Karnataka High Court
Ankappa vs Management Of K.S.R.T.C. Bangalore on 29 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: ILR1996KAR3050, 1996(7)KARLJ264
Author: Tirath S. Thakur
Bench: Tirath S. Thakur
ORDER Tirath S. Thakur, J.
1. These Writ Petitions raise a common question of law and are therefore being disposed of by this common order.
2. The petitioners are employees of the Respondent-Corporation who have suffered orders of punishment on the basis of chargesheets served upon them alleging acts of omissions and commission amounting to misconduct. Aggrieved, by the said order, they have come up with these petitions, assailing the same on precisely speaking two grounds. Firstly it is urged that the orders imposing punishments have been passed by the Respondent-Corporation under the provisions of the K.S.R.T.C. (C & D) Regulations 1971 framed under Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, which according to the petitioners are not applicable to them as they are governed by the standing orders framed under Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946. A similar question as to the applicability of the Standing Orders under the Act aforesaid to the employees of the Respondent-Corporation fell for consideration of this Court in W.P.No. 12417 - 22/92 and connected matters disposed of on 11th March 1996. This Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of the Standing Orders Act stood excluded in terms of Section 13B thereof in their application to the employees of the Corporation. It was further held that the employees of the Corporation were governed by the Statutory Service Regulations referred to earlier. Following the said decision and for the reasons stated therein the first ground of attack urged in these petitions must fail and is accordingly rejected.
3. Mr. Naik, Learned Counsel appearing for petitioner next submitted that each one of the orders issued by the Respondent-Corporation against the petitioners was without any enquiry into the charges framed against them. He urged that an order of punishment passed without the conduct of proper enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the chargesheet was violative of the principles of natural justice besides being contrary to the provisions of the Regulations. There is considerable merit in this submission. In terms of Regulation 22 of the Regulations mentioned above, a minor penalty like the one imposed upon the petitioners in these cases, could be imposed only after informing the employees concerned in writing of the proposal to take action against them and of the imputations of misconduct and misbehaviour on which it was proposed to be taken and giving to them reasonable opportunity of making such representation as they may wish to make against the proposal. Clause-3 of Regulation 22 further requires that any such penalty could be imposed only after an enquiry into the matter was conducted in accordance with Regulation 22(3) of the said Regulations, except in cases where the Disciplinary Authority may be of the opinion that conduct of such an enquiry was unnecessary. In other words, before even a minor penalty could be imposed it is obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to consider the question of holding or dispensing with an enquiry into the allegations made against the delinquent employees. An enquiry would become unnecessary only in case the Disciplinary Authority considered it to be so and recorded its opinion in express terms on the said issue. Needless to say that while considering any such question of either holding or dispensing with an enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority was bound to consider in a fair and objective manner not only the nature of the charges levelled against the employees but also the nature of the defence set up by him.
4. In the instant case however, the Respondents have not been able to demonstrate that the Disciplinary Authority had actually applied its mind to the question of either holding or dispensing with the conduct of the enquiry into the allegations made against the petitioners. Neither the order of punishment issued by the Respondents nor any other record for that matter demonstrates either application of mind on the part of the Disciplinary Authority or a conscious decision to dispense with the holding of an enquiry, looking to the nature of the allegations made in the chargesheets. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority had palpalably failed in the discharge of the obligation case upon it under Regulation 22-B and in proceeding to impose a punishment without recording a finding that the holding of an enquiry was unnecessary. The impugned orders are thus unsustainable and have therefore to be quashed.
5. Before parting however I cannot help observing that the Disciplinary Authorities exercising powers under the provisions of the Regulations mentioned above, have been found to be rather cavalier in their approach towards what is otherwise a very important matter from the point of view of the employees concerned. I have hardly come across a case where the Disciplinary Authority has been shown to have applied its mind properly to the question, of holding or dispensing with an enquiry in terms of Regulation 22-B. The result is that all such orders passed without holding an enquiry even though upheld by the Appellate Authorities in some case have been quashed and fresh orders directed to be passed on the subject. This attitude on the part of the Disciplinary Authority has continued despite repeated pronouncements from this Court over the past more than five years, beginning with the judgment of this Court in B.L. LINGAIAH v. THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, KSRTC, HASSAN AND ORS., W.P.No. 11420/1982: DD 6.2.1992, where this Court observed thus:-
"The enquiry referred to in Regulation 22(1)(b) is the enquiry stated in Regulation 23 which prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalties. Regulation 23(1)(b) in my opinion does not vest an absolute discretionary power of dispensing with the enquiry by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority will have to consider the seriousness of the charges and the possibility of a higher penalty though referred as a minor penalty being imposed on the delinquent. As a matter of course he cannot proceed to impose a penalty without holding an enquiry mechanically acting under Section 22(1)(b). Before selecting the procedure, there should be an objective approach to the facts of the case. In the instant case there is nothing to indicate that the disciplinary authority applied his mind and formed his opinion as to whether enquiry should be held or not. It looks to me that the disciplinary authority acted machanically under Regulation 22(1)(b) and proceeded to impose the penalty without following the procedure stated in Regulation 23, which is the proper Regulation governing the enquiry. On this ground alone the impugned orders are liable to be set aside."
The pronouncement of this Court notwithstanding the Disciplinary Authorities have continued to act mechanically without due regard to the requirement of the Regulations resulting in avoidable and unnecessary litigation in this Court and protracted proceedings for years even in matters which should and ought to have been satisfactorily settled if only the authorities had not remained oblivious of the letter and spirit of the provisions in question. I therefore consider this to be a fit case in which appropriate directions ought to be issued to prevent recurrence of similar orders in future. Such directions would in my opinion not only help reducing unnecessary litigation but also enable this Court to come down heavily in future in case it comes across cases of similar nature.
6. In the result, I allow these Writ Petitions; quash the orders impugned but reserve liberty to the Respondents to pass fresh orders in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made herein-above. I further direct that the Chairman and the Managing Director of the Respondent-Corporation shall issue appropriate instructions consistent with the view taken by this Court directing the Disciplinary Authorities to pass orders in future after due and proper application of their mind in particular to the provisions of the Regulation 22-B in so far as the same pertains to the holding or dispensing the conduct of an enquiry in each one of the cases dealt with by them. The needful shall in this connection be done by the Chairman of the Corporation within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
7. A copy of this order shall be furnished to Mr. V. Lakshminarayan, Standing Counsel for the Corporation for compliance of the above directions.
8. Mr. Rao is permitted to file his Vakalath if not already filed within 4 weeks.