Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Rahul Kumar vs Ndmc on 20 February, 2026
1
Court No. II
O.A. No. 4311/2024
M.A. No. 1615/2025
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 4311/2024
M.A. No. 1615/2025
Reserved on: 03.02.2026
Pronounced on: 20.02.2026
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
Rahul Kumar,
S/o Late Sh. Raj Kumar,
R/o Block F-2, House No. 381,
Shani Bazar Road, Sultanpuri,
New Delhi - 110086.
..Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Ankit Singh Sinsinwar with Mr. Ravi Kumar)
Versus
1. New Delhi Municipal Council,
Through its Chairman,
Palika Kendra, Sansad Marg,
New Delhi - 110001.
2. The Secretary,
New Delhi Municipal Council,
Palika Kendra, Sansad Marg,New Delhi - 110001.
3. Director (A & H),
New Delhi Municipal Council,
Palika Kendra, Sansad Marg,New Delhi - 110001.
4. Deputy Director,
New Delhi Municipal Council,
Palika Kendra, New Delhi - 110001.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Vaibhav Agnihotri assisted by Ms. Suruchi
Khandelwal)
ANJALI
ANJALI 2026.02.26
16:05:46+05'30'
2
Court No. II
O.A. No. 4311/2024
M.A. No. 1615/2025
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr.B.Anand, Member (A):
By way of filing of this Original Application (O.A.) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant seeks the following relief(s):
"(a) Quash and set aside the impugned termination order dated 09.08.2024, being illegal, arbitrary, stigmatic and violative of the provisions of Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 as well as the principles of natural justice;
(b) Direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant in service with continuity of service and all consequential benefits;
(c) Direct the respondents to pay arrears of salary and all admissible allowances to the applicant from the date of illegal termination till the date of reinstatement, along with all consequential benefits;
(d) Award costs of the present Original Application in favour of the applicant;
(e) Pass such other and further order(s) as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice."
2. Pursuant to notice, the respondents have filed reply and have disputed and contested the claim of the applicant. The applicant has filed rejoinder and reiterated his claim and the grounds pleaded in support thereof.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant, Rahul Kumar, entered the service of the respondents on 26.11.2009 as a 'Casual Labour' on 'Temporary Muster Roll (TMR)' basis in the Horticulture Department. In the course of his engagement, he was transferred to the Accounts Branch, where he was entrusted with clerical and computer-related functions, including digital data entry, preparation of records and typing of official documents. His engagement, like that of other TMR workers, was governed by a policy of short-term ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 3 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 employment with intermittent breaks, though he continued to render uninterrupted service in substance.
4. Pursuant to policy changes adopted by the respondents, TMR workers who had completed 500 days of service as on 31.01.2014 were granted the status of Regular Muster Roll (RMR). In terms of Order dated 25.07.2014, the applicant, having fulfilled the requisite eligibility, was conferred RMR status. While such conferment did not amount to regularisation or permanent appointment, it ensured continuity of employment without artificial breaks. The applicant continued to serve the respondents for over a decade thereafter, during which period he acquired experience, seniority and a satisfactory service record, giving rise to a legitimate expectation of stable employment.
5. On 03.05.2023, the respondents issued an appointment letter offering the applicant the post of 'Palika Sahayak (Udhyan)'. The appointment was subject to a probation period of two years and governed by the terms of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The applicant accepted the offer and joined duties on 04.05.2023. However, during his service as 'Palika Sahayak', the applicant was issued an explanation memo dated 21.12.2023, which was received by him on 02.01.2024. The memo referred to a complaint dated 26.12.2022 received by the Vigilance Department, alleging manipulation of attendance records of RMR workers in the Accounts Branch of the Horticulture Department in exchange for illegal gratification. It was alleged that the applicant, while working in the ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 4 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 Horticulture Accounts Unit and being attached with auditors, had facilitated excess wage payments to certain officials.
6. The applicant submitted a detailed reply dated 16.01.2024, categorically denying the allegations. He explained the operational framework under which salary disbursement for RMR and contractual employees had been made online since November 2020, pursuant to a departmental circular dated 13.11.2020. He clarified the division of responsibilities between himself and another official and pointed out the practical impossibility of physically verifying attendance records of several hundred workers within the limited timeframe available. The applicant further asserted that the proceedings were founded on an anonymous complaint, which was impermissible in light of the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 28.09.2022 prohibiting action on anonymous or pseudonymous complaints.
7. Despite the absence of any regular departmental inquiry and without affording the applicant an opportunity of hearing, the respondents issued a notice dated 14.06.2024 under Rule 5(1)(a) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, proposing termination of the applicant's services with one month's notice. Aggrieved by the said notice, the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 2679/2024. By order dated 12.07.2024, the Tribunal issued notice and stayed the operation of the termination order dated 14.06.2024.
8. While the stay order was in force, the respondents withdrew the termination notice dated 14.06.2024 by order dated 07.08.2024, admitting that the same was stigmatic in nature. However, ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 5 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 immediately thereafter, the respondents issued a fresh termination order dated 09.08.2024, invoking Rule 5(i) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, thereby terminating the services of the applicant forthwith.
9. Contending that the respondents had overreached the stay granted by the Tribunal, the applicant initiated contempt proceedings. Though notice was issued, the Contempt Petition was closed by the Tribunal on 12.09.2024 on the ground that the earlier termination order had been withdrawn and a fresh order had been passed. The applicant challenged the said closure before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 14008/2024. By order dated 08.10.2024, the Hon'ble High Court issued notice and made strong observations, expressing dissatisfaction with the bona fides of the respondents and observing that the withdrawal of the earlier order and issuance of the fresh termination order appeared to be an orchestrated exercise intended to overreach the Tribunal's interim protection.
10. In view of the fresh termination order dated 09.08.2024, the applicant withdrew his earlier O.A. as having been rendered infructuous and has filed the present O.A. challenging the impugned termination as illegal, arbitrary, stigmatic and contrary to the spirit and mandate of Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
11. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that, on a bare perusal of the Rule 5, it is evident that the same does not contemplate recording of any reasons while terminating the services ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 6 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 of a temporary Government servant. The scheme of Rule 5 clearly indicates that the termination envisaged therein is a termination simpliciter, without casting any stigma or attributing any misconduct to the employee. Any prudent person, upon reading the said Rule, would infer that the termination order must be innocuous in nature.
12. It was further submitted that once the termination order travels beyond a simpliciter discharge and is founded on allegations of misconduct, the same ceases to be a termination under Rule 5 and assumes the character of a punitive order, which can only be passed after holding a regular departmental inquiry in accordance with law. In the present case, the respondents, while issuing the notice dated 14.06.2024, have clearly attributed misconduct to the applicant, thereby rendering the said notice stigmatic and dehors the provisions of Rule 5. Even the subsequent order dated 09.08.2024, though couched as a simpliciter termination, is in fact founded upon the same allegations of misconduct and is merely an attempt to camouflage a punitive action as a termination simpliciter, which is impermissible in law.
13. It was argued that the entire action of the respondents has originated from a complaint dated 26.12.2022, which is an anonymous complaint. The learned counsel submitted that as per the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 28.09.2022, no action can be taken on anonymous or pseudonymous complaints. Therefore, the very foundation of the proceedings against the applicant is illegal and contrary to the binding instructions of the Government of India. ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 7 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025
14. The learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was served with an explanation memo containing serious allegations regarding manipulation of attendance and wage payments. Once such allegations were made, the respondents were required to hold a regular departmental inquiry in accordance with law. However, no inquiry was conducted, no charge sheet was issued and no opportunity of personal hearing was granted to the applicant. Instead, the respondents resorted to Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, which cannot be used as a shortcut to punish an employee for alleged misconduct.
15. It was also submitted that the earlier termination notice dated 14.06.2024 was admittedly stigmatic, as acknowledged by the respondents themselves while withdrawing the said order on 07.08.2024. The learned counsel contended that once the respondents accepted that the termination was stigmatic, they could not lawfully issue another termination order on the same set of facts by merely changing the wording. The impugned order dated 09.08.2024 is only a continuation of the earlier illegal action and is vitiated on that ground.
16. The learned counsel pointed out that during the pendency of O.A. No. 2679/2024, this Tribunal had stayed the operation of the termination order dated 14.06.2024. Despite the stay, the respondents withdrew the earlier order and issued a fresh termination order, which amounts to overreaching the orders of this Tribunal. Such conduct on the part of the respondents is arbitrary and unfair.
ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 8 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025
17. It was further submitted that the applicant has put in more than 15 years of service under the respondents, first as a TMR worker, then as an RMR worker and thereafter as a Palika Sahayak. His service record was never questioned earlier. Termination of service on the basis of unproven allegations, without holding any inquiry, has serious civil consequences and is against the principles of natural justice.
18. On these grounds, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the impugned termination order dated 09.08.2024 is liable to be quashed. It was prayed that the applicant be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits, as the respondents have misused the provisions of Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 to penalise the applicant without following due process.
19. Learned counsel further submitted that the Tribunal, in Pramod Kumar Sheel v. Union of India (O.A. No. 1387/2006), has held that once reasons such as doubtful integrity are attributed to an employee, the order ceases to be a simpliciter termination and becomes punitive in nature, thereby requiring compliance with principles of natural justice. It is submitted that in the present case also, the respondents have clearly attributed misconduct to the applicant, thereby rendering the impugned action stigmatic.
20. The applicant has also placed reliance upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
(i) Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and Another, (1984) 2 Supreme Court Cases 369.The relevant paras 14 and 15 of the said judgment read as under:-
ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 9 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 "14 The Union of India has placed before us all the relevant material including the recommendation of the Director of the National Police Academy that the appellant may be reinstated.
In this case, as stated above, explanation was called for form the appellant and other probationers. Explanations were received and all the probationers including the appellant were individually interviewed in order to ascertain facts. Explanation submitted by him and the answers give by others had weighed with the Director before making the recommendation to the Government of India on the basis of which action was taken. The only ground which ultimately prevailed upon the Director was that the appellant had not shown any sign of repentance without informing him that his case would be dealt with leniently if he showed an sign of repentance. In fact in the very first reply he gave to the Director on being asked about the incident which took place on June 22 1981, the appellant stated I sincerely regret the lapse,' Neither in the letter which the Director first wrote to the Central Government nor in the counter affidavit filed in this Court, due importance has been given to the said expression of regret and it is further seen that no additional lapse on the part of the appellant between June 22, 1981 and the date on which the Director wrote the letter to the Central Government, which would show that the appellant had not shown any sign of repentance is pointed out, although there is a reference to his reporting to duty late on an earlier date on June 1, 1981. On going through the above record before the Court and taking into account all the attendant circumstances we are satisfied that the Director wished to make the case of the appellant an example for others including those other probationers who were similarly situated so that they may learn a lesson therefrom.
15. A narration of the facts of the case leaves no doubt that the alleged act of misconduct on June 22, 1981 was the real foundation for the action taken against the appellant and that the other instances stated in the course of the counter affidavit are mere allegations which are put forward' only for purposes of strengthening the defence which is otherwise very weak. The case is one which attracted Article 311(2) of the Constitution as the impugned order amounts to a termination of service by way of punishment and an enquiry should have been held in accordance with the said constitutional provision. hat admittedly having not been done, the impugned order is liable t be struck down. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and the impugned order dated November 5, 1981 discharging the appellant from service. The appellant should now be reinstated in service with the same rank and seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order was passed as if it had not been passed at all. He is also entitled to all consequential benefits including the appropriate year of allotment and the arrears of salary and allowances upto the date of his reinstatement. The appeal is accordingly allowed." ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 10 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025
(ii) A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. and Another v. P.V. Swaminathan, (2001) 10 Supreme Court 83. The relevant para 3 of the said judgment reads as under:-
"3. The legal position is fairly well settled that an order of termination of a temporary employee or a probationer or even a tenure employee, simpliciter without casting any stigma may not be interfered with by the Court. But the Court is not debarred from looking at the attendant circumstances, namely, the circumstances prior to the issuance of the order of termination to find out whether the alleged inefficiency really was the motive for the order of termination or formed the foundation for the same order. If the Court comes to a conclusion that the order was, in fact, the motive, then obviously the order would not be interfered with; but if the Court comes to a conclusion that the so-called inefficiency was the real foundation for passing of the order of termination, then obviously such an order would be held to be penal in nature and must be interfered with since the appropriate procedure has not been followed. The decisions of this Court relied upon by Mr. K. Ram Kumar also stipulate that if an allegation of arbitrariness is made in assailing an order of termination, it will be open for the employer to indicate how and what was the motive for passing the order of termination, and it is in that sense in the counter-affidavit it can be indicated that the unsuitability of the person was the reason for which the employer acted in accordance with the terms of employment and it never wanted to punish the employee. But on examining the assertions made in paras 13 and 14 of the counter-affidavit, in the present case it would be difficult for us to hold that in the case in hand, the appellant-employer really terminated the services in accordance with the terms of employment and not by way of imposing the penalty in question."
21. Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nina Lath Gupta v. Union of India, Through Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting & Anr., reported in 2023: DHC:2944, has discussed and considered various judicial precedents including the principles laid down in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, (1999) 3 SCC 60, while examining the nature of termination orders. It was held that the real test is to ascertain ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 11 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 whether the order of termination is founded on allegations of misconduct or merely motivated by certain circumstances. The Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that if the termination is founded on misconduct, even though the order may appear innocuous on the face of it, the same would amount to a punitive and stigmatic termination.
22. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the contentions advanced by the applicant and submitted that the present O.A. is wholly misconceived, devoid of merit, and liable to be dismissed in limine.
23. It was submitted that the applicant has no enforceable right to continue in service, particularly in view of the fact that he was appointed on a purely temporary basis and was still on probation at the relevant time. The applicant was appointed as a 'Palika Sahayak(Udhyan)' vide appointment letter dated 03.05.2023, which clearly stipulated that he would remain on probation for a period of two years. The terms and conditions of appointment specifically provided that his services, being temporary in nature, were liable to be terminated at any time by giving notice under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. Having accepted these conditions, the applicant cannot now be permitted to challenge the same.
24. Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was afforded sufficient and adequate opportunity to present his case, including the grant of extension of time as sought by him vide letter dated 02.01.2024. However, the applicant has deliberately disclosed only selective portions of his submissions before the respondents ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 12 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 with an intent to mislead this Tribunal. Such conduct deserves to be viewed seriously.
25. It was further submitted that the allegations against the applicant were not based on any anonymous complaint. From the Notice dated 14.06.2024, it is evident that the vigilance department had received a complaint from a named individual, namely, Sh. Rajender Bhati. Therefore, the respondents have not acted on any anonymous complaint and have strictly adhered to the guidelines issued by the DoPT vide O.M. dated 28.09.2022. The action taken is founded upon a duly identified complaint and not on any anonymous source.
26. Learned counsel submitted that, as reflected in the Notice dated 14.06.2024, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the vigilance department vide U.O. Note No. 817/Vig./Imp./F. No. 316/IOV-II(S)/2024 dated 20.05.2024. It was only upon such enquiry that certain acts of omission and commission on the part of the applicant came to light.
27. It was further submitted that the applicant, while working as Palika Sahayak (Udhyan), failed to discharge his duties in accordance with the oath undertaken at the time of his appointment, thereby justifying the action taken by the respondents.
28. Learned counsel submitted that the respondents have strictly followed due procedure while terminating the services of the applicant. The applicant was initially issued a notice dated 14.06.2024 and was afforded an opportunity to submit his reply. The ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 13 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 reply submitted by the applicant was duly considered by the competent authority. Thereafter, in order to address the concerns raised by the applicant, the respondents withdrew the earlier notice dated 14.06.2024 and issued a fresh order dated 09.08.2024, which is a termination simpliciter under Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
29. However, the explanation furnished by the applicant was found to be unsatisfactory. It is well settled that an employer is entitled to assess the suitability of an employee during the period of probation and to discontinue his services if he is found unsuitable. The applicant, being a probationer, has no vested right to continue in service, and the respondents are well within their rights to terminate his services in accordance with the applicable rules.
30. Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned order dated 09.08.2024 is a non-stigmatic and innocuous order, which does not contain any allegation or imputation against the applicant. The said order merely terminates the services of the applicant in terms of Rule 5 and does not cast any stigma. Therefore, the contention of the applicant that the termination is stigmatic in nature is wholly misconceived and liable to be rejected.
31. It was also submitted that the earlier notice dated 14.06.2024 no longer survives, having been withdrawn by the respondents. Accordingly, the applicant cannot rely upon the contents of the withdrawn notice to assail the validity of the subsequent order dated 09.08.2024. The present challenge is confined only to the order dated ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 14 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 09.08.2024, which is a valid termination simpliciter passed in accordance with Rule 5(i) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. Learned counsel submitted that it is a settled position of law that a probationer can be discharged from service if his performance is found unsatisfactory, and such discharge does not amount to punishment, provided the order is not stigmatic. In the present case, the impugned order being simpliciter, no inquiry was required to be conducted.
32. It was further submitted that the applicant has misinterpreted the order dated 12.07.2024 passed by this Tribunal. The said order merely stayed the notice dated 14.06.2024 and did not grant any blanket stay on termination. Therefore, the issuance of the fresh order dated 09.08.2024 cannot be said to be in violation of the said order or an attempt to overreach the Tribunal.
33. Learned counsel also submitted that the contempt proceedings initiated by the applicant were subsequently closed by this Tribunal, which itself demonstrates that no case of contempt or illegality is made out against the respondents.
34. To buttress the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 520, and of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in State Bank of Travancore v. Prem Singh, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8258, to contend that where a termination order is couched in innocuous terms and is not stigmatic on the face of it, it would amount to termination simpliciter, and the ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 15 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 Court/Tribunal is not required to go behind the order to examine the motive, unless the order itself casts a stigma or is founded on allegations of misconduct.
35. The learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon the order/judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal, in which one of us [Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)] was a Member, in OA No. 1879/2017 titled Virender v.Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in Vijay Raj v. Union of India, Writ-A No. 63968 of 2005, decided on 05.03.2020. In the said decision, the Hon'ble High Court, after considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions, including several Constitution Bench judgments, has held in paragraphs 61 and 62 as follows:
"61. From the above discussions, the principles discernible to find out whether a simple order of termination/discharge of a temporary employee or probationer is punitive or not, broadly, may be stated as under:
(a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
(b) An order of termination simpliciter prima facie is not a punishment and carries no evil consequences.
(c) Where termination simpliciter is challenged on the ground of casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance the order itself to find out whether it casts any stigma and can be said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simpliciterness of the said order.
(d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, make it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or attending, show only the motive of the employer to ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 16 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 terminate, it being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found that the order is founded on such act or omission constituting misconduct.
(e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the employee was a mere probationer or temporary.
(f) 'Motive' and 'foundation' are distinct, though the distinction is either very thin or overlapping. 'Motive' is the moving power which impels action for a definite result; or to put it differently, 'motive' is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act.
'Foundation', however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the employee. When his acts and omissions treated to be misconduct, proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation.
(g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal; but if it falls short of it, it would not.
(h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish to bother about it, and instead of going into the correctness of guilt, feels like not to keep the employee and thus terminates him, it is simpliciter termination and not punitive.
(i) Where the termination simpliciter is preceded by an enquiry, preliminary or regular, the Court would see the purpose, object of such enquiry as also the stage at which the order of termination has been passed.
(j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating a probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive.
(k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry would not render termination punitive.
(l) Where the employer holds a formal enquiry to find out the correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and proceeds on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive and cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee.
(m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not pursued to the end, and instead a simple order of termination is passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would be immaterial and such an order would be non- punitive.
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(n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide, if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the Court, that would not make the order founded on any misconduct.
(o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The following words mentioned in the order have not been held to be punitive:
(i) want of application, (ii) lack of potential, (iii) found not dependable, (iv) under suspension, (v) work is unsatisfactory,
(vi) unlikely to prove an efficient officer.
(p) Description of background facts also have not been held to be stigmatic.
(q) However, the words "undesirable to be retained in Government service" have been held stigmatic.
(r) If there is (i) a full-scale formal enquiry, (ii) allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct, and (iii) a finding of guilt, where all these three factors are present, the order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form. However, if any one of these three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive.
62. The aforesaid are not exhaustive but lay down some of the principles to find out whether termination of an employee is simpliciter or punitive. Each and every case has to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, but broadly the aforesaid are the factors to find out whether termination of an employee is punitive or not." to contend that in appropriate circumstances, the competent authority is justified in dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India where it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry.
36. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the reliance placed by the applicant upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in Nina Lath Gupta (supra) is wholly misconceived and misplaced. On the contrary, the respondents seek to rely upon ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 18 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said judgment, wherein the Hon'ble High Court has categorically reiterated the settled legal position that the power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India can be validly exercised in cases where the competent authority, on the basis of relevant material available on record, arrives at a satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry.
37. It has further been held that such satisfaction of the disciplinary authority is entitled to due weight and cannot be lightly interfered with by the Court/Tribunal in exercise of its power of judicial review, unless the same is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or based on no material.
38. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance have carefully gone through the pleadings available on records.
39. The legal position governing termination of a probationer is well settled. While it is true that the services of a probationer or temporary employee may be terminated by way of a simpliciter order without holding a formal inquiry, it is equally settled that where such termination is founded on allegations of misconduct, the order assumes a punitive character. In such cases, compliance with the principles of natural justice is mandatory.
40. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Anoop Jaiswal (supra) has held that where misconduct constitutes the foundation of the order, the termination is punitive in nature. Similarly, in A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra), it has been held that even if ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 19 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 an order appears innocuous on its face, the Court is entitled to examine the surrounding circumstances to ascertain its true nature. The distinction between "motive" and "foundation" has also been consistently emphasized in judicial pronouncements.
41. Applying these principles to the present case, it is evident that the applicant was issued an explanation memo containing serious allegations of misconduct, and a vigilance inquiry was conducted in that regard. The earlier notice dated 14.06.2024 was admittedly withdrawn by the respondents on the ground that it was stigmatic. The subsequent order dated 09.08.2024 has been issued on the same set of facts.
42. In such circumstances, merely altering the language of the order does not change its true character. The Tribunal is entitled to look beyond the form of the order and examine the attendant circumstances. The sequence of events clearly indicates that the termination of the applicant is not based on mere unsuitability but is founded on allegations of misconduct.
43. Once it is found that the termination is founded on misconduct, the order becomes punitive in nature. Such an order cannot be sustained without conducting a proper departmental inquiry and affording the applicant a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Admittedly, no such inquiry has been conducted in the present case.
44. The action of the respondents in withdrawing the earlier stigmatic notice and issuing a fresh order on the same allegations ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 20 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 also indicates an attempt to circumvent the legal requirements. Such a course of action cannot be countenanced.
45. Moreover, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents upon the judgments in Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra) and State Bank of Travancore (supra) is misplaced and does not advance their case. In the said judgments, the Hon'ble Courts were dealing with cases of termination simpliciter, where the orders were found to be innocuous on the face of it and not founded upon any specific allegations of misconduct. The law laid down therein is that where the order is not stigmatic and the misconduct is merely the motive and not the foundation of the order, no inquiry is required.
46. However, in the present case, the impugned action is clearly founded upon allegations of misconduct, and the respondents have relied upon specific imputations against the applicant. The material on record demonstrates that the termination is not a simpliciter discharge but is punitive in nature. Thus, the foundation of the impugned order is misconduct, and not merely motive, thereby attracting the protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the respondents cannot take shelter under the aforesaid judgments, which are clearly distinguishable on facts as well as in law.
47. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that the impugned order dated 09.08.2024, though couched in innocuous terms, is in substance punitive, having been founded on allegations ANJALI ANJALI 2026.02.26 16:05:46+05'30' 21 Court No. II O.A. No. 4311/2024 M.A. No. 1615/2025 of misconduct. The same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and is therefore unsustainable in law.
48. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 09.08.2024 is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the applicant in service as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The applicant shall be entitled to consequential benefits in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions on the subject. However, it shall be open to the respondents to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, in accordance with law, if so advised.
49. The present O.A. is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms.
50. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
51. Pending MA(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) (Member (J)
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