Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Smt. Sogra Begum And Anr. vs The State Of A.P., Rep. By Its Prl. ... on 2 November, 2001
Bench: Bilal Nazki, E. Dharma Rao
JUDGMENT
Bilal Nazki
1. This is an appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing O.S. No. 1506 of 1993 on 14.8.1997. The suit was filed for a declaration that the plaintiffs were absolute owners and possessors of the suit property measuring 2318 sq. yards, which is part and parcel of house bearing No. 5-9-7/2, situated at Saifabad. They also sought perpetual injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 6 from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit property.
2. The facts leading to filing of the suit were that the suit property originally known as 'Roshan Manzil' was owned by one Sir Afsar-UL-Mulk who sold it to Feroz Shah in 1908. The said Feroz Shah sold it to Nawab Mohd. Yer-Jung in September, 1913.Nawab Jung died in 1942 and the total property measuring 15,105 sq. yard s devolved on his heirs. Some of his heirs migrated to Pakistan at the time of partition. The property was declared evacuee property and it vested with the Custodian of the evacuee property and was taken over by the Custodian. The Custodian divided the property into four parts and put it to auction. In the auction a portion of the property measuring 4165 sq. yards bearing Municipal No. 5-9-7/2 was purchased by Mehabubunnisa Begum, an extent of 3958 sq. yards was purchased by Dr. Brij Raj, an extent of 682 sq. yards was purchased by Akbar Hussain Latif and the remaining portion of the property i.e., 6300 sq. yards was purchased by Smt. Safia Begum. In the said auction necessary sale certificates were issued b y the competent officer to the respective purchasers and the purchasers were put in possession. The plaintiffs purchased the land from Mehabubunnisa Begum who had purchased 4165 sq. yards in the auction. The said Mehabubunnisa Begum remained in possession of the property till it was sold by her to the plaintiffs through sale deed dt. 19.11.1979. Before the sale deed was executed, permission under Section 27 of Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1979 and clearance certificate under Section 230 (A) of the Income Tax Act were obtained. It is further stated in the plaint that the suit property was being managed and supervised by Mohammed Mohamood, the husband of the 1st plaintiff and GPA holder of both the plaintiffs. It is stated that the plaintiffs were enjoying the property. The plaintiffs' vendor had leased out the suit premises to B.S. Venkat Ram and K.Rami Reddy, partners of Gopi hotel, for running a hotel. After purchase of the property, the plaintiffs' vendor filed eviction petition before the Prl. Rent Controller being R.C. No. 72 of 1980 against the tenant, as a result the tenant vacated the suit premises and handed over the vacant possession to the plaintiffs on 25.4.1988. They leveled and developed the rear side open land of the suit premises into two blocks by getting boulders cut into pieces and investing amounts. When the plaintiffs were leveling the second block on the eastern end, the defendants 3 and 6 started illegal interference and created hurdles in the development of the property. They contended that the property was the Government land. The plaintiffs issued notices dt. 13.10.1989 to the defendants 1 to 5 not to interfere with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The plaintiffs also requested the defendants to allow them to carry out necessary corrections in revenue records for recording the total extent of town survey No.42, Ward No.52, Block 'D' as 3482 sq. metres as against wrong recording of 1544 sq. metres. Defendant No.5 sent a reply on 5.12.1989. The Government never claimed the suit property as its own at any time either at the time of vesting or auctioning. Since the defendants made an attempt to interfere with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property which was sought to be justified on the basis of a town survey record, the plaintiffs filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 1021 of 1990 in the High Court. The High Court granted interim stay of eviction on 31.1.1990 in W.P.M.P. No. 1291 of 1990. Defendant No.3, in the counter-affidavit filed in the writ petition, admitted the auction sales and possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property. The High Court however disposed of the writ petition on 1.10.1993 directing status quo for a period of three months and gave liberty to the plaintiffs to seek appropriate relief from a Civil Court after giving notice u/s. 80 C.P.C. The plaintiffs gave notice u/s. 80 C.P.C. on 20.10.1993 to the defendants 1 to 6 and after expiry of the period of notice, the suit was filed.
3. Defendants 1 to 6 filed written statement through defendant No.6. He denied the assertions made in the plaint and admitted that the entire extent of the land having been declared evacuee property was sold in a public auction to Dr. Briz Raj under sale certificate dt. 5.11.1955, Akbar Hussain Latif under sale certificate dt. 3.11.1955, Mehabubunnisa Begum and Safia Begum under sale certificate dt. 9.11.1955. He further contended that according to the town survey records, the area covered by premises 5-9-7/2 relates to a portion of 'Roshan Manzil' belonging to Mehabubunnisa Begum and it was surveyed and the same falls in TS No.42, Ward 52, Block 'D' of Nampally village to an extent of 1544 sq. metres, bounded by plot of Dr. Briz Raj on the North, house of Mohd. Ishaq on the South, main cement road on the West and hillock on the East. As per the sale certificate issued by the competent authority of evacuee property i.e., the custodian the area covered by the premises was recorded as 1544 sq. metres as against their possession of 4165 sq. yards. It was further contended that the plaintiffs had filed W.P. No. 1021 of 1990 which was disposed of by the High Court with a direction to file a civil suit for declaration of title and possession. It was contended that as per the report of the Deputy Director of Survey and Land Records, the town survey of Hyderabad and Secunderabad was conducted under the provisions of Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 after extension to Telangana Region vide Act 22 of 1958. The area covered by premises No. 5-9-7/2 relating to 'Roshan Manzil' was surveyed as T.S.No.42, Ward 52, Block 'D' of Nampalli village for an extent of 1544 sq. metres only. It was contended that the averment of the plaintiffs that their vendor purchased 4165 sq. yards in the public auction and sale certificate was issued to that effect is false.
4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed for trial:-
(1) Whether the suit schedule property is the part of the property purchased by the plaintiffs' vendor under sale certificate No.24/146 to 149/Hyderabad/53 dt.9.11.1955 and the plan issued by the competent officer, Hyderabad, the auction conducted by the competent officer, Hyderabad District? (2) Whether the plaintiff is the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property?
(3) Whether a notice u/s. 9 (2) dt. 27.12.1965 under A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act was issued and served on Mehabubunnisa Begum, the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs as alleged by the defendants? (4) To what relief?
4. The trial Court decided all the issues against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. Only two questions are needed to be answered in this appeal, (1) what was the extent of land purchased by the vendor of the plaintiffs from the Custodian of evacuee property and (2) if the survey under A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act related to the land in dispute and if so, what could be its effect on the suit.
5. Now let us consider the first question. There is no dispute with regard to the following facts, Originally the entire property known as 'Roshan Manzil' belonged to Sir Afsar-UL
-Mulk who sold the same to Feroz Shah in 1908.Feroz Shah sold the same to Nawa b Mohd. Yer-Jung in September, 1913. Nawab Mohd. Yer-Jung died in the year 1942 and on his death the property devolved on his heirs. After partition in the year 1947 some of his heirs migrated to Pakistan, as a result the property was taken over by the Custodian of evacuee property. Among the heirs of Nawab Mohd. Yer-Jung who remained in Hyderabad were his wife Smt. Safia Begum and her two sons viz., S.M. Younus and Md. Ishaq and a daugher Aquis Jahan. After due enquiry into their claims the competent officer directed the sale of composite property taken over by the Custodian of evacuee property, dividing it into four parts. The first portion to an extent of 3958 sq. yards was sold to Dr.Briz Raj under sale certificate dt. 5.11.1955. The second portion to an extent of 682 sq. yards was sold to Akbar Hassan Latheef under sale certificate dt. 3.11.1955. Third portion to an extent of 4165 sq. yards was sold to Mahabubunnisa Begum w/o Younus under sale certificate dt. 8.11.1955 and the fourth portion of 6300 sq. yards was sold to Safia Begum under sale certificate. The total extent of land was 15,105 sq. yards. All these facts are admitted, but the trial Court was of the view that the plaintiffs did not prove the correct extent of the suit schedule property. According to the trial Court, the plaintiffs failed to establish their possession or their vendor's possession from 1955 till 1989 or 1990 when they filed W.P.No.1021 of 1990.Now in the light of the evidence that has been adduced before the Court below, let us examine what was the extent of the land that had been purchased by the vendor of the plaintiffs and then purchased by the plaintiffs. The vendor purchased through sale certificate Ex.A5. Ex.A5 does not contain the extent of the property that was sold. But P.W.1 stated that the extent was mentioned in the plan attached to Ex.A5. He denied the suggestion that the plan attached to Ex.A5 was not certified by the Custodian of the evacuee property. The plan attached to Ex.A5 is Ex.A6, which shows the measurements of the four parts of the lands that was sold through auction. According to this plan, an extent of 4165 Sq. Yards of land was sold to the vendor of the plaintiffs. Not only this shows that 4165 sq. yards was sold to the vendor of the plaintiffs, but if one calculates the total land sold to four purchasers, it comes to 15,105 sq. yards, which has also been the case of the defendants that the total land, which was auctioned by the Custodian of the evacuee property was 15,105 sq. yards. Ex.A6 has not only been admitted by the defendants, it is a document which has emanated from them. When the plaintiffs filed W.P.No.1021 of 1990 the State filed a counter which has been exhibited as Ex.A10. In this counter the defendant-State stated that, "Sri Md. Yar Jung died in 1942, on his death the property devolved upon his heirs. After India's partition some of his heirs migrated to Pakitstan, with the result the property was taken over by the Custodian of Evacuee property. Among the heirs of late Mohd. Yar Jung who remained in Hyderabad were Smt. Safia Begum and her two sons S.M. Younus and Md. Ishaq and a daughter Bilquis Jaham. After due enquiry into the claims of four heirs who were in India and competent officer directed sale of composite property taken over by the custodian dividing the same into four parts as follows. The said four parts were sold out in auction as detailed below:-
1. I portion - sold to Dr. Brij Raj under sale certificate dt.5.11.1955, extent3958 sq. yards
2. II portion - sold to Akber Hasen Latif under sale certificate dt. 3.11.1955, extent 682 sq. yards.
3. III portion sold to Mrs. Younus under sale certificate dt. 8.11.1955, extent 4165 sq. yards.
4. IV portion - sold to Safia Begum under sale certificate, extent 6300 sq. yards.
6. In this counter, as has been pointed out hereinabove, it was the State's case that Mrs. Younus had purchased 4165 sq. yards by sale certificate dt. 8.11.1955 out of the total extent of 15105 sq. yards. There is a lot of evidence to show that Mrs. Younus had purchased 4165 sq. yards. Since it has been admitted, not in one document, but in several documents by the defendants, therefore, we will not deal with the whole evidence. A reference has been made to the counter-affidavit filed by the defendant-state in W.P.No.1021 of 1990. It would suffice to make reference to another document which is Ex.A7. This is a judgment of the High Court in CCCA No. 27 of 1969 dt. 20.9.1972. As has been mentioned hereinabove, Safia Begum was one of the persons who had purchased the land from Evacuee property authority in pursuance of a sale certificate. She had filed a suit being O.S.No.75 of 1965 which was allowed. In this case, the dispute was with respect to an extent of land that has been purchased by Safia Begum, therefore she filed the suit. This was resisted by the Government contending therein that under Ex.B22 Dr. Brij Raj had purchased 3958 sq. yards, Akbar Hasan Latif had purchased an extent of 682 sq. yards under Ex.B24 dt. 3.11.1955, Mrs. Younus had purchased an extent of 4165 sq. yards under Ex.B23 dt. 8.11.1955. Ex.B6 was accepted by the Court as a plan attached to the sale certificate. The State accepted the extent of the land having been sold to the above three persons, but it resisted the suit of the plaintiff in that case on the ground that 8805 sq. yards of land was sold to the three persons named above (including the plaintiffs' vendor in this case), therefore, the remaining area that has been sold by the competent officer could only be 6300 sq. yards. It may be relevant to mention that the plaintiff in that case i.e., Safia Begum had claimed more than 6300 sq. yards. The finding of the Court was that, "The property known as 'Roshan Manzil' comprising of buildings and open land originally belonged to one Sir Afsarul Mulk. He sold the entire property comprising of the main building, out-houses etc. to one Feroz Shah under a registered sale deed Ex.A1 of July, 1908. Feroz Shah in his turn sold the same property to Nawab Mohd. Yar Mohd Jung, the husband of the plaintiff, under Ex.A2 of September, 1913, Mohd. Yar Jung died in 1942 and on his death the Mathruka property devolved on his heirs. After partition some of the heirs of Mohammed Yar Jung migrated to Pakistan with the result the property was taken over by the Custodian of the Evacuee property. Among the heirs of Mohd. Yar Jung who remained in Hyderabad were the plaintiff (his wife), two sons, S.M. Younus and Mohd. Ishaq and a daughter by name Bilquis Jehon. After due enquiry into the claims of the four heirs, who were in India, the Competent Officer directed sale of the composite property, taken over by the Custodian, dividing the same into four parts of lots. One portion was sold to one Dr. Brij Raj under a certificate of sale, Ex.B22 dt. 5.11.1955. The plan attached to this sale certificate is Ex.B4 and the area sold to him is 3958 sq. yards. The second part of it was sold to Akbar Hasan Latif under Ex.B24 dt. 3.11.1955 and the area covered by this sale is 682 sq. yards. Ex.B5 is the plan attached to the sale certificate. Mrs. Younus (Mahaboobinnisa Begum) purchased the third part under Ex.B23 dt. 8.11.1955. The area covered by the sale certificate is 4165 sq. yards and Ex.B6 is the plan attached thereto".
7. Therefore, the State has always been proceeding on the premise that the land sold to vendor of the plaintiffs was of an extent of 4165 sq. yards. Therefore, they could not be allowed to say that the plaintiffs had not proved that their vendor had not title to an extent of 4165 sq. yards. The only argument which was made by the learned counsel for the respondents was that the judgment of the High Court to which a reference is made hereinabove, would not operate as res judicata, as the plaintiffs in this case were not parties to that suit. But the learned counsel for the appellants submits that it is not that the judgment has not been pressed into service to pursue an argument that the matter was concluded by earlier judgment, but it has been only produced as evidence and which can be taken as evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act. He relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams V. K.M. Krishnaiah 1. The Supreme Court framed point No.1 in this judgment which was based on an argument made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent that there was an earlier judgment in another suit which had been rendered in favour of one of the parties and as the plaintiff in the second suit was not party to the earlier suit, hence any finding with regard to the other party's title given in that suit was not admissible in evidence. In para 9 the Supreme Court replied, "In our view, this contention is clearly contrary to the rulings of this Court as well as those of the Privy Council. In Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango V. Narayan Devji Kango, , speaking on behalf of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. held that a judgment not inter parties is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property in dispute. A contention that judgments other than those falling under Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act were not admissible in evidence was expressly rejected. Again B.K. Mukherjea. J (as he then was) speaking on behalf of a Bench of four learned Judges in Sital Das V. Sant Ram, , held that a previous judgment not inter parties, was admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as a 'transaction' in which a right to property was 'asserted' and 'recognized'. In fact, much earlier, Lord Lindley held in the Privy Council in Dinamoni V. Brajmohini, (1992) ILR 29 Cal. 190 (198) (PC) that a previous judgment, not inter parties was admissible in evidence under Section 13 to show who the parties were, what the lands in dispute were and who was declared entitled to retain them. The criticism of the judgment in Dinamoni V. Brajmohini and Ram Ranjan Chakerbati V. Rama Naraian Singh, (1895) ILR 22 Cal. 533 (PC) by Sir John Woodroffe in his commentary on the Evidence Act (1931, p.181) was not accepted by Lord Blanesburgh in Collector of Gorkhpur V. Ram Sunder, AIR 1934 PC 157:61 IA 286".
8. In view of this clear declaration of law by the Supreme Court, the judgment of this Court in CCCA No.27 of 1969 was clearly admissible in evidence. This is not only the judgment which is in favour of the present appellants, but even the contentions raised by the defendants in the suit and in the appeal which amount to admission of title of the present appellants with regard to the suit property. For these reasons, we find that the trial Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had not proved ownership of the land to an extent of 4165 sq. yards.
9. Now the second limb of the same controversy would be, whether they were in possession of the suit property. The evidence of the plaintiffs as well as the defendants has conclusively shown that either predecessor in title of the plaintiffs or the tenants on their behalf or the plaintiffs have been in continuous possession of the suit property.
10. P.W.1 is the GPA holder of the plaintiffs and is also husband of the 1st plaintiff and father-in-law of the 2nd plaintiff. He has clearly stated that they got the possession of the land after a sale deed was executed in their favour by the ir vendor. He also stated that one Ram Reddy carried on business in a hotel in the suit property in the year 1956, Rami Reddy died by 1979, thereafter his son Venkat Subba Reddy had run the hotel. The suit property comprised of a double storied building. Rami Reddy and his son Venkat Subba Reddy were residing in the 1st floor of the same building and they vacated the suit schedule property and other extent in the year 1988 and from 1988 the plaintiffs were in possession of the land. This was not controverted by the defendants at any stage. Even in cross-examination not a single question was posed to P.W.1 on this count. P.W.2 is Mr. Venkat Subba Reddy. He stated that his father was running Gopi hotel in the year 1956 in the suit premises which belonged to Mehabubunnissa Begum. He stated that the extent of the suit premises was 4000 sq. yards and odd.His father had taken the suit premises on rent in the year 1956 and he died in August, 1974. After his death, the witness continued to run the hotel till 1988. He further stated that he and his father were residing in the first floor of the suit premises, and the hotel was run in the ground floor and in the open land. He used to place chairs in open place and serve food to the customers and a portion of the open land was being used by them for keeping firewood and straw.Mehabubunnisa Begum sold the suit property to Smt. Sugura Begum and Smt. Sairabanu in November, 1979. Mehabubunnisa Begum informed them of the sale of the suit house to the plaintiffs and asked them to pay rents to them from December, 1979. He paid rents to the plaintiffs every month by money order. He also gave dimensions of the compound wall. He also stated that during their occupation of the suit premises, the Government never claimed any portion of the premises bearing No. 5-9-7/2 as their property. His father never received any notice from any authority or from the Town Survey authorities either in his name or in the name of Mehabubunnisa Begum. No questions were put to him in cross examination with regard to either any notice or with regard to possession of the property. Another witness of the plaintiffs is defendant No.9 (D.W.1).He stated that she was the daughter of Mehabubunnisa Begum and her mother had purchased the bunglow bearing No. 5-9-7/2 to an extent of 4165 sq. yards in an auction. She also corroborated to the statement made by the other witnesses. No question was put to her also in cross examination with regard to either extent or possession of the land. She denied the suggestion that any notice under Section 9 (2) of the A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act has been served on her mother on 27.12.1965. This evidence shows that the plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest have been in continuous possession of the land and there is no evidence contrary to this.
11. The defendants have examined some witnesses, they are with respect to notice u/s. 9 (2) of the A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act. We have not been shown any testimony of any of the witnesses with regard to the possession of the land. On the other hand, the defendants admitted the possession of the land by the plaintiffs in their counter-affidavit filed in W.P.No.1021 of 1990. In para 24 of the counter-affidavit they stated that after the stay of eviction order dt. 31.1.1990 was passed, the plaintiffs started construction over the suit property under the guise of the stay order, changed the boundaries in Government land unauthorisedly and shifted the boundary stones through lorries and also caused damage to the Government property. Their claim was that the plaintiffs had taken the possession of the land after they obtained the order from the High Court staying their eviction, but it was nowhere pleaded in the counter-affidavit that they were not in possession of the land. Assuming that the possession was taken by the plaintiffs after they obtained the orders of stay of eviction from the High Court, that had also to be proved in the suit. No evidence was led to prove that. No steps were taken to seek remedy from the High Court against the plaintiffs for having violated the orders of the court. On the other hand, in the written statement in para 7 the defendants took the plea, "The defendant further submits that the plaintiff filed the writ petition on untenable grounds and got interim stay of eviction on 31.1.1990 on the Government land occupied by her and developed after obtaining the stay orders in W.P.M.P.No.1291 of 1990 in W.P. No. 1021 of 1990 on 31.1.1990. It is true that after obtaining the stay orders, the plaintiff, not only started construction on the Government land, but also started changing the boundaries by encroaching and grabbing the land of the Government unauthorisedly and shifted the location and caused damage and loss to the Government property".
12. If one goes by this paragraph in between the lines, nowhere it is stated that the plaintiff was not in possession of the land. It is only stated that she started developing the land occupied by her after obtaining stay orders from the High Court. Even this was not proved through any evidence before the trial Court. Therefore, this Court is bound to come to only one conclusion that the plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest or the tenants on their behalf have been in possession of the suit property from the date it was sold by the evacuee property authorities.
13. Now the only question which remains is, what is the effect of the notification issued by the authorities under Section 13 of the Andhra Prudish Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923. The case of the defendants was that the survey was done in terms of the Act between 1963 and 1970 after issuing necessary notices to the land holders and as no objections were filed by late Mrs. Youngish despite she having been served with a notice u/s. 9 (2) of the Act and a final notification was issued in the official Gazette in the year 1977. It was further contended by the defendants that as the notice has been served on the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs i.e., Mrs. Youngish and she did not respond to the notice and a notification issued in the Gazette in the year 1977 had become final, therefore the plaintiffs could not obtain a decree against the Government.
14. Coming to the first question as to whether any notice was served on late Mrs. Youngish or not. D.W.1, the daughter of late Mrs. Youngish stated that no such notice was served in the year 1965, but her evidence was not accepted by the learned trial Court on the ground that she had been attending the college and after her marriage in 1962, she might have resided with her husband. Since she was not living with her mother, therefore her evidence cannot be taken to be correct with regard to service of notice. The trial Court also brushed aside the evidence of P.W.1 on the ground that P.W.1 had not any knowledge about the suit property till the year 1979. Since the defendants had contended that the suit land was surveyed and a notification had been issued, it was primary responsibility of the defendants to prove the service of the notice on the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs i.e., late Mrs. Youngish. In this case, they have examined D.W.2 who is the Deputy Inspector of Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad. In his statement he stated that the survey had been conducted between 1963 and 1970 and records were finalised between 1970 and 1979, entire Hyderabad city had been surveyed.
He further stated that, "we have surveyed premises No.5-9-7/2 relating to a port ion of 'Roshan Manzil' and it falls in T.S. No. 42/1 and 2 due to road widening, ward No.2, Block-D. It was also known as Nampalli village. Now the said ward and block falls in Khairatabad village". He stated that, " T.S.No.42 consisted of an extent of 1544 sq. metres, we have served a notice under Section 9(2) of the Survey and Boundaries Act on 27.10.1965. The notice was received by the representative and under Section 13 of the Survey and Boundaries Act a gazette publication was made on 28.2.1977, plaintiff had not filed any objection. It was inco rrect to state that the plaintiff purchased 4165 sq. yards of site". Ex.B2 is th e copy of the notice under Section 9 (2) of the Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 by the Deputy Director of Central Survey Office, Narayanaguda. Marking of this document was resisted by the plaintiffs as they had stated before the Court that since the original was available, a copy of the document could not have been produced and cannot be taken in evidence. Even without going into that objection, let us examine Ex.B2. Ex.B2, copy of the notice under Section 9 (2) of the Survey and Boundaries Act relating to T.S.No.42 shows that the name of the addressee is, 'Mrs. Youngish', name of the street or locality is shown as 'Nowbath Pahad', Nampalli revenue village. Under the remarks column, the following inscriptions were made, "(Note:- Here note the mode of service)". Under this column 'representative' is shown. Under the column of date of service, "27.10.1965" is shown. There is another column in this notice i.e., the signature of the recipient or the corporation authority if addressee is illiterate. Since the original has not been placed before the Court, the copy only shows, 'Sd/- M. Hasan Ali'. This Hasan Ali has neither been produced before the Court not was it shown to the Court that he is related to Mrs. younis and how was he representative of Mrs. Youngish. Therefore, the trial Court was not at all correct in saying that the notice has been served on 27.10.1965 on the representative of Mrs. Youngish. There is no other evidence which would show that the notice was ever served on the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs. In cross-examination D.W.2 stated that, "the notice under Section 9 (2) was served on the representative of Mahabubunnisa Begum, but not on her personally. I do not know whether Sri Hasan Ali who received the said notice as representative of Mehabubunnisa Begumis relative or an adult member of her family. It is not true to suggest that we have not filed proof of service of the notice under Section 9 (2) on Mehabubunnisa Begum". Therefore, we are of the view that no notice under Section 9 (2) of the Survey and Boundaries Act has been served on the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs.
15. Now coming to the Andhra Prudish Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, under Section 4 the State Government has power to appoint survey officers. Under Section 5 the State Government may direct the survey of Government land or of any boundary of such land. Under Section 6 survey of the lands ordered under Section 5 has to be notified by survey officers. Then Section 9 (1) lays down that the survey officer shall have power to determine and record as undisputed any boundary in respect of which no dispute is brought to his notice. Section 9 (2) lays down that notice of every decision of the survey officer under Section 9 (1) shall be given in the prescribed manner to the registered holders of the lands the boundaries of which may be affected by the decisions. Under Section 11, appeal against orders under Section 9 or 10 can be made. Section 12 lays down that an appeal under Section 11 can be made within three months from the date of service of notice under Section 9 or 10. And finally completion of demarcation has to be notified under Section 13. Under Section 14 a suit can be filed within three years to establish rights claimed in respect of the boundary of the property surveyed. In the present case since there was no notice under Section 9(2) given to the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, Section 14 has no application. Besides this factual background, we have been informed of the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court delivered on 25.4.2001 in W.P. No. 25727/2000. After considering the various judgments of the other courts, the learned single Judge was of the view that, "It is thus clear that an entry in TSLR itself cannot be the conclusive proof of title or lack of it, and the decision either to grant or refuse permission cannot be taken solely on the basis of an entry made in TSLR. It may be one of the factors that may have to be taken into consideration along with the other material available on record. An entry made in TSLR per se could not create any doubt or cloud on the right, title and interest of a person in respect of any land".
16. For the above reasons, we cannot sustain the judgment and decree of the trial Court which is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed and the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs. Let a decree be drawn accordingly.