National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Sri Jalandhar Shah C/O Mr. Ashok Shah vs Esi Hospital on 19 February, 2026
IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
AT NEW DELHI
FIRST APPEAL NO. 1055 OF 2024
(Against the order dated 01.07.2024 in RAP/20/2023 in CC/241/2013 passed
by the SCDRC, West Bengal)
Sri Jalandhar Shah ... Appellant
Versus
ESI Hospital & Ors. ... Respondents
BEFORE:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.P. SAHI, PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MR. BHARATKUMAR PANDYA, MEMBER
For the Appellant Dr. Kunal Saha, A.R.
Dated : 19.02.2026.
ORDER
1. This is an appeal filed in person by the appellant and the following reliefs have been prayed for:
"In the above-mentioned premises as aforesaid the appeiiant/compiainant most humbly prays that this Hon'bie Commission may be pleased to:
a) Admit the instant Review Application;
b) Set aside the impugned judgment passed by the Ld. WBSCDRC on 1st July, 2024 dismissing RA/20/2023 [Annexure- A6);
c) Direct the Ld. WBSCDRC to reconsider RA/20/2023 as per law after hearing all sides in a time-bound manner.
d) Pass such other order(s) or further orders as this Hon'bie Commission deems appropriate and right."
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2. The appellant seems to have filed CC/241/2013 before the SCDRC, West Bengal alleging deficiency in service and negligence against the ESI Hospital and others. The complaint was dismissed by the order dated 10.03.2023, that has been field as annexure F-2 at page 43 of the compilation.
3. The complainant aggrieved by the order dated 10.03.2023 filed review application no. RA/20/2023 and the same was admitted by the State Commission vide order dated 02.05.2023. The review application has been dismissed on 01.07.2024. It is only this order dated 01.07.2024 dismissing the review application that has been challenged in this appeal.
4. There is no challenge or any relief prayed in respect of the original order dismissing the complaint dated 10.03.2023. The complainant therefore cannot achieve indirectly by challenging the review order without challenging the main order dated 10.03.2023 and therefore we do not find this appeal to be maintainable on that count.
5. Such a procedure on similar facts was noticed by the Apex Court in the case of Asharfi Devi k State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 86, paragraphs 15, 19 and 20 whereof are extracted herein under:
"15. White examining the legality of the review order, we cannot examine the legality of the main order dated 14-3- 2008 [Asharphi Devi v. State of U.P., 2008 SCC Online AH 290 :
(2008) 71 ALP 614] on its merits because, as mentioned above, this appeal does not arise out of the main order. Therefore, we I
-3-' have to confine our inquiry with a view to find out whether the review order is legally sustainable or not.
19. The learned counsel for the appellants then argued the appeal as if this appeal arises out of the main order dated 14-3- 2008 [Asharphi Devi v. State of U.P., 2008 SCC Online AH 290 :
(2008) 71 AIR 614]. He extensively referred to the pleadings and several documents as if we are called upon to examine the legality of the main order itself.
20. We find no merit in any of his submissions for more than one reason. First, as mentioned above, this appeal does not arise out of the main order but arises out of review order only and, therefore, we cannot examine the legality and correctness of the main order in this appeal like an appellate court. Second, we examined the matter only with a view to find out as to whether the High Court was right in dismissing the review application and thereby justified in upholding the main order dated 14-3-2008 [Asharphi Devi v. State of U.P., 2008 SCC Online AH290: (2008) 71 ALP 614] holding that it did not contain any error/mistake apparent on the face of the record."
6. Once again this principle in respect of a High Court judgment was considered by the Apex Court and it was held that an SLR would not be maintainable as it challenged only the order passed in the review petition by the High Court with no challenge to the main judgment.
Paragraph 36 of the judgment in the case of Usha Bharti k State of U.P., (2014) 7 SCC 663 is extracted herein under:
"36. Having said all this, we would like to point out that in normal circumstances the present SIP would not have been entertained. Dr Rajeev Dhavan and Mr Ashok Desai had pointed out at the very initial hearing that the SLR would not be maintainable as it challenges only the judgment of the High Court rendered in review petition. The main judgment dated 5-2-2013 rendered in Usha Bharti v. State of U.P. [Usha Bharti v. State of U.P., Misc. Bench No. 9654 of 2012, order dated 5-2-2013 (AH)] which has been reviewed by the High Court in the impugned order [Review Petition No. 103 of 2013, decided on 4-7-2013 (AH)] has not been challenged. As a pure statement of law, the aforesaid proposition is unexceptionable. However, in the present case, we have been persuaded to entertain the present SLP in view of the order passed by this Court on 19-2-2013 [Usha Bharti v. State of U.P., SLP (C) No. 8542 of 2013, order dated 19-
2-2013 (SC), wherein it was directed: "Taken on board. Mr Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the High Court has retied upon the report submitted by the Additional District Judge, without giving the petitioner any opportunity to submit any objection to the report. The petitioner was unable to submit her objection since copy of the report was not supplied to her. This apart, in view of the provisions contained in Article 243-C(2) of the Constitution of India, in Panchayat elections, there is no provision for "no- confidence motion". He submits that the point with regard to the applicability of scope and ambit of Article 243 of the Constitution of India, even though specifically argued before the High Court, has neither been noticed nor considered. If that be so, in our opinion, the remedy of the petitioner would be to seek review of the Judgment of the High Court rather than to challenge the same by way of this special leave petition. Although Mr Bhushan has prayed that operation of the impugned order be stayed for two weeks to enable the petitioner to approach the High Court by way of review petition, we are not inclined to accept the aforesaid prayer. We, however, make it dear that the result of the meeting, which is scheduled to be held on 22-2-2013, shall not be declared for a period of two weeks. With these observations, the special leave petition is disposed of."]. In Ripa Sarma case [(2013) 3 SCC 63: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 13: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 44: (2013) 1 SCC (L8iS) 474], it was not disputed before this Court that the judgment and order dated 20-11-2007 passed in Ripa Sarma [Ripa Sarma v. State of Assam, Writ Appeal No. 279 of 2007, decided on 20-11-2007 (Gau)] was not challenged by way of an SLP before this Court. Relying on Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the earlier judgments of this Court it was held that: (Ripa Sarma case [(2013) 3 SCC 63 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 13 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 44 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 474], SCC p. 65, para 5) "5. In view of the above, the law seems to be well settled that in the absence of a challenge to the main judgment, the special leave petition filed challenging only the subseguent order rejecting the review petition, would not be maintainable."
7. Another decision of the Apex Court in the case of MCD v. Yashwant Singh Negi, (2020) 9 SCC815, also refers to the same proposition while referring to a previous decision of the Apex Court in the case of DSR Steel (P) Ltd. (DSR Steel (P) Ltd, v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 SCC 782 and approved the same.
8. The aforesaid decisions came up for reference once again before the Apex Court before a three Judges Bench in the case of T.K. David k KuruDoamoadv Service Coop. Bank Ltd., (2020) 9 SCC 92, that reflects -6- on the same proposition that unless a challenge is raised to the main order, the appeal filed against the review order would not be maintainable. Paragraphs 12 to 18 of the said decision are extracted herein under:
"12. The first question, which need to be considered is as to whether the present special leave petition challenging the above review order dated 6-2-2020 [T.K. David v. Kuruppampady Service Coop. Bank Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 4527] is maintainable when the Division Bench judgment dated 11-3-2015 [T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014, order dated 11-3-2015 (Ker)] has neither been challenged nor can be challenged in this special leave petition. The consequence of the rejection of the review petition is that the High Court has refused to review the judgment of the Division Bench dated 11-3-2015 passed in T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. [T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014, order dated 11-3-2015 (Ker)]. As noted above, the Division Bench judgment dated 11-3-2015 [T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014, order dated 11-3-2015 (Ker)] was questioned by the petitioner by special leave petition in this Court, which was dismissed on 21-8-2015 [T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1877] . When Special Leave Petition No. 24231 of 2015 challenging the earlier judgment has already been dismissed, such dismissal has become final between the parties. In this special leave petition, the petitioner cannot challenge the earlier order dated 11-3-2015 [T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014, order dated 11-3-2015 (Ker)j against which he unsuccessfully has earlier filed the special leave petition. When the order dated 11-3-2015 [T.K David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014, order dated 11-3-2015 (Ker)j is unassailable by the petitioner in this special leave petition, no relief can be granted to petitioner, which may have effect in any manner diluting, modifying or reversing the earlier judgment dated 11-3-2015 [T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014, order dated 11-3-2015 (Ker)].
13. This Court had earlier considered the question as to whether the special leave petition challenging the order rejecting review petition is maintainable when the main judgment of the High Court is not under challenge. We may refer to judgment of this Court in MCD v. Yashwant Singh Negi [MCD v. Yashwant Singh Negi, (2020) 9 SCC 815] . In the above case, a special leave petition was preferred against an order rejecting the review petition. A preliminary objection was raised that special leave petition is not maintainable since the main judgment is not challenged. In para 1 of the judgment, facts have been noticed, which are to the following effect: (Yashwant Singh Negi case [MCD v. Yashwant Singh Negi, (2020) 9 SCC 815]), "1. This special leave petition has been preferred against the order dated 11-9-2009 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Review Petition No. 79 of 2009 in LPA No. 1233 of 2006. Mr Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the special leave petition is not maintainable since the main judgment rendered by the High Court on 5-11-2008 in Yashv/ant Singh Negi v. Union of
-
India [Yashwant Singh Negi v. Union of India, LPA No. 1233 of 2006, order dated5-11-2008 (Dei)] was not challenged."
14. This Court after considering the earlier judgment [DSR Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 SCC 782 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 1034] of this Court held that special leave petition is not maintainable. In paras 3 and 4 following was laid down:
"3. We find ourselves unable to agree with the views expressed by this Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. [Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugat Kumar, (2008) 14 SCC 295] In our view, once the High Court has refused to entertain the review petition and the same was dismissed confirming the main order, there is no question of any merger and the aggrieved person has to challenge the main order and not the order dismissing the review petition because on the dismissal of the review petition the principle of merger does not apply. In this connection reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Manohar v. Jaipalsing [Manohar v. Jaipalsing, (2008) 1 SCC 520 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 325] wherein this Court has taken the view that once the review petition is dismissed the doctrine of merger will have no application whatsoever. This Court in DSR Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [DSR Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 SCC 782 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 1034] also examined the various situations which might arise in relation to the orders passed in review petitions. Reference to paras 25, 25.1, 25.2 and 25.3 is made, which are extracted below for ready reference: [DSR Steel (P) Ltd. case [DSR Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 SCC 782 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 1034], SCC pp. 790-91]
25. Different situations may arise in relation to review petitions filed before a court or tribunal.
25.1. One of the situations could be where the review application is allowed, the decree or order passed by the court or tribunal is vacated and the appeai/proceedings in which the same is made are reheard and a fresh decree or order passed in the same. It is manifest that in such a situation the subsequent decree alone is appealable not because it is an order in review but because it is a decree that is passed in a proceeding after the earlier decree passed in the very same proceedings has been vacated by the court hearing the review petition.
25.2. The second situation that one can conceive of is where a court or tribunal makes an order in a review petition by which the review petition is allowed and the decree/order under review is reversed or modified. Such an order shall then be a composite order whereby the court not only vacates the earlier decree or order but simultaneous with such vacation of the earlier decree or order, passes another decree or order or modifies the one made earlier. The decree so vacated reversed or modified is then the decree that is effective for the purposes of a further appeal, if any, maintainable under law.
25.3. The third situation with which we are concerned in the instant case is where the revision petition is filed before the Tribunal but the Tribunal refuses to interfere with the decree or order earlier made. It simply dismisses the review petition. The decree in such a case suffers neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. It is an order by which the review petition is dismissed thereby affirming the decree or order. In such a contingency there is no question of any merger and
-JO anyone aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal or court shall have to challenge within the time stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order dismissing the review petition. Time taken by a party in diligently pursing the remedy by way of review may in appropriate cases be excluded from consideration white condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, but such exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is a merger of the original decree and the order dismissing the review petition.'
4. We are in complete agreement with the principle laid down by this Court in DSP Steel (P) Ltd. [DSP Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Pajasthan, (2012) 6 SCC 782 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 1034] and applying the third situation referred to therein in para 25.3, we are inclined to dismiss this special leave petition. We find force in the contention made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent that this SLP is not maintainable, since the main order was not challenged but only the order passed in the review petition alone was challenged in this SLP. Hence, the SLP is, therefore, not maintainable and the same is dismissed."
15. We may also notice another elaborate judgment of this Court in Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 4 SCC 696] . In the above case also special leave petition was filed against the Division Bench judgment of the High Court rejecting the review petition. Facts have been noticed in para 1, which is to the following effect: (SCCp. 700) "1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 14-9-2004 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court ofJudicature at Bombay in Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) .?■ Ltd. v. Union of India [Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. v. Union of India Notice of Motion No. 62 of2004, decided on 14-9-2004 (Bom)] whereby the High Court while dealing with an application of review has declined to condone the delay of 129 days in preferring the application for review and also opined that the application for review was totally devoid of merit. The expression of the said view led to dismissal of the application for review."
16. In the above case, this Court noticed several earlier judgments and accepting the preliminary objection held that the special leave petition is not maintainable. Following was held in paras 29 to 32: [Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. case [BuSsa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 4 SCC 696], SCCpp. 710-11] "29. Needless to state that when the prayer for review is dismissed, there can be no merger. If the order passed in review recalls the main order and a different order is passed, definitely the main order does not exist. In that event, there is no need to challenge the main order, for it is the order in review that affects the aggrieved party.
30. The decisions pertaining to maintainability of special leave petition or for that matter appeal have to be seemly understood. Though in the decision in Shanker Motiram Na/e [Shanker Motiram Naie v. Shioiaising Gannusing Rajput, (1994) 2 SCC 753] the two-Judge Bench referred to Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure that bars an appeal against the order of the court rejecting the review, it is not to be understood that the Court has curtailed the plenary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution by taking recourse to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. It has to be understood that the Court has evolved and formulated a principle that if the basic judgment is not assailed and the challenge is only to the order passed in review, this Court is obliged not to entertain such special leave petition. The said principle has gained the authoritative status and has been treated as a precedential principle for more than two decades and we are disposed to think that there is hardly any necessity not to be guided by the said precedent.
31. In this context, we may profitably reproduce a passage from State of A. P. v. A.P. Jaiswai [State of A. P. v. A.P. Jaiswai, (2001) 1 SCC 748 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 316] wherein a three-Judge Bench has observed thus: (SCC p. 761, para 24) '24. Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents, principle of stare decisis, etc. These rules and principles are based on public policy....'
32. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the submission of Mr Guiati that all the subsequentjudgments are per incuriam as they have not taken into consideration the decision rendered in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. [Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. State ofA. P., AIR 1964 SC 1372: (1964) 5SCR 174] is not correct. Consequently, the appeal, being not maintainable, stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."
17. The rationale for not entertaining a special leave petition challenging the order of the High Court rejecting the review petition when main order in the writ petition is not challenged can -13- f be easily comprehended. Against the main judgment SLP having been dismissed earlier the same having become final between the parties cannot be allowed to be affected at the instance of the petitioner. When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be affected in any manner, no relief can be granted by this Court in the special leave petition filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court. This Court does not entertain a special leave petition in which no relief can be granted. It is due to this reason that this Court in Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. [Bussa Overseas & Properties (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 4 SCC 696] has held that principle of not entertaining special leave petition against an order. rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle. We reiterate the above precedential principle in this case again.
18. The special leave petition against the Division Bench judgment dated 11-3-2015 [TK David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd. Writ Appeal No. 399 of 2014, order dated 11-3- 2015 (Ker)] having been dismissed by this Court earlier on 21-8- 2015[TK David v. Kuruppumpady Service Coop. Bank Ltd., 2015 SCC Online SC 1877] and the review petition filed by the petitioner to review the judgment having been dismissed by the impugned judgment [TK David v. Kuruppampady Service Coop. Bank Ltd., 2020 SCC Online Ker 4527], we see no reason to entertain this special leave petition. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed."
9. Applying the aforesaid principles on the facts of the present case, the present appeal only against the order in the review application will not be maintainable.
10. Even otherwise the original order passed on the review application without any challenge to the main order cannot be gone into for another reason that in the instant case the complaint was filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The order passed by the State Commission has attained finality which is only subject to an appeal. The provision of finality under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Section 24, is extracted herein under:
'24. Finality of orders. - Every order of a District Commission, the State Commission or the National Commission shall, if no appeal has been preferred against such order under the provisions of this Actf be final."
11. The second aspect is that the State Commission had no power of review under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and therefore the review application was misplaced. The law in this regard has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Rajeev Hitendra Pathak & Ors.
vs. Achyut Kashinath Karekar & Anr., (2011) 9 SCC 541 (paras 2, 34,
35) followed and reiterated by the Apex Court in Lucknow Development Authority vs. Shvam Kapoor (2013) 2 SCC 754 (paras 10, 11, 12) and Samaresh Prasad Chowdhury vs. UCO Bank & Ors. (2021) 12 SCC 414 (paras 4, 6).
12. The review application was dismissed on 01.07.2024 and the present appeal has been filed on 20.09.2024.
.k
13. The reporting of delay by the office does not appear to be correct as it is based on an incorrect recital of the date of the impugned order as 02.05.2013, when in fact the order under challenge is only the review order dated 01.07.2024.
14. As a matter of fact the said delay reflects the delay as against the original order which is dated 10.03.2023 and would be slightly above 500 days.
15. Thus, on both counts the present appeal cannot be entertained without there being any challenge raised to the original order dated 10.03.2023.
16. Dr. Saha prays that liberty may be granted to seek an appropriate remedy, but we find that unless there is any challenge raised and the delay explained there is no occasion for us to grant any such liberty in this appeal which is not maintainable for the reasons set out hereinabove. The appeal is therefore consigned without prejudice to the rights of the appellant to seek his remedy against the orders which he proposes to challenge or has challenged in accordance with law.
SdA
( A.P. SAHI, J.)
PRESIDENT
SdA
Brahm /VM/Court-1/07 ( BHARATKUMAR PANDYA )
MEMBER
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