Delhi District Court
State vs Ravinder Singhania And Ors on 11 November, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SHRI PAWAN KUMAR, ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE-06, SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI
REVISION PETITION N0. 161/2024
CNR NO. DLST01-003377-2024
IN THE MATTER OF:
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
Through : Public Prosecutor
.......Revisionist
Versus
1. Ravinder Singhania
S/o. Sh. Dulichand Singhania
R/o. B-92, Himalaya House,
K G Marg, New Delhi.
2. Anil Harish
S/o. D.M. Harish
R/o. 13, C.C.I Chamber,
1st Floor, Dinshaw Wacha Road,
Church Gate, Mumbai-400053.
3. Sanjay Bahadur
S/o. Sh. Jagdish Bahadur
R/o. Flat No. 901/B, Green Acres,
Lokhandwala Complex, Andheri, West,
Mumbai.
Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 1 of 14
4. Prashant Kumar Mohanty
S/o. Sh. Indubhushan Mohanty
R/o. 3-B, Monalisa, 17, Camac Street,
Lilkata-700017.
5. Minoti Bahri
S/o. Sh. Gandharv Raj Bahri
R/o. R-87, Greater Kailash-I,
New Delhi -110042.
........Respondents
Instituted on : 16.04.2024
Reserved on : 15.10.2025
Pronounced on : 11.11.2025
JUDGMENT
01. Vide instant revision petition, revisionist takes exception to the order dated 27.03.2023 passed by Ld. CMM, South District, whereby it discharged the respondents. The State/revisionist has filed the present revision petition against the respondent Ravinder Singhania (R-1), Anil Harish (R-2), Sanjay Bahadur (R-3), Prashant Kumar Mohanty (R-4) and Minoti Bahri (R-5), who were discharged by Ld. Trial Court on the application under Section 239 Cr.P.C.
02. The admitted facts qua the respondents as recorded by Ld. Trial Court in the impugned order are reproduced as follows:
The facts as mentioned in the charge-sheet qua the accused no.6 to 10 are reproduced hereinbelow:
Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 2 of 14 a. that accused Ravinder Singhania was independent Non- Executive Director of alleged company M/s Unitech Ltd. and on perusal of record of alleged company, it was revealed that during 2007-2015, he obtained commission/ bonus of Rs.70 lacs along with sitting fee of Rs.7.60 lacs. Though, Independent Non-Executive Directors do not have any material pecuniary relationship or transactions with the company and appointed by the company to protect the interest of share-holder as per Section 149 of the company Act yet it has been mentioned that he was participating in the meetings of board and AGMs in which all vital/ policy decisions of company were supposed to be taken. He has got sitting fee for the same. He is also holding shares of the alleged company. He had resigned from the post on 23.05.2015.
b. that accused Anil Harish was Independent Non- Executive Director of alleged company M/s Unitech and on perusal of records of alleged company, it was revealed that during 2007-2015, he obtained commission/ bonus of Rs.70 lacs along with sitting fee of Rs.2.60 lacs. Though, Independent Non-Executive Directors do not have any material pecuniary relationship or transactions with the company and appointed by the company to protect the interest of shareholders as per Section 149 of the Companies Act yet but it has been mentioned that he was participating in the meeting of board and AGMs in which all vital / policy decisions of company were supposed to be taken. He had got sitting fee for the same. He is also holding shares of the alleged company. He had resigned from the post on 23.05.2015.
c. that accused Sanjay Bahadur was Independent Non- Executive Director of alleged company M/s Unitech and on perusal of records of alleged company, it was revealed that during 2007-2015, he obtained commission/ bonus of Rs.70 lacs along with sitting fee of Rs.6.80 lacs. Though, ndependent Non- Executive Directors do not have any material pecuniary relationship or transactions with the company and appointed by the company to protect the interest of shareholders as per Section 149 of the Companies Act yet it has been mentioned that he was participating in the meetings of board and AGMs in which all vital / policy decisions of company were supposed to be taken. He had got sitting fee for the same. He is also holding shares of the alleged company. He had resigned from the post on 23.05.2015.
Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 3 of 14 d. that accused Minoti Bahri was Non-Executive Director of alleged company M/s Unitech and on perusal of records of alleged company, it was revealed that during 2007-2015, she obtained sitting fee of Rs.9 lacs for attending AGMs. Although, she had submitted that she was unconnected with the day to day management affairs, business, decision making, policy making, acquisition and sales of company yet it has been mentioned that she was participating in the meetings of board and AGMs in which all vital/ policy decisions of the company were supposed to be taken. She had got sitting fee for the same. She is also holding shares of the alleged company. She had resigned from the post on 11.12.2017.
e. that accused P. K. Mohanty was Independent Non- Executive Director of alleged company M/s Unitech and on perusal of records of alleged company, it was revealed that during 2007-2015, he obtained commission/ bonus of Rs.70 lacs along with sitting fee of Rs.5.20 lacs. Though, independent Non-Executive Directors does not have any material pecuniary relationship or transactions with the company and appointed by the company to protect the interest of shareholders as per Section 149 of the Companies Act yet it has been mentioned that he was participating in the meetings of board and AGMs in which all vital / policy decisions of company were supposed to be taken. He had got sitting fee for the same. He is also holding shares of the alleged company. He had resigned from the post on 13.08.2014.
03. Before adverting to the merits of the case, this petition is accompanied with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As per the application, there is a delay of 12 months in the filing of the revision petition. Written reply has been filed by the respondents. I have heard both the parties on the aspect of condonation of delay.
04. Ld. Addl. PP for the revisionist/State submits that there is delay of 07 months and the same has been explained. It is further argued that due to administrative reasons, the petition could not be filed within the limitation Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 4 of 14 period. It is further submitted that approval to file the revision petition was delayed as it took time in the administrative channels.
05. Per contra, Ld. Counsels for the respondents has argued that the present revision petition is hopelessly time barred and there is no sufficient cause to condone the delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is further argued that the revisionist is bound to explain the delay of each and every day by showing cogent reason and evidence. It is further argued that the only explanation offered by the petitioner is 'administrative reason', which is completely misleading and legally untenable. It is further argued that the petitioner has failed to submit any sufficient cause seeking condonation of delay and the petition deserves to be dismissed being time barred.
06. Section 5 of the Limitation Act confers discretion upon the court to condone the delay in filing the appeal, application and revision. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reads as under: -
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.-- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 5 of 14
07. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the recent judgement titled and reported as Shivamma (dead) by LRS v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. Appeal No. 11794 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019) made extensive deliberation upon the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this judgement, the Apex Court considered contrary views in different judgement and interpreted the words 'within such period'. The relevant extract of the judgement are as follows:
"40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a "sufficient cause" that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
115. However, as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of "sufficient cause" for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days."
08. In the case of the Shivamma (dead) (supra), the Apex Court further discussed the term 'sufficient cause' and lays down the principle as to what would constitute 'sufficient cause' to explain the delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in this regard are as follows:
Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 6 of 14 "119. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice -- that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. Despite the liberal approach being adopted in such matters, which was termed justifiable, this Court lamented that the message had not percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy and, accordingly, emphasis was laid on the courts adopting a liberal and justice- oriented approach. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531]
120. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse".
Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531].
122. The exceptional provision of condonation of delay on grounds of "sufficient cause" is couched as a manifestation of substantive justice. This Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, summarized the principles governing the exceptions imagined under "sufficient cause"
vis-à-vis substantive justice as under: -
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 7 of 14 for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
(Emphasis supplied)
130. The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with sufficiency of the cause. The law are independent and diverse factors. Hence the extent of delay should not determine whether the cause is sufficient or not. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length of the delay."
09. The impugned order being challenged in the present revision petition was passed on 27.03.2023 and the revision petition was filed on 16.04.2024. The petitioner is bound to explain the delay of 01 year and 19 days in filing the petition. The court may condone the delay on being Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 8 of 14 satisfied of sufficient cause for not filing the petition within the prescribed period of limitation.
10. The present revision petition has been filed by the State and the explanation for delay is stated to be administrative exigencies. The statutory time limit laid down by the Limitation Act are not mere expressions ornamentally brought on the statue book to be defied by the litigants with impunity. The State while litigating against its own citizen should act as a role model and cannot expect any privilege as a litigant in the court. This court is fortified in its opinion by the observation of the Apex Court in the case of Shivmma (supra), wherein it is observed as under:
"261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State- machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 9 of 14 inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law."
11. Illumined by the law laid down by the Apex Court in catena of judgements, adverting to the facts of this case, the impugned order was passed on 04.05.2023 in the presence of Ld. Addl. PP for the State. In the application for condonation of delay, the only explanation advanced by the petitioner is the administrative reasons. The application for condonation of delay is bereft of any details explaining the administrative exigencies or stages which led to inordinate delay in filing the petition. There is absolutely no explanation forthcoming on record explaining the delay in filing the petition. It would be unjustified to turn a naleson's eye towards the casual approach of the petitioner, ignoring a valuable right which has crystalised in favour of the respondents. The rights accrued in favour of the respondents should not be curtailed in the name of 'liberal approach'. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon H. Guruswami and Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah since deceased by LRs Civil Appeal No. 317/2025, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed herein as under:
Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 10 of 14 "13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal "substantial approach","Justice justice"should oriented not be approach", employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation.
14. We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties.
15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.
16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the herein, tenor it of the approach appears that they of want the to respondents fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation.
Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
17.We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time."
12. On careful perusal of the application for condonation of delay, the Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 11 of 14 revisionist failed to submit any cause least the sufficient cause for delay in filing the revision petition. The petitioner has completely failed to explain the delay by giving sufficient cause for the same. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, the present revision petition is hopelessly time barred and accordingly, dismissed.
13. Even on merits, Ld. Trial Court has passed a detailed reasoned order of discharge of the respondents. It is admitted that the respondents were independent non executive directors of the accused company. As per the case of the prosecution, they had participated in the meetings of Board of Directors and had obtained commission/bonus alongwith sitting fees. While discharging the accused, the Ld. Trial Court had acted within the scope of discharge under Section 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. and has discussed the law on this aspect.
14. The respondents have been chargesheeted for the offence punishable under Section 406/420/34 IPC. The factual matrix of the case is that the accused no. 1 company through its representative had given lucrative proposal to the public in a upcoming project under the name "Unitec Habitat" at Greater Noida. The accused company alleged to have induced the complainant to deposit around Rs. 70 lac and despite receiving payments, the company failed to deliver the possession of allotted space.
15. On careful perusal of the chargesheet, there is no iota of evidence as to the exact role attributed to the respondent. Apart from being the non executive directors of the company, they had no role in the commission of Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 12 of 14 the alleged offences. There is no minutes of meeting to show that the respondent had participated in the meeting in which the decision as to the present case was taken. The allegations against the respondent are general and vague in nature.
16. The Ld. Trial Court has rightly observed that the directors of a company cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of the company unless there are specific allegations as to their individual role in the alleged offence. Ld. Trial Court has discussed the law regarding the criminal liability of the directors as to the acts of the company. The Ld. Trial Court has rightly relied upon the judgements of the Apex Court as follows:
• Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 666; • Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane (2015) 12 SCC 781 &; • Sushil Sethi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 240.
17. Further, reliance may be placed upon the recent judgement of the Apex Court in the case titled and reported as Sanjay Dutta & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Anr. CRL Appeal No. 11 OF 2025 (@ SLP (Crl) No. 7464/2024), and the relevant observations in this regard are as follows:
"13. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, if the statute provides for such liability and if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening criminal liability on an Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 13 of 14 officer of a company, there is no presumption that every officer of a company knows about the transaction in question."
18. Apart from being hopelessly time barred, even on merits, the petitioner failed to point out any patent illegality/ infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and therefore, present petition is liable to be dismissed. There is no patent illegality or infirmity in the impugned order and accordingly, the revision petition stands dismissed on merits also.
19. Copy of this judgment be sent to Ld Trial Court for information.
20. Revision file be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Pawan
Kumar
Digitally signed
by Pawan Kumar
Date: 2025.11.11
16:01:50 +0530
Announced in the Open (PAWAN KUMAR)
Court on 11th November, 2025. Additional Sessions Judge-06, South, Saket Courts, New Delhi Crl Rev No. 161/2024 State v. Ravinder Singhania & ors. Page No. 14 of 14