Madras High Court
M.Pandi vs The Senior Regional Manager on 8 June, 2015
Bench: S.Manikumar, G.Chockalingam
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 08.06.2015 Coram THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR and THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE G.CHOCKALINGAM Writ Appeal (MD) No.630 of 2015 M.Pandi ... Appellant/Petitioner vs. 1.The Senior Regional Manager, Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation Ltd. (TASMAC), Madurai Region, No.100, Anna Nagar, Madurai. 2.The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation Ltd. (TASMAC), CMDA Towr II, 4th Floor, Gandhi Irwin Bridge Road, Egmore, Chennai-600 008. ... Respondents/Respondents Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, against the order, dated 10.12.2014 made in W.P.(MD)No.19071 of 2014. !For Appellant : Mr.R.V.Rajkumar ^For Respondents : G.M.Muniyasamy :JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.MANIKUMAR,J) Material on record discloses that the appellant was appointed as a Supervisor in a TASMAC shop run by the respondents, on 25.12.2003. It is alleged that on 23.11.2004, he was directed to hand-over charge to another person by name Marimuthu, with an assurance that he would be accommodated in some other TASMAC Shop. He was not accommodated. Therefore, the appellant made a representation, which, according to the appellant, is an appeal, to the Senior Regional Manager, Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation Limited, Madurai Region, the 1st respondent herein, to give him suitable posting order. But, no order was passed. Hence the appellant filed another representation, which claims to be revision, before the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation Limited, Chennai, on 05.05.2010. the 2nd respondent herein. Finding no response, he filed further representations, dated 20.01.2012 and 17.06.2014, before the 2nd respondent. As the aforesaid appeal and revision and other representations were not disposed of, the appellant filed a writ petition in W.P.(MD)No.19071 of 2014, seeking for issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation Limited, Chennai, the 2nd respondent herein, to dispose of the revision petition, dated 05.05.2010, in accordance with law, within a time frame.
2.On the above averments, the writ court, by observing that delay defeats equity and that the petitioner had approached the Court with a delay of eight years, was not inclined to entertain the prayer of the appellant and, accordingly, vide order dated 10.12.2014, dismissed the writ petition. Seeking to set aside the said order, the present appeal has been filed.
3.From the facts extracted supra, it could be deduced that in the year 2004, directions were issued to the appellant to hand-over charge to some other person. After three years, a representation is stated to have been filed, categorising it as an appeal, before the 1st respondent. Three years thereafter, another representation, dated 05.05.2010, has been filed categorising the same as a revision petition. Mandamus has been sought for to dispose of the same, in accordance with law. As rightly observed by the writ court, a person aggrieved over the decision to relieve him of the duties ought to have approached the Court within a reasonable time. What is 'reasonable time' is explained in Veerayeeammal v. Seeniammal, reported in 2002 (1) SCC 134, at Paragraph 13, is as follows:
"13. The word ?reasonable? has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word ?reasonable?. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the ?reasonable time? is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar?s The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean:
?A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ?directly?; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.?
4.The writ court has observed that after eight years, the appellant has approached the court. Though remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable in nature, as rightly observed by the Writ Court, delay defeats equity. Paragraph 3 of the order of the writ court reads as under:
?3.But this Court finds no justification for giving any direction for the reason that when the petitioner himself admits that he was orally terminated from service on 23.11.2004, while so, it is not known why he has not approached this Court for the past 8 years. It is a well settled position that delay defeats equity. As the petitioner has approached this Court with a delay of almost eight years, this Court is not inclined to entertain the prayer made by the petitioner. The writ petition fails accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.?
5.To support the view of the writ court that delay defeats equity, we deem it fit cite few decisions.
(i)In (2008) 14 SCC 295 ? Eastern Coalfields Limited vs. Dugal Kumar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"24.As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant."
(ii)In the unreported decision of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.238 of 2013, decided on 27.03.2015 ? Ramalinga Singh v. The State of Bihar & Others., it has been held as follows:
"5.In the considered opinion of this Court, this writ application must fail on the ground of delay and laches alone inasmuch as the petitioner's appointment came to be cancelled on 25.02.2003 and this writ application has been filed almost after ten years on 04.01.2013 for setting aside such order. Mere filing of representation cannot be sufficient explanation for such inordinate delay in moving this Court.
6.By now it is also well settled that mere filing of representation and awaiting result of the same would not explain the delay and the writ application for the unexplained delay in moving court would be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. Through its Chairman & Managing Director & Anr. Vs. K.Thangappan & Anr. Reported Pata High Court CWJC No.238 of 2013 dt.27-03-2015 4 in 2006(4) SCC 322 wherein it was held as follows:-
"9.It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."
(iii)In Board of Secondary Education of Assam v. Mohd. Sarifuz Zaman, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 408, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:-
"12. Delay defeats discretion and loss of limitation destroys the remedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit of discretionary power being denied on principles of equity. Loss of limitation resulting into depriving of the remedy, is a principle based on public policy and utility and not equity alone??.?
(iv)In S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479, the Supreme Court considered a case, where the appellant therein, approached the court, with an inordinate delay, claiming right to appointment. The proposition of law held by the Apex Court is that there is no indefeasible right to appointment. A candidate included in rank list cannot obtain a mandamus, unless arbitrariness or discrimination is established. While addressing the aspect of delay, the Supreme Court, at paragraph 17, held as follows:-
?17. It is also well-settled principle of law that ?delay defeats equity?. The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party- respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage."
(v)In Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of J&K, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 321, the Supreme Court, while considering the scope of equitable relief, considered the following decisions, at paragraphs 14 and 15, which are as follows:-
"14. It is now well settled that who claims equity must enforce his claim within a reasonable time. For the said proposition, amongst others, we may notice a decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, reported in 2004 (1) SCC 347 = 2004 SCC (L&S) 225, wherein it has been opined: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34) ?34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar, reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138 = 1991 SCC (L&S) 841 The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law.?
(emphasis supplied)
15. The question yet again came up for consideration before this Court in NDMC v. Pan Singh, reported in 2007 (9) scc 278 wherein it has been observed:
(SCC p. 283, para 16) ?16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction."
(vi)Again, while referring to statutes of limitation, the Supreme Court described them as statutes of peace. Paragraphs 27 to 29 would be relevant for the purpose of understanding the rationale behind fixing time limit, under the statutes and also as to how the courts have to exercise their jurisdiction of condonation of delay. Though the Apex Court referred to statutory limitations, yet the principles are applicable to writ jurisdiction also, for the reason that delay defeats equity, due to negligence of the parties or laches.
?27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as ?statutes of peace?. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This Court in Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, reported in 1973 (2) SCC 705, has observed: (SCC p. 712, para 18) ?18. The object of law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party?s own inaction, negligence or laches.?
28. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, reported in 1969 (1) SCC 110, this Court observed that this principle is based on the maxim ?interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium?, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression.
29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."
6.Even the present appeal was filed with some delay. Though we were inclined to condone the delay in filing the appeal and directed the Registry to number of the writ appeal, there are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the order made by the writ court.
7.In the light of the discussions and the decisions cited supra, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.