Allahabad High Court
Dileep Singh Chhabra vs State Of U.P.Through Chief Secy.And 2 ... on 28 February, 2012
Author: Sudhir Agarwal
Bench: Sudhir Agarwal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR Court No. - 4 Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 5135 of 2001 Petitioner :- Dileep Singh Chhabra Respondent :- State Of U.P.Through Chief Secy.And 2 Ors Petitioner Counsel :- O.P.Srivastava Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,V.K. Singh And Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 5423 of 2009 Petitioner :- Dileep Singh Chhabra Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Secretary, Petitioner Counsel :- Om Prakash Srivastava,A.K. Verma Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,V.R.Singh Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
1. These two writ petitions are connected having been filed by the same person namely Dileep Singh Chhabra. Though in Writ Petition No.5135 of 2001 there are nine petitioners including Dileep Singh Chhabra, but since issues are common and therefore both these matters have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.
2. Heard Sri O.P.Srivastava, Advocate for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel, Sri Vivek Rai Singh and Sri Sarvesh Kumar, Advocates, for the respondents and perused the record.
3. The factual matrix in brief, relevant for matter in dispute for proper adjudication may be stated as under:
4. First I take up the facts as are involved in Writ Petition No.5135(S/S) of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as "first petition"). Here there are nine petitioners before this Court seeking a writ of certiorari quashing option proforma/contract bond of an agreement (Annexure 1 to 8-A to the writ petition). They have also sought a mandamus commanding respondents to continue petitioners in service with usual pay and salary in like pay scale attached with other existing posts with all attending benefits treating them regularly appointed employees of State Urban Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as "SUDA").
5. The petitioners were initially employed and engaged in U.P. State Mineral Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "UPSMDC"). The petitioners No.1 to 3 namely Sri Dileep Singh Chhabra, Sudha Kant Mishra and Vijai Kumar were appointed as Assistant Manager (Marketing); petitioner No.4 Sri Rajesh Kumar Pandey was appointed as Superintendent (Marketing); petitioner No.5 Sri Shashi Dayal Rai was Assistant Manager (Geology); petitioners No.6, 7, 8 and 9 were appointed as Deputy Manager (Mining), Assistant Manager (Accounts), Assistant Manager (Inventory) and Statistical Officer respectively. It is said that these appointments in UPSMDC were on regular basis and were made between 1979 to 1986. The business of UPSMDC shrinked with passage of time resulting in heavy losses compelling the management to go for retrenchment of the employees due to substantial reduction in work load. All these petitioners were declared "surplus" and efforts were made to provide them alternative appointment.
6. In the year 1991, SUDA came into existence as a Society registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 constituted by State of U.P. Its funds are supplied by State Government as well as Central Government. The main objective and purpose of its constitution was to provide developmental activities to ameliorate/improve poor in slum areas of urban cities in the State.
7. By Government Order dated 15.11.1997, 677 posts were created in SUDA which included 69 posts of Project Officer. The petitioners were offered employment on transfer and deputation on temporary basis in SUDA as Project Officer in the scale of 2000-3200. On expressing willingness by the petitioners, and no objection granted by UPSMDC, petitioners were issued transfer/deputation letters posting them as Project Officer in SUDA. These letters were issued on 25.5.1998. Besides others, it was clearly mentioned in the aforesaid letters that aforesaid transfer/deputation is on purely temporarily basis and may continue till the candidates by direct recruitment are available or until further orders. It also said that in case any adverse information is received in respect to any person or their service is not found useful for SUDA, the incumbents may be repatriated to the parent departments. The terms and conditions of deputation/service transfer was to be informed later on. Copies of the aforesaid letters are on record as Annexure 10 to 14 to the first petition.
8. The petitioners, pursuant to the aforesaid letters, joined service in SUDA. While the petitioners were serving in SUDA, UPSMDC came to be closed and most of its employees were adjusted/absorbed in other departments/undertakings of State of U.P.
9. One Indra Pal Kanaujia, employee of Nagar Nigam Kanpur is said to have been absorbed as Project Officer in SUDA by order dated 1.10.1997 (Annexure 17 to the writ petition). Similarly three employees of UPSMDC were absorbed in U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation. Another employee, Som Dutta Jalwan, a retrenched employee of Auto Tractors Ltd. was absorbed in SUDA by order dated 22.1.2001. Copy of the order is Annexure 19 to the first petition which shows that pursuant to a judgment dated 18.1.2000 in Writ Petition No.1600 (S/B) of 1998, order for absorption of Sri Som Dutt Jalwan, retrenched employee of Auto Tractors Ltd. was passed by State Government on 22.1.2001.
10. However, ignoring the above benefit/absorption extended to other employees, respondent SUDA required petitioners to execute contract bond for engagement of their service for a period of one year on a consolidated salary, else, the petitioner's service shall be deemed to be terminated on 30.9.2001.The terms and conditions contained in the contract includes tenure of appointment i.e. one year, liable for renewal on satisfactory work and performance assessed by the employer, and also, that after completion of tenure of service, they shall stand terminated automatically. It also provides that the contract is liable to be terminated at any point of time without any notice.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners being retrenched employee of UPSMDC, like other employees, were liable to be adjusted/absorbed in any other department of Government and therefore SUDA was not justified in requiring them to execute a contract bond of employment containing totally oppressive conditions of service particularly when it has the effect of changing the very nature of appointment of petitioners i.e. from regular to contractual and tenure appointment. He submitted that approach of respondents was wholly illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and also amounts to taking benefit of uneven bargaining power of petitioners qua the respondents and hence violative of Section 23 of Indian Contract Act. He placed reliance on Apex Court's decisions in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571 and Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India AIR 1984 SC 636. He also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Writ Petition No.338 (S/B) of 1997 (Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti & Others Vs. State of U.P. & others) wherein this Court (Lucknow Bench) held that since State Government itself has given statement that retrenched employees shall be absorbed elsewhere, it may do so in phased manner within a specified time. In order dated 13.7.2001, this Court gave following directions:
"In view of the aforesaid reason, the request is accepted and the State Government is directed to absorb such employees in a phased manner within a period of six months. The employees will be absorbed in accordance with seniority in the particular cadre; meaning thereby, that the senior most in the cadre will be first absorbed and thereafter, that process will continue till the absorption process will come to an end within six months.
With the aforesaid directions, the review petition is disposed of."
12. Though at the first flush the argument advanced appears to be quite attractive but on a deeper scrutiny I do not find any substance therein. The petitioners filed this writ petition while serving in SUDA. It is not their case in the entire writ petition that SUDA at any point of time made any representation that petitioners shall be absorbed in SUDA. From the own letter of posting in SUDA, placed on record by the petitioners, it is evident that they were transferred on deputation to SUDA with a clear stipulation that said transfer is temporary and incumbent may be repatriated to parent department. It is well settled that an appointment on deputation does not confer any right to claim absorption in the department in which the incumbent has gone to join on deputation. He is liable to be repatriated to his parent department at any point of time.
13. The right of an employee to continue on deputation has been considered in a catena of cases earlier also. In Kunal Nanda Vs. Union of India, 2000(5) SCC 362, the Court held:
"....The basic principle underlying deputation itself is that the person concerned can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department to serve in his substantive position therein at the instance of either of the departments and there is no vested right in such a person to continue for long on deputation or get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on deputation..." (para 6)
14. In the matter of Union of India and another Vs. V. Ramakrishnan and others : 2005(8) SCC 394, the same view has been reiterated and in para 32 of the judgment, the Court said:
"Ordinarily, a deputationist has no legal right to continue in the post. A deputationist indisputably has no right to be absorbed in the post to which he is deputed. However, there is no bar thereto as well. It may be true that when deputation does not result in absorption in the service to which an officer is deputed, no recruitment in its true import and significance takes place as he is continued to be a member of the parent service. When the tenure of deputation is specified, despite a deputationist not having an indefeasible right to hold the said post, ordinarily the term of deputation should not be curtailed except on such just grounds as for example, unsuitability or unsatisfactory performance. But, even where the tenure is not specified, an order of reversion can be question when the same is malafide. An action taken in post haste manner also indicates malice."
15. In Ratilal B. Soni and others Vs. State of Gujrat and others 1990 (Supp) SCC 243, the Court held:
"5. The appellants being on deputation they could be reverted to their parent cadre at any time and they do not get any right to be absorbed on the deputation post ....."
16. All the petitioners are working on deputation in SUDA. Their parent department faced closure. The petitioners become surplus. They also lost option of repatriation due to vanishing of parent employer i.e. UPSMDC employee, it was always open to the petitioners to approach State Government, the respondent No.1, with a request for their absorption elsewhere as was done in respect to other employees. There is nothing on record to show that petitioners made any such attempt. It appears that UPSMDC informed SUDA that as a result of closure of UPSMDC all the employees have rendered surplus and they have been terminated w.e.f. 31.1.2000. Taking a considerate and lenient view in the matter, SUDA, who otherwise could have simply terminated the petitioners as soon as their service in parent department had already been terminated, gave an opportunity to them (the petitioners) to continue in SUDA on contract basis for a period of one year, liable to be renewed on the assessment of performance as the case may be. The petitioners at no point of time had any right on any post in SUDA. Their letter of transfer/posting in SUDA clearly contemplate a condition as is evident from Annexure 13 to the first petition that in case of closure of their department, the incumbent shall have no lien in SUDA. The aforesaid arrangement by transfer or deputation also was to continue only till a direct recruitment in accordance with rules is made or until further orders. By no stretch of imagination the aforesaid arrangement can be said to be a regular arrangement or regular appointment of the petitioners in SUDA and this assumption pleaded in the writ petition and argued by Sri Srivastava is wholly unfounded and baseless.
17. It is well settled that a transfer on deputation can be brought to an end at any stage by repatriating the deputationist at any post of time and he has no right to continue in borrowing department. He can be repatriated without assigning any reason by the borrowing department. The rights of deputationist are very fortitious and he can be directed to go back to parent department at any point of time without assigning any reason and where he ceased to be an employee of parent department, it would naturally result in cession in the parent department also unless borrowing department on its own takes a different step for retaining such an employee over which the deputationist employee however has no right to enforce so as to continue thereat. Nature of deputationist's right has been considered in catena of decisions, some of which have already been referred hereinabove and some are as under:
18. The Apex Court in Prasar Bharti and others Vs. Amarjeet Singh and others 2007 (2) SCALE 486 held that a person sent in a cadre outside his substantive cadre has no right to continue in foreign cadre and can be repatriated to his parent cadre at any point of time without assigning any reason.
19. This court in Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and Others, writ petition no 52527 of 2005 decided on 3rd August 2005, has held as under:
".........It is well settled that a deputationist has no right to remain on deputation and he can be sent back to his Parent Department at any time........"
20. In the case of Devi Kumar Vs. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad 2004, 3 UPLBC 2318, this court observed :
".........The period of deputation originally fixed can be cut short, if considering necessary, a deputationist has no right to continue in the deputation post........."
21. A Division Bench of this court in the Gauri Shanker Vs. State of U.P. and Others 2005 (1) AWL 426 held as under:
"....A deputationist has no right to remain on deputation and he can be sent back to his Parent Department at any time......."
22. The same view has been followed by another Division Bench of this court in the case of Dr. Seema Kundra Vs. State of U.P. 2003 (1) AWL520.
23. In Uttar Pradesh Gram Panchyat Adhikari Sangh and others Vs. Days Ram Saroj and others, 2007(2) SCC 138 the Court has reiterated the same principles as has been laid down in the case of Kunal Nanda (supra) as quoted above.
24. In my view, the decision in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra) and Anoop Jaiswal (supra) have no application in the present case at all since petitioners were called on deputation with their consent and without any representation by SUDA respondents No.2 and 3 that they shall be absorbed in SUDA at any point of time. Hence question of offering any conditions of service against public policy does not arise on the part of SUDA since there was no representation otherwise by them. Moreover, engagement on contract basis with a prescribed tenure by itself cannot be said to be a condition of service which is against public policy or arbitrary. A Constitution bench of Apex Court has considered such kind of appointment in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Uma Devi and others JT 2006 (4) SC 420, and in para 34 of the judgment observed as under:-
"If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued."
25. The Constitution Bench has also overruled all other earlier judgments of the Apex Court taking a view contrary to the judgment of the Constitution Bench.
26. Now the question comes about the right of the petitioners for absorption in any other employment of State Government.
27. With respect to retrenched employees of the State Government the issue may be examined from two angles, firstly in the context of provisions if any made by the State Government in the rules framed under proviso to Article 309 which are applicable for recruitment on civil posts under the State Government and secondly; in the context of U.P. Absorption of Retrenched Employees in Public Corporations Rules, 1991 which are applicable to such corporations which are notified under rule 3 thereof.
28. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not shown to this Court any statutory provision in respect to civil post which are governed by the rules framed under proviso to Article 309 wherein a blanket right of absorption has been conferred upon the employees of a company or corporation owned by State Government. Admittedly these employees cannot be said to be holder of civil posts and therefore their initial appointment is not on civil posts governed by provisions of Article 309, 310 and 311 of Constitution. Such employees, therefore, unless there is some statute to provide otherwise, cannot, as a matter of right, claim their appointment or absorption against a civil post, recruitment and appointment wherein is governed by statutory rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of constitution. However, in respect to the "retrenched employees" from the service of State Government, which satisfy requirement of civil posts, certain provisions for giving some weightage in selection have been made which may be referred in brief hereinafter as under:
29. The U.P. Retrenched Employees Rules, 1967 (for short the 1967 Rules) was promulgated, which defined "Retrenched Employee" under Rule-2(b) as under:
"(b) "retrenched employee" with the grammatical variation and cognate expressions, means a person who was employed in any service or on any post under the rule-making control of the Governor, whether in a substantive, officiating or temporary capacity, and had served continuously for a period of not less than one year, and whose services are, whether before or after the commencement of these rules, terminated, or are certified as liable to termination but does not include a person who was appointed on an ad hoc basis."
30. The definition of "retrenched employee" contained in 1967 Rules clearly refers to a person, who was employed in any service on the post under the rule-making control of the Governor and whose services were terminated, or are certified, as liable to termination after working for a period of not less than one year in substantive, officiating or temporary capacity except on ad hoc basis. The rule making authority also explained ad hoc appointment and explanation 1 to Rule 2(b) of 1967 Rules provides that a person not appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the recruitment rules or orders applicable to the service or post concerned shall be deemed to have been appointed on ad hoc basis. Rule-3 of 1967 Rules, however, provides that the said rules shall remain in force for a period of three years and thereafter for such period as notified by the Governor in consultation with the Commission. The said rules were applicable to all services and posts under the rule making control of the Governor, which were to be filled in wholly, or partly by direct recruitment.
31. The aforesaid rules continued to remain in force upto October, 1971. In 1975, for recruitment in Ministerial Cadre in the Subordinate Offices, statutory rules under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India were framed, namely, "The Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1975" (hereinafter referred to as "1975 Rules") published in the Gazette dated 29.7.1975. The rule-making authority declares that the said rules are being enacted in supersession of all existing rules and orders on the subject and for recruitment of ministerial staff in the subordinate Government offices in the State. The preface of 1975 Rules reads as under:
"In exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, and in supersession of all existing rules and orders on the subject, the Governor is pleased to make the following rules for recruitment of ministerial staff in the subordinate Government offices in the State."
32. Rule 3 of 1975 Rules, which give it overriding effect, reads as under:
"3. Effect of inconsistency with other rules.- In the event of any inconsistency between these rules and any specific service rules:
(1) the provisions contained in these rules prevail to the extent of the inconsistency in case the specific rules were made prior to the commencement of these rules; and (2) the provisions contained in the specific rules shall prevail in case they are made after the commencement of these rules."
33. Rule 4(gg) of 1975 Rules provides the definition of "Retrenched Employee" and reads as under:
"(gg) "Retrenched Employee" means a person who was employed on a post under this rule making power of the Governor-
(i) in permanent, temporary or officiating capacity;
(ii) for a total minimum period of one year, out which at least 3 months service must have been continuous service.
(iii) whose services were or may be dispensed with due to reduction in or winding up of the establishment; and
(iv) in respect of whom a certificate of being a retrenched employee has been issued by the Appointing Authority but does not include a person employed on ad hoc basis only."
34. 1975 Rules initially, as enacted, did not specifically contain any provision giving any relaxation to "Retrenched Employee" but Rule 13-A was inserted by Notification dated 6.7.1977 for a period of three years from the date of its commencement and it reads as under:
"13 A. Relaxation for retrenched employees.-(1) A retrenched employee shall be given exemption from the upper age-limit to the extent of the period of service rendered by him to the State Government together with the period spent without a Government job as a result of the retrenchment.
(2) A retrenched employee, who on the date of his first appointment in the service of the State Government possessed the academic qualifications prescribed on such date for the post now being applied for, shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of academic qualifications for such post.
(3) For the purposes of this rule, the expression "retrenched employee" means a person who was employed in any service or on any post under the rule-making control of the Governor whether in a substantive, officiating or temporary capacity, and had served continuously for a period of not less than one year, and whose services are, whether before or after the commencement of these rules, terminated or liable to termination, on account of reduction of establishment, and in respect of whom a certificate of being a retrenched employee has been issued by the appointing authority concerned, but does not include a person who was appointed on an ad hoc basis.
Explanation- A person appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the recruitment rules or orders applicable to the service or post concerned shall be deemed to have been appointed on an ad hoc basis."
35. Consistent with 1975 Rules a Government Order No. 27/2/1974- Karmik-2 dated 6.7.1977 was published containing definition of "retrenched employee" and on the same date, another Government Order No. 41/2/1967- Karmik-2 dated 6.7.1977 was published for giving effect to the provisions of 1975 Rules and for guidance and clarification of the concerned officials. The aforesaid Government Order relevant for the present purpose is reproduced as under:
^^'kkŒ laŒ&41@2@67&dkfeZd&2] fnukad tqykbZ 6] 1977 fo"k;% jkT;k/khu lsokvksa esa oxZ&3 o 4 ds NaVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dks [kikus dh O;oLFkkA jkT;k/khu dk;kZy;ksa ds NaVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dks Hkkoh fjfDr;ksa esa [kikus ds fy, o"kZ 1967 esa ,d fu;ekoyh cukbZ xbZ Fkh] tks vDVqcj] 1971 rd izHkkoh jghA mlds i'pkr ferO;f;rk ds vk/kkj ij vf/k"Bkuksa esa deh fd;s tkus vFkok vU; iz'kklfud dkj.kksa ls jkT; ds fofHkUu dk;kZy;ksa esa oxZ 3 rFkk 4 ds deZpkfj;ksa dh NaVuh djuk vfuok;Z gks x;k rFkk NaVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dks [kikus dk iz'u 'kklu ds le{k iqu% mifLFkr gks x;kA 2- bl lEcU/k esa eq>s ;g dhus dk funsZ'k gqvk gS fd bl leL;k ij lE;d~ fopkj djus ds mijkUr NaVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dks jkT;k/khu dk;kZy;ksa ¼vizkfof/kd rFkk yksd lsok vk;ksx dh ifjf/k ds ckgj ds inksa½ esa gksus okyh fjfDr;ksa es [kikus ds fy, 'kklu us vc fuEufyf[kr fu.kZ; fy;s gSa% ¼d½ vk;q lhek ds NwV& ,sls deZpkfj;ksa us ftrus o"kZ dh lsok viuh NaVuh ds iwoZ dh gks rFkk ftruh vof/k ds fy, og Nvuh ds dkj.k lsok ls ckgj jgs gksa mrus o"kZ dh vk;q lhek ls mUgsa NwV iznku dj nh tk;A ¼[k½ 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk ds NwV& ;fn ,sls deZpkjh viuh iwoZ fu;qfDr ds le;] ftl in ds fy, og vc vH;FkhZ gSa ml le; ml in dh fu/kkZfjr 'kSf{kd vgZrk iwjh djrs gSaA ¼x½ lqfo/kkvksa dh vof/k& mi;qZDr lqfo/kk;sa bl 'kklukns'k ds tkjh gksus ds fnukad ls 3 o"kZ ds fy, gh ekU; jgsaxhA ¼?k½ NVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dh ifjHkk"kk& NVuh'kqnk deZpkjh dh ifjHkk"kk ogh gksxh tks dkfeZd vuqHkkx&2 dh vf/klwpuk la[;k 27@2@1974 &dkfeZd ¼2½ fnukad 6 tqykbZ] 1977 esa nh gqbZ gS vkSj tks lqyHk lnHkZ gsrq uhps m)`r dh tkrh gSA ^^NVuh fd;k x;k deZpkjh** dk rkRi;Z ml O;fDr ls gS tks jkT;iky ds fu;e cukus ds fu;U=.k esa fdlh lsok esa ;k fdlh in ij ekSfyd LFkkukiUu] ;k vLFkk;h :Ik ls fu;ksftr Fkk vkSj ftlus de ls de ,d o"kZ dh vof/k rd yxkrkj lsok dh gks vkSj ftldh lsok;sa bl fu;ekoyh ds izkjEHk gksus ds iwoZ ;k i'pkr vf/k"Bku esa deh fd;s tkus ds dkj.k lekIr dh tk lds vkSj ftuds lEcU/k esa lEc) fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh }kjk NVuh fd;k x;k deZpkjh gksus dk izek.k&i= tkjh fd;k x;k gks] fdUrq blesa ,slk O;fDr lfEefyr ugha gS ftls rnFkZ vk/kkj ij fu;qDr fd;k x;k gksA Li"Vhdj.k& lEc) lsok ;k ij ij iz;ksx HkrhZ fu;ekoyh ;k vkns'kksa esa fofgr izfdz;k ds vuqlkj fu;qDr O;fDr dks rnFkZ vk/kkj ij fu;qDr fd;k x;k ugha le>k tk;sxkA 3- ,sls NVuh'kqnk deZpkjh tks oxZ 3 ¼lewg x½ ds fyfid oxhZ; inksa] ftudk U;wure osrueku 200&320 :i;s gSa rFkk prqFkZ oxZ ¼vc lewg ?k½ ds os in ftudk osrueku 165&215 :i;s gSa vkSj ftl ij HkrhZ ftyk Lrjh; p;u lfefr;ksa ds ek/;e ls dh tkrh gS] esa HkrhZ ds bPNqd gksa mudks mi;qZDr lqfo/kk ds vUrxZr dsoy fu;fer p;uksa esa vgZrk nsus ds fy, NwV nh tk;sxh ijUrq mUgsa p;u esa dksbZ izkFkfedrk iznku ugha gksxhA 'kklukns'k la[;k 8@dkfeZd&1975 fnukad 22 uoEcj] 1975 esa tkjh fd;s x;s vkj{k.k lEcU/kh vkns'kksa ij dksbZ izHkko ugha iM+sxk vkSj iwoZ dh Hkkafr gh mudks dk;kZfUor fd;k tk;sxkA rn~uqlkj ^^v/khuLFk dk;kZy; fyfid oxZ ¼lh/kh HkrhZ½ fu;ekoyh] 1975** rFkk ^^prqFkZ oxZ deZpkjh lsok fu;ekoyh] 1975** esa vko';d la'kks/ku dj fn;s x;s gSaA^^
36. Rule 13-A expired after three years and so the Government Order dated 6.7.1977. In order to continue with the relaxation in age, educational qualification another GO No. 41/2/67-Karmik-2 dated 23.5.1981 was issued for a period of three years wherein the definition of "retrenched employee" as notified on 6.7.1977 and modified on 18.10.1979 was reiterated. For ready reference, it is re-produced as under:
^^'kk-la- 41@2@67&dkfeZd&2] fnukad 23 ebZ] 1981 fo"k;% jkT;k/khu lsokvksa esa oxZ 3 o 4 ds NaVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dks [kikus dh O;oLFkkA mi;qZDr fo"k;d lela[;d 'kklukns'k fnukad 6 tqykbZ] 1977 esa iznRr lqfo/kkvksa dh ekU; vof/k 5 tqykbZ] 1980 dks lekIr gks xbZ gSA 'kklu dh tkudkjh esa ;g ckr vkbZ gS fd NVuh 'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dh leL;k dk funku iw.kZ :i ls ugha gks ldk gS vr% bl fo"k; ij iqu% fopkj fd;k x;kA 2- eq>s ;g dgus dk funsZ'k gqvk gS fd bl leL;k ij leqfpr fopkjksijkUr NaVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dks jkT;k/khu dk;kZy;ksa esa gksus okyh Hkkoh fjfDrksa ¼vizkfof/kd rFkk yksd lsok vk;ksx dh ifjf/k ls ckgj ds inksa½ esa [kikus ds fy;s 'kklu us fuEufyf[kr fu.kZ; fy;s gS% ¼d½ vf/kdre vk;q lhek ls NwV% ,sls deZpkfj;ksa us ftrus o"kZ viuh NaVuh ls iwoZ dh gks rFkk ftruh vof/k ds fy;s og NaVuh ds dkj.k lsok ls ckgj jgs gksa mrus o"kZ dh vf/kdre vk;q lhek ls mUgsa NwV iznku dj nh tk; ijUrq izfrcU/k ;g gS fd ;g vof/k fdlh Hkh n'kk esa 10 o"kZ ls vf/kd ugha gksxhA ¼[k½ 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk ls NwV% ;fn ,sls deZpkjh viuh iwoZ fu;qfDr ds le;] ftl in ds fy;s og vc vH;FkhZ gSa] ml in dh fu/kkZfjr 'kSf{kd vgZrk j[krs Fks] rks ;g le>k tk;sxk fd os orZeku in ds fy;s fu/kkZfjr 'kSf{kd vgZrk iwjh djrs gSaA ¼x½ lqfo/kkvksa dh vof/k% mi;qZDr lqfo/kk;s bl 'kklukns'k ds tkjh gksus dh frfFk ls rhu o"kZ ds fy;s ekU; jgsxhA ¼?k½ ifjHkk"kk% NVuh'kqnk deZpkjh dh ogh ifjHkk"kk gksxh tks 'kklukns'k la[;k 41@2@67&dkfeZd&2 fnukad 6 tqykbZ] 1977 esa nh gqbZ gS vkSj lela[;d 'kklukns'k fnukad 18 vDVwcj] 1979 }kjk ;Fkk la'kksf/kr gS vkSj tks lqyHk lUnHkZ gsrq uhps m)`r dh tkrh gS% ^^NaVuh fd;k x;k deZpkjh** dk rkRi;Z ml O;fDr ls gS tks jkT;iky ds fu;e cukus ds fu;a=.k esa fdlh lsok esa ;k in ij ekSfyd] LfkkukiUu vFkok vLFkk;h :Ik ls fu;ksftr Fkk vkSj ftlus de ls de 3 ekl dh fujUrj lsok dh gks ijUrq dqy feykdj ;g QqVdj [kf.Mr lsok Hkh ,d o"kZ dh iwjh gks xbZ gks vkSj ftldh lsok;sa v/khuLFk dk;kZy; fyfid oxZ ¼lh/kh HkrhZ½ ¼prqFkZ la'kksa/ku½ fu;ekoyh] 1979 rFkk prqFkZ oxZ deZpkjh lsok ¼r`rh; la'kks/ku½ fu;ekoyh 1979 ds izHkkoh gksus ds iwoZ ;k i'pkr vf/k"Bku esa deh ds dkj.k lekIr dj nh xbZ gks ;k lekIr dj nh tk;s vkSj ftlds lEcU/k esa lEc) fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh }kjk NVuh fd;k x;k deZpkjh gksus dk izek.k&i= tkjh fd;k x;k gks fdUrq mlesa ,slk O;fDr lfEefyr ugha gksxk ftls rnFkZ vk/kkj ij fu;qDr fd;k x;k gksA Li"Vhdj.k & lEc) lsok ;k in ij iz;ksT; HkrhZ fu;ekoyh ;k vkns'kksa esa fofgr izfdz;k ds vuqlkj fu;qDr O;fDr dks rnFkZ vk/kkj ij fu;qDr fd;k x;k ugha le>k tk;sxkA 3- ,sls NVuh'kqnk deZpkfj;ksa dks mi;qZDr lqfo/kk ds vUrxZr dsoy fu;fer p;uksa esa vgZrk nsus ds fy;s NwV nh tk;sxh ijUrq mUgsa p;u esa dksbZ izkFkfedrk iznku ugha gksxhA Lkfpo^^
37. The aforesaid government order was extended for a further period of three years vide Government Order No. 41/2/1967-Karmik-2 dated 12.4.1983, which reads as under:
^^'kkΠla[;k42@2@1967&dkfeZd&2] fnukad 12 vizSy] 1983 fo"k;%& tux.kuk foHkkx ds NVuh fd;s tkus okys deZpkfj;ksa dks jkT;k/khu lsokvksa @inksa esa fu;qfDr gsrq fj;k;rA mi;qZDr fo"k;d lela[;d 'kklukns'k fnukad 12 Qjojh] 1982 ds dze esa eq>s ;g Li"V djus dk funs'k gqvk gS fd mijksDr 'kklukns'k esa nh xbZ lqfo/kk;s jkT; ljdkj ds v/khu dsoy mu lsokvksa@inksa ij fu;qfDr gsrq vuqeU; gksaxh ftu ij lh/kh HkrhZ yksd lsok ds ek/;e ls ugha gksrh gSA mi lfpoA^^
38. Vide Notification dated 16.3.1985 the Governor promulgated a new set of Rules, namely, The U.P. Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985 (in short '1985 Rules'), in supersession of existing rules and orders on the subject as is apparent from the following:
"In pursuance of the provisions of Clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution, the U.P. Governor is pleased to order the publication of the following English translation of Notification No. 20/3-82-Personnel-2-85, dated March 16, 1985.
In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, and in supersession of all existing rules and orders on the subject, the Governor is pleased to make the following rules regulating recruitment of ministerial staff in the Subordinate Government Offices in the State."
39. Rule-3 of 1985 Rules also gives it overriding effect over any inconsistent existing rule and Rule-4(i) defines "retrenched employee" which reads as under:
"Retrenched employee" means a person-
(i) who was employed on a post under the rule making power of the Governor, in permanent, temporary or officiating capacity for a total minimum period of one year, out of which at least three months' service must have been continuous service;
(ii)whose services were or may be dispensed with due to reduction in or winding up of the establishment; and
(iii) in respect of whom a certificate of being retrenched employee has been issued by the appointing authority;
but does not include a person employed on ad hoc basis only."
40. In 1991, "The Uttar Pradesh Absorption of Retrenched Employees of Government or Public Corporation in Government Service Rules, 1991" (for short the '1991 Rules') were framed and published in the Gazette dated 19th August, 1991. The aforesaid rule provides for absorption of 'Retrenched Employee" of Government or Public Corporation. Rule-2-(b) defines Public Corporation, Rule 2-(c) defines "Retrenched Employee" and Rule-3 is a charging provision, which are reproduced as under:
"2(b) "Public Corporation" means a body corporate established or constituted by or under any Uttar Pradesh Act except a University of Local Authority constituted for the purpose of Local Self Government and includes a Government Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 in which the State Government has prepondering interest;
(c) "retrenched employee" means a person who was appointed on a post under the Government or a public corporation on or before October 1, 1986 in accordance with the procedure laid down for recruitment to the post and was continuously working in any post under the Government or such corporation upto the date of his retrenchment due to reduction in, or winding up of, any establishment of the Government or the public corporation, as the case may be and in respect of whom a certificate of being a retrenched employee has been issued by his appointing authority."
(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other service rules for the time being in force, the State Government may by notified order require the absorption of the retrenched employee in any post or service under the government and may prescribed the procedure for such absorption including relaxation in various terms and conditions of recruitment in respect of such retrenched employees."
41. Thereafter 1998 Rules were promulgated on 9.6.1998. It would be appropriate to refer the declaration made under the aforesaid rules which was not in the same terms as it was in 1975 Rules and 1985 Rules that the same are being enacted in supersession of all the existing provisions and on the contrary 1998 Rules only makes a declaration of making of the rules by the Hon'ble Governor and reads as under:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor is pleased to make the following rules:"
42. Rule-2 of 1998 Rules declares to override inconsistent existing rules. Rule 5(3)(c) provides weightage which is admissible to a "retrenched employee" for recruitment in 1998 Rules. Admittedly, 1998 Rules did not contain any definition of "retrenched employee". The Hon'ble Governor further promulgated another set of rules in 2001, namely, The Uttar Pradesh Procedure for Direct Recruitment for Group "C" posts (Outside the Purview of the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission) Rules, 2001 (in short the "2001 Rules"). The aforesaid rules have been framed in supersession of all the existing rules and orders on the subject as is apparent from the following declaration made under the Rules:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and in suppression existing rules and other on the subject, the Governor is pleased to make the following rules."
43. 2001 Rules, admittedly does not contain any definition of 'retrenched employee' but provides certain concessions in recruitment to a 'retrenched employee' vide Rule 6(6)(b) etc.
44. Coming to the second angle of the matter, i.e. 1991 Rules, These rules are applicable to only such category of undertakings which are notified under Rule 3 thereof. Referring to these rules some judgments were delivered by this Court of Allahabad and Lucknow both but without considering the above rules with threadbare analysis, which resulted in issuance of some directions for absorption of the employees of undertakings and corporations of State Government without realizing whether they were notified under the said rules or not. In some of the matters even appeals in Apex Court were dismissed in limine rendering the judgments final. However, later on these rules were rescinded by the State Government vide Rescission Rule 2003. Both these rules and their implications and interpretation in detail came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and others Vs. Sunil Kumar Verma and others, 2010(10) ADJ 125 and this Court in paras 40, 46, 62, 63, 75, 76 and 90 clearly held as under:
"40. Reference of Government order dated 11th November, 1993 issued by the State Government has also been made, which was issued in reference to closure of Regional Development Corporations. The Government order dated 11th November, 1993 provided that names of Class ''C' and Class ''D' employees whose services have come to and end, shall be registered in the respective employment offices in accordance with the seniority and their names be forwarded after requisition is received from the employers. It is the case of the State that absorption of the retrenched employees was having negative impact on the efficiency in the government departments and was proving counter productive to the aims and object for which aforesaid orders were issued, the State Government had come up with Government order dated 27th May, 1993 stating that there is no justification in future to absorb the employees of the Corporation in the government service since the retrenched employees of the Government companies and Corporation falling within the purview of labour legislation are entitled to certain benefits and certain clarifications were issued thereafter. The Bhadohi Woollen Mills Limited was closed whose employees filed Writ Petition No.17195 of 1998 (Bageshwari Prasad Srivastava and others vs. State of U.P. and others), which was decided on 27th April, 1999 directing the State Government to absorb the employees of Bhadohi Woollen Mills as per the 1991 Rules. The Government order dated 11th November, 2002 was issued providing for procedure for consideration of absorption of the employees of Bhadohi Woollen Mills (Annexure-11 to Writ Petition No.45102 of 2008. Clause 8 of the said Government order provided that those employees, who were working in Group-C and Group-D post and whose services have come to an end, shall be registered in employment office in separate pool and on requisition from employers their names shall be forwarded accordingly. It was also provided that upper age limit shall not be applicable for such employees for government service. Certain other conditions were also mentioned in the Government order dated 11th November, 2002. Thereafter came the Rescission Rule 2003 with effect from 8th April, 2003 rescinding the 1991 Rules. . . ."
"46. By virtue of sub-rule (ii) of Rule 3(1) of the Rescission Rules 2003 the orders of the Government issued from time to time prescribing the norms for absorption of retrenched employees of a particular Government department or Public Corporation in Government Service and granting of consequential benefits including pay protection shall stand abrogated from the date of commencement of the Rescission Rules, 2003. However, Rule 3(2) of the Rescission Rules 2003 provides that notwithstanding such rescission the benefit of pay protection granted to an absorbed retrenched employee prior to the date of commencement of the Rescission Rules 2003 shall not be withdrawn. Rule 3(2)(ii) further provides that a retrenched employee covered by the 1991 Rules prior to the date of the commencement of the Rescission Rules 2003, but who has not been absorbed till such date, shall be entitled to get relaxation in upper age limit for direct recruitment to such Group 'C' and Group 'D' posts which are outside the purview of the Public Service Commission to the extent he has rendered his continuous service in substantive capacity in the concerned Government Department or Public Corporation in completed years. . . ."
"62. In view of Rule 3 of the Rescission Rules 2003 and Section 3 of the 2009 Act making express provisions for terminating the right of consideration of retrenched employees accrued under the 1991 Rules, there is no enforceable right in the retrenched employees to seek mandamus directing the State Government to consider their case for absorption.
63. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that after the Rescission Rules 2003 with effect from 8th April, 2003, the right of retrenched employees for absorption acquired under the 1991 rules stands terminated with effect from 8th April, 2003 and no such right could have been enforced by retrenched employees after expressly terminating their above right with effect from 8th April, 2003. The Rescission Rules 2003 has no retrospective operation but it terminated the right of consideration for absorption acquired under the 1991 Rules with effect from 8th April, 2003, the date of enforcement of the Rescission Rules, 2003. Those retrenched employees, who were absorbed between the period 9th May, 1991 to 8th April, 2003 were clearly saved."
"75. In view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, we are of the view that the word "may" used in Rule 3 of the 1991 Rules cannot be read as word "shall" but we hasten to add that Rule 3 which gave enabling power to the State to consider for absorption also intended a corresponding right in the employee that his case for consideration for absorption be considered by the State till the 1991 Rules were in force.
76. Now comes the submissions of learned counsel for the writ petitioners that judgments of this Court in Shailendra Kumar Pandey's case (supra) and Bageshwari Prasad Srivastava's case (supra) are holding the field and against both the above judgments rendered by the learned Single Judges the special appeals before the Division Bench of this Court and special leave petition before the Apex Court having been dismissed, the State is bound to follow the ratio of the aforesaid judgments and it is not open for the State to contend in these appeals that writ petitioners are not entitled for any direction for absorption in the Government department. . . ."
"90. We also endorse the above view of the learned Single Judge. We having found that the right of consideration for absorption under the 1991 Rules having come to an end after the Rescission Rules 2003, no mandamus can be issued for enforcing the said right. . . . ."
45. Thus except to the extent what has been held by Division Bench of this Court in Sunil Kumar Verms (supra) there cannot be any right to claim absorption/adjustment in any other service, without undergoing process of recruitment or selection on the said post in accordance with the rules applicable thereto and consistent with the requirement of Article 16 of the Constitution. The petitioners, in any case, never had any right to enforce their claim for absorption vis a vis SUDA respondents no.2 and 3 since it was never represented by them and State Government had also not directed for any such absorption. At least no such order with respect to petitioners has been shown to this Court. The petitioners, therefore, had no right to claim any benefit even if their matter could have been governed by 1991 Rules contrary to what has been said by the Division Bench of this Court in Sunil Kumar Verma (supra) overruling the judgments taking a different view.
46. In view of the above the first petition deserves to be dismissed being devoid of any merit.
47. The writ petition No.5423 (S/S) of 2009 (hereinafter referred to as "second petition") has been filed by sole petitioner Dileep Singh Chhabra during pendency of first petition challenging order dated 24.8.2009 whereby he has been discharged from service of SUDA.
48. It appears that an interim order was passed on 31.10.2001 in first petition recording statement of counsel for SUDA that last date of filling up form/objections shall be extended. However this interim order did not and could not have resulted in continuance of petitioner in service since his employment in parent department had already been come to an end on 31.1.2000. Hence SUDA also did not pay salary to the petitioner. The petitioner therefore signed the contract bond, as stated in paras 15 and 17 of the second petition. Initially it was for one year whereafter it was further extended. The last extension was made upto 14.7.2004 whereafter there is no extension at all. The petitioner, however, continued to function in SUDA without there being any extension of contract of service. One of such extension order dated 4.8.2003 is on record as Annexure CA-4 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents No.2 and 3 in second writ petition. The Director SUDA passed an order dated 30.7.2009 terminating the petitioner. The aforesaid order was challenged in writ petition No.4746 (S/S) of 2009 which was allowed on 13.8.2009. While setting aside the aforesaid order of termination, this Court granted liberty to respondents to pass a fresh order in accordance with law under the terms of contract, and, till a fresh order is passed, it was stated therein that, petitioner shall not be dispensed with and shall be allowed to continue under the terms of contract. Consequently, impugned order dated 24.8.2009 has now been passed terminating petitioner's service and discharging him.
49. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that once it was held by this Court that the petitioner could not have been terminated merely on attaining the age of 58 years, by means of the impugned order, his services could not have been terminated by observing that the same is no longer required since petitioner is entitled to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years which is the age of retirement of other Government employees. He further submitted that impugned termination is wholly arbitrary and discriminatory, inasmuch as, other persons taken from UPSMDC have been allowed to continue.
50. In my view, none of the submissions advanced have any force. The impugned order of termination is a termination simplicitor. The contract, which the petitioner has executed with SUDA clearly provides that the same is liable to be terminated at any point of time without any notice. The petitioner has been terminated in terms of his conditions of contract. An order of termination simplicitor is not to be interfered by the Court. When such an order may be interfered has been considered and certain aspects have been enumerated by a Division Bench in Paras Nath Pandey Vs. Director, North Central Zone, Cultural Centre, 2008 (10) ADJ 283. After considering various authorities of Apex Court commencing from Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 till those decided up to the judgment the Court has laid down certain guidelines to find out when order of termination simplicitor is liable to be interfered and says:
"(a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution
(b) An order of termination simplicitor prima facie is not a punishment and carries no evil consequences.
(c) Where termination simplicitor is challenged on the ground of casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance the order itself to find out whether it cast any stigma and can be said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said order.
(d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, makes it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or attending, show only the motive of the employer to terminate, it being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found that order is founded on such act or omission constituting misconduct.
(e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the employee was a mere probationer or temporary.
(f) "Motive" and "foundation" are distinct, though the distinction is either very thin or overlapping. "Motive" is the moving power, which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently. "Motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. "Foundation", however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the employee, When his acts and omissions treated to be misconduct, proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation.
(g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, but if it falls short of it, it would not.
(h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish to bother about it, and, instead of going into the correctness of guilt, feel like not to keep the employee and thus terminate him, it is simpliciter termination and not punitive.
(I) Where the termination simplicitor is preceded by an enquiry, preliminary or regular, the Court would see the purpose, object of such enquiry as also the stage at which, the order of termination has been passed.
(j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge, would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating an probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive.
(k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry would not render termination punitive.
(l) Where the employer hold a formal enquiry to find out the correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and proceed on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive, and, cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee.
(m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not pursued to the end. Instead a simple order of termination is passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would be immaterial and such an order would be non punitive.
(n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide, if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the Court, that would not make the order founded on any misconduct.
(o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The following words mentioned in the order have not been held to be punitive.
i. "want of application", ii. "lack of potential", iii. "found not dependable", iv. "under suspension", v. "work is unsatisfactory", vi. "unlikely to prove an efficient officer".
(p) Description of background facts also have not been held to be stigmatic.
(q) However, the words "undesirable to be retained in Government service", have been held stigmatic.
(r) If there is (i) a full scale formal enquiry, (ii) in the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct, (iii) which culminated in a finding of guilt; where all these three factors are present, the order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form. However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive."
51. None of the above apply in this case. In view of what has been said in Paras Nath Pandey (supra) the termination of service by an order of termination in accordance with the terms of contract is not to be interfered.
52. Learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage submitted that since the respondents themselves have admitted that contract was not extended after 14.7.2004 therefore terms and conditions of the said contract are not attracted hence the said contract would not justify his termination and the petitioner's termination without holding any enquiry or till he attain the age of superannuation is bad and illegal.
53. The submission is self destructive, contradictory and demolishes the case of petitioner on its own. Either it can be said that in absence of any formal order of extension of contract the last contract continue and the petitioner continued to function on the terms and conditions that are contained in the last extended contract or there is no valid letter of appointment on the basis whereof the petitioner could have functioned. If the contract itself is treated to have ceased and inoperative after 14.7.2004, as suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner, that would result as if there is no letter of appointment in respect to petitioner's continuance in service and he is/was working without any authority i.e. a right flowing from a written order.
54. That be so, at the best it is a wholly stop gap arrangement which could have been ceased at any point of time since such kind of arrangement does not confer any right upon the incumbent to hold a post wherein recruitment/appointment is subject to Article 14 of Constitution and other recruitment rules. It cannot be disputed that SUDA is a society formed by State Government but since entire funding and control by State Government, it satisfy requirement of Article 12 of the Constitution being an "other authority" and therefore recruitment and appointment therein could have been made only consistent with Article 16 of Constitution and other relevant provisions. There is no concept of holding over applicable in service matters. The Apex Court in State of Orissa Vs. Mamata Mohanti, JT 2011(2) SC 164 has said that right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. The concept of adverse possession or lien on post or holding over is not applicable in service jurisprudence. Therefore, continuation of a person wrongly appointed or never lawfully appointed on a post shall not create any right in his favour.
55. The petitioner therefore apparently has no right to hold the post from any angle of the matter as discussed. It not his case and has not been substantiated at all that termination in question is penal in nature, hence this issue needs no further examination.
56. No other argument has been advanced.
57. In totality of the discussion as made above, I find no substance in both these writ petitions.
58. Dismiss.
Order Date :- 28.2.2012 KA