Allahabad High Court
Ashok Singhal vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 1 February, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005CRILJ2324
Author: Amar Saran
Bench: Amar Saran
ORDER Amar Saran, J.
1. Heard Shri R. P. Goyal assisted by Shri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the applicant, Shri N.I. Jafri, learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 2 and learned Additional Government Advocate representing the State and perused the application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and the affidavit filed in support thereof, counter affidavit filed by opposite party No. 2 and the written argument filed on behalf of the applicant.
2. This application has been filed for quashing criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 106 of 1990, Khurshidur Rahman v. Sri Ashok Singhal, pending in the Court of IV Judicial Magistrate, Aligarh and the order dated 27-2-1990 passed by the IV Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance against the applicant under Sections 108, 153A, 153B, 295, 298 and 501, IPC.
3. The allegations in the complaint dated 5-6-1989 were that an article appeared in the weekly news magazine "Panchjanya" on 30-4-1989, which carried an interview of Ashok Singhal, General Secretary of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the offending portion of which read : "Aray Bhai Dangay Fasad Kama To Musalmano Ki Rojana Ki Kasrat Hai. Jis Tarah Hum Log Subah Uthkar Vyayam Kartay Hai Na Theek Usi Turah Yeh Log Dangay Kartay Hai. Insay Darta Kaun Hai. Aray Unki To Quran Bhee Dangay Ki Shiksha Daytee Hai. Quran Kay Anusar Ramzan kay Mahinay Ko Chhor Ker Baki Sab Mahino May Katl Kerna Jayaz Hai. Per Ab To Musalman Ramzan May Bhee Apni Harkat Say Baaz Nahim Aata. Ekkeeswi Shatabdi May Sah-Astitva Kee Bhumika Kay Prakash May Unhay quran Ki Kuchh Aayto Ki Punarvyakhya Karni Chhaihay."
4. Translated the statement is as follows:
"Oh brother indulging in riot is the daily exercise of the Muslims. In the same manner as we do exercise in the morning, in that very manner these persons indulge in riots. Who is afraid of them. Even their quran imparts lesson of indulging in rioting. According to the Quran, except the month of Ramzan, it is legitimate to commit murders in other months, but now even in the month of Ramzan the Muslims are not abstaining from this exercise on their part. On the basis of the principle of mutual co-existence, in the 21st Century, some of the Verses in the Quran need to be recast."
5. According to the complainant, he was a peace loving person and a follower of the Muslim religion of which Quran was the sacred text, whose sacred character was to be preserved by all Muslims and as a consequence of the applicant's interview in the 'Panchjanya', which was published from Delhi, which describes members of his community as rioters and murderers and denounces their sacred text, the Quran, great mental pain was caused to the complainant and his religious feelings were outraged.
6. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint and after examining the complainant under Section 200, Cr. P.C. and his witnesses Amiruddin and Munnawwar Ali under Section 202, Cr. P.C. and the documentary materials, which consisted of the interview as published in the weekly 'Panchjanya' and the report of the S.S.P., Aligarh (Exts. Ka 5 and Ka 6), the learned Magistrate summoned the applicant, who was the General Secretary of the Vishwa Hindu Parished and Ram Janam Bhoomi Samiti, Mukesh Kaushik, Journalist in the said weekly, Hem Das Kotwani, Printer and Publisher of the said weekly and Ram Shanker, the Chief Editor of 'Panchjanya' by the order dated 27-2-90.
7. The Court observed that prima facie the impugned interview hurt the religious feelings of the complainant and his co-religionists and acted as a negative influence by tending to promote enmity between different religious communities, and was prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony and the cause of national integration. Words which were derogatory and including of the religion of a particular community, or meant to hurt their religious feelings were spoken, and even after being conscious of the fact that the words were defamatory of the Muslims, they were allowed to be published.
8. The first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant is that as the interview was given by the applicant in Delhi, the Judicial magistrate at Aligarh had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
9. In this connection, the words of Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, make the jurisdiction of a Court to take cognizance of an offence where it is committed or its consequences experienced explicit, and the same may be usefully perused :
"179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.-- when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued."
10. Now clearly an interview to a weekly with a known All India circulation which is given in Delhi, is bound to result in consequences wherever it is read and in such circumstances there is no substance in the argument of the applicant's counsel that the interview was given only at a particular place and the accused had not authorized its publication elsewhere. An interview which is given to a magazine with an All India circulation will give rise to consequences wherever it is read, and if the averments give rise to a criminal offence, the same could be inquired into or tried by the Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing was done, i.e. the place where the interview was given (Delhi) or where the consequence ensued. Hence if the consequences were experienced in Aligarh, there would be no bar on the Magistrate at Aligarh to take cognizance in the matter.
11. In this connection, it has been clearly held in the case of S. Bangarappa v. Ganesh Narayan Hegde, 1984 Cri LJ 1618 (Kant), that the offence of defamation consists not only of the statement said to have been made, but also its publication. The publication is a consequence of the alleged statement by the accused. Therefore, the Court which would have jurisdiction must be the Court where the act has been done or where the consequence has ensued. If a defamatory statement is published first at one place and then at another place in another paper, the Court of the second place will have jurisdiction in the matter.
12. Similarly, in the case of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Prabhakar S. Pai, 1984 Cri LJ 1329 (Bombay), it was mentioned that where the Indian Express in which the offending news items was published was circulated and read was the city of Bombay where the complainant resided, the consequences of the statement made at Chandigarh had been completed at Bombay by circulation of the said newspaper, and therefore, the offence of defamation was completed in the city of Bombay. In this view of the matter, the Courts both at Chandigah and Bombay would have the jurisdiction to entertain the complained under Section 500, IPC.
13. In the case of P. Lankesh v. H. Shivappa, (1995) 4 Crimes 506 : (1994 Cri LJ 3510) (Kant.), it has been held that where the newspaper containing the imputation is published at one place and sold at other places, Courts at such other places will also have jurisdiction to try the offence of defamation.
14. In the case of State of Punjab v. Nohar Chand, AIR 1984 SC 1492, it has been held by the Apex Court that if manufacturing substandard fertilizer is by itself an offence and marketing the sub-standard product is a distinct offence, but as they are so interconnected as cause and effect, both can be tried at one or the other place. In that situation, therefore, in view of Sections 179 and 180, Cr. P.C., there would be no fetter on prosecuting the manufacturer wherefrom the marketing agent of the manufacturer of the fertilizer, which is found to be sub-standard, is prosecuted for marketing the substandard fertilizer and the Court where the sub-standard fertilizer was marketed will have the jurisdiction to try both.
15. In Trisuns Chemicals Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686 : (AIR 1999 SC 3499), it has been held that the Magistrate taking cognizance of offence need not have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well, and any Judicial Magistrate of the First Class has power to take cognizance of any offence whether committed in his jurisdiction or not the provisions of Sections 177 and 179 Cr. P.C. do not trammel the power of any Court to take cognizance of the offence. It is only after taking cognizance, the Magistrate may decide as to the Court which has jurisdiction to inquire into and try the offence and that situation would reach only at the post-cognizance stage and not earlier. In paragraph 15 of the said law report, the Apex Court observed that the High Court without considering any of the aforesaid legal aspects rushed to the erroneous conclusion that the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Gandhidham has no power to take cognizance of the offences alleged, merely because such offences could have been committed outside the territorial limits of the State of Gujarat. Even otherwise, without being apprised of the fuller conspectus a decision on the question of Jurisdiction should not have been taken by the High Court at a grossly premature stage as this.
16. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that the Magistrate at Aligarh lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance in this case.
17. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that mens rea is absent in this case for the offences for which the applicant has been arraigned, as the applicant had simply offered bona Ode and fair criticism of the followers of another religion and its tenets, and in any case his criticism was directed at the fanatical section of the Muslim community.
18. In this regard, it may be mentioned that if allegations are made in a press interview describing the members of the Muslim community as persons whose daily exercise was to indulge in rioting and to commit murders, which activity is said to be sanctified by their sacred text which according to the interviewer requires amendment in the light of the conditions in the 21st Century, such allegations are prima facie likely to result in generating feelings of hatred or ill will between members of different religious communities and such words may be prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony and national integration.
19. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that only fanatic Muslims were being denounced as the question posed by the interviewer was as to what would happen if finatical Muslims incited Muslims to create impediments to the creation of the Ram Temple, the reply had been given to this question, and thus should be understood to refer to Mulsim fanatics only.
20. I do not think that on a bare reading of the offending words in the complaint quoted above, a distinction is sought to be made between fanatic and non-fanatic Muslims, as the reference in the impugned reply by the applicant appears to be to Muslims in general, and not to a particular section amongst the Muslim population. The reply of the applicant is to the effect that it is the dally exercise of the Muslims to indulge in riots and to commit murders (without distinguishing between fanatic and non-fanatic Muslims) which is also prescribed in their Quran, which is said to legitimize murders in months other than the period of Ramzan, but nowadays Muslims are said to engage in murders even in this period, and some 'Ayats' of their Quran need to be rewritten in the light of the conditions in the 21st Century. In any case, it would be for the applicant to show at the trial of the case by leading appropriate evidence or material that he was not intending to say anything derogatory or to promote ill will or hatred towards all Muslims, but only with respect of certain class of Muslims, or that he was making a legitimate and Justifiable criticism against the Muslims or their holy book. In any case as these questions require appreciation of facts, which pertain to the defence of the applicant, they cannot be considered in an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C., which is only confined to considering the nature of allegations against the accused and whether prima facie they disclose a criminal offence or whether a legal bar for taking cognizance exists or whether there is a complete want of evidence so that allowing the criminal prosecution to proceed may amount to an abuse of the process of Court.
21. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the case of Lalai Singh Yadav v. State of U. P., 1971 Cri LJ 1773 (FB). In that case an application was being considered under Section 99B of Code of Criminal Procedure by the High Court for quashing of the State Government's order forfeiting a book titled "Samman Ke Liye Dharam Parivartan Karen". The State Government had forfeited the book as it had held that the said book was an insult to Hinduism and promoted disharmony amongst different castes and was punishable under Section 395A, IPC. The Court had held that the said book basically denounced the practice of untouchability, which has been condemned by no less a person than Mahatma Gandhi himself. In this context the Court observed as follows (at p. 1775 of Cri LJ) : "But when we are judging the book, it is important that we should bear in mind its underlying purpose, which is to draw the attention of the scheduled castes to the unfair disabilities imposed on them by the practices and customs of the Hindu religion in its Brahminical form and to persuade them to give up Hinduism and adopt Buddhism instead. Rational criticism of religious tenets; couched in restrained language cannot amount to an offence either under Section 153A or under Section 295A of the Penal Code. And criticism of the Hindu religion for its inculcation of the doctrine of untouchability and for the sanction which it has given to reprehensible treatment meted out to the lower castes has of recent years been considered perfectly legitimate, having been sponsored by no less a person than Mahatma Gandhi himself."
22. Furthermore, it is significant to note that the said decision was given in proceedings under Section 99-B of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (which corresponds with Section 96 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), where any person having any interest for challenging a declaration of forfeiture of a written text made by the State Government under Section 95 of Cr. P.C. (present Code) may file an application before the Special Bench of the High Court of three Judges for having the said declaration set aside. Thereafter, the High Court may pass an order maintaining or setting aside the declaration of forfeiture after receiving evidence in that respect from the parties. The proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. on the other hand are very limited and it is only to be seen therein whether a prima facie case was disclosed. No meticulous examination of the evidence or examination of the defence cases is permissible at this stage.
23. Another case cited by learned counsel for the applicant, Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 was a case where after the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the appellants, who were petty government functionaries had raised slogans of "Khalistan Zindabad" and "Raj Karega Khalsa" etc. However, the Apex Court had set aside the conviction of the appellants by holding that the appellants had only raised three slogans casually a couple of times and there was no evidence to show that their intention was to cause disorder or to incite the people to violence, no reaction from the public had been evoked and mens rea appeared to be absent on the facts of that case. In fact the Supreme Court observed that the police official had exhibited lack of maturity and more of sensitivity in arresting the appellants for raising the slogans, which arrest, and not the casual raising of one or two slogans could have proved more detrimental for maintaining law and order, keeping in view the tense situation prevailing on the date of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi. The present case is not one where petty functionaries have casually raised a few slogans in an impulsive manner on the streets, but where the leader of a responsible organization has given an interview to a Weekly with an All India circulation, and categorically denounced members of the Muslim community and their Holy Book in a thought out and considered manner.
24. Also as mentioned above, Balwant Singh case, (AIR 1995 SC 1785) (supra) was a case of an appeal from the judgment of the Courts below convicting the appellants under Sections 124A and 153, IPC where evidence was led from both sides and a decision was given on a detailed consideration of the merits of the matter by the trial Court and the appellate Court. The scope under Section 482, Cr. P.C. as pointed out above is very limited.
25. The third case referred by the learned counsel is Kamla Kant Singh v. Chairman Managing Director, Bennet, Colman and Company Limited, 1987 All LJ 1508, where a learned single Judge of this Court had refused to set aside the order passed by the Magistrate concerned refusing to issue process against the Chairman/Managing Director of the "Dinman" weekly, its Printer, Publisher, Editor, Assistant Editor for an article which was published in the "Dinman" weekly titled "Satsang Nagar Jahan Dharm Ke Nam Per Apradhdon Ki Kheti Hoti Hai", for which only the writer and author Shri Ved Prakash Vajpayee had been summoned. Significantly, in that case the author had only been summoned under Sections 295A and 298, IPC and not under Sections 120B and 153B, IPC.
26. In that case certain allegations had been made against the followers of the religious institution situated at Deoghar where "Satsang" was carried out to the effect that one Mahru Verrna was killed at the instance of some criminals who used to take shelter in that Ashram, and that one Jogeshwar Ojha, a servant of the Ashram was also killed and there was molestation of a minor daughter of one Shankar Mahto. That one Barda married thrice and it was even reported that he had married his step sister and there were certain other similar allegations against the institution.
27. The Court observed that what has been made punishable Under Section 298, IPC, is uttering words with deliberate intention to wound religious feelings and it could not be said that so far as the opposite parties other than the author were concerted, they had any intention to wound the religious feelings with the deliberate intention of publishing the said article. Furthermore, the position when the Court has passed an order refusing to issue process against certain accused by holding that no prima facie case is disclosed against them and the same is challenged in a criminal revision, stands on a different footing from a case where the order of a Magistrate issuing process against an accused is challenged, as no such right of having the complaint against him dismissed has accrued to the accused in the latter case.
28. In the present case, the position of the applicant who was the author of the alleged interview in question, would be more akin to Shri Ved Prakash Vajpayee, the author of the news item in the "Dinman" who had been summoned in the case of Kamla Kant Singh (1987 All LJ 1508) (supra), and the validity of whose prosecution was not even challenged in the said case.
29. Significantly, in the present case the most sacred text of the Muslims, their Holy Quran, has been assailed by the applicant as not being consistent with the requirement of the 21st Century. In this connection, it has been stated by the framers of the IPC that the object of Section 298 of the IPC was that whilst permitting religious discussion, it was to be ensured that no intentional insults were to be cast on what was held sacred by others. The object and reasons for framing the said clause may usefully be extracted here :
"In framing this clause we had two objects in view : We wish to allow all fair latitude to religious discussion and at the same time to prevent the professors of any religion from offering, under the pretext of such discussion intentional insults to what is held sacred by others. We do not conceive that any person can be justified in wounding with deliberate intention the religious feelings of his neighbours by words, gestures or exhibitions. A warm expression dropped in the heat of controversy, or an argument urged by any person, not for the purpose of insulting and annoying the professors of a different creed, but in good faith for the purpose of vindicating his own, will not fall under the definition contained in this clause."
30. The interview given by an accused person to a journal, which has wide circulation cannot be said to be 'a warm expression dropped in the heat of controversy' or an argument urged by any person, not for the purpose of insulting and annoying the professors of a different creed, but in the good faith for the purpose of vindicating his own, especially if it has even proceeded to denounce what the followers of the other religion consider their most 'sacred' and inviolable text.
31. The final point raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that no sanction has been obtained under Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the Central Government or State Government, which was a sine qua non for prosecuting an accused under Sections 153A, 153B and 295A or for an abetment to commit the aforesaid offences under Section 108A, IPC. However, from a perusal of the pleadings of this case, I find that this point has not even been raised anywhere in the application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. or in the affidavit filed in support thereof, hence this point whether any sanction existed or was required to be obtained cannot be considered in this application under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
32. In this view of the matter, there is no force in this application and it is accordingly dismissed.
33. As the proceedings in this case have remained stayed since 12-12-1990, the trial Court is now directed to proceed with the trial of the case and to decide the case within six months, if possible.
34. The trial Court is, however, directed to decide the trial on merits uninfluenced by the observations which have been made hereinabove for the purpose of disposal of this application