation in the case of Manish Sisodia vs. C.B.I. reported in 2023 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1393, concerning the Delhi Government's Excise Policy.
36. This Court views whether the policy decision secured a discussion in the Legislative Assembly as irrelevant for adjudicating the present anticipatory bail application. In Quarry Owners' Association vs State of Bihar and others5, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"45. It is true that the language of both sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of Section 28 is different. They are reproduced below:
"28. Rules and notifications to be laid before Parliament and certain rules to be approved by Parliament.--(1) Every Rule and every notification made by the Central Government under this Act shall be laid, 5 (2000) 8 SCC 655 T.M.R., J 21 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the Rule or notification or both Houses agree that the Rule or notification should not be made, the Rule or notification shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that Rule or notification."
37. Adhering to the observations in the mentioned decision, this Court asserts that even if it is presumed that the policy decision to withdraw the privilege fee reached the highest office in the State, namely the Governor, it does not absolve the need for examination regarding whether the said Rule or modification is made without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under the Rule or notification.
38. This Court acknowledges the merit in the argument presented by the learned Senior Counsel for petitioner/A.1, asserting that the deletion of the privilege fee for 2B Bars was accomplished through G.O.Ms.No.468 dated 11.12.2015, issued by the Government based on the proposal from the then Commissioner, P&E, which was complete and appropriately signed by M.K. Meena, I.A.S. This contention finds support in the documents referred to by both parties. It is evident from the records that petitioner/A.1 was transferred from the post after the file was returned with a query on the financial implications of the privilege fee, and the charge of the Commissioner, P&E, was handed over to Shri AjeyaKallam, I.A.S., on T.M.R., J 22 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch 07.10.2015. Additionally, Shri M.K. Meena, I.A.S., assumed charge as Commissioner, P&E, on 03.11.2015 and submitted a proposal on 17.11.2015, leading to the issuance of a new bar policy.
39. The learned Senior Counsel for Petitioner/A.1 contends that the respondent/State's assertion that the successor Commissioner, P&E, merely followed the earlier draft proposal of Petitioner/A.1 is legally untenable and misleading. He further contends that, as a responsible public servant, the then Commissioner, P&E, had the duty to scrutinize the proposal's contents before forwarding it to the Government. The Government, in turn, was expected to make a considered and judicious decision.
40. The learned Advocate General for the respondent/State counters, arguing that both decisions to withdraw the privilege fee for A4 Shops and 2B Bar licenses were made with full awareness of the financial implications to the public exchequer. Moreover, approval from the Finance Department, as mandated by Rule 11 of the Secretariat Business Rules, 2013, was not obtained. The files were not even sent to the Finance Department, demonstrating non-compliance with the prescribed procedure for decisions that involve relinquishing revenue on a significant scale.
41. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A.2 contends that the Government, in the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 72 of the A.P. Excise Act, 1968, issued/framed the rules, deleting the provision/rule which provides collection of privilege fee, is a collective decision/subordinate T.M.R., J 23 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch legislation. No motive can be attributed to such a decision; this collective decision was taken after following the due procedure as per the advice of the bureaucratic head concerned; such decision may not constitute any offence either under Section 409 IPC or under Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. In a judgment K. Mohanlal vs Konijeti Rosaiah (Common Order in Crl.P.No.5313 of 2013 and Crl. R.C. No.2349 of 2012 dated 04.10.2015), this High Court held as follows:
"(1)The Act of the Petitioner in issuing G.O. is not illegal and the power was exercised invoking the Business Rules which empowers the Chief Minister to overrule the objections raised by the concerned Minister or the Officers In-charge; (2) the Complainant could not establish the fact that there was monitory transaction for the Act of the Petitioner.
Further, violation of any of the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act itself would not attract criminal offence."
42. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner/A.2 that note files in both matters were placed before the Court by the respondent/State. The note files do not show any Officer in the department, including the Additional Chief Secretary, putting up a note pointing out that there is a requirement to obtain prior concurrence from the Finance Department. It is not the case that the Minister overruled the note put up by the Secretary and ordered the issuance of G.O. without the concurrence of the Finance Department. There is considerable force in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that it is for the bureaucracy to follow the Rule, to put up the appropriate note and appraise the Minister and Chief Minister of such procedural requirement; the long line T.M.R., J 24 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch of bureaucracy is intended only to assist the political executives in legal and procedural matters; failure to obtain prior concurrence from the Finance Department prima facie cannot be attributed to A.2 and A.3.
43. The learned Senior Counsel for Petitioner/A.1 argues that the respondent/State emphasizes the removal of the privilege fee and the alleged loss to the exchequer while neglecting the overall revenue increase due to policy changes. According to the petitioner, the government earned substantial amounts through application fees and A4 shop disposal. Still, the alleged non-earnings or loss of expected revenue to the tune of thousands of crores due to the irregularities that occurred in the decision to withdraw the privilege fee for High-Volume Liquor Sellers is the focal point for the present crime, which is noticed in the report dated 12.03.2020. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A.1 contends that the C.A.G. procedure is that the draft observations are sent to higher officials for vetting and the client organization, and after verification if found true, it will not be carried to the final report. It is also highlighted that the reply given by C.P.E. to C.A.G. that the provision has been removed, keeping in view the volume of privilege fees collected, was very meagre. The remarks could not find a place in the final report/C.A.G. report on revenue for the period ending March 2019, confirming that C.A.G. dropped this after a thorough study. This Court finds force in the contention of the petitioner/A.1 that as regards the beneficiaries (A.4 shop dealers), as a result of the removal of the T.M.R., J 25 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch privilege fee, were not known at the time of issue of G.O., as the proposed new excise policy would begin w.e.f. 01.07.2015 after selection of new shops by way of lottery is completed. The benefit of deletion of privilege applies to new licensees only, and the question of petitioners colluding with future unknown licences does not arise.
44. The State advances the argument that M/s. S.P.Y. Agro Industries Limited, Nandhyal, received the benefit of instalments for paying the Licence Fee despite a High Court direction in P.I.L. No.102 of 2015, which stated that S.P.Y. was obligated to pay the enhanced licence fee amended in 2001, not as on the date the Letter of Intent (L.O.I.) was granted. The State contends that, despite the High Court's finding that S.P.Y. cannot take advantage of its error, the benefit of paying instalments was granted. Moreover, interest on arrears in Licence Fee was allowed to be collected only from 27.11.2015 (the date of the High Court's judgment in P.I.L. No.102 of 2015), contrary to the judgment's findings. According to the State, there is no provision under the Act and Rules to give up or indirectly waive the interest payable or enforce it from a future date. This decision allegedly caused the government a financial loss of Rs.15 Crore.
45. The State asserts that a detailed investigation is necessary, including exploring the possibility of quid pro quo, mainly because the promoter, Sri S.P.Y. Reddy, is a politician and Member of Parliament (M.P.) from Nandhyal at the relevant time. From the State's stance, it is evident that, so far, no T.M.R., J 26 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch material has been collected, and the suspicion is based solely on the potential quid pro quo involving the fact that the promoter, Shri S.P.Y. Reddy, was a politician.
46. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner/A.2 contend that granting instalments by the Government for payment of enhancing licence fee and collecting the interest thereon with effect from the date of the Judgment of this High Court is not contrary to the Judgment of the High Court. As per the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, as the arrears' amount was approximately Rs.51 Crores at the company's request, the officials prepared a note to consider the request for payment on an instalment basis. The Note file shows that the issue as to whether the interest should be collected from the date of Judgment or the date of the introduction of the enhancement was referred to the Law Department as per the Business Rules. The Assistant Secretary has put up a note stating that:
"Since the manufacturer has already utilized the facility of payment in instalments provided in the rules within the L.O.I. period, the request of S.P.Y. Agro for grant of licence by paying the difference amount in instalments has to be considered by relaxing Rule-5(2)(b)(i) &
(ii) of A.P. Distillery (Manufacture of IMFL other than Beer and Wine) Rules, 2006 as proposed.
In so far as the cut-of-date for interest calculation on the arrears is concerned, the Supreme Court in General Manager, Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan vs Laxmi Devi [2010 (1) S.L.J. 43] held that "Judicial decisions, unless otherwise specified, are retrospective; they would only be prospective".
In this case, the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court in P.I.L. No.102/2015 dated 27.11.2015 has not explicitly directed the S.P.Y. Agro to pay interest on the arrears with a retrospective date. The licence fee to be paid by the S.P.Y. Agro was concluded by the High Court on 27.11.2015 in P.I.L. No.102/2015 and batch. Therefore, the T.M.R., J 27 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch interest on the arrears has to be calculated from the date of the Judgment of the High Court, i.e., from 27.11.2015.
47. The note file indicates that considering the opinion of the Law Department and the stance expressed by the Special Chief Secretary regarding the relaxation of rules, the then Hon'ble Chief Minister (A.3) was urged to make a decision. It is apparent from the note files that A.3 did not make a decision directly but instructed that the proposal be presented in the Cabinet meeting. This underscores that the Cabinet, relying on the Law Department's opinion, decided to collect interest from the High Court's Order date.
48. The note file reveals that when the Cabinet memorandum was forwarded to the Finance Department, the Principal Finance Secretary expressed that Finance did not have specific comments except acknowledging that the proposal involved relaxation of Rule 6(3) of the P. Distillery Rules, 2006. Suppose the proposal to relax the rules is approved. In that case, the C.P.E. should implement adequate safeguards to ensure compliance with statutory requirements and request the file circulation to the Chief Minister (A.3) through the Finance Minister.
49. From the material provided, the Law Department recommended calculating interest from the date of the High Court order by relying on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, and the Cabinet decided accordingly. The respondent/State needs to clarify how this Cabinet resolution, made in T.M.R., J 28 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch consultation with the Law Department, implicates criminal liability for the petitioners/A.1 to A.3.
50. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A.1 contends that about grant of DM2 (MGO) licence to M/s. S.P.Y. Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd, A.1 rejected their proposal to grant DM2 licence proceedings dated 27.06.2015. Shri Ajeya Kallam issued the entire process and subsequent G.Os, Special Chief Secretary (Revenue-Excise) and implemented by Shri Meena, I.A.S., the then Commissioner, P&E, and as such, A.1 is in no way concerned regarding the issuance of a licence to M/s. S.P.Y. Agro Industries Pvt. Limited, Nandyal. The said contention of A.1 is supported by the documentary evidence placed on record. For the reasons best known to the respondent, it is the grievance of the petitioner/A.1; No action has been initiated against the Officers who issued and implemented the G.Os
51. The learned Advocate General asserts that the implication of Criminal Breach of Trust under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) is prima facie evident in the facts of the case and the recitals of the F.I.R.; the accused, in criminal conspiracy with specific individuals, allegedly organized the market to generate demand for bottles of specific brands to be procured by the Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Ltd. (APSBCL) for further disposal, accounting for 70% of the total market share; this allegedly resulted in undue pecuniary advantage to 5-6 suppliers/manufacturers, as indicated in the sale disclosures of the corresponding years.
T.M.R., J 29 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch
52. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.3 argues that the permission for the grant of distilleries is to be handled at the official level and never reached the table of the Chief Minister. Therefore, this allegation has no bearing on the petitioners.
53. No specific details were provided regarding the recommendations made. Moreover, the recommendations put forth by the Committee are merely suggestions for consideration and are not binding on the decision- making authority. Therefore, prima facie, no malfeasance, malice, or mens- rea can be imputed to the petitioners. No material has been presented to substantiate that the petitioners/A.1 to A.3 were involved in the decision- making process for granting permission for distilleries contrary to the existing rules and procedures.
54. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.3 argues that brand orders are placed based on consumer choice, with payment made only after sales. Suppliers are responsible for taking back unsold quantities, and APBCL imposes demurrage charges if the stock remains unsold for over 90 days. This matter was handled at the official level in the excise department and does not involve the petitioners/A.1 to A.3. The Court prima facie, acknowledges the validity of the petitioners' argument that supply orders are contingent on sales performance and are adjusted accordingly.
55. The allegation pertains to the day-to-day internal business activities of the Andhra Pradesh Beverage Corporation. It is the responsibility of the T.M.R., J 30 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch respondent/State to clarify how the petitioners are involved in the daily affairs of the Corporation. The petitioners contend that ordering the supply of specific brands from distilleries would not cause any loss to the Corporation, as the distilleries are paid the purchase money after the sale of the supplied brands.
56. The contention is that after the notification of the General Elections in 2019, the Government expedited the approval of brands without any evident public interest, solely for the benefit of the suppliers. The learned Senior Counsel for Petitioner/A.2 argues that the General Elections' notification was issued on 18.03.2019. However, no supporting material has been presented to substantiate this claim.
57. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners/A.2 and A.3 contends that Rule 8 of the A.P. Business Rules, 2023, declares that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible for all the executive orders. Therefore, whether or not the Council of Ministers dealt with a particular subject is immaterial; in the instant case, it is not the case of the prosecution that the orders were issued without jurisdiction; the excise department has followed the due procedure; the decision of the excise department is deemed to have been taken by the Council of Ministers. So, no individual minister can be personally held responsible. Rule 8 reads as follows:
T.M.R., J 31 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch "Rule 8-Collective responsibility: The council shall be collectively responsible for all the executive orders issued in the name of the Governor in accordance with these rules, whether such orders are authorized by an individual Minister on a matter appertaining to his portfolio or as a result of discussion at a meeting of Council or otherwise".
58. The learned Advocate General contends that the contention of petitioners/A.2 and A.3 that they cannot be held responsible for the collective decisions taken by the Cabinet is misguided as the flow of the stream in collective responsibility is from the Council of Ministers to the concerned Minister and not on the reverse. The learned Advocate General for the respondent/State relied on a decision reported in Kaushal Kishor vs State of Uttar Pradesh and others.6, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"114. Question 4 referred to us is this:
"Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to any affairs of the State or for protecting the Government, be attributed vicariously to the Government itself, especially in view of the principle of Collective Responsibility?"
140. What follows from the above discussion is (i) that the concept of collective responsibility is essentially a political concept, (ii) that the collective responsibility is that of the Council of Ministers, and (iii) that such collective responsibility is to the House of the People/Legislative Assembly of the State. Generally, such responsibility correlates to (i) the decisions made and (ii) the acts of omission and commission done. It is not possible to extend this concept of collective responsibility to any and every statement orally made by a Minister outside the House of the People/Legislative Assembly.
149. As all the literature on the issue shows, collective responsibility is that of the Council of Ministers. Each Minister is responsible for the decisions taken collectively by the Council of Ministers. In other words, the flow of the stream of collective responsibility is from the Council of 6 (2023) 4 S.C.C. 1 T.M.R., J 32 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch Ministers to the individual Ministers. The flow is not on the reverse, namely, from the individual Ministers to the Council of Ministers. After carefully reading the decision, this Court finds force in the submission of the learned Advocate General.
59. The learned Advocate General further contends that the petitioners' contention that they were not called upon to join the enquiry and were not afforded the right to submit their explanations during the preliminary enquiry and, therefore, the registration of the F.I.R. is flawed is unfounded and misplaced in the light of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) and another vs. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi @ T.H. Vijayalakshmi and another7, wherein it is held that:
"40. Given the above discussion, we hold that since the institution of a Preliminary Enquiry in cases of corruption is not made mandatory before registering an F.I.R. under the CrPC, PC Act or even the C.B.I. Manual, for this Court to issue a direction to that effect will be tantamount to stepping into the legislative domain. Hence, we hold that in case the information received by the C.B.I., through a complaint or a "source information" under Chapter 8, discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, it can directly register a Regular Case instead of conducting a Preliminary Enquiry where the officer is satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
41. The above formulation does not take away from the value of conducting a Preliminary Enquiry in an appropriate case. This has been acknowledged by the decisions of this Court in P Sirajuddin (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra) and Charansingh (supra). Even in Vinod Dua (supra), this Court noted that "[a]s a matter of fact, the accepted norm -
be it in the form of C.B.I. Manual or like instruments is to insist on a preliminary inquiry". The registration of a Regular Case can have 7 2021 S.C.C. OnLine SC 923 T.M.R., J 33 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch disastrous consequences for the career of an officer if the allegations ultimately turn out to be false. In a preliminary enquiry, the C.B.I. is allowed access to documentary records and speaks to persons just as they would in an investigation, which means that information gathered can be used at the investigation stage as well. Hence, conducting a Preliminary Enquiry would not take away from the ultimate goal of prosecuting accused persons in a timely manner. However, we once again clarify that if the C.B.I. chooses not to hold a Preliminary Enquiry, the accused cannot demand it as a matter of right. As clarified by this Court in Managipet (supra), the purpose of Lalita Kumari (supra), noting that a Preliminary Enquiry is valuable in corruption cases, was not to vest a right in the accused but to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of law in order to target public servants."
60. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.3 argues that the allegations pertain to policy decisions made to discharge their official duties. Therefore, prior approval under Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act (P.C. Act) should have been obtained. The absence of such prior approval renders the registration of the F.I.R. illegal, and arrests based on such an illegal F.I.R. are not valid, although a coordinate bench of this Court in Crl.P.No.6942 of 2023 has held that for offences committed before 26.07.2018, no prior approval is required, the issue is currently under consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, in the present case, even according to the F.I.R., the alleged occurrence was before June 2019, thus, a part of the offence, as per the F.I.R., occurred after 26.07.2018, and therefore, Section 17-A of the P.C. Act should have been complied with in this instance.
61. The learned Advocate General contends that Section 17-A of the P.C. Act, inserted in the Act through an amendment dated 26.07.2018, is prospective. Further, offences occurring before 26.07.2018 do not require T.M.R., J 34 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch any sanction from the competent authority to launch criminal proceedings against public servants. He also contends that the ensuing continued offences in a situation occurring both before and after 26.07.2018, resulting in a hybrid situation, came up for consideration before this Court in Kinjarapu Atchannaidu vs State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2020 S.C.C. OnLine AP 533, wherein this Court held as follows:
"35. One strong circumstance to consider in this respect is that the transactions relating to various instances involved in this matter continued for a considerable length of time, viz., from 2014-15 to 2018-
19. The situation in the nature of a hybrid, in the application of Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is thus seen. Further circumstance to be noted in this context is that there are other accused apart from the Petitioner who have been attributed definite and certain roles in the whole affair, including certain Government (Public) servants.
41. One of the learned Judges of the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Crl.P. No. 9144 of 2018 dated 16.11.2018 observed that amended provisions of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act are prospective in operation without retroactive application. It was followed in a later order of this Court in Crl.P. No. 4775 of 2019, dated 23.01.2020, among others.
45. As already stated, a hybrid situation is found in the present case, covering a long period of the alleged instances, either prior to the amendment of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 or after that. However, the nature and import of Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act reflect that it is procedural. Therefore, the test applied by the Karnataka High Court in the T.N. Bettaswamaiah case (30 referred supra) requires application in this respect. It is also desirable to consider and apply principles of interpretation of Statutes explained in Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) -1, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited (21 supra) to understand the application of Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
"53. Apart from the gravity and magnitude of the instances involved in this case that inhibit the grant of bail to the Petitioner, as rightly contended by the learned Advocate General, the possibility of the investigation getting affected once the Petitioner is released on bail is very much foreseen. Instances are pointed out by the learned Advocate General as to scaring away the witnesses to come forward to assist the investigating agency. In the back drop of the circumstances in this case, where ramifications and reflections seem to be imminent, this contention T.M.R., J 35 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch as such cannot be brushed aside. These are other factors warrant the rejection of the request of the Petitioner for bail.
54. It should also be borne in mind that these instances represent a serious economic offence. Its effect is stated in the Nimmagadda Prasad case (15 referred to supra). The relevant observations in this ruling are in para 25, which reads as follows:
"25. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered as a grave offence affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country."
62. The record indicates that petitioner/A.3 was arrested in Crime No.29 of 2021. The Petitioner primarily challenged the registration of the F.I.R. in Crime No.29 of 2021 and the remand order dated 10.09.2023 through Crl.P.No.6942 of 2023, asserting that the proceedings are void due to the absence of approval under Section 17-A of the P.C. Act. This Court dismissed the petition through an Order dated 22.09.2023. The Petitioner appealed the said Order to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India via S.L.P. (Crl) No.12289 of 2023, and the matter was reserved for Judgment on 17.10.2023. Both parties have also presented their submissions on the applicability of Section 17-A of the P.C. Act in this case. Since the matter is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and this Court has already expressed its opinion, which is the subject matter of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.12289 of 2023, it is not appropriate to express any opinion on the contentions raised by both parties regarding the applicability of Section 17-A of the P.C. Act.
T.M.R., J 36 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch
63. The F.I.R. is based on a complaint dated 11.10.2023 from the Commissioner of Distilleries and Breweries and Managing Director of Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Limited. The Petitioner strongly argues that the State initiated this case on 11.10.2023 and registered the case after an inexplicable delay of around four years from the Policy decisions, which are purportedly under investigation. The reason for the delay in reporting by the Complainant was that, while analyzing the previous files for suggesting policy issues to the Government, the Complainant came to know about the facts noted in the report, taking time for proper analysis and conclusions on those facts. This Court notes that, as a matter of policy, the Excise Policy is expected to be reviewed by the Government every year. It is somewhat incomprehensible that the State has not reviewed the effect of reducing revenues for eight years. The present Government is expected to review the impact of the previous Excise Policy while introducing the new policy. Thus, it shows that the State has not offered any reason to explain the delay in registering the present crime.
64. It is not the case of the respondent/State that it has not reviewed the liquor policy after coming into power in 2019. The concern of petitioner/A.3 is the registration of this case while he was in judicial custody in connection with Crime No.29 of 2021. When he moved an application for regular bail and was released on interim bail on 31.10.2023, it was nothing but an attempt made by the respondent/State to remand him to judicial T.M.R., J 37 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch custody. The Petitioners/A.2 and A.3 contend that the Defacto Complainant invoked the criminal law after the lapse of four years to harass the Petitioners by falsely implicating him on account of political vendetta.
65. The learned Advocate General for the respondent/State submits that the petitioners/A.2 and A.3 could not claim the case as regime revenge by the present Government; the political vendetta/regime revenge does not vitiate criminal proceedings.
66. In support of his contention, he relied on decisions in Ramveer Upadhyay and another vs. State of U.P. and another8, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar4. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or Complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh5, "if the use of power is of fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalyzation by malice is not legicidal."
67. In the State of Chhattisgarh and another vs Aman Kumar Singh and others9, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"76. We have perused the writ petitions filed by AS and Y.S. and have no hesitation to agree with Mr Hegde that the pleadings are insufficient to return a finding that the F.I.R. is an outcome of mala fide. Certainly, certain allegations are levelled against the Government and the Chief 8 2022 S.C.C. OnLine SC 484 9 (2023) 6 SCC 559 T.M.R., J 38 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch Minister; however, such allegations are vague and general. Mala's motives are required to be affirmatively pleaded and proved. However, no foundation in that behalf has been laid and naturally so, the High Court even did not examine whether exception could have been taken to the F.I.R. on the ground of mala fide.
77. Secondly, neither the head of the political executive (the incumbent Chief Minister) nor that of the administrative executive (the Chief Secretary) was personally arrayed as a party to any of the proceedings. Now, the law is well settled that the person against whom mala fide or bias is imputed should be impleaded as a party respondent to the proceedings to nomine and that in his/her absence, no inquiry into the allegations can be made. This is what the decision in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222: 1992 S.C.C. (Cri) 192] lays down. With regard thereto, since the incumbent holding the office of Chief Minister of the State against whom mala fide is alleged is not on record, we are loath to attach any importance to the allegations of mala fide, even if there be any.
78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station, and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance.
In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint."
68. As the investigation is pending, this Court is not inclined to express any opinion on the contentions raised by the petitioners/A.2 and A.3 with regard to the foisting of the case against them due to political vendetta. Even if it is assumed that case against petitioners/A.2 and A.3 was registered due to political vendetta, such a ground alone cannot warrant the anticipatory bail.
69. The crime is registered against the accused persons for the offences under Sections 166, 167, 409, 120(B) read with Section 34 of I.P.C. and T.M.R., J 39 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of P.C. Act. Admittedly, Sections 166 and 167 of I.P.C. are bailable offences. It is the contention of the petitioners that the ingredients of Section 409 IPC have no application to the facts of the case.
70. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision reported in N. Raghavender vs State of Andhra Pradesh, C.B.I.10, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"42. The entrustment of public property and dishonest misappropriation or use thereof in the manner illustrated under Section 405 is a sine qua non for making an offence punishable under Section 409 IPC. The expression 'criminal breach of trust' is defined under Section 405 IPC, which provides, inter alia, that whoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property contrary to law, or in violation of any law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or contravenes any legal contract, express or implied, etc. shall be held to have committed criminal breach of trust. Hence, to attract Section 405 IPC, the following ingredients must be satisfied:
(i) Entrusting any person with property or with any dominion over property;
(ii) That person has dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use;
(iii) Or that person dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation of any direction of law or a legal contract.
43. It ought to be noted that the crucial word used in Section 405 IPC is 'dishonestly', and therefore, it presupposes the existence of mens rea. In other words, mere retention of property entrusted to a person without any misappropriation cannot fall within the ambit of criminal breach of trust. Unless there is some actual use by the accused in violation of law or contract, coupled with dishonest intention, there is no criminal breach of trust. The second significant expression is 10 2021 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1232 T.M.R., J 40 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch 'misappropriated', which means improperly setting apart for one's use and to the exclusion of the owner."
71. In Common Cause, a Registered Society vs. Union of India and others11, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"168. A trust contemplated by Section 405 would arise only when there is an entrustment of property or dominion over property. There has, therefore, to be a property belonging to someone which is entrusted to the person accused of the offence under Section 405. The entrustment of property creates a trust which is only an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property and arises out of a confidence reposed and accepted by the owner. This is what has been laid in State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal [A.I.R. 1968 SC 700 : (1968) 2 SCR 408]. In Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397: 1997 S.C.C. (Cri) 415], the essential ingredients for establishing the offence of criminal breach of trust, as defined in Section 405, have been spelt out as follows: (S.C.C. pp. 406-07, para 13) "(i) entrusting any person with property or with any dominion over property; (ii) the person entrusted dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his own use that property; or dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust."
72. The petitioners contend that there is no allegation that there was any property, either entrusted or kept under the domain of the Petitioner and that he misappropriated the same in any of the modes mentioned in Sections 405 and 409 IPC; there is no prima facie case making out an offence under Section 409 IPC against the petitioners.
73. In light of the principles laid down in the decisions cited, it cannot be said that there is no substance in the petitioners' contention. However, as 11 (1999) 6 SCC 667 T.M.R., J 41 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch the investigation is pending, at this stage, this Court is not supposed to come to a definite conclusion in this regard.
74. The learned Advocate General for the respondent/State relied on a decision in Rajiv Kumar vs State of Uttar Pradesh and another12, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"10. Section 13 of the P.C. Act, in general, lays down that if a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, he would be guilty of "criminal misconduct". Sub-section (2) of Section 13 speaks of the punishment for such misconduct. Section 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, lays down the essentials and punishment, respectively, for the offence of "criminal misconduct" by a public servant. Section 13(1)(d) reads as under:
"13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.--(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct--
(d) if he-- ***
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or."
A perusal of the above provision makes it clear that if the elements of any of the three sub-clauses are met, the same would be sufficient to constitute an offence of "criminal misconduct" under Section 13(1)(d). Undoubtedly, all three wings of clause (d) of Section 13(1) are independent, alternative and disjunctive. Thus, under Section 13(1)(d)(i) of the P.C. Act, obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means by a public servant in itself would amount to criminal misconduct. On the same reasoning under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) 12 (2017) 8 SCC 791 T.M.R., J 42 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch of the P.C. Act, "obtaining a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage" by abusing his official position as a public servant, either for himself or for any other person would amount to criminal misconduct".
75. In Neeraj Dutta vs State (Government of N.C.T. of Delhi)13, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"88. What emerges from the aforementioned discussion is summarised as follows:
88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence, which can be in the nature of oral evidence, or documentary evidence.
88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not.
Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal, the presumption stands.
76. In Manish Sisodia vs Central Bureau of Investigation14, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"24. Clauses (a) and (b) to Section 7 of the PoC Act47 apply : (a) when a public servant obtains, accepts or intends to obtain from another person undue advantage with the intent to perform or fail to improperly or to forbear or cause forbearance to cause by himself or by another person; (b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain undue advantage from a person as a reward or dishonest performance of a public duty or 13 (2023) 4 SCC 731 14 2023 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1393 T.M.R., J 43 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch forbearance to perform such duty, either by himself or by another public servant. Explanation (2) construes the words and expression "obtains, accepts or attempts to obtain" to cover cases where a public servant obtains, accepts or intends to obtain any undue advantage by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal interest over another public servant by any other corrupt or illegal means. It is immaterial whether such a person, being a public servant, accepts or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party.
25. On this aspect of the offences under the PoC Act, the C.B.I. has submitted that conspiracy and involvement of the appellant - Manish Sisodia is well established. For the sake of clarity, without making any additions, subtractions, or a detailed analysis, we would like to recapitulate what is stated in the chargesheet filed by the C.B.I. against the appellant - Manish Sisodia:
77. This Court views that in Manish Sisodia's case, as per the observations in the charge sheet, the conspiracy and involvement of the appellant, Manish Sisodia, is prima facie shown. In the said case, it is observed that:
"the existing excise policy was changed to facilitate and get kickbacks and bribes from the wholesale distributors by enhancing their commission/fee from 5% under the old policy to 12% under the new policy. Accordingly, a conspiracy was hatched to carefully draft the new policy, deviating from the expert opinion/views to create an eco-system to assure unjust enrichment of the wholesale distributors at the expense of government exchequer or the consumer. The illegal income (proceeds of crime, as per the DoE) would partly be recycled and returned in the form of bribes. The licence fee payable by the wholesale distributor was a fixed amount of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- (rupees five crores only). It was not dependant on the turnover. The new policy facilitated big wholesale distributors, whose outpour towards the licence fee was fixed."
78. It is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the prior demand and acceptance of any pecuniary advantage or valuable thing for himself or for any other person must be satisfied before T.M.R., J 44 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch attracting the offence mentioned above and thus prima facie sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of P.C. Act are not made out.
79. It is stated in the F.I.R. that a detailed investigation is necessary, including the possibility of quid pro quo. It is also mentioned that the matter needs to be investigated for abuse of office by a public servant, loss to the state exchequer, compromise to the public interest, and the corresponding unlawful gain to the licensees. As the investigation is pending, this Court is not inclined to express any opinion regarding the applicability of penal provisions and the foisting of false cases for political reasons. However, this Court is of the view that a prima facie case is yet to be established.
80. The Learned Advocate General contends that merely because custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated by itself, it cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision reported in Sumitha Pradeep vs Arun Kumar C.K. and another15, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"16. xxx The first and foremost thing that the Court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie case put up against the accused. Thereafter, the nature of the offence should be looked into along with the severity of the punishment. Custodial interrogation can be one of the grounds to decline anticipatory bail. However, even if custodial interrogation is not required or necessitated, by itself, cannot be a ground to grant anticipatory bail."
81. After careful perusal of the material placed, this Court views that the respondent/State has to gather prima facie material supporting the report's 15 2022 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1529 T.M.R., J 45 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch contents to establish the Petitioners' alleged role in the commission of the offence.
82. The mere fact that the previous Government belonged to a different political dispensation than the current one does not warrant suspicion unless prima facie evidence supports such skepticism. This Court acknowledges that an unexplained delay of four years, as evident in the present case, can be a valid consideration for granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioners, in line with observations in the State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar case.16
83. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre's case, as referred to supra, the Hon'ble Apex further held as follows:
"113. Arrest should be the last option, and it should be restricted to those exceptional cases where arresting the accused is imperative based on the facts and circumstances of that case. The Court must carefully examine the entire available record, particularly the allegations directly attributed to the accused, which are corroborated by other material and circumstances on record."
84. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing; the justification for exercising it is quite another. Apart from the power to arrest, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons. No arrest can be made routinely on a mere allegation of the commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that no arrest is made without reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to 16 (2011) 14 SCC 770 T.M.R., J 46 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch the genuineness of the allegation. (In this regard, a reference can be made to Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar.17)
85. This Court views the power to authorize detention as a very solemn function. It affects the liberty and freedom of citizens and needs to be exercised with great care and caution. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool for police officers who lack sensitivity or Act with oblique motives.
86. Notably, Petitioner/A.3 presently holds the opposition leader position and lacks direct or indirect control over the concerned department. The Petitioner highlights that even in the remand report filed by the same investigation agency in Cr. No.29 of 2021, it is explicitly acknowledged that the Petitioner is not a flight risk, and the Petitioner is afforded Z+ security by the National Security Guards (N.S.G.) under the Central Government's auspices. Despite the alleged offences occurring from 2015 to 2019, during the Petitioner/A.3's tenure as Chief Minister, there is no indication that any documents pertaining to the present crime have been tampered with. The petitioner/A.2 is the former Minister of State holding the Portfolios of B.C. welfare, Prohibition and Excise and Handlooms from 2014-2017 and also served as Minister holding the portfolios of Law and Justice, Skill Development, Youth, Sports, Unemployment Benefits, N.R.I. Empowerment and Relations for the period from 2017-2019. The petitioner/A.1 worked as 17 (2014) 8 SCC 273 T.M.R., J 47 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise and Managing Director of A.P. Beverages Corporation Limited. Now, the petitioner/A.1 is retired from his service. Granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioners would not impede the ongoing investigation, given that the relevant documents are already in the custody of the current Government. Considering the nature of the accusations against the Petitioners/A.1 to A.3, this Court finds that the custodial interrogation of the Petitioners is not required to conduct further investigation. There is no reasonable apprehension that the Petitioners may hamper the investigation or tamper with the evidence.
87. All transactions out of which the complaint had arisen have taken place during the period 2014-17, and all are borne out by records. When the primary focus is documentary evidence, this Court fails to understand why the Petitioners should now be arrested. The report suggests a need to collect prima facie material to establish the petitioners' commission of the alleged offence.
88. After carefully considering the material, this Court is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist to grant anticipatory bail.
89. As a result, these petitions are allowed by granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners/A.1 to A.3 subject to their surrender before the Investigating Officer concerned within one (1) week from today. On such surrender, the petitioners/A.1 to A.3 shall be released on bail on their furnishing a personal bond for Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) each T.M.R., J 48 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer. Upon their release, the Petitioners are mandated to adhere to the following conditions:
(a) The Petitioners/A.1 to A.3 are required to appear before the Investigating Officer whenever their presence is necessary, with a minimum of 48 hours' notice provided for their appearance.
(b) The Petitioners/A.1 to A.3 shall cooperate with the investigation. They shall make themselves available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required, and they shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or any police officer.
(c) The Petitioners/A.1 to A.3 should abstain from making any public comments related to this case.
It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present application without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is affirmed to have the freedom to investigate without being influenced by the observations in this Order.
Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, in this petition shall stand closed.
______________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date:10.01.2024 MS T.M.R., J 49 Crl.P.Nos.8490 of 2023 & Batch THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.8490, 8781 and 9025 OF 2023 Date:10.01.2024 MS