Delhi District Court
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj Cc No. 1399/2010 on 17 November, 2011
IN THE COURT OF SH. RAKESH KUMAR SINGH:
METROPOLITAN MEGISTRATE (NI ACT)-1, CENTRAL:
ROOM NO.-42, TIS HAZARI COURT COMPLEX, DELHI
17.11.2011
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010
JUDGMENT
a. Serial No. of the case
1399/2010
b. Date of the commission of the offence
28.01.2004
c. Name of the complainant
Vijay Kumar Manghani
d. Name of accused person and his parentage and residence
P.K. Bajaj, Prop of M/s M. Bajaj Papers, A-5, Maya Puri Industrial Estate, Phase-I, Delhi.
e. Offence complained of or proved Dishonor of cheque for "Insufficient funds" punishable under Section-138 NI Act.
f. Plea of the accused and his examination (if any) Not guilty. Complainant unknown. Blank signed cheque was given to someone else for purchase of property. No legal demand notice. No liability.
g. Final Order
Held not guilty. Acquitted.
h. Date of such order
17.11.2011
i. Brief reasons:
The complaint case at all relevant point of time being tried as summons trial, deserves a judgment to be pronounced under Section-355 Cr.PC.
Brief facts:
Complainant has filed the present complaint case on the basis of a dishonored cheque of Rs. 3,00,000/- received in lieu of a loan of the same amount advanced to the accused. The said cheque when dishonored due to insufficient funds, a legal demand notice was issued by the complainant but the accused failed to pay the amount. Hence this complaint. Complainant filed affidavit to establish the necessary ingredients of Section-138 NI Act and also relied upon promissory note and receipt are Ex. CW1/1 & 2.
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 1 Accused taken a defence that the complainant is unknown to him and the instant cheque and promissory note were given to one Daulat Ram Deepani in blank signed form for the purchase of property. However, subsequently the said deal was to be canceled only due to the conduct attributable to Daulat Ram Deepani i.e. the owner of the said property. The said Daulat Ram Deepani did not return the blank cheque and promissory note despite demand. Complainant in collusion with the said Daulat Ram Deepani filed this complaint. Accused lodged a criminal complaint against the present complainant, Chandi Ram Kukreja, Daulat Ram Deepani under various sections of IPC.
Complainant examined himself, Chandi Ram Kukreja apart from formal bank witness. Accused examined himself and ahalmed from a Court of Ld. MM.
Discussion:
What is going against the complainant:
There are several contradictions in the testimony of complainant and his witness:
** Complainant in his cross-examination claimed that post dated cheque was given within two days whereas the complainant's witness Mr. Kukreja claimed in his cross- examination that the cheque was given by the accused to the complainant in December 2003.
** Complainant has also claimed in his cross-
examination that he had given the loan by reaching in the office of the accused whereas the complainant's witness Mr. Kukreja claimed in his cross-examination that he received the amount from the complainant and then taken it to the accused.
** From the cross-examination of complainant it appears that everything was done in his presence (complainant never claimed the presence on the scene of any third character) whereas from cross-examination of complainant's witness Mr. Kukreja it appears that everything (such as filling up the promissory note by the employee) was done only in the presence of the said witness.
** Complainant has also claimed in his cross-
examination that words and figures at the bottom of Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 2 promissory note and receipt are in the handwriting of the accused. Whereas complainant's witness Mr. Kukreja claimed in his cross-examination has claimed that the entire pronote in words and figures was written by the employee of the accused.
** Complainant has also claimed in his cross-
examination that advance interest amount was taken at the time of loan whereas complainant's witness Mr. Kukreja never claimed such fact either in chief or in cross-examination. He even stated that Rs. 3 lacs was given in cash.
** Complainant's witness Mr. Kukreja in his examination in chief stated that the complainant made the payment to the accused in his presence. Whereas in the cross-
examination, the said witness changed his stand and stated that he obtained the amount from the complainant and then he himself taken the amount to the accused.
The cheuqe is claimed to have been received for repayment of loan, however, the cheque is of the same amount which was advanced despite the fact that loan was allegedly repaid after 8(eight) months and rate of interest was 21% p.a. This was not a friendly loan (complainant and accused were unknown) and acceptance of repayment without interest may create some doubt. (However first time in his cross- examination, the complainant introduced the fact that advance interest was taken from the accused at the time of loan transaction. But he failed to establish the fact by cogent evidence despite specific question in the cross examination).
Complainant obtained part of the total amount from his relatives that too on loan, he however does not know the name of such relatives.
Complainant however does not know how much amount was with him and how much he collected from his relatives. The complainant even not examined any of his relatives.
Complainant failed to establish accumulation of money.
Accused has lodged a criminal complaint against complainant, Mr. Kukreja, Mr. Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 3 Deepani and Mr. Charlady in respect of cheating and forgery pertaining to cheque and promissory note. It may or may not be a counter blast to the present complaint. The said case is not only against the present complainant. All the aforesaid persons (i.e. complainant, accused, Mr. Kukreja, Mr. Deepani and Mr. Chawla) are present in the instant complaint and also in the complaint of cheating.
The story of complainant itself is inherently difficult to believe. One Mr. Chawla introduced the accused to one Mr. Kukreja. Mr. Kukreja met the accused one or two times. Accused directly approached Mr. Kukreja for a cash loan of Rs. 3,00,000/-. Mr. Kukreja having difficulty in advancing a cash loan contacted his friend Mr. Manghani(complainant) to advance the loan. Accused was unknown to Mr. Manghani. Mr. Manghani was also not having the cash with him but Mr. Manghani contacted his relatives and taken loan from his relatives(that too undisclosed relatives). Mr. Manghani then collected the entire amount. For what purpose? To advance loan to an unknown person.
The above discussion goes to show that blank signed cheque and promissory note were somehow available with the complainant. No doubt complainant was well within his right to rely upon mandatory presumptions of law. However, the same are rebuttable even by showing a preponderance of probability and if certain defects are established by the accused, the complainant should try other ways to support his case. In the present case, however, the complainant did not make such efforts on his own peril. He has to bear the consequences. No blemishes in the story of the accused can give a right to the complainant to claim that his story should be preferred. It is well settled law that if from the facts and circumstances two views are possible, the one which makes no interference in life and liberty i.e. the one which goes in favour of the accused should be preferred.
Nature and extent of rebuttal
2. A three judges bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with presumptions under Prevention of Corruption Act has observed in Trilok Chand Jain vs State Of Delhi 1977 AIR 666 as under:
"The presumption however, is not absolute. It is rebuttable. The accused can prove the contrary. The quantum and the nature of proof required to displace this presumption may vary according to the circumstances of each case. Such proof may partake the shape of defence evidence led by the accused, or it may consist of circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence itself, as a result of cross-examination or otherwise. But the degree and the character of the burden of proof which s. 4(1) casts on an accused person to rebut the presumption raised thereunder, cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof which under s. 101, Evidence Act rests on the prosecution.. While the mere plausibility of an explanation given by the accused in his examination under s. 342, Cr.P.C. may not be enough, the burden on him to Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 4 negate the presumption may stand discharged, if the effect of the material brought on the record, in its totality, renders the existence of the fact presumed, improbable. In other words, the accused may rebut the presumption by showing a mere preponderence of probability in his favour; it is not necessary for him lo establish his case beyond a reasonable doubt-see Mahesh Prasad Gupta v. State of Rajasthan(1).
Another aspect of the matter which has to be borne in mind is that the sole purpose of the presumption under s. 4(1) is to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving a fact which is an essential ingredient of the offences under s. S (1) (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 161, Penal Code. The presumption therefore can be used in furtherance of the prosecution case and not in derogation of it. If the story set up by the prosecution inherently militates against or is inconsistent with the fact presumed, the presumption will be rendered sterile from its very inception, if out of judicial courtesy it cannot be rejected out of hand as still born."
2.1. To what extent a mere reliance upon the presumptions of law can help the complainant is the question involved in the present case.
2.2. Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Peter Mascarenhas Vs. Monsabre Ashley Oswald Dias, CCC X-2010(4) 234 has dealt with the above aspect in great detail. This was also a case of friendly loan of Rs. 12 lakhs which the complainant had lent to the accused after collecting the same from several other persons. Complainant had examined the persons from who he collected the amount. There was also an agreement executed by the accused person. However, after a detailed factual and legal discussion, Hon'ble High Court has acquitted the accused primarily on the ground that complainant has failed to discharge his onus to establish accumulation of money. It has been observed therein that:
"In juxtaposition though the Complainant was faced with the aforesaid material which has come through the cross examination of Cw.2, Cw.3 and Cw.4, the Complainant did not choose to lead any further evidence to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the liability when the burden again shifted to him. Applying the principles that the Complainant has to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt but the Accused has to only probabilise his defence, in my view, the test has been satisfied by the Accused then the Complainant. The Complainant as can be seen has not led any further cogent evidence to prove the factum of the lending of the money to the Accused and thereby has not discharged the burden which had shifted to him on account of the evidence which has come in cross examination of the Complainant and his witnesses."
2.3. Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Prakashan vs P.K. Surenderan decided on 10 October, 2007 has also dealt with the aspect of friendly loan and scope of presumptions of law. The facts of the case were:
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 5 "3. Respondent herein allegedly, on diverse dates, advanced a sum of Rs. 3,16,000/- to the appellant who issued a cheque for the said amount on 18.12.1995. The said cheque was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient fund. Allegedly, when the matter was brought to the notice of the appellant, he undertook to remit the amount on or before 30.01.1996. The cheque was again presented but the same was not encashed on the ground payment stopped by the drawer.
5. The complainant in support of its case led evidence to show that he had advanced various sums on the following terms:
On 31-1-94 a sum of Rs. One lakh; on 8-6-94, Rs. 86,000/-;
on 12-6-94, Rs. 28,000/-; on 23-4-95, Rs. 50,000/- on 18-6-95, Rs. 40,000/- and on 7-8-95, Rs. 12,000/-.
6. Defence of the appellant, on the other hand, was that he had issued blank cheques for the purpose of purchase of spare parts, tyres, etc. in connection with the business of transport services run in the name of his brother. The blank cheques used to be returned by the sellers of spare parts, etc. when the amounts were paid. According to the appellant, the complainant lifted the impugned cheque book put in the bag and kept in his shop. Appellant in support of his case examined the Bank Manager of the Bank concerned. "
Hon'ble High Court having reversed the judgment of acquittal, accused approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed therein that:
"14. The learned Trial Judge had passed a detailed judgment upon analysing the evidences brought on record by the parties in their entirety. The criminal court while appreciating the evidence brought on record may have to weigh the entire pros and cons of the matter which would include the circumstances which have been brought on record by the parties. The complainant has been found to be not a man of means. He had allegedly advanced a sum of Rs. 1 lakh on 13.01.1994. He although had himself been taking advances either from his father or brother or third parties, without making any attempt to realize the amount, is said to have advanced sums of Rs. 86,000/- on 8.06.1994. Likewise he continued to advance diverse sums of Rs. 28,000/-, Rs. 50,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 12,000/- on subsequent dates. It is not a case where the appellant paid any amount to the respondent towards repayment of loan. He even did not charge any interest. He had also not proved that there had been any commercial or business transactions between himself and the appellant. Whey the appellant required so much amount and why he alone had been making payments of such large sums of money to the Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 6 appellant has not been disclosed. According to him, he had been maintaining a diary. A contemporaneous document which was in existence as per the admission of the complainant, therefore, was required to be brought on records. He failed to do so. He also did not examine his father and brothers to show that they were men of means and in fact advanced a huge sum to him only for the purpose of grant of loan by him to the appellant. The learned Trial Court not only recorded the inconsistent stand taken by the complainant in regard to the persons from whom he had allegedly borrowed the amount, it took into consideration the deposit of the cheques in the bank commenting: Ext. D1 the counterfoil of the cheque book issued to the accused from that bank, was proved through him. It contains the counterfoils of the cheques 782451 to 782460. Ext. D2 is the pass book issued to the accused from that bank. SW1 is the Branch Manager of Syndicate Bank,Koyilandy. He would say that in Ext. P4 ledger extract, cheque No. 782460 reached the bank for collection on 30.12.93. The net transaction in that account was in the year 1996. Cheque No. 782451 reached the bank on 8.1.96. Ext. D1 shows that is the first cheque in that book. 782460 is the lost cheque in that book. If the lost cheque i.e. 782460 reached the bank for collection on 30.12.93 in normal and reasonable course the first cheque i.e. 782451 might have been issued even prior to that date. Case of the complainant is that Ext. P1 cheque was given to him by the accused on 5.10.95 and the cheque was dated 18.12.95. Ext. P4, D1 and D2 substantiate the case of the accused that the allegation of the complainant that Ext. P1 cheque was given to him on 18.12.95 is not genuine."
Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed therein that:
"15. The High Court, as noticed herein before, on the other hand, laid great emphasis on the burden of proof on the accused in terms of Section 139 of the Act.
16. The question came up for consideration before a Bench of this Court in M.S. Narayana Menon (supra) wherein it was held:
"38. If for the purpose of a civil litigation, the defendant may not adduce any evidence to discharge the initial burden placed on him, a fortiori even an accused need not enter into the witness box and examine other witnesses in support of his defence. He, it will bear repetition to state, need not disprove the prosecution case in its entirety as has been held by the High Court."
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 7 A presumption is a legal or factual assumption drawn from the existence of certain facts. It was furthermore opined that if the accused had been able to discharge his initial burden, thereafter it shifted to the second respondent in that case.
The said legal principle has been reiterated by this Court in Kamala S. v. Vidhyadharan M.J. and Another [(2007) 5 SCC 264] wherein it was held:
"The Act contains provisions raising presumption as regards the negotiable instruments under Section 118(a) of the Act as also under Section 139 thereof. The said presumptions are rebuttable ones. Whether presumption stood rebutted or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case."
The nature and extent of such presumption came up for consideration before this Court in M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani V. State of Kerala and Anr. [(2006) 6 SCC 39] wherein it was held :
"30. Applying the said definitions of proved or disproved to the principle behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the court shall presume a negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that the consideration dos not exist. For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could be relied upon. "
This Court clearly laid down the law that standard of proof in discharge of the burden in terms of Section 139 of the Act being of preponderance of a probability, the inference therefor can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record but also from the reference to the circumstances upon which the accused relies upon. Categorically stating that the burden of proof on accused is not as high as that of the prosecution, it was held;
"33. Presumption drawn under a statute has only an evidentiary value. Presumptions are raised in terms of the Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 8 Evidence Act. Presumption drawn in respect of one fact may be an evidence even for the purpose of drawing presumption under another. "
..........
18. Ms. Srivastava has relied upon a decision of this Court in Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula DSouza and Another [(2003) 3 SCC 232] wherein this Court opined:
"The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act which is to promote the efficacy of banking operation and to ensure credibility in business transactions through banks persuades us to take a view that by countermanding payment of post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. A contrary view would render Section 138 a dead letter and will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal obligations undertaken by them through their own acts which in other words can be said to be taking advantage of ones own wrong. If we hold otherwise, by giving instructions to banks to stop payment of a cheque after issuing the same against a debt or liability, a drawer will easily avoid penal consequences under Section 138. Once a cheque is issued by a drawer, a presumption under Section 139 must follow and merely because the drawer issued notice to the drawee or to the bank for stoppage of payment it will not preclude an action under Section 138 of the Act by the drawee or the holder of the cheque in due course. This was the view taken by this Court in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi 2 . On same facts is the decision of this Court in Ashok Yeshwant Badave v. Surendra Madhavrao Nighojakar. The decision in Modi case overruled an earlier decision of this Court in Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian Technologists & Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd. which had taken a contrary view. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Modi case. The said view is in consonance with the object of the Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 9 legislation. On the faith of payment by way of a post-dated cheque, the payee alters his position by accepting the cheque. If stoppage of payment before the due date of the cheque is allowed to take the transaction out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act, it will shake the confidence which a cheque is otherwise intended to inspire regarding payment being available on the due date. "
19. No exception to the aforementioned legal principle can be taken. What, however, did not fall for consideration in the aforementioned case was as to how the said burden can be discharged.
20. It is now trite that if two views are possible, the appellant court shall not reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible to be taken. The appellate courts jurisdiction to interfere is limited. [See M.S. Narayana Menon (supra) and Mahadeo Laxman Sarane & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (7) SCALE 137] The High Court furthermore has not met the reasons of the learned Trial Judge. It proceeded on the premise that the appellant had not been able to discharge his burden of proof in terms of Section 139 of the Act without posing unto itself a further question as to how the said burden of proof can be discharged. It furthermore did not take into consideration the legal principle that the standard of proof upon a prosecution and upon an accused is different. "
2.4. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamala S vs Vidyadharan M.J. & Anr Appeal (crl.) 233 of 2007, decided on 20.02.2007 "15. The Act contains provisions raising presumption as regards the negotiable instruments under Section 118(a) of the Act as also under Section 139 thereof. The said presumptions are rebuttable ones. Whether presumption stood rebutted or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
17. This Court clearly laid down the law that standard of proof in discharge of the burden in terms of Section 139 of the Act being of preponderance of a probability, the inference therefor can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record but also from the reference to the circumstances upon which the accused relies upon......."
2.5. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde 2008 AIR SCW 738 has observed that:
"30. The proviso appended to the said section provides for compliance with legal requirements before a complaint petition can be acted upon by a court of law.
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 10 Section 139 of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability.
31. The courts below, as noticed herein before, proceeded on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis that for proving the defence the accused is required to step into the witness box and unless he does so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.
32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of the accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different.
... ....
34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of the accused is 'preponderance of probabilities'. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. ......
45. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted to regulate the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country and the strict liability to promote greater vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is essential to the economic life of a developing country like India. This however, shall not mean that the courts shall put a blind eye to the ground realities. Statute mandates raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does not say how presumption drawn should be held to have been rebutted. Other important principles of legal jurisprudence, namely, presumption of innocence as a human right and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by Section139 should be delicately balanced. Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials brought on record and having regard to legal principles governing the same."
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 11 It may be pertinent to mention here that a three judges bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. S. Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 has considered the dictum of Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) and overruled the view so far as existence of liability is concerned, however, has not dissented with other parameters observed and laid down in the said case. It has been observed therein that:
"14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. "
2.6. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, if we make a fine balance between the two propositions i.e. reverse onus and presumption of innocence, it can be safely held that accused has successfully probabilised his defence by showing that the non-existence of debt or liability and consideration is probable or its non existence is so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances act upon the supposition that it did not exist.
2.7. I am of the opinion that an accused has a right to rebut the presumption by placing reliance upon the circumstances brought and material placed by the complainant. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. S. Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 has further held that:
"However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own."
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 12 Result:
3. Viewed as discussed above, I am of the opinion that the present complaint can not succeed.
4. A finding of not guilty is thereofore returned. Accused P.K. Bajaj is acquitted from the charges in present complaint case.
5. Question in respect of money landing business has also been raised during the arguments. Accused also relied upon a judgment of brother Ld. MM Sh. Arun Kumar dated 30.08.2011 wherein the present accused was acuitted on the basis that complainant was not having any money landing licence. Complianant opposed the arguments. It appears that the said case has been decided upon its own facts and the complainant therein was a registered NBFC and was providing loan to others. Whereas in the present case, the complainant an individual person had claimed to have one casual loan. This Court however does not find any necessity to discuss the issue in detail (in view of Section-355 Cr.PC which prevails over section-354 Cr.PC.) as the accused has been acquitted in the peculiar facts of the case.
6. A copy of this order be placed on the official website of the District Court.
(Rakesh Kumar Singh)
MM(NI Act)-01, Central/17.11.2011
Vijay Kumar Manghani vs P.K. Bajaj CC No. 1399/2010 13