Delhi High Court
N.N.S. Rana vs Union Of India And Others on 16 September, 2011
Author: J.R. Midha
Bench: J.R. Midha
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA No.757/2010
Date of Reserve : 13th July, 2011
% Date of decision : 16th September, 2011
N.N.S. RANA ..... Appellant
Through : Mr.Aditya Kumar Choudhary,
Adv. along with the appellant
in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ..... Respondents
Through : Mr.V.S.R. Krishna, Sr. Adv.
with Mr.Abhishek Yadav, Adv.
CORAM :-
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA
1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the Judgment?
Not
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Necessary
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest?
JUDGMENT
J.R. MIDHA, J.
*
1. The appellant has challenged the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court whereby his suit for damages has been dismissed as being barred by limitation.
2. The learned Trial Court has held that the period of limitation for filing a suit for compensation for libel is one year RFA No.757/2010 Page 1 of 5 from the date of the publication of libel under Article 75 of the Limitation Act.
3. The appellant was working as Chief Personnel Officer with the Northern Railways from 13th December, 1965 to 31st October, 1996. One Kuljeet Kaur working under the appellant made a complaint of sexual harassment to the Ministry of Railways on 4th October, 1996 whereupon the appellant was suspended on 31st October, 1996 and a chargesheet was issued on 16th December, 1996. The Ministry of Railways issued a press release regarding the appellant's suspension on 1st November, 1996 followed by a communiqué of 4th December, 1996. The appellant challenged his suspension before the Central Administrative Tribunal, which was revoked vide order dated 30th October, 1997. The disciplinary proceedings against the appellant were completed on 13th January, 2000 and he was found not guilty of charges of sexual harassment. The appellant served a notice dated 30th August, 2000 under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the respondents and thereafter filed a suit for recovery of damages on 12th January, 2001. The respondents contested the suit on various grounds inter alia that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 75 of the Limitation Act.
RFA No.757/2010 Page 2 of 5
4. The learned Trial Court held the suit to be barred by limitation. The findings of the learned Trial Court are as under:
"Issue No.1 Whether the present suit is barred by limitation? OPD Para 22 of the plaint shows that cause of action to file this suit seeking damages for defamation of Rs.10 lacs arose on 04.11.96 when a defamatory press communiqué was issued by defendant which was widely printed in press media. Article 75 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit for compensation, for libel has to be filed within one year from the date of publication of the libel.
Article 75 of Schedule under Limitation Act runs as under:
Description of Period of Time from
suit Limitation which period
begins to run
For compensation One year When the libel is
for libel. published
21. As per this statutory provision this suit in hand could have been filed on or by 04.11.97. Record shows that this suit was filed on
05.02.2001 almost after 4½ yrs of accrual of cause of action. As such this suit is hopelessly time barred. At this juncture plaintiff submits that he had a continuous cause of action in this matter in so far as Departmental enquiry was pending against him. The Language of Article 75 of the Schedule is unambiguous and in case of defamation there can be no continuous cause of action. The sheer fact that Departmental enquiry was going on is not sufficient in its own wisdom to enhance one year limitation provided by statute. At this juncture it is stated by the plaintiff that since he was falsely chargesheeted and was prosecuted he deserves compensation on RFA No.757/2010 Page 3 of 5 account of malicious prosecution. Not only title to the suit but the entire text and the prayer clause shows that this suit is for seeking damages for defamation and not for malicious prosecution. If the plaintiff was desirous of using the defendants for seeking damages for malicious prosecution, he could have framed the suit, accordingly. But after prolonged trial of 9 yrs. on the date when the suit is being decided, plaintiff cannot orally change the nature of the suit. Before parting with this issue it can be said that it was the duty of Ld. Counsel for defendant to agitate the issue of the suit in hand being time barred as a preliminary issue, when the issues were framed. The alertness of the defendants could have saved valuable and precious 9 years time of the courts since the suit was hopelessly time barred. With these observations I am of the considered view that this issue is decided in favour of defendant and against the plaintiff."
5. The learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute that the period of limitation for filing of the suit is one year under Article 75 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The appellant's contention is that one year period has to be computed from 13th January, 2000 when the appellant was held to be not guilty of the charges of sexual harassment by the Disciplinary Authority. The appellant has referred to and relied upon West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Roy, 2005 (1) ATJ 362; West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray, 2006 (12) Scale 559; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Balakrishna Savalram RFA No.757/2010 Page 4 of 5 Pujari Waghmare and Others v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sanstahn and Others, AIR 1959 SC 798.
6. Article 75 clearly stipulates that the period of limitation of one year would begin to run when the libel is published. The language of Article 75 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is clear and unambiguous that the period of limitation would start from the date of publication and it has to be interpreted according to the Rule of Literal Construction. The appellant's contention that the period of limitation would run from the date when he was exonerated of the charges, is rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court. Section 22 of the Limitation Act has no application to the present case. None of the judgments referred to and relied upon by the appellant reflect upon the appellant's contention that the period of limitation under Article 75 of the Limitation Act would start from the date of exoneration of the appellant.
7. There is no merit or substance in the appeal, which is hereby dismissed.
J.R. MIDHA, J SEPTEMBER 16, 2011 Dev RFA No.757/2010 Page 5 of 5